The Far East

ON THE WORLD TODAY

THE new position of the Soviet Union in Asia is the most important element contributing to the crises in our China policy. In the period from 1924 to 1927 the Soviet Union took an active part in China’s internal politics and found itself opposed by the British Empire, Japan, and the United States.

The situation has now changed completely. Japan, the self-appointed “bulwark against communism in East Asia,” has been defeated. The British no longer hold the dominant position of ten years ago. And the Chinese who twenty years ago welcomed Russian support are now bitterly resentful of what they consider American interference in the domestic affairs of China.

Today our relations with the Soviet Union are the key to all our actions in the Far East. Everything we do must be considered in the light of whether it is a step towards or a step away from possible conflict with Russia. Any action we take to help China gain stability must satisfy Russia also if that stability is to be permanent.

Both countries have potential support in China. Neither country can claim, considering the record, to be avoiding interference in the domestic affairs of China. There is one important difference, however, between our policy and that of the Russians. We have strongly backed the National Government of China, to the detriment of the cause of Chinese democracy.

Actions such as our movement of troops into North China and the furnishing of ships and planes to the National Government have in fact helped to limit the military potential of the Communists, even though our immediate mission was to bring about the demobilization of Japanese troops. The Russians, also, have dealt with the National Government, and have concluded an important treaty with it; but at the same time they have kept, as we have not, the good will of the Chinese Communists.

Russia remembers history

In this situation the Russians are likely to remember a good deal of history which we have forgotten. Although we are now the strongest champions of China’s national independence and territorial integrity, although we have given up extraterritoriality and the treaty ports, only twenty years ago we joined the British in resisting the Chinese nationalist revolution in its efforts to get rid of these very things.

The Russians also feel that Anglo-American policy in action, if not in words, condoned a good deal of Japanese expansion on the continent as a means of balancing the growing influence of the Soviet Union. From the suspicions thus accumulated arises contemporary Russian criticism of our policies in Japan.

According to the October issue of the Russian journal New Times, “So far, practically nothing has been done to abolish the rule of the militarists, to put a stop to jingo propaganda, or to destroy Japan’s military-economic potential and, above all, the basis of Japan’s aggression — her war industry.”

The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in China must be projected on a world scale. China is only one of the many fronts on which we meet the Soviet Union. Soviet policies in all the peripheral areas in which we have common interests are closely interrelated. What is done in Korea and China, what is demanded of us in Japan, what happens in Iran, the Balkans, and other areas, are part and parcel of the same problem.

The direction and timing of Russian action are carefully planned, and precedents agreed to or established by default in one area are important for others. In this sense we have a China policy only in so far as we have a Russian policy.

How much did Hurley intervene?

Whatever action we take in China is bound to affect the internal politics of China. We must examine the political realities of the situation and judge how we can best achieve our ends. Those ends, in order of priority, must be: (1) a sound understanding with the Soviet Union: (2) a unified and progressive China. To turn the order around is to be sentimental, stupid, and anti-Russian.

One aspect of General Patrick Hurley’s resignation as ambassador to China has particular importance in the light of these objectives. General Hurley was apparently asked to implement a policy calling for support of the National Government, prevention of civil war, and encouragement of a strong, progressive China. No one can quarrel with these aims. Mr. Hurley failed because he threw away his bargaining power.

To blame minor officials who were removed from China before the critical negotiations with the Communists began, or to accuse State Department officials of being pro-Communist, is merely to draw up a smoke screen to distract attention from personal failure. To say that we are supporting both colonial imperialism and Communist imperialism, and that, at the same time, we are being drawn into a fight between the two, shows muddleheadedness or is a further smoke screen to cover up anti-Russian bias.

It is now clear that when the war ended, the Chungking government overestimated its military potential and embarked on plans which it was not strong enough to carry out alone. These plans included the occupation of railways and cities of North China and Manchuria, the demobilization of Japanese troops, and the containing of the Communists within the rural hinterland.

When their negotiations with Chungking failed, the Communists naturally took steps to see that the balance of power was not substantially altered. By shooting at American troops and engaging Nationalist forces, they hoped to arouse American opinion against the endangering of American lives and thus secure the withdrawal of the Marines, and to throw the blame for civil war on the National Government.

How strong are the Communists?

Two things must be borne in mind about the Chinese Communists. One is that their military potential, though not to be exaggerated, is great enough to make the job of crushing them by force very long and costly.

Secondly, the Communists would be extremely difficult to exterminate by force alone, not because they are Communists, but because they feed on agrarian discontent. They are both agrarian reformers and Communists. Even if the last Communist Party member were exterminated, the massive discontent of China’s peasantry would find some other means of political-military expression. One further consideration: the very process of exterminating the Communists in a civil war is likely to make the Kuomintang even more conservative.

Our course, therefore, seems clear enough. We should not be scared by the Communists into withdrawing troops from China which have been sent there to demobilize Japanese troops. The Russians did their job of demobilizing in Manchuria, and we should do ours in China proper.

