Indonesia

on the World Today

WHAT is the United Stales to do when the implications of its foreign policy in one part of the world apparently conflict with the inescapable requirements of policy in another region? This is the dilemma posed by Indonesia. For in Europe, the United States is committed to programs— the Marshall Plan, Western Union, the North Atlantic Pact — in which the Netherlands will receive its share of U.S. aid. And in Indonesia, the experience of nearly four years of turmoil points to the necessity for working against the Netherlands and with the forces of nationalism and social change re [iresen tod by the Indonesian Republic, in order to bring durable peace to the archipelago.

Until the Dutch police action of December 19, 1948, the Republic was the strongest prospective member of the projected I’nited States of Indonesia (U.S.I). Its leaders, Soekarno, Hat la, and Sjahrir, ha ve been t he act ive heads of t luorganized lint ionalist movement for over twenty years. With these names, and the symbol represented by the Republican government, even the inarticulate rice grower in Java and Sumatra is familiar. As the American delegate, Dr. Philip C. Jessup, recently declared at a session of lhe Security Council, “The Republic is the heart of Indonesian nationalism.”

Since its declaration of independence on August 17, 1945, the Republic has made mistakes. It has. as the Dutch allege, been unwilling or unable to prevent irregular armed bands — originally trained for guerrilla warfare by the Japanese, and later absorbed into the Republican army — from committing terrorism against elements of the population suspected of collusion with the Dutch. The Republic’s defense has been that the activity ol these bands has been due to resent incut against Dutch intransigence in the political negotiations, and the growing strength of Dutch forces in occupied areas.

The Republic also made the mistake of allowing Communist elemenls within the government lo grow and arm, with the result that the Communists set up a “soviet regime” in Fast Java in September, 1948. By the end of October, the revolt was effectives quelled In vigorous Republican action.

Yet, despite these obstacles, the Republic has managed, during its turbulent early years, to achieve the beginnings of positive reform and progress. A parliamentary government, based on independent political part it’s of Right, Center, and Left, was established and maintained. The Central Organization of Indonesian Labor grew to over a million members. Internal banking facilities for agrarian and small business credit were established. Education was expanded to raise the 7 per cent literacy rate. Road building and bridge construction were begun by the Ministry of Public Works, with the meager resources available.

Diplomatic and commercial relations were established with the United States, Britain, the Middle East, India, Singapore, Siam, the Philippines, Australia, and the United Nations.

To some extent, such generalizations overstate the case, for in many instances these measures lacked thoroughness, proper equipment, and adequate administration. Nevertheless, as the record of a young government under extreme duress, the Republic’s first years were highly creditable.

Controlled freedom for the Indonesians

What, then, lay behind the Dutch military action against the Republic? Before the Dutch took action the Netherlands and the Republic had reached basic agreement on many of the issues that had originally divided them. The negotiations dealt with the Republic’s status as a member stale in the U.S.I.; the continued sovereignty of the Dutch crown while an interim U.S.I. was organized; the transfer of full independence to the U.S.I. within one year thereafter; partnership between the Netherlands anti the U.S.I. in the NetherlandsIndonesian Union.

The Dutch action was not due to any specific issue. It was due to the tacit conviction that in “backward" Indonesia freedom can be reconciled with order only through continued control by the Netherlands, either formally in terms of “sovereignty” or informally through Dutch influence and a Dutch civil service. The Republic stands for the contrary proposition that while aid and advice from outside are welcome and necessary, freedom — to be meaningful must be worked out by the Indonesian people through their indigenous institutions.

These opposing concepts have separated the two parties throughout the protracted negotiations of the past four years. They were as germane to the first Dutch police action in July, 1947, as they were in December, 1948.

Asia backs Indonesia

In a sense, the Republic’s altitude represents a theme of dominant importance in all Asia today. Almost without exception, the nations of the Middle Hast, Southern and Eastern Asia, and the Philippines have been sufficiently close to colonialism to be extremely hostile to the Dutch position and sympathetic to lhat of the Republic. The New Delhi Conference of nineteen Asian states (including Australia and New Zealand) in January, 1949, bore witness to this fact.

Called by the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, the conference condemned the Dutch action and called upon the United Nations Security Council to restore the Republican administration, to arrange for the withdrawal of Dutch troops, and to establish a timetable for achieving independence in Indonesia. The application of economic sanctions in case of Dutch failure to comply was also discussed at New Delhi.

The growing importance and influence of the new Asia in world affairs was clearly attested by the Security Council action which immediately followed. On January 28, 1949, the Council approved by a vote of eight to none, with only Russia, the Ukraine, and France abstaining, a resolution similar to that of the New Delhi Conference.

Furthermore, the Council extended the powers of its on-the-spot Good Offices Committee to make recommendations to both parties, and to observe on behalf of the Council the constituent elections which are to lead to a sovereign U.S.I. During its more than eighteen months of activity in Indonesia, the three-nation committee — consisting of the United States, Belgium, and Australia lacked both prestige and effectiveness because of the restricted mandate it originally received from the Council. It now becomes a more truly mediative commission, though it remains to be seen what effect its recommendations will have in the face of continued recalcitrance on the part of the Netherlands government.

