England and Japan
I
NOTHING at this moment furnishes so much food for speculation as the new alignment of the powers likely to follow in the wake of Armageddon. Italy has dropped out of the Dreibund. From Berlin come whispers of a separate peace with Russia. In Petrograd mutterings have been heard of Russia’s dissatisfaction with the way England has been treating her. In England the voice of disapproval of Japan’s aggressive policy in China has been growing louder. Is this an indication of Downing Street’s desire to break with Tokio when the treaty of alliance terminates in 1921?
In the Far East equally momentous developments are taking place. Japan has already entered into a new convention with Russia which may easily develop into an alliance. Will she couple the compact with an entente with Germany? Not a few Japanese writers and publicists have come forward with tributes to German efficiency and valor, while many Germans, on their side, have been urging the wisdom of making up with the Japanese. The German officers and men who capitulated to the Japanese at Tsingtau have been accorded the most courteous treatment ever since their arrival in Japan. As if to add significance to the incident, a section of the Japanese press began, soon after the fall of Tsingtau, to voice sentiments by no means flattering to England. Will Japan prove after the war so rash as to cut asunder the ties of alliance which have united her to England during the past twelve years?
To forecast the future of the AngloJapanese alliance it is essential to know something of its past. The first alliance, concluded on January 30, 1902, was of far greater significance than was realized by its authors. On the face of it, the treaty afforded Japan no tangible benefit. It partook rather of the nature of a shadowy assurance against attack. It simply prescribed that if either high contracting party should become involved in war with a third power, the other high contracting party should maintain a strict neutrality, and exercise its influence to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally. It was only in the event of a third power or powers joining in hostilities against either high contracting party that the other was required to come to its assistance. Now, the only power expected at the time to encroach upon Japan’s rights was Russia. Since there was but little probability of any third power joining Russia in the event of a Russo-Japanese war, it was not thought likely that England would be called upon to render military assistance to Japan. Thus the risk run by Great Britain was very small.
The statesmanship of Lord Salisbury and Lord Lansdowne foresaw all this and more. A victorious Japan, in the fast-approaching war with Russia, meant the checkmating of the Russian advance in the Far East —that nightmare of British statesmen. Even if Japan were defeated at the hands of the Muscovite, the Far-Eastern situation, so far as British interests were concerned, could not have become worse. Open-minded publicists of Great Britain have been frank enough to admit this advantage bestowed upon their country by the alliance. As Mr. Alfred Stead puts it: —
‘For Great Britain the gain, even before the Russian war, was much more substantial. British diplomacy assumed a new importance at Peking when backed by Japan, and, amongst other results, the Tibetan expedition was rendered possible. Since the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, and the consequent revelation of Japan’s power, the advantages to British diplomacy in Europe have been very considerable. In fact, British foreign policy all over the world has been influenced and strengthened by the alliance. The destruction of the Baltic fleet enabled four British battleships to be sent home to play a very important part in the diplomatic crisis in Europe. We owe so much to our alliance that we should thank our lucky stars that Japan, the much-courted new power, paramount in the Far East, is anxious, not only to renew the alliance, but also to extend its scope.’
Was the treaty, then, a one-sided agreement? To be frank, the alliance did not accord Japan much material benefit. True, England financed Japan in her titanic struggle with Russia; but that would have been done anyway, even in the absence of the treaty of alliance. The real advantage that Japan received from the alliance was something that could not be spoken of in terms of dollars and cents.
The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 was one of the most romantic incidents in the history of the nations. It was not merely an alliance between two nations, but a cementing of friendship between two hemispheres which had long appeared as if ordained by Providence to remain forever separated. It was the first union of the East with the West, the first recognition that an Asiatic nation was capable of rendering assistance to a foremost power of the Occident. The advantage thus gained by Japan was of necessity sentimental, but its significance was none the less great. Japan was definitely recognized as an important factor in world-politics and was accorded a place in the concourse of the world’s great powers. No longer was her voice to be ignored in the disposition of Far-Eastern questions.
