Science and National Security

by L. A. DuBRIDGE

1

THE strength of any nation — for peace or for war— is critically dependent on the strength and quality of its laboratories of pure and applied science. In 1940 there existed in this country a large, active, and well-trained body of scientists, working for the most part in university laboratories. There existed also a strong group of industrial laboratories, manned by engineers and scientists working on the applications of scientific knowledge to new and improved industrial products. Finally, the military services operated a group of laboratories devoted to the development of military weapons and techniques.

With the coming of war, our military laboratories were, of course, greatly enlarged and multiplied and our industrial laboratories were diverted to military problems. The university scientists were mobilized, largely under the Office of Scientific Research and Development, in newly created weapon development centers located chiefly on university campuses and operated by the universities under government contract. It was from these university laboratories that many of the most spectacular new weapons and techniques emerged: radar, the proximity fuse, rockets, the atomic bomb.

The university scientists actually deserted their basic science for the duration of the war and became engineers. They stopped their search for new knowledge and began applying their knowledge to the immediate task of winning the war. No one will deny that they were extraordinarily successful. Scientists working as engineers made a great contribution to victory.

Science helped win the war because it was strong before the war. The nation’s supply of scientisis had been built up over many years under peacetime conditions. And it was built up not in laboratories devoted to military weapon development, but in university laboratories devoted to pure science.

Unless we want to fight the next war solely with the weapons of the last (a sure way of losing it), we must restore our laboratories of basic science and resume the training of new scientists. Without these men and the new knowledge which they will in the meantime discover, there will be no more new weapons of science. We must avoid hiding behind a Maginot Line of atomic bombs.

We have a triple task to face — the maintenance of pure science plus the maintenance of two fields of applied science, military and civilian. These three tasks cannot go forward side by side in the same laboratory under the same conditions. Military research requires military organization and military secrecy. Industrial research involves industrial organization and a modest amount of trade secrecy. Pure science tolerates no imposed organization and no secrecy. And unless pure science thrives, all applied science must eventually die.

How can we establish the conditions under which pure science will thrive?

There are two essential requirements: freedom and financial support. Freedom of the individual scientist to pursue his own line of research without interference, to reach his own conclusions, to publish his results and discuss them with others — this is the sine qua non of a virile science. On no other basis can it move ahead. It progresses only through the combined and coordinated efforts of many men in many laboratories.

That is why science has always flourished most fully in universities where the atmosphere of freedom has long prevailed. It is in the universities, too, that fresh young minds are continually coming in to ask new questions and carry on the never ending search for truth. The pursuit of basic science and the training of new scientists are closely tied together.

Unless we as a nation are willing to guard and cherish the freedom of science as vigorously as we defend freedom of speech and freedom of the press, we might as well stop pretending that we want a strong science. One of the gravest mistakes made by Hitler, and more recently by Stalin, is the purge of scientists who espoused scientific theories which were said to be contrary to the party philosophy. Why on earth should we copy them!

The costs of scientific research are very high in comparison with the funds available in hard-pressed university budgets. But they are minuscule when compared with the national defense budget or with the funds for the development of weapons.

The Federal government is currently spending close to a billion dollars a year on weapon development. But it is spending less than one twentieth of this amount on pure science. And the distressing thing is that this money is coming almost entirely through agencies primarily devoted to military problems—namely, the National Military Establishment and the Atomic Energy Commission. A free science cannot develop if it is forced to compete for funds with battleships and atomic bombs; or if it must prove its worth solely in terms of military weapons; or if in the eyes of the public it comes to be regarded as primarily an agency of national defense and subject, therefore, to military controls and military secrecy.

2

JUST how science suffers when it is dependent on our military program may be illustrated by the problems the Atomic Energy Commission has had to face. By the terms of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 the AEC is charged with responsibility for the development of atomic energy for both military and peaceful purposes, and for the encouragement and support of basic research in nuclear science and allied fields. No group of men ever had a more difficult assignment. The members of the Commission and its chairman, David Lilienthal, deserve far more credit than they have received for their Herculean efforts to bring order out of a chaos of conflicting requirements.

When the AEC first took over the atomic energy enterprise, it was confronted with the task of rebuilding a vast organization which had largely dissolved between the end of the war and the day the Commissioners took office a year and a half later. On V-J Day everyone said, “The war is over, let’s go home.” And go home they did—hundreds, thousands, of scientists, engineers, mechanics, secretaries, workers. The AEC had to rebuild from the ground up.

The Commission’s first task in the field of research was in its own laboratories. Not only were many problems of science crying for solution at Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Argonne (Chicago), and other places, but two great laboratories largely devoted to basic research (rather than the development of bombs or of nuclear power) had already been created— the Radiation Laboratory of the University of California at Berkeley, and The Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island, operated under a contract with a group of nine Eastern universities. The Commission knew that a strong nuclear science requires a broad base. There must be many centers of research at many universities.

