The Balance of Military Power

ANONYMOUS

THE balance of military power is a variable which changes from day to day. There is no living expert who can call the exact turn. The best one can do is to add up the known and the probable and, since it is always clarifying to look back, one can arrive at a plausible estimate of what that balance has been over the past five years and what it is now.

From 1945 until midsummer 1949 the military world was dominated by two factors. The first was the American monopoly in atomic weapons and an air force capable of projecting those weapons against the industrial vitals of Russia. The second was a Russian ground army so much more powerful than all other ground armies of the world that it constituted an equivalent Russian monopoly of ground power sufficient to dominate the land mass of Eurasia.

These two monopolies in effect, canceled each other out, because while neither could conquer the other, each possessed the ability to injure the other terribly, and the amount of potential injury each could do was, in conjecture, equal. It would not have served the power interests of either to launch a war, for if the Russians launched it with their ground armies the United States could wreak terrible retribution upon the industrial centers of Russia; whereas, if the United States launched it with its atomic weapons, the Russians could retaliate by seizing continental Europe and thus cut the United States off from its commercial, cultural, and military associations with Western Europe. We could have maimed each other but we could not destroy or conquer each other. Therefore the world of 1945 to 1949 existed in a state of military equilibrium which was precarious and dangerous but none the less a state of equilibrium which neither dared to disturb. In the summer of 1949 two events threatened to tilt the balance in favor of the Soviet Union. The first was the fact that the Russians had succeeded in achieving an atomic explosion. The second was the triumph of Communist armies in China. Those events did not immediately change the balance. There would have to be a lapse of time before Russia could convert a single atomic explosion into a stockpile of atomic bombs sufficient to diminish the military value of the stockpile that the United States had been accumulating since July of 1945. And it remained to be seen in late 1949 what degree of influence Moscow would gain over the new Communist regime in China. There was a possibility worth testing that the new Chinese government would take its foreign policy from at home even though it took its political and economic philosophy from Stalin.

However, the grim fact impressed itself upon the men responsible for the security of the United States in Washington that the military equilibrium of the first four and a half post-war years was being undermined. The possibility stood forth starkly that at some indefinite but approaching day in the future Russia would attain the capacity to injure the United States so seriously that we might not recover from the blow. There was a further possibility that Russia might command the land mass stretching from the China Sea to the Elbe, and from the Indian Ocean to the Arctic Sea — a land mass which could ultimately give its masters a sufficient base for perpetual military domination of the world.

The test of the foreign policy of the new Chinese regime was made on January 12, 1950, by an offer of peace contained in the speech Secretary of State Acheson delivered before the National Press Club. The results were immediate — and negative. China imprisoned American consular officers, mistreated American missionaries, launched a violent propaganda campaign against the United States, and began military preparations directed at Korea, Formosa, Indo-China, and Tibet. Plainly China had decided to join hands with Moscow and to attempt to exploit with Russia the twin advantage of the Russian bomb and its own civil war victory in China.

Copyright 1951, by The Atlantic Monthly Company, Boston 16, Mass. All rights reserved.

But before China’s rejection of the American peace offer, Washington had taken the first steps to counteract the threatened imbalance in the military equation. In October of 1949 the policy and planning staffs of the State and Defense Departments and the National Security Resources Hoard began an exhaustive re-examination of the problem of Soviet Russia and of America’s relationship to Russia. The study resulted in a document known as National Security Council #68. This document charted the long-term project of restoring the threatened equilibrium and of inducing Russia, some day, to abandon its outward pressures and become a tolerable neighbor in the world.

While this study was going forward, research into military uses for atomic energy other than the bomb was intensified; the expansion of United States and allied ground forces was charted; expansion of the American radar warning net was pushed to the limit of available funds; the decision was taken (January 31, 1950) to seek the hydrogen bomb; and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization moved towards the idea of a unified armed force under a single command.