The diplomatic feat accomplished by Lord Salisbury and Lord Lansdowne in concluding the alliance with Japan (coming as it did at the moment when the Kaiser was holding up before Europe the picture of the yellow peril) was particularly remarkable. The farseeing English statesmen knew the ulterior motives of the astute monarch’s dramatic ‘ appeal’ to Christ endom, and refused to be beguiled or scared by his trumpeting of the Oriental menace. On the contrary, they saw in Japan’s sudden awakening and rapid progress great possibilities, not only for the advancement of England’s own interest, but for the regeneration of the Orient.
Japan’s brilliant victory over China, regarded as the sleeping Hercules of the East, was the event which first elicited British admiration. The excellent discipline and great efficiency displayed by Japanese officers and troops during the Boxer disturbance of 1900 intensified the respect already entertained by the Englishmen for the Japanese. In contrast to the lawlessness and brutalities of the troops from certain Christian countries, the humane conduct of the Mikado’s ‘heathen’ soldiers was indeed conspicuous. It was, therefore, not merely incidental that the AngloJapanese alliance followed upon the heels of the Boxer troubles.
The first treaty of alliance was not a defensive and offensive alliance in the true sense of the term. In the war with Russia, upon which Japan staked her very existence, the instrument was useful to Japan only in so far as it assured England’s moral support. It was only toward the end of the war that Great Britain came out squarely for an unqualified alliance, and agreed to cast her lot with Japan in the event of another war. The result was the second treaty of alliance, of August 12, 1905. In place of the lukewarm provision of the first treaty the new treaty contained the following definite article: —
’If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any power or powers, either contracting party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests (in Eastern Asia and India), the other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.’
This new agreement was made public when the outcome of the peace conference at Portsmouth was quivering in the balance, with Japan anxious to end the war on honorable terms, Russia wishing to continue hostilities until she was in a position to dictate her own terms. It went into effect on the day it was signed. Had it not contained an article forestalling its application to the war then going on in Manchuria, the new alliance would have been employed as a lever to oblige Russia to accept peace terms more favorable to Japan than were actually agreed upon.
In the minds of many students of international affairs it remains a question why England insisted upon inserting in the new treaty such a clause of exemption, if she wished to be of real service to Japan. Looking at the situation through the perspective of history, it is certain that England’s main object in concluding the second treaty of alliance was to prepare against the rising tide of German power and influence which had begun to be strongly felt, not only in Europe, but in the Far East. To guard her interest in Tibet and India against the possible Russian advance was certainly not England’s main purpose in renewing the alliance, though the world was made to believe that this was the sine qua non of the treaty. The British statesmen would have been surprisingly deficient in farsightedness had they failed to see that, thanks to Japan’s firm stand in Manchuria, Russia had been sufficiently crippled to prevent, at least for a decade or so, the renewal of her vigorous movement toward India. They would indeed have been nearsighted had they not discerned the ominous situation arising out of Germany’s rise in world-politics. In renewing the treaty of alliance with Japan England undoubtedly had in view such a calamity as she faces to-day, obliging her to remove her troops from Asia and to transfer her warships from Oriental to European waters. The part played by Germany in the Morocco incident and in the Balkan situation attests the above interpretation.
But the treaty, coming at the psychological moment when Japan needed foreign sympathy and encouragement most keenly, was welcomed in the Mikado’s Empire with great enthusiasm and appreciation. The press was most effusive in praising England’s chivalrous spirit in renewing the alliance, and believed that the new treaty was of no small influence in determining the Russian attitude at the peace conference. And indeed the alliance has exercised great influence in preventing Russia from waging a war of revenge against Japan.
II
The second treaty of alliance was to have remained in force for ten years, but circumstances compelled its revision four years before its termination. Upon the heels of its conclusion events followed one another in rapid succession. Korea had ceased to be a problem. British influence in Tibet had been firmly established. But the most important factor which necessitated its revision was the signal change that had come over the relationship between Japan and the United States.
