The United Nations

on the World Today

THROUGHOUT the Western world the news of the Czech coup and Masaryk’s death came as an alarm bell. It came at a time when the fortunes of the anti-Communist forces in Greece and China — in which the United States was heavily involved were going badly, when relations between the Western and Eastern powers controlling Germany had reached the breaking point, when Italy, on the eve of an election, was facing the likelihood of substantial Communist and left-Soeiahst gains.

In a single week — March 14-20— events took place which changed the entire pattern of international relations. In Brussels, the live-nation fiftyyear defense pact was signed; in Washington, President Truman made his peacetime conscription speech; and on the same day, at Lake Success, Chile appeared before the Security Council to present its charges against the Soviet Union. In Paris, the conference of the sixteen Marshall Plan nations hastened their program of joint economic action. Washington, London, and Paris proposed returning Trieste to Italy. Congress speeded its ERP timetable. And at Lake Success, Senator Austin announced that the United State’s had abandoned its stand in favor of the partition of Palestine.

Partition by force?

The General Assembly resolution of November 29 had made the Council ultimately responsible for seeing that partition was carried out. While (IK* Palestine Commission met in closed session at Lake Success, the Arabs of the Middle East were making good their threats to block partition by force. Reports from Jewish Agency and British sources told of armed Arab bands moving into Palestine from Syria and Lebanon, and violence in Palestine began to take the shape of civil war.

As the death toll mounted, the Jewish Agency accused the British of doing little to maintain order — accusations the British denied. The British, however, made no bones about their refusal to permit the Palestine Commission to organize a Jewish militia and police force while the mandate continued, and about their rejection of the Commission’s request that the British open up Tel Aviv to them as a Palestine base of action. On February 18, the Palestine Commission in a special report to the Security Council requested an international force with which to implement the partition scheme. This report came up for discussion on February 24, when a fact long suspected came out into the open: the United States was lukewarm in its support of the Assembly’s decision. Warren R. Austin, the United States delegate, said that the Security Council had no legal authority to impose partition by force. The most it could do was to take action to maintain order if it were proved that a threat to international peace existed.

Faced with the refusal of both the United Kingdom and the United States to stand forcefully behind partition, and doubtful that under the circumstances an enduring settlement could be imposed, the Canadian delegate urged that a last supreme effort be made to bring about conciliation. The American delegate then proposed that the* whole matter be referred to a committee composed of the five permanent Security Council members.

Up to this point there had been no open breach between the United States and the Soviet Union on Palestine. But to the American proposal, Andrei Gromyko replied that he saw no point in setting up a new committee on Palestine, and certainly no point in a Security Council committee consulting with the Jewish Agency, the Arab Higher Committee, the mandatory power, and the Palestine Commission, as Senator Austin’s resolution proposed. During the lunch hour Mr. Austin and Mr. Gromyko reconciled their differences in a joint resolution. Four of the five permanent members of the Security Council — the United Kingdom refused to take part—went into consultations. The conference ended when Mr. Austin proposed a special session of the General Assembly to establish a “temporary trusteeship” for Palestine under the Trusteeship Council.

The U.S. changes its mind

Unless we see it in the context of world developments, American reversal on Palestine is inexplicable. The facts in the situation — the unwillingness of the two communities in Palestine to reach agreement, Arab violence, the imminent ending of the British mandate, and the questionable legality of Security Council action to impose partition — were all known or anticipated when the United States decided in favor of partition. In fact, a number of nations — New Zealand, C anada, and the United Kingdom particularly — warned the Assembly of the serious problem of implementation. Nevertheless, the American delegation backed partition and supported the resolution that gave the Security Council an important role in its implementation.

The United States proposal for “temporary trusteeship” and for a special session of the General Assembly to put it into effect represented an aboutface with no new facts to support it. Strategic rather than moral reasons determined the switch.

The United States was opposed to an international army to enforce partition because it would mean bringing Russian troops into the Middle East. Moreover, at a time when all efforts were being directed to strengthening the coalition of Western nations, oil reserves, Middle Eastern bases, and the friendship of the Arab states counted for more than commitments to a Jewish nat ional home.

A very serious consequence of the Palestine reversal is not merely that it deals a staggering blow to United Nations prestige but that it is not likely to contribute any benefit to the Middle East. Violence will continue and will probably increase. The Jewish people have given every indication of abiding by the Assembly decision, and t hey are proceeding with the organization of a state of their own. The Arabs will intensify their opposition.