No one can say what would have come of these projects if the North Koreans had not marched south on the 25th of June, 1950. Until that day “economy” was still the official slogan of both the Administration and the political opposition in Washington. But the North Korean attack was made. Under the impact of that attack the Congress did authorize many, although as yet not all, of the projects contemplated in NSC #68. June 25, 1950, converted abstract plans into physical projects. The United States and its allies began in many and vigorous ways to attempt to check the deterioration in the military balance and to regain a stable equilibrium.

Substantial progress has been made since the Korean war began. Last November there were seven American divisions in Korea. Those seven divisions represented roughly two thirds of the total organized and equipped ground strength of the United States. In November those seven divisions were struck a surprise blow for which they were not prepared. For a time the possibility existed that our force might be destroyed or captured. Today the divisions in Korea represent roughly a third of the total ground strength of the United States. They have become an asset to, rather than a net drain upon, the over-all military strength of the country. There is a flow of battle-trained veterans back to the training bases. The army in Korea itself has come through the ordeal of defeat. Its combat morale and efficiency, the organization of its supply system, its defenses in depth, its air and sea support, have all been improved. Its commanders are confident that they can get that army out of Korea safely even if Russia were to join the battle.

A real breeding of strength has been taking place throughout the whole area of American remobilization. A weakness in the American military posture through 1950 was the existence of several points where serious damage might have been done by surprise hostile action. There was a single assembly line for B-36 bombers. There was only one armored division. New weapons were being produced in only a few army arsenals. There never was and never will be an American Achilles’ heel, but an enemy seeking to injure the warmaking capacity of the United States would have to strike many more targets today than in 1950. Assembly lines for planes, tanks, guns, and radar have been multiplied and dispersed. This is an incidental to the process of building capacity to sustain a long war. By 1952, if present projects are completed, the United States will have the capacity to produce 50,000 military aircraft a year. The capacity to produce in all other areas of weapons is being expanded correspondingly.

The military value of America’s present and potential allies has expanded during the Korean war period. The prowess of Greeks and Turks on the Korean battlefields and the steadiness of Yugoslavs in the face of attempted intimidation by satellite neighbors have extended plans for the construction of a “southern flank” for Europe. The welcome victory which French forces won in Indo-China in December, 1950, against the Viet Minh armies of Ho Chi Minh came into the balance.

It was accidental, but none the less welcome, that the winter of 1950-51 saw the spread of a schism in the world Communist movement. The effect of this schism on the military balance cannot be measured even approximately. One only knows that Moscow no longer controls a monolithic Communist Party totally loyal to its orders. To some unmeasurable extent this is compensation for the alliance between China and Russia.

These elements of improvement in the American position since the outbreak of the Korean war tend to reduce Russia’s domination of the area of ground power. However, since 1945 the heaviest single factor on the Allied side of the military balance has been the American lead in atomic weapons.

2

STRENGTH in the area of atomic warfare depends primarily on three factors. They are (a) the possession of stockpiles of atomic bombs, (b) the ability to deliver those bombs against enemy targets, and (c) the ability to defend against enemy bombs. Examine the relative position of the two sides in each of these three categories.

The numbers of atomic bombs in American and Russian stockpiles are the most closely guarded secrets of the two governments. Yet the probable magnitude of the two stockpiles is not as great a mystery as is generally believed. There is knowledge in the public domain which permits a calculation derived from what we know of the rate of American production in 1945 at the beginning of the atomic age. We know that the first atomic bomb was exploded at Alamogordo on July 10, 1945. We know that Bombs Two and Three were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 11, 1945. We know that when number Three was dropped on Nagasaki it was the last one the United States possessed at the time. We know further that the plans for the invasion of Japan in November of that same year called for three bombs to support each of three main landings. That is, we know that the United States had the capacity to produce at least nine atomic bombs between August and November of 1945. We can assume, therefore, that the initial rate of production of the American industrial economy was a minimum of three per month. If the United States had maintained only its initial rate of production over the intervening period it would possess today (June 1, 1951) a stockpile of 210 atomic bombs minus the number exploded in subsequent tests. However, there have been many statements to the effect that the technique and speed of production has been increased since the initial experimental stage. The statement has been made, and not contradicted, that the United States possesses today somewhere between 750 and 1000 atomic bombs. There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of this as a measure of the general magnitude of the American stockpile.