Beginning with the now historic ‘school incident’ in San Francisco, the anti-Japanese agitation in California had become portentous enough to threaten the amicable relations between the two nations. The Japanese statesmen, of course, did not so much as dream of going to war on account of the California question, for they could easily foresee that war would never solve the immigration question. They would have been exceedingly stupid had they failed to realize that war with America presupposed the withdrawal of all the Japanese population from this country and the abandonment of all hope of sending any emigrants to these shores for many years after such a war.
And yet a small section of the press showed a propensity to exploit the California question to the detriment of the friendly relations which the two governments were anxious to maintain. This was where England’s apprehension came in. Should Japan and the United States come to blows, would not England, as Japan’s ally, be called upon to come to Japan’s assistance? A careful examination of the preamble and articles of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was all that was needed to convince any one of the impossibility of applying the treaty to a war that might develop out of the immigration or California question. But the feeling of uneasiness prevailing both in America and England was something that could not be ignored.
Consequently the Mikado’s government thought it the part of wisdom to assure the United States and England that the Anglo-Japanese alliance could never be applied to an American-Japanese war. Thus, in the third treaty of alliance, signed on July 13, 1911, Japan agreed to insert the following article: ‘ Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting Power an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.’ Almost simultaneously the United States entered into a general arbitration treaty with Great Britain. To those who have the eyes to read, these instruments ought to be sufficient proof that Japan has no intention of dragging England into the war which many fireeaters think unavoidable between Japan and the United States.
In renewing the treaty of alliance with Japan for the second time, Great Britain had, as in the case of the alliance of 1905, an eye upon Germany. So far as Russia was concerned, British interests in the Far East were no longer in danger. There is reason to believe that in 1911 or thereabouts the two European powers entered into an understanding defining their respective spheres of influence in Tibet and Mongolia. In the meantime, the Mikado’s statesmen not only effectively checked the Russian advance on the China Sea, but succeeded, by dint of shrewd diplomacy, in healing the hurts Russia had been nursing after her defeat in Manchuria.
On the other hand, the German advance in China had now assumed such an ominous aspect that England had begun to doubt the security of her position. Even when the smoke of battle was still hovering over the plains of Manchuria in 1905, the brilliant British writer on Chinese affairs, Mr. B. L. Simpson, clearly foresaw the approaching conflict of the German programme with the established British power in the Par East. He said: —
‘The German programme [in China] is as clear as the light of day. In a few years another naval base somewhere in the region of Swatow will be required, and then, linked by a system of German railways, a huge slice of Northern, Central, and Southern China will be practically ruled from Berlin. It may seem nebulous and vague to those who sit in the darkness of blissful ignorance faraway, but it is patent to those whose business it is to follow audacious Empire plans. Tientsin will mark the extreme northern limit of these ambitions; Kaifengfu the northwestern; Hankow the central west; and Swatow the extreme south. Including, therefore, great portions of nine or ten provinces of China, the German programme is so framed that it clashes directly with no other power in the world excepting England.’
Considered from the British side, therefore, the new Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance was concluded chiefly with a view to forestalling possible German aggression both in China and Europe. Japan, on the other hand, considered the treaty to be of great value as a means of furthering friendly relations with Russia. Without the influence of the British alliance, it is open to question whether Japan could have succeeded as she did in reconciling Russia in so short a period after the war.
We have seen that the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1911 was concluded with a view to preparing the two sea-powers against the portentous rise of Germany. They had in view just such a case of emergency as the present war, wherein England might be enabled to remove her troops and men-of-war from the Orient, leaving the protection of that region to the Japanese. Japan was glad enough to enter into the compact, mainly because she saw a perpetual menace in the occupation of Kiauchow by a European power whose sovereign had long been actively engaged in prejudicing the whole Occident against Japan.
