The United Nations

on the World Today

THE initial decision of the Security Council to come to the aid of South Korea set in motion an explosive sequence which subjected the United Nations to the most severe strains. The decision to stop the aggression in South Korea was possible only because Jacob Malik was sulking in his Long Island tent, displeased over the continued presence of Nationalist China at the Council table.

This fact accounts to a large extent for the almost absolute authority entrusted to General MacArthur as supreme commander of the UN forces. When, on August 1, Mr. Malik returned as president of the Council, General MacArthur had all the authority and discretionary power he needed. It was his war and no Soviet veto could interfere with its conduct.

Another problem was the mobilization of United Nations forces. In Chapter VII of the Charter, detailed provisions are made for the contribution of armed forces, assistance, and facilities from Member States, under the direction of the Security Council with the advice and assistance of the Military Staff Committee. But, long before the current emergency, all attempts by the Council and the Military Staff Committee to plan for the organization of United Nations forces to be used in the case of aggression had collapsed because of the fundamental disagreement between the Soviet Union and the other permanent members of ihe Council.

The military action taken in Korea, therefore, had to be based on the forces available at the time. These consisted chiefly of the American forces under General MacArthur’s command in Japan. Additional help in the form of troops, naval and air services, was later drawn from the United States, and men and supplies were contributed voluntarily by other Member States at the invitation of the Security Council.

The fact that, during the course of the war, the bulk of the military, naval, and air forces engaged in Korea have been American forces has obviously strengthened General MacArthur’s position as supreme commander and made it more difficult for the United Nations to reassert its authority in important military and political decisions.

The first critical decision was faced kite in September when representatives of the sixty nations were gathering at Lake Success lor the fifth session of the General Assembly. By that time, United Nations forces in Korea, after their desperate defense of the Pusan beachhead, had struck north, carried out a brilliant amphibious operation at Inchon, reoccupied Seoul, and were facing the 38th parallel.

Crossing the 38th paralled

The question was: Should United Nations forces press their assault against the retreating North Korean forces beyond the 38th parallel: From a purely military point of view there was much to be said in favor of this action. To stop at the 38th parallel would allow the North Korean army to reinforce its units in preparation for a counteroffensive. By this time, United Nations commanders did not underestimate the fighting ability of the North Koreans. Moreover, if the intention of the United Nations action was not only to repel aggression but also to make possible the emergence of a free and unified state in the whole of Korea, then, it was argued, the United Nations had to assert its authority over the whole of Korea.

On the other side was the potent argument that to drive north of the parallel into North Korean territory was to risk a serious if not disastrous spread of the war. How real that danger was became known to the General Assembly on October 5 when Chou Fn-lai, the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China, warned that China “would not stand idly by" if the 38th parallel was crossed.

On October 7 the General Assembly took its first action on the Korean situation. It passed a resolution entitled “The Problem of the Independence of Korea,”which recommended that steps should be taken “for the establishment of a unified and independent Government in the sovereign State of Korea" and insisted that United Nations forces should remain in Korea only long enough to achieve the objectives specified in the resolution. Other parts of the resolution called for the appointment of a Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, mapped out its functions, and dealt with certain economic and rehabilitation measures which were considered essential.

It is claimed on good authority that the drafters of this resolution did not contemplate the crossing of the 38th parallel as a necessary step in its implementation. It must be admitted, however, that the vagueness of the resolution’s language and the emphasis it placed on the unification and independence of Korea as a major I nited Nations objective provided some justification for the continued drive nort lnvard.

The Chinese Communists move

Three weeks after the passage of the General Assembly resolution Chinese troops were pouring over the Manchurian frontier. During the first week in November, General MacArthur’s headquarters reported that at least three divisions were in action against United Nations forces which, having driven north in places as far as the Yalu River, were forced to retreat as much as 50 to 100 miles. The Chinese forces were then mysteriously withdrawn, and for two weeks there was a lull on the northern front.

This lull gave both the Security Council and the General Assembly an opportunity to consider the startling new crisis that had developed. It was quite clear not only that Chou En-lai had made good his warning but that the presence of United Nations forces close to the Chinese-Korean frontier was being considered by Peking as a direct menace to China’s security.

On November 10 a resolution introduced into the Security Council calling for the retirement of the Chinese armies stated that once a united, independent, and democratic nation was established in Korea, United Nations forces would be withdrawn. The resolution went on to state that it was “the policy of the United Nations to hold the frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone.” On November 17, President Truman assured the Chinese government that the United States and the United Nations had no aggressive designs against China.

That the Peking government did not take these assurances very seriously was to be seen in a radio broadcast from Peking two days after the President had spoken. The broadcast claimed that America had lied and smashed its way across the world into Chinese territory, had seized Formosa, and was threatening another neighbor, Indo-China. In a note to the United Nations, it justified its aid to North Korea as aimed at repelling American aggression. In a further effort to quiet Chinese suspicions, on November 22 the Government of the United Kingdom, through its Chargé d’Affaires in Peking, reaffirmed United Nations objectives in Korea and insisted that the achievement of these objectives held no threat for the security of China or for its interests in the area.

Two days later, on November 24, General MacArthur launched his major offensive, designed to end the war, into territory close to and extending along the whole length of the Chinese frontier. Almost immediately the Chinese counteroffensive was launched in such mass that with great difficulty the United Nations forces were able to extricate themselves and fall back to positions far to the south.

The news of this disaster was presented to the Security Council on November 28 in a communiqué from the supreme commander announcing that “an entirely new war faced United Nations forces.”It was on this day that Peking’s representative, General Wu chuan-chuan, appeared before the Council. Refusing to answer directly to charges of Chinese aggression directed to him by the United States representative, Warren Austin, he repeated China’s accusations of American aggression and justified the actions of Chinese “volunteers” who had crossed into Korea to participate in the great liberation struggle of the Korean people.

