Red China's Army

THERE has been wide-ranging speculation recently as to how far the United States can push in Vietnam before meeting a direct military response from Communist China. The steadily increasing U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia has been debated, demonstrated against, and bitterly denounced, and Peking itself has added to the clamor with frequent pronouncements that the Chinese people will assist their Vietnamese brothers “whatever the cost.”

If we were to read only official Chinese Communist statements, we might understandably characterize the men of Peking as bellicose. But it is perhaps wise to recall the words of China’s most illustrious military strategist, Sun Tzu, who laid down the precept some 2300 years ago that all warfare is based on deception. A skilled general, he insisted, must first of all be master of the art of confusing and deluding the enemy. Mao Tsetung drew heavily on Sun Tzu in setting forth his own military doctrine, and as a result, many questions in regard to China’s intentions and its military strength are unanswered: Is China really bent on militarily subjugating Southeast Asia? Is its huge People’s Liberation Army actually being deployed for an encounter with the United States? Is Peking truly spoiling for a military confrontation with America?

As a closed and tightly regulated nation, China does not lend itself to easy understanding. Those in search of answers must rely heavily on official Peking statements, on the occasional capture of classified documents, on frequently dubious refugee reports, and on the intelligence provided by the cameras of spy satellites and the reconnaissance planes that probe the mainland from Taiwan.

Land, sea, and air forces

In terms of numbers, the land, sea, and air forces of China are not the largest in the world. But in toto, they are enormous. To begin with, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which includes all three branches of the military, totals 2.7 million men — third largest after the Soviet Union (3.15 million) and the United States (about 3 million). But behind the PLA are some 300,000 to 500,000 Public Security Forces (secret police) and an estimated 12 million militiamen.

By far the most impressive and important branch of the PLA is the ground force, which totals 2.5 million men, divided into about forty armies of 40,000 line troops each plus support troops. Basically a light infantry force, the armies are short on heavy artillery, trucks and other military vehicles, heavy engineering equipment, and tanks. But in terms of light weapons, the Chinese soldiers are armed with excellent grenades, automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, and recoilless rifles, many of which have been seen in action in Vietnam.

With tough and highly disciplined soldiers, the PLA has proved that it has tactical mobility; its strategic mobility, however, is of a low order. China’s north-south rail communications are reasonably good, but lateral lines are few. There is no modern highway system, which would be of little use anyway without sufficient transport.

Although the PLA Air Force is the third largest in the world, having some 100,000 men and 2500 aircraft, it is basically obsolete. Most of the planes, including the 1800 to 2000 jet fighters and bombers, are old Soviet models. There are an estimated 800 to 1000 MIG-17’s of Korean War vintage, which form the backbone of the Chinese Air Force. These are supplemented by about 500 older MIG-15’s, now serving mainly as patrol and training aircraft. Some sources say there are up to 100 supersonic MIG-19’s and possibly a couple of dozen MIG-21’s. Continuing problems for the Air Force are spare parts and aircraft fuels. It is believed the Chinese have cannibalized 300 to 400 jet planes during the past five years owing to parts shortages. But the lack of jet fuel which had forced PLA pilots to cut their monthly flying time has been somewhat alleviated as a result of heavy investment in the petroleum industry.

The Navy consists of some 120,000 to 140,000 men, with 1000 ships divided into three fleets.

Most of the vessels are twenty to thirty years old, and China’s naval experience is extremely limited. Certainly the most important part of the PLA Navy is its submarine fleet. The Chinese are believed to have thirty submarines, including two of the Soviet G class, which is capable of firing ballistic missiles. But it is unlikely that the Chinese have operational missiles for them.

In any evaluation of Chinese Communist military potential the role of the militia and Public Security Forces must be considered. Little is known about them, but in a time of national emergency the Public Security Forces could be expected to augment the regular forces in carrying out intelligence and subversion. As for the militia, Peking claims an effective force of 50 million men and women; most Chinawatchers set a more realistic figure at 12 million.

The most significant feature of China’s military force is its deployment. Exact figures are secret, but Western military informants insist that the general situation has not changed appreciably since China withdrew its forces from Korea in 1958. American military sources deny any significant buildup on the Vietnam border. They say the Chinese apparently have not altered their view of the most strategic areas: the northeast industrial base, the areas across from Taiwan, and the Soviet border.

Nuclear capability

As for China’s much-talked-about nuclear weapons and missile program, speculation is questionable, to say the least. The Japanese, for example, reckon China has a capacity for fifty atomic bombs a year, based on production estimates of known Chinese reactors. They also believe it is possible for Peking to test a hydrogen device sometime during this year. Independent Chinese observers in Hong Kong share the Japanese view.

But Western analysts tend to be more skeptical of China’s ability to make rapid strides in the fields of rocketry and atomic weapons. “The Chinese are not likely to have a military capability that includes nuclear weapons and missiles in the foreseeable future,” one American source says flatly. “Nuclear weapons and missiles are an age beyond these people.” Perhaps, but underestimating the enemy can be a fatal mistake. China’s first atomic test on October 16, 1964, came as no surprise, but it shocked more than a few observers to learn that the device had used uranium 235 and not the more easily obtained plutonium.

There has been considerable debate over what it is costing Peking to produce atomic weapons. Certainly the manpower drain is heavy, for China simply does not have large numbers of highly trained scientists and technicians. Diverting large sums of money to the nuclear program creates a strain, but analysts now are generally of the opinion that with the Chinese Communist gross national product estimated at $70 billion, the nuclear weapons program represents a very small percentage of the GNP.