In the present titanic conflict, then, Japan’s duty permits of no misconstruction. With the text of the treaty before us, we can readily understand why Japan joined hands with Great Britain in the present war. It is obviously England’s right to call upon Japan for aid, while it is Japan’s duty to respond to England’s call. Read the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance carefully, and you will notice that wherever either high contracting party may be attacked by a third power the other high contracting party is required to come to its assistance in the regions of the Far East. The treaty does not say ‘aggressive action in the Far East,’ but ‘aggressive action wherever arising.’ The state of affairs described in the treaty had certainly come into existence by the time England asked for Japan’s aid, and Japan could not shirk the responsibilities put upon her shoulders by the treaty.
It is amusing to see the American press indulging in all manner of allegations with regard to Japan’s entry into the war. Friends of Germany claim that the tide of American sentiment turned against England the moment she called upon Japan to act. Why the American public should be reluctant to recognize Great Britain’s obvious right to ask for Japan’s aid is difficult to understand. Back of this much ado about nothing is perhaps racial prejudice. Had Japan been a Caucasian race, no nation would have criticized England’s act in calling upon her at such a moment of grave danger, and no one would have questioned Japan’s right and duty to join hands with her ally. The plain fact is that Japan did not enter into the war without conferring with England ‘fully and frankly.’ For the information of prejudiced critics, it is necessary to put this fact on record.
On August 3, 1914, that is, the day before England declared war, Sir Conyngham Greene, British Ambassador to Japan, hurried back to Tokio from his summer villa and immediately requested an interview with Baron Kato, the Foreign Minister. At this conference the British Ambassador informed Baron Kato that his government was compelled to open hostilities against Germany and desired to ascertain whether Japan would aid England in the event of British interests in the Far East being jeopardized by German activities. Baron Kato answered that the question before him was so serious that he could not answer it on his own account.
On the evening of the same day, Count Okuma convened a meeting of all the Cabinet members. On August 4, Baron Kato, bearing the resolution made at this meeting, called upon the British Ambassador and told him that Japan would not evade the responsibilities which she had assumed in entering into alliance with England. At this time Japan did not expect to be called upon to aid England at once. But on August 7 the British Ambassador asked for an interview with Baron Kato and told him that the situation had developed in such a manner as would oblige Japan’s immediate entrance into the war. On the evening of that day Premier Okuma requested the ‘elder statesmen’ and his colleagues in the Cabinet to assemble at his mansion. The conference lasted until two o’clock the next morning. Before it adjourned Japan’s policy had been definitely formulated.
The Japanese press is in all probability right when it says that Japan and England were obliged to act promptly in order to frustrate Germany’s scheme to transfer Kiau-chow to the Chinese government before she was compelled to hand it over to Japan. Had Germany succeeded in carrying out this scheme she would still have enjoyed, by virtue of Article 5 of the Kiau-chow convention of 1898, the privilege of securing in some future time ‘ a more suitable territory’ in China. This was exactly the condition which the Allies did not want established in China. If, on the other hand, Germany were forced to abandon Kiau-chow by a third power, either peacefully or by the arbitrament of the sword, China would no longer be under obligation to ‘cede to Germany a more suitable place.’
III
In the present world-war, as during the preceding decade, the Anglo-Japanese alliance has proved to be of mutual advantage to the high contracting parties. Will it survive the great upheaval which is shaking Europe from its foundation? With Kiau-chow restored to Chinese sovereignty, and with Russia becoming more and more friendly toward Japan, has the raison d’être of the Anglo-Japanese alliance virtually ceased to exist? In a word, what will be the future of the alliance?
That its future depends largely upon Russia’s attitude after the war seems inevitable. If, at the peace conference that is to follow the war, Russia is given what she has been coveting, she will continue to be friendly with Great Britain and will keep Germany at arm’s length. In that case there is no reason why Japan should not renew the alliance with England, though perhaps in more or less modified form. She has already entered into an entente cordiale with Russia. By renewing the alliance with England, she will become a party to a triangular combination and thus secure herself against the not improbable revenge of Germany. England, too, will be anxious to participate in such a combination, for she knows that she will have to bear the brunt of Germany’s bitterest enmity for many years after the war.