The same reasoning can give us an approximation of the Russian stockpile. If one assumes that the Russian atomic bomb industry was constructed on a scale comparable to the American, then the Russians, who exploded their first bomb in midsummer of 1949, must today (June of 1951) have a minimum of 63 atomic bombs. It seems reasonable, and only safe, to assume that they have been able to increase their rate of production after nearly two years in the business. To beside against disastrous surprise America must assume that the Russian stockpile may run as high as 200 atomic bombs.

Thus we begin our measure of the relative atomic weapons strength of the two sides with an assumed ratio of at least four to one in favor of the United States in numbers of atomic bombs in stockpiles. The present ratio could be to our advantage by ten to one. We may take five to one as a fair working formula.

The first conditioning factor on the usefulness of the stockpile is the ability to deliver the bombs to targets in an enemy country. Guided missiles with atomic war heads may eventually replace the bomber with its crew of human beings as the vehicle. Such missiles are available now for the distances which would be involved in war in Europe. Russia would be vulnerable to them around her outer boundaries. Britain and France would not be safe from them unless the Russian army could be kept east of Germany. But the intercontinental rocket is still well in the future. So far the only means by which American atomic bombs could be dropped deep inside Russia, or Russian atomic bombs dropped deep inside the United States, is by bomber.

The United States has a present lead in bombers. The American B-36 is the only bomber known to exist which is capable of two-way operation between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. It is conceivable that somewhere in the vast ness of Russia the Russians have built intercontinental bombers comparable in size and performance to the B-36. We cannot rule out the possibility since the Japanese were able to build whole battleships secretly previous to the last war. A new bomber would be easier to conceal in Russia than a battleship in pre-war Japan. However, to the best of our knowledge the Russians have nothing better yet than the TE-4 — an imitation of the American B-29, the “Superfortress” of the last war. The Russians are known to be working on a jet intercommental bomber.

The U.S. Air Force already regards its superior B-36 as semi-obsolescent and is going into production by the end of this year on its successor — the B-52 all-jet heavy bomber. These planes will have the range to fly from U.S. bases to targets anywhere in the U.S.S.R. and return to home base nonstop. The United States has three types of medium bombers capable of carrying atomic bombs to Russia by using overseas bases. These are: the old B-29; the B-50, which is a modernization of the B-29; and the B-47, which is an all-jet plane.

The backbone of the Russian bomber force is still the TU-4. This plane has a range of about 4000 miles. The Russians are believed to have between 400 and 500 of these planes. The Russians have recently extended the runways of their airfields in Eastern Germany. We must presume that they have done the same with runways in the Murmansk area of European Russia and on the Chukotoski peninsula at the northern tip of Siberia. They can reach any point in the United States from these three areas by one-way bombing. From the Chukotoski peninsula they can reach the northwest corner of the United States with the TU-4 and return.

A second controlling factor is the number of targets which must be hit in order to do vital injury to the opponent. American industry, communications, and transportation are less vulnerable than Russian in the sense that there are more elements at more widely scattered places. There is only one TransSiberian Railway. There are many transcontinental American railways. Russia’s oil comes largely from Baku. American oil comes from a dozen states as widely separated as Pennsylvania and California, Texas and Wyoming. It is a fair estimate that to do a given amount of damage Russia would have to hit three times as many targets in the United States as we would have to hit in Russia.

On the other hand, Russian pilots would probably find targets more easily in well-charted America than American pilots could find them in Russia, particularly that part of Russia beyond the line of farthermost German advance. Also, the Russians could become less vulnerable by further conquest if that could be done without general war. Capture of Middle East oil would reduce their dependence on Baku and give us more oil targets to have to hit to make a strategic bombing operation effective.