Missiles

Considerably less is known of China’s missile development program than of its nuclear effort. Former Soviet Premier Khrushchev, however, did remark to Ambassador Averell Harriman in 1959 that Russia had supplied China with a variety of rockets. Japanese sources report that Chinese scientists were testing a 500-to-700-mile-range missile as early as 1963. Though Western sources are dubious of such reports, it is common knowledge that the Chinese have a missile-testing range running from Ch’uch’uan in Kansu Province to the Lop Nor nuclear-test-ground desert in Sinkiang, a distance of some 500 miles.

More than likely the PLA has at least a few anti-aircraft missile units using Soviet SA-2 rockets for SAM’s, as they are known in Vietnam). The other missile units now operational are supposedly using the Soviet version of the American Honest John artillery rocket, which has a 15-mile range. In any case, Western experts emphasize, such units are few in number and would not be particularly useful in a Sino-U.S. military confrontation.

There is little doubt that Peking has exerted considerable effort on building up and modernizing the PLA. In addition to spending large sums on nuclear and missile development programs, the Chinese have invested heavily in providing high-quality conventional armaments. How much emphasis is placed on military hardware is perhaps best seen in the fact that five of China’s eight ministries of machine building are concerned with military needs.

Despite this investment in munitions, armaments, and modern weaponry, Western military authorities insist that Chinese logistics industries are still few in number and highly vulnerable to air attack. “Today,” says one analyst, “the PLA does not have even a primitive capability for operations involving combined land, sea, and air arms.” Another military specialist says, “In a conventional war, inside China, fighting within 200 meters of the enemy, the Chinese army would be tough. Outside of China, or fighting over distances of more than 200 meters, no. It’s not that their troops are not good. They are. But they simply lack sustained logistics support and mobility.”

As a result of these shortcomings, American military authorities believe, the Chinese would be hardpressed to maintain a large force beyond their own borders. The Korean example, they say, does not really apply. In the Korean conflict, the Chinese forces were backed by Soviet assistance. In addition, China’s own fledgling logistics industry was not touched. As for the Sino-Indian clash in 1962, China’s only other excursion beyond its own borders, the drive was limited in size and duration. The Chinese forces simply made a quick jab and then retreated before provoking intervention by a major power.

Despite Peking’s blustering, Chinese troops remain defensive. And it is not without reason that Chinese taunting of the United States invariably says, Attack us if you want, come on and fight in China. As the Chinese leaders know, their only hope of defeating the power of the United States would be to make their stand on terrain they know best, where the population would be friendly and where they could employ guerrilla warfare.

Barring the use of nuclear weapons and biological and chemical warfare, it would take only a short time for American forces operating at optimum strength to reduce the Chinese military to dependence on the rifle, the grenade, and the bayonet. Lacking strategic mobility and an industrial backbone, the Chinese Army would have to fight a “people’s war.”

Training guerrillas

Since the appearance of Defense Minister Lin Piao’s much publicized lengthy article last September, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War,” training emphasis has been directed to the individual, to squads, and to companies — the basic guerrilla units. The training is rigorous. There is much field work, with various units receiving instruction in jungle and mountain warfare. Special attention is paid to fast-paced marching and to infiltration techniques.

The soldiers are constantly reminded that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong have shot down supersonic jets with rifles, disabled tanks with hand grenades, and seriously crippled crack U.S. troops with bamboo splits and spiked booby traps. The soldiers are taught to continue firing their rifles and throwing grenades while charging enemy positions. They are exhorted to charge fast, keeping their eyes glued on the enemy without wavering in the face of enemy fire. “It is the tradition of the PLA not to withdraw from the battlefield when slightly wounded and not to cry out when seriously wounded,” the young recruits are told.

Being a member of the PLA has become a considerable honor. With a current induction rate of 750,000 a year, the Chinese leaders need to take only 10 percent of those of draftable age (18 to 22). Thus they can be highly selective, and they are. The elimination of ranks in the PLA in June, 1965, was an attempt to keep the Army in the revolutionary fold. When the Communists fought their way to victory over Chiang Kai-shek, their armies were rankless. The same was true in Korea.

The Chinese leadership declared that once again “Our cap insignia are Red, the collar badges are Red, and our thinking will also be Red.”

If allowed to fight on its own terms, the Chinese Army is a formidable opponent. But as with all armies, there are grounds for complaint and there are complaints. Many of these involve family problems, such as long separation from wives and children, and the tight restriction on early marriage. The Chinese press on occasion refers to soldiers who are willing to “rest on old assets,” instead of maintaining “revolutionary freshness.” There is talk of soldiers who feel there should be more stress on military affairs and less on politics. But even with this grumbling, analysts in such outposts as Hong Kong reject reports of widespread unrest in the PLA. “The Chinese leaders want perfection in the Army,” one observer explained. “So they cite examples of things that stand in the way of perfection. These get misinterpreted as signs of greater problems than actually exist.”

Most China-watchers agree that Peking’s military policies have been characterized by their caution. The Chinese leaders probably will not intervene directly in the Vietnam war unless they feel China itself is threatened. A more likely approach, and one that Mao has long propounded, is to stir discord and upheavals in scattered parts of the world in order to tie down as many U.S. troops as possible and force Washington to overextend itself.

If the United States and China somehow did become engaged in a major war, Peking’s defensive strategy almost certainly would be based on the concept of a protracted “people’s war.” The Chinese would not expect it to be a short encounter, as information on their likely moves indicates. With the initial American assault, the militia would form a front line using hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. The main-force PLA would slowly withdraw toward the interior, perhaps to the mountains in the northeast, where there are rumored to be subterranean munitions dumps and munitions works. Drawing the U.S. forces deep into the interior, the PLA would then try to cut them apart, piece by piece.