United Europe

on the World Today

THE question of a United Europe is vital to all of the free world. For centuries, forward-looking rulers and statesmen have deplored the fractionation of Europe and have repeatedly endeavored to unite it by force. Charlemagne, Louis IX, Francis I, Charles V, Henry IV, Napoleon, and Adolf Hitler are some of those who have attempted to impose centralized control over various portions of Western Europe, but with no lasting result.

Jean Monnet of France has done more than any other European since 1940 to push the idea of unity. He deserves the thanks of every Frenchman for the comprehensive plan for French rehabilitation which bears his name, and of every good European for the skill with which he shaped the Coal and Steel Community, originally launched as the Schuman Plan. Monnet has been one of the most ardent advocates of the unity of Europe, which he hopes will be modeled on the successful Coal and Steel Community. But this is still only a hope and not yet a Western alliance. Leaders of six countries have been working on the plan for a Common Market and an Atomic Energy union, and an agreement was hammered out and signed by the Prime Ministers on March 25. However, as was the case with the European Defense Community agreement among prime ministers does not necessarily mean ratification by parliaments.

Opponents of the proposed Common Market and Atomic Energy treaties claim that both are instruments less economic than political, and point to the evidence in the striking phrase used by their keenest advocates: “It is necessary to make Europe.”

“Little Europe”

In ihe fear that a frustrated Germany might turn eastward for relief, one after another of the onerous restrictions imposed by the Western Allies at the end of World War II was first relaxed and then removed. Germany received financial aid to rebuild its destroyed homes and factories, and the presence of the occupying powers relieved it of the tremendous burden of providing its own defense. Scarcely recovered from the scourge of the Gestapo and the brutalities of SS troopers, France hesitated to relinquish the controls held by the Allies, especially those which barred the Ruhr from resuming the powerful place it had occupied in Imperial and Nazi Germany.

It was to meet these legitimate objections that the idea was conceived of pooling coal and steel, thereby separating them from the armament industries and neutralizing them as instruments of national policy.

Thus, for the first time in history, six of the most important countries of Western Europe freely imposed upon themselves a supranational authority with the right to make — and the power to enforce — decisions in a domain which always had been exclusively under national control. This grouping of the six nations for an economic purpose has formed what Winston Churchill somewhat scornfully dubbed “Little Europe.

The revolutionary innovation in this new alignment which overpassed existing frontiers was that of the transfer of sovereignty from the national parliaments to an international authority composed of High Commissioners, presumably impartial, with power to legislate within the limited field of its supervision, in the best interests of the Community. The success of this first venture has been sufficiently marked to attract Britain, which is now represented on the Council by an observer.

In view of Russia’s intransigence and its opposition to reunification, once the economic controls which had restrained Germany were abolished and she was welcomed as a founding member of the nascent Community of Europe, the question of German rearmament inevitably followed. As the United States and Great Britain applied pressure. France, Belgium, and Holland reluctantly agreed to use the coal-and-steel formula as the basis for a politico-military alliance to be called Communauté Européenne de Défense, or more popularly CED.

This new plan was to form a strategic command to servo a unified political objective, with centralized powers of government. The transfer of limited military powers to a supranational authority was not enough; such an authority, to be effective, must be able to command. And it followed logically that, to enforce its decisions, it must have at its disposal a supranational force, which implied a unified political system. The organization would control such essential matters as 1) determining the duration of compulsory military service; 2) the preparation of strategic plans; and 3) the declaration of a state of war.

France balks at the superstate

The most important article in the CED, which was the real stumbling block to its passage by the French parliament, was not military but political. Article 38 provided for an Assembly similar to that of the Coal and Steel Community, which within six months should draw up a special political treaty to be binding on the member nations.

By “transfers of sovereignty” similar to those of the Coal and Steel Community, this treaty was to drawup, not another supranational authority, but rather a superstate which should be empowered by special delegation from the member states to legislate on foreign affairs and on the international economy of its members, to manage financial matters, and to establish an international medium of monetary exchange for the six nations.

While the proposed CED treaty was being prepared and before it was presented to any constituent state parliament for discussion, the Assembly of the Coal and Steel Community which had just been installed applied Article 38 to its own affairs. In 1952, the Assembly of the Coal and Si eel Community, which was originally charged with questions of organization and operation, was transformed into a body with plenary powers, with the mission of preparing within six months a third treaty, providing for European political union. A commission was named and in a few weeks had prepared a European constitution which was submitted to the Coal and Steel Assembly for discussion. It was debated and accepted by an overwhelming majority.