To summarize the evidence so far: the United States has many more atomic bombs at this time, better planes with which to deliver them, and fewer targets which must be hit to achieve a decisive effect. However, the Russians could reach any point in the United States with their existing heavy bombers, and they possess something up to 200 atomic bombs. There is not the slightest reasonable doubt that in the event of war the United States would have to sustain a heavy attack of atomic bombs.

The last major factor in the atomic bombing equation is ability to protect against the bombing attack. We are told that while the United States has been building television sets the Russians have been building a radar screen. There is some truth in this and it has been useful towards arousing American public opinion to the dangers inherent in the situation. But the factories which have been pouring out TV sets in the United States also provide a broad industrial base for radar defenses. Probably there is more nearly equality in the development of a radar warning net in the two countries than in the other two areas. The United States has its embryonic net protecting the most vital areas of the country, just as Russia does. American planes skirting the borders of Russia have maintained a constant check on the development of the Russian defenses, as the Russians have on the American net. Evidence would indicate that the ability to detect an approaching attack is about equal on both sides. The same applies in the area of interceptor fighters. The best defense against atomic attack is the radar screen plus the jet interceptor. Both sides have modern jet interceptors. It is doubtful that either side has the advantage in radar warning or jet interception capacity. Given the determination, American factories could turn out radar sets and jet interceptors faster than the Soviet Union.

Antiaircraft artillery is another element in defense against atomic attack. Less is known about Russian progress here. It may be substantial or negligible. American progress is substantial. The proximity fuse has been wedded to the self-tracking gun. The guided ground-to-air missile would play a part in any new war. We can be certain that not all the Russian planes which took off for America would drop their bombs on the intended target.

3

THE time may come when the elements in aerial defense will reach such a peak of development that aerial bombing by piloted planes will cease to be profitable militarily. However, that time is not here, or even remotely in sight. At present the bomber is still ahead of the radar screen, the interceptor plane, and the antiaircraft gun. A majority of the big bombers would deliver their bombs at or near the target. The accuracy of American bombing should be higher than of Russian, but there is no proof that it is. The U.S. Air Defense Command hopes to bring down or divert 30 per cent of the planes in an enemy bombing attack. This would be under ideal—and unlikely — conditions. The air defenders will feel that they have done all that could reasonably be expected if the score is 10 per cent. The Strategic Air Command hopes that nine out of every ten U.S. bombers which cross the Russian frontier will get home safely after dropping their bombs on target, but is prepared for heavier losses.

Thus the weight of the atomic blow which the United States is able to deliver on Russia exceeds the weight of the atomic blow which Russia is able to deliver on the United States. If we use the working ratio of five to one for numbers of bombs in stockpiles, and the ratio of one to three for numbers of targets which must be hit to achieve decisive results, and include in our calculations that the United States is much better off than Russia in facilities for two-way as opposed to one-way bombing, it follows that if it came to atomic war at the present time the United States would be able theoretically to deliver a blow from which the Russian industrial, transportation, and communication systems could not recover. On the other hand, the United States probably could pick itself up off the floor after receiving the Russian blow and regain its warmaking capacity although it would be hurt cruelly.

The United States could deliver an initial blow as hard as the total potential Russian blow. And such an initial American blow could be repeated four or five times, or more, depending on the actual size of the two stockpiles.

However, Russia does have atomic bombs and Russia has the ability to deliver her atomic bombs on targets in every part of the United States. Each Russian bomb delivered on or near target would do relatively the same amount of damage to the United States that a thousand blockbusters of World War II type were able to do on Germany and Japan.

There can be no absolute certainty that the American atomic blow would put Russia out of the war even though it should inflict a crippling blow on Russia itself. The Russian ground forces probably still possess the capacity to overrun Europe even though Russia herself is devastated. They could do this from existing stockpiles of ammunition and equipment and by living off the land of conquered countries. The Russian high command might even attempt to transfer its headquarters out of Russia and carry on a war of sorts trying to use non-Russian factories and non-Russian Communists as replacements for what had been lost in Russia.