The AEC made a good start in this direction. One step was the transferring of funds to the Office of Naval Research, which had built up a nuclear physics program. At present the AEC is developing the direct support of university programs in nuclear physics, chemistry, radiation biology, and other allied fields. It has also expanded the program, initiated by the Manhattan District, of making radioactive isotopes, manufactured at Oak Ridge, available at modest cost to research laboratories. This has probably been the AEC’s most valuable contribution to science to date.

In addition the AEC, noting the great shortage of scientists, wisely decided to finance an expanded fellowship program, operated by the highly successful National Research Council.

The NRC is an agency of the National Academy of Sciences, an organization comprising the top 450 American scientists. After World War I the NRC was given funds by the Rockefeller Foundation to provide advanced research experience and training to the most promising of the country’s annual crop of Ph.D.’s in science. These carefully selected men and women were provided stipends to carry on research for two years at leading research centers in the United States or in Europe. An astonishingly large percentage of the leading scientists of the country, and of those prominent in the war program, got their start as NRC Fellows.

It was natural then for the AEC in 1947 to turn again to the NRC to assist in the training of the huge new crop of scientists now so sorely needed. And it was natural too for the AEC to authorize the NRC to follow its previous policies and procedures in the selection of its Fellows.

All went well at first. Over 500 new NRC Fellows were carrying on their graduate or post-doctoral studies in the universities all over the country. They were studying physics, chemistry, biology, or medicine — all fields of critical shortages.

And then a Congressional committee discovered that one of these students was an avowed Communist, and the storm broke. Charges of “incredible mismanagement ” burst into print.

To understand the public’s reaction, we must go back and analyze the relation between secrecy and national security.

One cannot build a strong base of fundamental science in this country under a blanket of secrecy. Since a strong basic science is essential to national security, secrecy imposed in this area runs directly contrary to national security. And here is the heart of the present AEC trouble. In its activities directed toward the practical development of nuclear energy, secrecy is imposed by law. In its support of basic science, secrecy is neither necessary nor desirable; in fact, it is impossible. The AEC is in for continued trouble, unless or until the public and the Congress more clearly understand the duality of function and of policy under which the Commission must operate.

Developing atomic weapons and nuclear power plants simultaneously is in itself a tough problem in applied science. It becomes immeasurably tougher because some of the secrets of the military field intrude into the power field where open nonsecret development would speed up the program and bring additional industrial resources and talent into the picture. However, since even the industrial aspects are still applied rather than pure science and must go forward in large laboratories under close AEC supervision, the secrecy problem here is not insurmountable.

But to apply these same secrecy conditions to a large number of university laboratories, which are seeking knowledge rather than developing devices or techniques, impairs or destroys the freedom essential to the full flowering of creative science.

3

THE most difficult and most exasperating of all the phases of the secrecy problem is that concerned with what is called personnel security. When an agency employs persons to work on a project involving national security, each person employed is required to undergo investigation by the FBI and a security clearance. Naturally and properly, we wish to take no chances with vital national secrets.

It sounds very simple. There are just two difficulties: —

1. How do we draw the line between what are vital national secrets and what are not ?

2. How do we decide whether any given person really can be trusted with such secrets?

Obviously only a tiny fraction of the vast area of basic science can be classified as secret. Scientific information always has been and always should be freely published. However, a piece of information which might assist a potential enemy in designing a specific weapon or military technique must be classified.

But where do we draw the line? We do not think of classifying scientific data on the properties or behavior of steel for fear a potential enemy might use such data in the design of a gun. Should we classify the nuclear properties of the element iron for fear such data might help a rival design a better case for an atomic bomb? There are many who answer this question with a yes, on the ground that if there is any risk at all of helping a rival design a bomb, we should not take it.

But wait! That same information if published might materially assist a friendly scientist or engineer to make an important advance in our own art of making bombs — or of making steel. More important, it might lead to an important advance in our knowledge of atomic nuclei. We might thus gain far more than we lose by publishing this information. Does the risk outweigh the possible gain?

All of this bears directly on how to answer the second question — of who may safely be entrusted with secrets. Every human being is some security risk. How do we judge for which ones the risk may be regarded as negligible?

Of course, if a man is to be employed to work in the bomb design division at Los Alamos, we must have him thoroughly investigated by the FBI. The FBI investigation involves an inquiry into the candidate’s present and past activities, associations, affiliations, and political opinions, and also those of his relatives and friends. If there is significant “derogatory information” in his record we will say no — even if the information is only a hint that the candidate becomes carelessly voluble at cocktail parties.

But suppose the man is to be employed at Brookhaven National Laboratory, where most of the work has only the remotest connection with bomb design or manufacture. Should we require the same clearance procedure? At present we do. There has been some attempt to arrive at a less rigid type of clearance than the Los Alamos. But a satisfactory policy of “partial clearance” has not yet been achieved.

And now consider the case of a candidate for an NRC Fellowship — who is not to work near any secret information at all, but who is to study at a university laboratory. Shall such a student be subjected to an FBI investigation? The AFC said no.