There were immediate objections from several sources in France. Aside from opposing any German rearmament, military leaders and experts opposed cutting the armed forces into two separate parts. All branches based on French soil would be under international command, while those serving overseas would be under their regular national commanders. In metropolitan France, recruiting and training, promotion of officers, strategic planning, would be under the international assembly. Such a transfer of sovereignty would not only remove all questions of political policy from direct French control but would deprive each country of its status as an independent power in charge of its own armed forces.

From a national viewpoint, the French would he hit the hardest if CED went through. Germany will not regain its place as a free and independent power until after reunification; Italy, notwithstanding its remarkable record during the past ten years, cannot be considered a major power; and the Benelux partners are all small though solid nations. Consequently, France would have had to sacrifice the most in joining CED. These considerations made rejection of CED inevitable for the French parliament and forced the West to find another solution for the rearmament of Germany. This necessity gave Sir Anthony Eden his moment of greatness, when he negotiated Germany into the Western European Union (of which the U.K. was already a member).

The Western European Union

The setup of the WEU, which includes seven nations, is similar to that of the Coal and Steel Community, with one fundamental difference: authority is not vested in an independent Council of High Commissioners, but is exercised by a Council of Ministers, assisted by competent counselors, and an Assembly, to be responsible to and controlled by the national governments, which thus remain the final arbiters on all questions affecting European and individual defense. Although the United States would have preferred a federal union with a central government, it energetically backed the Eden proposals as a stop in the right direction.

Opponents of the Common Market claim that its proponents plan ultimate political integration—which, as called for by Article 38, was responsible for the French rejection of CED.

The French parliament urged that the Common Market and Euratom assemblies should be independent of the Coal and Steel Assembly. In conformity with this suggestion a new Common Market Assembly has been created by the proposed treaty. The existing Coal and Steel Assembly will later be abolished, and together with Euratom will be placed under the Common Market Assembly, thus setting the stage for a supranational authority which could become ultimately a supranational government.

It is this plan — to put all three organizations under the single Assembly: Coal and Steel, Atomic Energy, and Common Market—which scares those who resist European union now and integration later. They fear that, once established, the Assembly will exert a powerful influence on the transfer of sovereignty and lead to the creation of a central government for “Little Europe,” with the right to modify existing treaties which might conflict with the new central government, without referring such changes to the national parliaments of the member countries.

The Common Market

The treaty setting up the Common Market proposes to “create a zone of political economy” in order to liberate progressively the free exchange of capital, goods, and workers. If it is ratified and starts operating successfully, four results would follow automatically: 1) industry and agriculture with wider markets would be able to organize production in the best manner to guarantee maximum output at lowest cost; 2) consumers and users would be able to purchase anyw here in the six member count ries the best goods at the lowest prices; 3) production would be rationalized throughout the area so that each article would be produced under the most advantageous conditions; 4) the standard of living for the entire Community would rise each year.

Whether age-old habits, customs, and prejudices will break down is anybody’s guess. The Common Market is bound to result in the disappearance in each member nation of a certain number of business activities which can be better handled in one of the other countries. Closing down such industries probably would result in local unemployment, at least for a time. This affirmation raises two questions: Will the advantages gained exceed the disadvantages, and will the losses of revenue and perhaps of capital be compensated by the increased production and wealth created by the Common Market ?

Most economists claim that the free circulation of men, manufactures, and money will result in a net advantage. A common fund to carry 50 per cent of the cost of readaptation is provided for in the treaty; the other 50 per cent for its own nationals is to be borne by each member state. Climate, national and social customs and habits, the scale and scheme of living, language, religious practices, all will interfere with any rapid movement of populations. Theoretically it would seem simpler to transform and convert local activities than to move masses of men from the place where they have always lived and worked to a new and strange environment.

Another real difficulty is to bring the social security provisions of the six countries into line. Today French workers and their families receive greater protection, work shorter hours, have longer paid holidays, than those of some of the other countries, Unless these are standardized, competition would not be fair and the fluidity of the labor force would be restricted. Although a standard European currency might be advisable, no provision for interference with or control of national currencies is included in the proposed treaties.

The world in which we are living is a perplexing world. Soviet Russia and China have gobbled up and enslaved peoples that were formerly free, claiming that when all peoples are ruled from Moscow real freedom will be assured for the whole world. Half-savage underdeveloped peoples revolt against the evolutionary controls of Britain, France, Belgium, Port ugal, and South Africa, struggling to set themselves up as small independent fractional states, many of which have no possible economic raison d’être.

Will Europe, split into tiny racial states for many centuries, now turn toward integration as the Middle East, Asia, and Africa disintegrate? Assuming that the solutions will be found for a number of complicated problems, what will be the consequences of these revolutionary changes? Let’s frankly face up to the answer: nobody knows.