On November 30 the six-nation motion asking for the withdrawal of Chinese troops received a 9 to 1 vote in the Council. The single vote of the Soviet Union constituted a veto. At this point, decisive responsibility for the Korean situation passed to the General Assembly. On December 6 the Security Council resolution was assigned to the Assembly’s Political Committee.

The General Assembly takes over

It had long been realized that the General Assembly would have to assume responsibilities in the Korean war which could not be carried by the vetoblocked Security Council. On November 3 a resolution originally introduced by Secretary of State Acheson passed the plenary session by an overwhelming vote.

This resolution established a procedure under which the Assembly, in cases of emergency and where the Security Council had failed to act, could mobilize the collective strength of the majority against a nation judged to be an aggressor. The resolution set up a Peace Observation Commission and a Collective Measures Committee through which threats to the peace could be reported and acted upon. Previously, such actions had been the prerogative of the Council. The motion provided that the Assembly could be called into emergency session on 24-hour notice.

It might have been assumed that the General Assembly that had made this drastic decision would be prepared to take bold steps in the face of the Chinese threat. But by the time the Security Council resolution requesting withdrawal of Chinese troops reached the Political Committee the overriding concern among the majority of the members was to avoid a general war in Asia.

To the West European nations, involvement in war in Asia meant reduction in the quantity of aid available for Europe. To them, the Soviet Union and not China was the big threat. The nations of the British Commonwealth, with long experience in critical international relations, thought it was utterly unnecessary to become involved in an unlimited war. To the nations of Asia and the Near East — and these nations had played an increasingly significant role in recent assemblies — a war in Asia, with its East-versus-West connotations, was the eventuality most to be feared.

U.S.-British rift

The most serious rift at this time developed between the policy of the United States and that of the United Kingdom, the two major powers on whose unity of purpose depended the security of the West. Almost at the very moment when in London Foreign Secretary Bevin was urging that the first essential was to stabilize the military situation in Korea and explore a political settlement, in Washington President Truman was speaking about strengthening military defenses in order to meet the threat of aggression elsewhere and was mentioning with too much ambiguity the possible use of the atom bomb. It was the atom bomb reference, overplayed in the world’s press, that brought Prime Minister Attlee to Washington to urge moderation in American policy. Truman and Attlee were in conference in Washington when the Korean question once more came on the agenda of the Political Committee.

The temper of the Assembly was revealed by the fact that priority was given not to the Security Council resolution but to action sponsored by thirteen Asian and Arab states, under the leadership of Sir Benegal N. Rau of India, which pointed towards a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement of the Korean war. A similar proposal had been made a few days earlier in a speech at Ottawa by Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson.

In two resolutions the Asian-Arab group suggested that the President of the Assembly, Nasrollah Entezam of Iran, name a three-man committee, including himself, to “determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea could be arranged,”and that a second committee be appointed to “make recommendations for a peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”

The first resolution was adopted with little delay on December 14; only the Soviet group objected. The second resolution was not voted on. The President named Sir Benegal and Mr. Pearson as the other members.

The first task of this cease-fire committee was to draft a working basis for negotiations which might lead to a peaceful settlement. The elements in this proposal, which was presented to the Political Committee on January 11, were, first, the working out of arrangements for the cease-fire which could be done if there were a lull in hostilities; second, provision for the withdrawal from Korea of all nonKorean forces so that, without pressure, the Korean people under international provision could decide their own future; third, the working out of international arrangements for the administration of Korea and the maintenance of peace until such time as national authorities were constituted; fourth, negotiations of outstanding issues in the Far East, including the question of the admission to the United Nations of the People’s Republic of China and the question of the future of Formosa.

With military events still going against the United Nations forces, the Soviet Union interpreted this proposal as a device to enable UN armies to regroup and consolidate. The first reply from the Peking government echoed, to some degree, ihe Soviet attitude. At the request of the Canadian and British Prime Ministers, additional clarification of the Chinese reply was sought through India’s ambassador in Peking.

In its second statement, the Chinese government accepted in principle the idea that the arrangement of a ceasefire should be the first order of business before a seven-nation conference as suggested by the good-offices committee. By this time it was apparent that the American government, exasperated by Chinese and Soviet attacks on their intentions in Asia, weighed down by the responsibilities of carrying the brunt of the war, subjected to the sharpest criticism in Congress and in the press for going along with the “appeasement" group, would credit Peking with no good faith in its reply. Austin, describing the hinese clarification as “a transparent effort to divide the free world,”dismissed it as “not much more than a postcard.”

The “aggressor resolulion”

By now a United States resolution to brand China an aggressor had gathered momentum and most of the nations who hud rallied with hope behind the Asian-Arab cease-fire plan had, in their disillusionment with Chinese intentions, swung to its support. The majority, however, was not assured for the resolution until it became evident that the judgment was a “moral" one and not likely to be followed by sanctions of a serious nature.

Even when it came the vote was reluctant. Mr. Pearson, in pledging his vote, described the American resolution as “premature and unwise.”Rau predicted that it would end all chances of negotiating a peaceful settlement. Walter Lippmann, pointing out that the vote had revealed that we have no important supporters in Asia, said: “The victory for which Mr. Austin said he thanked God is a self-inflicted American defeat.”

No action in these days of uneasy balance is ever as final as it appears at the moment it is taken. The “aggressor resolution “ marked the end of the first serious attempt to end the Korean war by negotiation. But the General Assembly, held in session months beyond its normal span, had not lost hope of averting the Big War.