Here are a few of its reasons: —

1. No problem of security is involved, for no secret data are in question.

2. If the NRC Fellow should ever in future be employed by the AEC, he will then first be cleared, if secret work is involved.

3. The Army ‘s own Veterans Administration did not require FBI clearance or even a non-Comnnmist oath before awarding a GI scholarship.

4. NRC’s long Fellowship experience and success seemed adequate assurance of a well-directed program. The AEC did not see the necessity for government interference.

5. Because FBI investigation includes inquiries as to political opinions, no one wanted to have this procedure injected into the determination of fitness for an educational appointment. Education and polities, it was felt, did not mix.

So the AEC went ahead with its program, allowing the National Research Council to select its people as before, and taking part itself only to the extent of paying for the Fellowships.

Then someone discovered Hans Freisladt. This young man was a veteran, He had gone through the University of Chicago on a GI scholarship given him without demur by the Veterans Administration. He had never come near an “atomic secret.” and at the time he was noticed, he was studying the theory of relativity at the University of North Carolina. But he admitted to being a Communist.

Why all the hullabaloo? Clearly because most people assumed that “atomic secrets" and national security were involved. And perhaps also because people just don’t like the idea of “giving government money to somebody who believes in the overthrow of the government.

But the question is more important than one of money. We must recognize that in extending FBI investigation to nonsecret fields we are playing with fire. We are getting pretty close to the Gestapo type of purge of persons whose political opinions are not “right.” If a single person, in an FBI investigalion, casts aspersions on the character or associations of the man being investigated, this goes down in the report under the head of “derogatory information.”Would you like to have your job or career threatened by the aspersions cast by your worst enemywho would remain anonymous?

The hysteria over submitting nonsecret workers to FBI investigation has appalling implications. The government grants money to hundreds of worthy students. The AFC-NRC program is only one of many. The U.S. Forestry Service, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Soil Conservation Service, the Weather Bureau, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the National Bureau of Standards, the Bureau of Labor Statistics— and many other Federal bureaus and depart merit s, as well as hundreds of state bureaus and departments — pay out government money in scholarships to outstanding students. Shall all these thousands of students undergo FBI investigation, in order to find one or two goats among tho sheep?

We can, of course, require a loyalty oath and a non-Communist affidavit. The AEC immediately agreed to do this in the future. But what a shallow and meaningless thing that is! It will eliminate the naive men like Freistadf, who openly admit their Communist ties — and still claim they are loyal citizens. But will a really dangerous Communist Party member hesitate to perjure himself by signing such an oath if he thinks it worth while to do so? Certainly not!

The sensible procedure in nonserrct fields is to leave out the FBI and make only the normal inquiries as to a man’s ability, honesty, and integrity. And if in the course of its continued vigilance the FBI does discover disloyal Communists, let suitable legal action be taken.

Let us not destroy the AEC Fellowship program and the AEC’s other activities in support of science and the training of scientists for false security reasons. It will only endanger national security-and be harmful to a free America besides.

It has been suggested that the support of basic science and the training of scientists should be taken out of the hands of any agency concerned with military matters. But the development of certain areas of basic, science is important to these military agencies. They need the contact with science and they need more scientists.

The public and the Congress must understand this. But they must not force these agencies to adopt the same procedures in dealing with university laboratories that they must follow in their own secret military laboratories.

There is, however, one solution to most of our difficulties which is readily available as soon as the public demands it. This is to remove the necessity of science depending for its financial support solely on military agencies, or solely on any agency whose primary interest is in applied science.

There are three sources of support for scientific research: (1) individuals or foundations, (2) industry, and (3) the government.

The individual and the foundation were nearly the sole support in the pre-war years. Generous as this support was in many cases, it, was inadequate then and it is even more inadequate today.

Industry, of course, is helping — now more than ever before; more, it is hoped, in the future than now. Stockholders could insist on it!

But the support of science is a matter of nutional interest in many ways: national defense, public health, natural resources, better living conditions, and soon. Government has clearly a responsibility. The state governments have long been a major support of science through the state universities. This support has rapidly increased in recent years.

What about the private universities? And the universities in the poorer states? Here we get close to the controversial question of federal subsidies to higher education. That form of support we may wish to reject because of the concomitant Federal control.

But through the mechanism of scholarships and fellowships, and of the research contract, we have the proved instruments for fostering science (and other fields too) without bureaucratic control.

A plan for a science foundation to utilize just these instruments was presented in 1945 by a Commission appointed by President Roosevelt and headed by Dr. Vannevar Bush, and a bill to create such a foundation was introduced in the Congress. It has now passed the Senate but not the House, after struggling along through Cougressional committees for four years.

In this plan lies the hope for a free and virile science. But the public and the Congress must acquire a better understanding of what science is, how it operates, how it can and how it cannot contribute to national welfare and national defense, if the proposed Science Foundation, like the Atomic Energy Commission, is not to become entangled in a network of misguided or politically inspired restrictions that will render it ineffective.