India and Pakistan take the stand

The conflict in Kashmir was only one expression of the bitter struggle between Moslem and Hindu communities which partition of India had failed to resolve. At the outset the arguments seemed to be on the side of India. Pakistan appeared to be a proved accomplice in the warlike incursion of the northern tribes into the province of Jammu and Kashmir. Active Indian resistance had come in response to the appeal of the princely ruler of Kashmir, a Hindu, who turned over his state to the protective custody of the Dominion of India.

But as the Pakistan case was presented by Pakistan’s brilliant Foreign Minister, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, it became clear that the situation was more complicated than the Indian representative had made out. There were, in fact, indications that India was determined to consolidate its position in strategically important Kashmir with its predominantly Moslem population. India was prepared to grant a plebiscite. But it insisted that a provisional government under the pro-Indian Sheikh Abdullah should take office and that Indian troops should remain even after the tribesmen and their Pakistan aides had withdrawn.

During January, the President of the Security Council, Fernand van Langenhove of Belgium, conducted direct negotiations between the Indian and Pakistan representatives, and members of the Council submitted several proposed lines of settlement. In February, General Andrew G. L. McNaughton, the new head of the Council, advanced a plan which called for the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of all outside forces, and the holding of a free plebiscite under United Nations auspices.

The Pakistan delegate gave broad assent to the proposal, but the Indian delegate, standing by his claim to India’s paramount interest in Kashmir, announced abruptly that he was going home and had already booked his plane passage.

The Council immediately asserted its authority. India had brought the dispute to the Council and had no right to walk out on what had become a Council matter. The Indian delegate might go home to consult his government, but he was instructed to inform New Delhi of the wishes of the Council and report back. Meanwhile Kashmir remained on the agenda and the Council proceeded to examine complaints that Pakistan had brought against India concerning areas other than Kashmir.

The U.N.’s future in the balance

The acute deterioration in the relationships between the Soviet Union and the Western nations has raised serious debates as to the future usefulness of the United Nations. Those who view the building of the Western coalition as a prelude to war are waiting for the day when Russia and the Eastern nations will walk out. On the other hand, there are many who believe that if the present moves among the Western nations lead to the restoration of economic and political health and not merely to military preparedness, a more stable balance between East and West will result.

Certainly, there are no present pressures to force Russia out of the United Nations. In the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, for example, much time has been devoted to a discussion of modification of the veto in the Security Council. What has been evident from the start is the lack of important support for the abolition of the veto. It is still hoped that a “code of conduct” can be agreed to among the Big Five to restrict use of the veto to matters in which a majority decision would call for sanctions against a member nation.

Philip C. Jessup, the deputy American delegate, brought forward the most constructive proposal in listing thirty-one cases in which, if the powers agreed, the veto would not apply. In the past, the Soviet Union has opposed any efforts to modify the voting procedure of the General Assembly. It has, however, on many occasions followed the practice of abstaining from voting on proposals with which it did not agree.

Coalition for peace?

One important question that has a bearing on the future of the United Nations is the form the currently developing Western coalition will assume. Hamilton Fish Armstrong and others have suggested that Article 51 of the Charter permits collective self-defense agreements “until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” Since the Security Council is obviously not in a position to take these measures now, a general defense agreement might be concluded among the Western nations.

Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, in a speech given in Toronto in January, suggested a course which would retain the present Charter but would frankly recognize that within the present United Nations certain members were determined to form a collective system which “would really guarantee their own collective security, even if this could only be done on a limited basis of membership.”

He denied that this would be “an offensive and defensive alliance of the old type . . . because it would be bound by all the obligations and restraints of the Charter.” Moreover, said Mr. Pearson, “such a security system could, and indeed must, establish beyond doubt that it was solely an instrument of peace, and that it would not be used to further selfish national or imperial interests, or to support aggressive power policies by any of its members.”

The next months will decide what form this inner security system will take. If the big powers call the tune, there is danger that the coalition will become the old-type alliance. If the smaller powers continue to exert the influence they have exerted in the past, it may be a constructive step in the direction of peace and not war. For, as Mr. Pearson concludes: “A collective security agency within the United Nations which would prove both its good will and its power — two tilings which don’t always go together — might hope eventually to attract to its membership all states of the United Nations. We might then, in fact, have secured a new United Nations with both universality and effectiveness.”