The Atlantic Report on the World Today: Washington

THERE was no agenda for the Churchill visit until shortly before the British Prime Minister arrived in Washington. That fact left Administration officials perplexed as to precisely what Mr. Churchill wanted. Secretary Acheson in particular was cool to the idea of the Churchill visit, though the acrimony which existed between Acheson and Foreign Secretary Eden at Paris mellowed into a formal correctness, if not harmony.

As the talks progressed it became evident that Churchill’s objectives were closer coöperation with the United States in military and diplomatic affairs, and recognition of Britain’s role as distinct from that of united Europe. For the record, at least, he succeeded in his objectives.

Britain and the Untied States narrowed their differences over their individual policies toward Egypt and Iran. Churchill’s consent to support the World Bank’s efforts in Iran represented a substantial concession from the previous British position that any negotiation with the Mossadegh government was impossible. Mr. Truman and his advisers already had agreed independently to call for joint action in Iran in the event that the Communist Tudeh Party should take over.

The British and American teams also agreed on joint action in Southeast Asia in case of new Communist drives. Britain has been less worried about Indo-China than about Burma, which now would fall like a ripe plum. Eden’s statement that any new aggression in the area would be referred to the United Nations for collective action represents the attitude here, but it is probable that more specific measures also were outlined.

On other points, such as recognition of China, there was agreement to disagree. Some of the points, such as the adoption of a standardized infantry rifle, were regarded as red herrings. It would take at least three years to get either the new British lightweight rifle or its American counterpart. into quantity production. Thus the American M-1, or Garand, for which new orders recently were placed, will continue to be standard in the NATO countries.

Probably the most important single accomplishment was the accord on raw materials. Britain is to receive needed steel from the United States; in return, Canadian aluminum and copper previously destined for Britain are to be diverted to the United States, and Britain is to furnish Malayan tin at a contract price of $1.18 a pound. This last concession is the quid pro quo the Administration wanted.

Atomic secretS

Private assurances already had been given that Britain would be consulted on any contemplated use of the atom bomb. Another British request involving a fuller exchange of atomic information was partly met by an agreement to allow small groups of scientists from both countries to study certain areas of atomic energy in which the British are interested. Although the two countries cooperated broadly during the war, American atomic research has been virtually walled off from Britain since 1945.

Shortly before Churchill’s visit a top Canadian atomic scientist, Dr. C. J. Mackenzie, called attention to the harm this wall was doing the American weapons program. Canada has built a relatively inexpensive plutonium separation plant at Chalk River, Ontario, which is far more efficient than any in this country, Britain has been conducting her own atomic weapons project at Harwell. Both countries have been supplying the United Slates with atomic information. Yet, as Dr. Mackenzie put it, they have not been permitted to see how that information has been used or to correct mistakes.

In part this situation of all take and no give stems from narrow interpretations of the McMahon Act, which forbids the exchange of information bearing upon atomic weapons. A slight modification sponsored by Senator McMahon was passed by the last session of Congress but has not really begun to operate.

Behind the American policy have been two illusions— first, that the atomic bomb was entirely an American development; and second, that there was a “secret ” which could be safeguarded indefinitely. Actually, scientists of many national backgrounds participated in the development of the atomic bomb, and some of the most important contributions were made by British and Canadian scientists. The principal “secret,”of course, evaporated with the advent of the Russian bomb.

Whenever the exchange of information with Britain and Canada has been mentioned, some members of Congress have thrown up their hands in horror. What about the Klaus Fuchs case? they ask. That was a spectacular case of laxness in British security precautions. Unquestionably there are certain scientific adaptations in atomic weapons which it is desirable to keep secret. But it is doubtful whether any sort of security that is predicated primarily on secrecy can succeed.

Real atomic security lies in scientific progress — in new discoveries and techniques. This is a field in which many minds are better than a few, and a field in which progress is related to the exchange of ideas. The question which the United States must ask itself is whether its stress on secrecy is not actually retarding the atomic progress upon which much of the defense of the free world depends.

Reforming the tax collectors

The first of the President’s longpromised steps to clean up influence and corruption in government consisted of a sweeping reorganization of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The offices of the 64 politically appointed collectors of internal revenue will be abolished and the activities consolidated in 25 district offices; all employees except the Commissioner of Internal Revenue will be placed under civil service; and there will be an independent inspection service reporting directly to the Commissioner.

The reorganization embodies many of the recommendations of the Hoover Commission and similar groups. But it did not meet with universal approval. There were skeptical remarks among members of Congress, some of whom saw in it the loss of patronage — and perhaps of political ammunition. Since some of the reforms depend upon the assent of Congress, completion of the plan is by no means assured.

Even if all the President’s requests are granted, it will take years to carry out the changes. The mere placing of more revenue employees under civil service does not, of course, ensure that there will be no more graft; civil service employees have been involved in many of the scandals. The problem really is one of moral atmosphere — and that should emanate from the White House.

Nevertheless, there is a disposition to credit the President with a move in the right direction. It is also a move which enables Mr. Truman to take Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder off the hook. Reportedly Mr, Snyder encouraged the reforms in the Bureau of Internal Revenue. But the Bureau has been his bailiwick all along, and he bears at least a share of the responsibility for the deterioration that has taken place.

Senator Williams has charged that the Treasury deliberately withheld evidence from a St. Louis grand jury investigating the deposed collector of internal revenue there.