In all reason the United States will maintain a numerical lead over the Russians both in numbers of atomic bombs and in the quality of planes with which to deliver them. Russia is of course at the same time increasing the weight of the blow which it can strike at the United States.

4

THE greatest dangers to the United States inherent in this situation do not derive from the fact that Russia is increasing the absolute weight of its atomic blow. The old equilibrium which existed before 1949 is gone. It can never be restored in its original form. The ability the Failed States possessed before 1949 to deliver an atomic blow from a base immune to the same kind of blow ended with the first Russian atomic bomb. That particular kind of immunity can never be regained. However, it was not that immunity to retaliation in kind which made our atomic weapon a deterrent before 1949. If our bomb was a deterrent to Russia before 1949, it continues to be a deterrent today, for our blow can and will be able to do mortal injury to Russia so long as we retain the capacity to use it, no matter how many bombs and bombers the Russians themselves obtain. What changes is Russia’s rising ability to retaliate in kind. There is no diminishment of our power to injure Russia. At present, at least, that power is rising.

Our greatest immediate danger is that through laxness the Russians might find a moment when they could hit us without being hit in return. We have our bomb pointed at them. They have theirs pointed at us. The man who threatens me with a gun is not likely to pull the trigger if he knows that my gun will kill him at the precise moment he shoots. He might pull the trigger if I dropped my gun, or if he could knock it from my hand. The only presently visible way by which the Russians could knock our gun from our hand would be by destroying most of our bombing planes on the ground through a combination of political action, sabotage, and surprise attack.

The longer danger to the United States — the danger which appears to be overlooked in the MacArthur concept of American strategy—lies in the possibility that the Russians might undermine our system of overseas alliances. This could be fatal, because the alliances are the foundation of our atomic striking power. If that striking power could be applied to the full, independently of alliances, then it would be militarily possible for the United States to base its security on its own citadel. But that is not the case. It is true that without secondary overseas bases our B-36 bombers, and the future B-52 bombers, could reach targets in Russia and return to the United States with the aid of refueling devices. But these planes cost as much as a light destroyer. They are incredibly complicated to operate. It takes years to train a crew. Only the best human material is suitable and there is a limit to the quantity available. These big bombers do not come in thousands as did the “Flying Forts” of the last war. You count them by the tens. And while in theory they can operate without secondary bases, in practice the rate of attrition without such bases probably would be exorbitant.

Thus the bulk of the Strategic Air Command Mission must rest on the medium bombers (B-29, B-50, B-47). These planes are dependent on secondary bases. The only useful secondary bases owned outright by the United States are those in Alaska. All the others — Saudi Arabia, Africa, Germany, France, Britain, the Azores, Iceland, Canada, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines — derive from our alliances. The alliances are as essential to the success of the SAC Mission as are the bombers. One without the other would be meaningless.

Failure on our part to balance out Russia’s ground strength at least as fast as Russia balances out our atomic strength could be just as fatal, although less immediately so, as damage to the system of alliances. The two are of course related closely. The United States alone is not capable of producing ground strength equal to Russia. The only possible way the Russians can be balanced out is by the organization of an Allied army based on a population comparable to that of the Russian bloc. That brings us back again to the urgency of alliances. The controlling consideration here is that if Russia can maintain her relative superiority in ground strength while at the same time narrowing the gap in atomic striking power, the time comes when the Russian land army becomes the decisive weapon in the military balance.

These considerations explain the prime concentration of Russian foreign policy on the effort to break up the Western alliances. They also explain the constant harping of Russian propaganda on our system of air bases. If a combination of satellite aggressions, Communist fifth columns, and synthetic Russian-inspired “neutralism” could break up the American system of bases, then the SAC Mission would become unachievable. Russia in that event would have obtained effective immunity from the American atomic bomb — would have “outflanked “ our atomic lend.