Throughout recent Security Council discussions, the growing concern of the United States and its staunch opposition to Dutch action have been evident. Statements by the United States delegate in support of the Republic’s position contrast strongly with the offhand attitude taken when the Council first began consideration of the Indonesian question in September, 1947.

There is an increasing awareness that the political stability which America desires in Indonesia, and indeed in all Southern Asia, cannot be secured by force, or force alone. The stubbornness of Republican guerrilla fighting in the Javanese hills is the clearest evidence of this fact. Whatever the rationalizations behind Dutch action, there is little doubt as to its effects: to foster the disorder, resentment, and distrust on which both anti-Western feeling and Communism can flourish. In the face of a crystallized Asian opinion, moreover, these effects reach far beyond Indonesia. If they are to be mitigated, backing of the Republican government seems to be indicated.

What should the U.S. do?

Washington’s support of the Republic tends to falter when the Indonesian situation is viewed in relation to United States policy in Europe. Withdrawal of Marshall Flan aid from an obstinate Netherlands is considered unwarranted use of economic pressure for political purposes, which may vitiate the atmosphere of coöperation carefullv being built up by the Economic Coöperation Administration.

Loss of Dutch coöperation is also regarded as detrimental to the future of Western LTnion and of the North Atlantic Pact. Certainly, the Indonesian problem has assumed global proportions, presenting this country with a dilemma of similar magnitude. Yet perhaps part of the dilemma is only apparent. Dutch coöperation in Western Union and the North Atlantic Pact may be dictated by Continental considerations, quite apart from tile situation in Indonesia. And perhaps material backing of the Republic in Indonesia is as necessary for the political stability of Asia as Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands is for the economic stability of Europe.

America’s economic interest in Indonesia clearly lies in rapid expansion of production and trade in commodities vital for stockpiling, consumption, and industrial use: tin, copra, petroleum, rubber, pepper, gums, sugar. There is wide disagreement as to the proper method for attaining this objective.

Business concerns having long associations with the Dutch tend to favor support of the Netherlands and a return to the pre-war pattern of trade in Indonesia.

New American business interests regard a restoration of Dutch influence as favoring the firms with established pre-war connections. They see their best opportunity in an Indonesian economy developing under Indonesian auspices, and for that reason prefer the Republican side.

In the longer run, America must also consider the necessity for helping; to gear the Indonesian economy into a broad structure of international trade. American technical aid and investment, to develop Indonesia’s exports and open the area’s markets to imports from Europe as well ;is the United States, may offer a specific example of the type of program for the development of backward areas which President Truman called for in his inaugural address.

Nationalism: 1949 brand

Events in Indonesia are clearly symptomatic of the powerful forces of change which tire impinging on all of Soul hern Asia today. Politically, these forces constitute a spreading national consciousness aimed against any vestige of alien rule.

Nationalism as a clomina.nl political theme, appealing lo llie feelings and imagination of the people, plays a role in current-day Asia analogous lo its role in nineleenth-Senlury Europe. Now, as then, it is espoused as a common rallying point hy groups which support widely divergent ideologies. Communists and religious traditionalists vie with one another in the intensity of their nationalism.

Yet in many respects the moderate nationalist groups represents! by Nehru in India, Thakin Nu in Burma, and the Republican leaders Malta and Sjahrir in Indonesia are more sophisticated in their attitude toward nationalism than were nineteenthcentury liberals. These men have plainly recognized that while nationalism may be a powerful unifying force in their new states, it is also capable of militant and virulent expression if it remains unsupplemented by needed economic and social reform. They have repeatedly emphasized that international peace cannot be secured in a nationalist world, and have consequently supported both the United Nations and regional consolidation as necessary programs above and beyond nationalism. Vet for all their insight the nationalist factor remains central to an understanding of Asia today.

Toward democracy

Intellectual change in Asia manifests itself in an inchoate shift away from nonsecularism and mysticism, toward Western materialism and science. Sjahrir, in his book Out of Exile, sees the characteristic fatalism of Eastern culture as an adaptation to colonialism. For colonialism made the individual’s attainment of dignity and self-respect impossible.

The rejection of colonialism is both a cause and a consequence of the new Asia’s move toward Western values. That a new synthesis mav emerge in the process is the hope of many in the West as well as the East.

Socially, the post-war revolutionary movement in Asia opposes a social hierarchy ol either colonials or natives. While it would bo premature to deny the influence of the indigenous aristocracy, it is nonetheless true that the age-old class barriers of a semi feudal society are beginning to be broken down.

Jn India, the equal status guaranteed to untouchables by the new Constitution is one sign in this direction. And in Indonesia, many of the young nobility dropped their lilies in entering the nationalist movement.

The drive for social equality also expresses itself in terms of a clamor for education and social legislation to improve the woeful conditions of public health.

Finally, the economic motif, stressing labor organization, economic development, and rising living standards, represents a vital force in Asia’s changing scene.

Successful American policy in the area requires a clear understanding of the context within which that policy must be implemented. In Indonesia, the forces of change which comprise that context are represented by the embattled Republic. Recognition of this fact must be a fundamental precept of American policy in Indonesia.