Scepticism and Animal Faith: Introduction to a System of Philosophy
by . New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 1923. 8vo. xii + 314 pp. $3.50.
THE central doctrine of this book is summarized in its baffling and intriguing title. The gist of it seems to be this: it is possible for the mind merely to intuit or contemplate. In this case there can be no uncertainty, or room for error. That which we intuit is by hypothesis just what it is, and there can be no discrepancy between what is and what is before the mind. This would be illustrated by the case of seeing red, or thinking fire. The red and the fire are what I am seeing and thinking. Red and fire in this case are called data. But though no uncertainty attaches to data, they do not constitute knowledge, but only poetry or imagination. Knowledge begins only when something is expected of data, or asserted about them, or claimed for them. But as soon as knowledge begins, it is attended with uncertainty. If refers to something which is not. given, and which is therefore questionable, as when I believe that the rose is red, or that there is a fire in Boston. In other words there is no self-evident knowledge, since all knowledge appeals for evidence beyond itself.
It is possible to cultivate the purely intuitive attitude, and take things precisely as one finds them. Indeed, Mr. Santayana confesses to a personal predilection for this attitude. But such an attitude is unnatural to any animal, Mr. Santayana included. Fear, hunger, watchfulness, and other animal instincts are all attitudes of ‘intentness,’ expectancy or belief. Animal life is essentially an adventure, a series of leaps in the dark, in which knowledge is attained at the risk of error. Knowledge is thus an outgrowth of ‘animal faith.’
Because knowledge is thus related to what is primitive and biologically universal, Mr. Santayana professes confidence in ‘common sense’; and because he accepts the results of physical science as the most authentic knowledge, he professes himself in natural philosophy ‘a. decided materialist — apparently the only one living.’ But this does not prevent his being ‘a Platonist in logic and morals, and a transcendentalist in romantic soliloquy,’ because logic, morals, and ‘romantic soliloquy’ are not knowledge at all, but matter of intuition.
Associated with this theory of knowledge the book contains a division of being into ‘realms.’ The most important division is that between ‘essences’ which may be intuited, and ‘existences’ which Can only be known. It is not clear whether this makes the difference between essences and existences, or whether they have a difference of character as well. There are serious difficulties attaching to both alternatives. For Mr. Santayana admits that essences can be known as wTelI as intuited; and if existence is distinguished by its character, there appears to be no reason why it should not be intuited as wel] as known. There are other realms and other difficulties. Intuitions belong to the realm of ‘spirit,’ which in its irreducibility to physical terms is hard to reconcile with the author’s materialistic professions. There is also a realm of ‘truths’ which is hard to distinguish from the realm of essence.
These and many other serious difficulties of detail will interest and disquiet the technical philosopher. It must be admitted, furthermore, that the author’s clarity and eloquence decline as he passes from the ‘soliloquizing’ Preface to the argumentative chapters that follow. But it is none the less a book of rare distinction, both in style and thought, and it leaves the reader eager to accept the author’s promised invitation to ‘a further excursion’ through those ‘Realms of Being’ which are here only partially disclosed.
RALPH BARTON PERRY.