5

THE reverse of this proposition contains the key to our own ultimate security and tranquillity. If we can retain our superior immediate striking power with our atomic weapons and at the same time find the means to outflank Russia’s ground power, then the time will come when the military balance will shift decisively to our advantage and it will no longer be either safe or possible for Russia to challenge the coalition of free countries. The way to such an “outflanking” of Russian ground power is by broader and stronger alliances. Military power rests upon territory, raw materials, industry, and population. Ultimately, the broader base sustains the greater power. Russia’s apparent long-term strategy is to broaden her base while avoiding war. At present we are beginning to check the broadening of the Russian base. Since Korea the Western system of alliances has grown stronger, not weaker. The question over the long term — the next ten years, the next half century — is whether we will succeed in holding together an alliance possessing a broader base in territory, raw materials, industry, and population than do the Russians.

There is a possible immediate application of these “breadth of base” factors which cannot be overlooked. While it seems implausible that the Russians would deliberately choose war now in view of the weight of the blow which SAC could, and would, deliver, we must include in our calculations the possibility that the Russian leaders are prepared to hit now rather than risk the ultimate decline of their cause and frustration of their purposes.

At the present time, when Russian ground strength is not yet equalized or neutralized, it is a theoretical possibility that the Russian army could sweep outside its home areas and sustain itself indefinitely on the fields and factories of countries it could capture quickly and which we would be extremely reluctant to bomb. This sort of thing has never been done successfully on a large scale. In effect, it was Hannibal’s attempted strategy against Rome. We must, however, recognize that any sudden deterioration in our system of alliances would give this strategy a dangerously high chance of success. Suppose that “neutralism” should become dominant in the British Commonwealth and South America. Suppose that Communism should sweep through Japan and the Philippines. Suppose that the Russians could manipulate these developments to accord with a sudden sweep of Russian armies across Western Europe. If the price of such advances were the destruction of Russian home industry it is a price which the leaders of Russia might be willing to pay.

The only sure protection against either the longrange possibility of Russia attaining a stronger base for her military power or of attempting a wartime strategy of shifting her base from home to foreign soil is the system of alliances which can retain for America the broader military base. Here is where the swift revival of American sea power since Korea makes a difference in today’s equation. Our overseas secondary air bases depend on our alliances. An alliance is a two-way bargain. A country certain to be overrun in event of war will be understandably reluctant to grant base rights which would invite retribution after an occupation. A country possessing reasons for thinking it can prevent an occupation by Russia will more willingly grant base rights for the use of American bombers. American sea power is the weapon which can bring support to a country such as Turkey which is of first importance to the success of an aerial attack on Russia. Bases in Turkey might make the difference between the success or failure of aerial attack on Russian oil supplies. The United States and Turkey are discussing an alliance which would guarantee base rights in Turkey to the U.S. Air Force in the event of war. This possibility is the product partly of increased American confidence in Turkish military prowess, partly of increased Turkish confidence in the ability of American sea power to maintain sea communications to Turkey and thus to assure to Turkey at least a flow of arms and ammunition.

There is still more immediate importance to this factor. American sea power is a device which can reduce the present importance of Russia’s ground strength in the military equation. Red Fleet has charged that the United States and Britain are preparing offensive war against the Black Sea coast of Russia. Red Fleet is well informed though it gives a false twist to the facts. The British and American navies do not contemplate an exclusive role of running cargoes to Britain in the event of war. They have never been accustomed to playing passive roles in wartime. In the event of a war with Russia both contemplate, and have plans for, extensive operations against Russia from the Arctic, the Baltic, and the Black Sea — but most vigorously from the Black Sea. War in Europe would by no means be just a matter of the Russian army striking for the English Channel and a Western army trying to halt it at the Elbe or Rhine. General Eisenhower’s plans call for a bigger and more complex operation. He is doing his best to organize the defense of Elbe or Rhine. He and his staff planners also think in terms of flank pressures which would reduce the force which Russia could project against Elbe or Rhine.