We should not be alarmed if we thereby increase the military strength of the National Government. But we should make it clear that our troops will be withdrawn when the Japanese have been dealt with. We should keep our bargaining power and use it to discourage the National Government from attempting to crush the Communists by force, even if the Communists refuse to come to terms.

Now that the Communists have lost the benefit of the unifying effect of hostility toward the Japanese, the quickest way to undermine their political influence among the peasants of China would be by carrying out very simple and elementary reforms in Kuomintang China. Only after the political influence of the Communists had been undermined could military pressure be usefully exerted, and by that time it would probably be unnecessary.

What we do in China both indicates and determines our policy towards Russia. We have not gone ahead ruthlessly with a strong anti-Communist policy, crushing all opposition up to the limits of Russian influence; but we have gone far enough to incur some of the disadvantages of such a policy.

We have not brought our full influence to bear on the Nationalist Government and the Communists to force military unity and political compromise; but we have gone far enough to involve some of the risks attendant on such a course.

Korea

The lines between American and Soviet influence are much more clearly drawn in Korea where the 38th parallel separates the Russian zone from ours. In North Korea the administration is a mixture of Russian-trained Korean Communists and local officials.

Some Koreans consider the Soviet area more democratic than the American zone, and they accuse us of leaving the Japanese in charge too long and then replacing them with American personnel rather than with Koreans. We plan to have the military government run the administration until a Korean government can be formed through democratic elections.

In Korea, we have on our hands one of the hottest political problems in Asia, for new political parties are springing up everywhere (there are sixty registered now) and an untrained military government staff has difficulty in finding its way about. Political terms mean little. The so-called Democratic Party is dominated by the biggest and richest families of Korea, who are bent on recovering their grasp on the Korean economy.

The People’s Party constantly runs afoul of the military government. It is in favor of the confiscation and free distribution of Japanese-owned property, and of government ownership of major industries, and apparently has wide popular support. The National and Communist parties are not so strong. The returning Korean émigrés tend to side with the Democratic Party.

Meanwhile the Koreans are becoming more and more united at least on one thing — the desire to have American and Russian troops withdraw. The powerful and well-organized Korean underground, which set up the People’s Republic, is the most volatile force to be reckoned with. We do not yet have enough information to evaluate fully the job being done by the military government. But the commander got off to a poor start when he described Koreans and Japanese as “the same breed of cats.”

The Koreans are not the easiest politicians in the world to deal with after forty years of oppression. The longer Korea is divided, the greater the political differences and the harder the achievement of unity both by the Koreans themselves and by the powers who occupy their country.

The old order persists

Compared with the rest of Asia, Japan, paradoxically enough, presents a picture of orderly political development. There was no political collapse in Japan, and there was only one occupying power for the main islands. The political stability of a defeated country rests, not on the skill and force of the occupying power, but on direction and control by the defeated.

Two views about the success of our occupation policies are emerging. On the one side there is the note of self-confidence and implied optimism in the orders and communiqués of the Supreme Commander. Two months ago he announced that the military spirit of Japan was crushed as effectively as her Army and Navy.

Correspondents and other Americans returning from Japan suggest another view. The Japanese are trying their best, with some measure of success, to fob us off with democratic window-dressing while preserving the essence of the old order. There has certainly been no substantial change in the composition of the ruling group. The Japanese press and radio are still powerful weapons preserving the old order.

New political parties — the Democratic Party and the Liberal Party, for example — have hopeful names but not necessarily democratic purposes. The Communist Party is the only one to come out in favor of abolishing the Imperial institution. The government, on the other hand, is doing its best to humanize the Emperor as well as the aristocracy, whose members are competing in the relinquishing of titles.

The Emperor as usual

There is little to suggest that the elections to be held in January will bring about any fundamental shift in the real balance of power within Japan. According to the Tokyo radio, the Emperor opened the Imperial Diet with a rescript which said among other things: “It is expected that you will fully bear in mind our wishes and deliberate upon them in harmony, thereby fulfilling your duty by giving your approval.”

The Emperor is seen more in public. Private cars are now allowed to pass the Imperial car, but adverse comment is still frowned upon. Kiichiro Hiranuma, President of the Privy Council, was quoted by Tokyo as saying: “A real picture of Japan is that of one sovereign and the people, and imperial rule supported by the people. ... If we should look into Japanese history, no matter what period, it is a fact that there is not a single instance of the Emperor’s oppressing the people arbitrarily.

“The basis for reform is a solidification of the relationship between the Emperor and the people and the eradication, through the will of the people, of any obstacles existing to this bond of relationship. This will determine whether the democratization of Japan can be realized.”

A further indication of the methods of the Japanese is their attempt to hold the Allied powers responsible for the feeding of Japan during this winter when hundreds of thousands will starve to death. Certainly Japan faces staggering problems. Millions of men have been demobilized and thousands are being repatriated. Over a quarter of a million have returned from Korea alone.

There are three million troops and nearly three million civilians awaiting repatriation, a job that may well take two or three years to complete. Economic pressure is forcing a small colonization movement to Hokkaido, but this migration will do little to relieve the demands on available resources. The economic plight of Japan is real, and the Japanese will do their utmost to make us feel responsible for relieving it.