Through it all, however, there has been remarkably little heat on Mr. Snyder for what in most departments would be regarded as gross negligence. Perhaps the explanation for the contrast between the treatment of Snyder and the scorching criticism turned on Attorney General McGrath lies in the fact that Snyder seemed genuinely concerned, whereas McGrath gave the appearance of indifference. Moreover, Snyder has been basically a banker in a political assignment, whereas McGrath has been a politician angling for a bigger job.

Symington and Gray resign

Two of the Administration’s most faithful performers resigned early in the New Year. W. Stuart Symington, hi 1 fly administrator of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, went back to private business, and Gordon Gray, former director of the Psychological Strategy Board, returned to the presidency of the University of North Carolina.

Symington has been an “operator.”Handsome, glib, and affable, he made things hum wherever he was. As Secretary of the Air Force before Korea, he installed an efficient internal machinery and at the same time made no bones about his opposition to Administration policy in limiting Air Force expansion.

As chairman of the National Security Resources Board, Symington revived that planning agency after a fifteen-month hiatus. He was newer content with mere long-range planning, however, and the appointment of Defense Mobilizer Wilson more or less eclipsed him in the mobilization picture. He thus was a natural to take over the RFC after the loan scandals had made it a hot spot.

Symington lived up to his promise to make the RFC “bristle with integrity” by instituting tighter loan procedures and summarily firing officials when there was any hint of impropriety. He also ran into considerable controversy over his attempts to break the rubber and tin markets and force down the prices of materials which the RFC purchases for strategic needs.

Symington has been in essence, though not by admission, a preventive warrior. This explains his zeal and deep sense of dedication. Sometimes his actions have appeared more forceful than wise in retrospect, but no one can question that he had a big impact in the Capital.

Gordon Gray, mild and soft-spoken, though not beyond a righteous anger, acquired a reputation for quiet efficiency as Assistant Secretary and later as Secretary of the Army. He had come up “through the ranks” as both an enlisted man and officer during the war, and that gave him breadth. Before taking the university post he made a detailed survey of the economic prospects of Europe after the Marshall Plan — though his conclusions were thrown completely out of kilter by the Korean war.

There was satisfaction when Gray agreed to come back to Washington as the first director of the Psychological Strategy Board on a short leave of absence from the university. This is the board set up to coördinate the psychological aspects of diplomatic and military policy, the better to counter Kremlin propaganda. It is composed of the Under Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.

But Gray found that an amorphous agency of this sort was different from the Army, where the job was clearcut. His view was that before the board could function effectively its lines of authority would have to be straight. He concentrated on getting acknowledgment of the board’s place, and was dismayed by the mountains of paper work. He was particularly miffed by the fact that the President’s disarmament speech of last fall was referred to the board only as an afterthought .

If the Psychological Strategy Board is to mean much, one of its most important needs is continuity of direction. Hence it is a bad omen that even before he stepped into Gray’s shoes, the new director, Dr. Raymond B. Allen, was already slated to become chancellor of the University of California at Los Angeles in September.

Economy and the budget

Despite the talk in Congress about cutting the President’s budget, there is little likelihood that any substantial cuts will be made. In the first place, the budget this year appears to be unusually tight: virtually every agency complained to the Bureau of the Budget before the message went to Capitol Hill. In the second place, Congress has no effective machinery for reviewing the budget intelligently.

In the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Congress provided for a legislative budget which would be adopted each year as a sort of ceiling for appropriations. Having made this effort on paper, however, Congress promptly proceeded to ignore it.

There is little chance that, the plan advanced by Representative Coudert for a ceiling of $71 billion on expenditures — roughly the total anticipated tax revenues — will be adopted. Congress could not afford to tie its hands in a time of international crisis; moreover, there is some prospect that the tax take will be substantially higher than $71 billion. This conditions the feeling of legislators against anv new tax increases in an election year.

It has become extremely difficult to enforce economies once appropriations bills reach the floor, for the reason that few members like to vote against pork-barrel projects that affect their own districts, such as the perennial rivers and harbors bill. Also, the way of an economizer is hard, as Senator Paul Douglas has found. During the last session Mr. Douglas recommended 90 separate economy measures which, if carried, would have saved $1,3137,000,000. Only 10 of these proposals, aggregating some $215 million, were enacted. Nearly $200 million of the total saved was represented in a single amendment cutting the leave of Federal employees from 26 to 20 days annually.

Mood of the Capital

General Eisenhower’s statement indicating his availability for the Republican presidential nomination if drafted was vastly encouraging to those persons in the Capital who feel a drastic need for change but cannot stomach Senator Taft. Of certainty the announcement has pushed the Taft forces to new vigor in their efforts to line up delegates. But the feeling here is that this impetus is more than compensated for by the enthusiasm which the announcement has instilled into the Eisenhower supporters.

The sagging morale of the Eisenhower enthusiasts has been greatly bolstered by the general’s declaration that he is a Republican and his indication that he will be available in the flesh if called by the convention. Supporters here are counting heavily on these facts, plus the amount of public support for Eisenhower shown by the polls, to enlist, uncommitted delegates as well as to persuade waverers away from Taft.

A cautious optimism over the prospects of peace infuses the Capital. This optimism was greatly reinforced by Winston Churchill’s calmness, particularly his prophecy that peace would prevail throughout 1952.

Churchill is regarded as above all a realist. No one discounts the possibility of new Communist moves in Southeast Asia which might have to be met by some new combination of forces; nor is there any tendency to gloss over the fact that there is not yet a unified defense of Europe.

Nevertheless, in regard to the chance of all-out war, there is a disposition to accept the estimate of Defense Mobilizer Wilson: that whereas a year ago the odds were 50-50, today they are 60-40 against war. In other words, the rearmament program has begun to pay off.