Much is made of Russia’s capacity to mobilize 300 divisions for war. That is an awesome number. Obviously, if 300 or even 200 Russian divisions could reach the Rhine some of them could also sweep on to the Channel. But Russia dares not commit its entire ground army to such an operation. American submarines know their way through the Dardanelles, and their way into the Baltic. Granted, it would only be in the final victorious stages of a war that cruisers, battleships, or aircraft carriers would penetrate those inland seas. But there are smaller and faster ships which could enter them. Commando raids on the Russian Black Sea coast would be feasible from the opening week of a war. There is potential defection in the Ukraine. Perhaps risings could be stimulated. Whether that happens, even light raids on the Black Sea coast would cause Moscow to give thought to her southern front. Russia must protect herself against a repetition in modern form of the diversion which the Western allies projected against that same front in the war of 1854-56 when an Anglo-French expedition landed in the Crimea and caused Moscow to abandon its designs upon Constantinople. The lesson of the Crimean War is not forgotten in London or Washington. We may be sure it has not been overlooked in Moscow.

American air and sea power could bring aid to the Finns, who, in the event of a general war, would be conducting guerrilla operations against the northern flank of Russia. There would be possibilities for landings along the coast of Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. We still have some friends in those countries in spite of liquidations and enforced migrations.

Actually, if war came soon the Russians would start not with their full, ultimate 300 divisions, but with their first line of 175 divisions. By the time they had taken suitable precautions for their many frontiers, their supply and communication lines, and the “loyalty” of their satellites they would probably not be able to put more than 100 on the Elbe. Of those, not above 75 and more probably only some 60 would reach the Rhine. That is why General Eisenhower talks of making Western Europe defensible with some 60 Western divisions.

6

THE immediate problem facing Western military leaders is the problem of how to pen the Russian army inside the Russian frontiers. When and if this problem can be solved we can look into the future with considerably more composure than at present. At that time the Russians would be deprived of any serious prospect of being able to sustain a long war outside of Russia regardless of atomic attacks upon their home bases. They would also be deprived of the prospect of the long-term broadening of their military base.

The possible answer to this problem must be a complex of many factors. The “new weapons” are important as one means to the perfection of a European army which could withstand the Russian ground assault. The recoilless cannon firing the shaped charge, the atomic artillery shell, selfaiming artillery—these and many more can be a part of the answer. One important component missing at present is adequate tactical air support for ground forces. When TAC — Tactical Air Command — comes into its own alongside of SAC, we will be nearer the day when we can see Europe strong and defensible. We will also be nearer the day when we can consider our system of alliances proof against Russian military threats, diplomatic subversion, Communist infiltration and propaganda.

What we are driving for now is a system of alliances which can (1) prevent Russia from eliminating the present system of secondary air bases upon which our atomic striking power rests, (2) prevent Russia from securing a long-term military base adequate for military domination of the world, and (3) give to the United States and its allies a clear and continuing ability to win a war against Russia.

At the present time we are holding against the Russian effort to expand her long-term military base. The Russians have been checked in Europe since the capture of Czechoslovakia in 1948. The Chinese Communists have not yet succeeded in gaining provinces outside of China proper.

At the present time we are holding our system of secondary bases and the alliances upon which they rest. In fact we are gaining in this area of our military power.

We certainly have the possibility of gaining consistently over the Russians in all areas of military power except atomic striking power. We gain there in the absolute, but not relatively. They are bound to creep up on our lead. The question is whether we can generate sufficient compensation in the other areas in time.

Of course it remains to be seen how far we will convert our possibilities into realities. Our very will is a basic factor in the military balance. Like every other factor it is a variable. There is nothing static in the balance of military power. To keep and to improve our present military position we must constantly search for, and find, new weapons and new techniques in the air, at sea, and on the land. To keep and to improve our military position our diplomacy must hold all the allies we have today, and find us new ones. In order that our diplomacy may keep present allies and find us new ones, our social and economic policies must help, not hinder, the friendships we would keep and gain. Finally, our moral position must attract, not repel. The security of the Republic depends on constant gains in every field of power — and in this kind of power race an ethical point can be as weighty as a new weapon.