If, on the other hand, Russia is dissatisfied with the outcome of the peace parley, and shows herself inclined to be reconciled with Germany, Japan will of necessity hesitate to continue the alliance with England on the same basis as hitherto; for it is a foregone conclusion that Japan will avoid, if she can possibly do so, another disastrous war with Russia, knowing that her resources are too limited to cope with Russia’s tremendous potential power. Japan’s present relationship with Russia is one of entente cordiale, and not one of alliance; for the recently concluded convention provides no mutual obligations of the high contracting parties to extend armed assistance to each other. On the contrary, the Anglo-Japanese alliance, in its present form, obliges either high contracting party to render armed assistance to the other in case either is involved in war, defending its territorial or special interests mentioned in the treaty. Should Russia and England cease to be friends as the result of the peace conference and eventually become involved in war, into which Germany might easily be drawn as Russia’s ally, England, on the strength of the present alliance, would oblige Japan to open hostilities against Russia and Germany. The instinct of self-preservation must impel Japan to avoid such a disastrous course.
It is not unthinkable that Downing Street views with some little uneasiness the growing friendship between Tokio and Petrograd. It is rumored that soon after the fall of Tsingtau Marquis Yamagata, dean of the elder statesmen of Japan, expressed himself in favor of entering into an alliance with Russia. His idea in urging such an alliance was, of course, to prepare against Germany’s possible revenge. He entertained no thought of superseding the Anglo-Japanese alliance by an alliance with Russia. In official circles, however, it was feared that Great Britain would by no means be pleased if Japan were to take steps towards the conclusion of an alliance with Russia. This was undoubtedly the circumstance which caused much delay in the consummation of the new convention with Russia, which was to have been signed almost a year before. Count (now Marquis) Okuma, in a statement for the press, made it plain that the delay was due to the negotiation which had to be conducted with the British government.
There is no room to doubt that Japan has been fastidiously considerate of the susceptibilities of the British government — so much so, indeed, that a Tokio newspaper sarcastically inquires if Japan’s foreign department is in Downing Street. Yet the alliance terminates in 1921. Will it be renewed, or will the two powers have come to the parting of the ways? The key is in Russia’s hands. It does not take a prophet to foresee that Russia’s attitude and disposition will be the determining factor in the realignment of the powers in the Far East.
Much has of late been said of Japanese discontent with the alliance with England. But the public has forgotten that before Japan began to complain of England’s ‘selfishness’ many British newspapers and publicists had long been assailing Japan. As early as 1908 such men as Lord Stanhope and F. B. Vrooman, and many others, openly attacked Japanese ambitions, and urged the readjustment of England’s FarEastern policy. The same sentiment has been voiced in not a few English newspapers. At that time Japanese publicists and press made no reply to such expressions of unfriendliness. Japan’s whole attention was turned to the recuperation of her energy and to the readjustment of her position in Manchuria. As she gradually recovered from the shock of the Russian war, however, she began to cast about and found that England’s attitude towards her had been far from cordial.
But it was not until after the fall of Tsingtau that a few Japanese newspapers and publicists openly attacked the British policy in the Far East. The reader will recall that when Japan decided to enter into the war England dispatched a cruiser and a contingent of troops to participate in the siege of Tsingtau, the German stronghold in Kiau-chow. Officially Japan extended to them a cordial hand of welcome, but at heart she felt that England was intruding in a field where her assistance was not needed. The Japanese felt that their western ally must either be distrustful of them or entertain motives other than those of expediting the reduction of Tsingtau. No public comment was made to that effect, but the feeling was in the air.
Upon the fall of Tsingtau one or two newspapers in Tokio came out with the assertion that England, on the strength of the part she had played in the capture of Tsingtau, coveted the northern half of the Tientsin-Pukow line controlled by Germany. It was also rumored that she was averse to the extension of Japanese influence in Shantung, formerly Germany’s sphere of influence. How true these statements were only those within the inner official circles at London and Tokio can tell. The fact remains that they did no small injury to the cordial relations between the two nations.
In the celebrated Japanese demands presented to China in January, 1915, Japan expressed the ‘wish’ that China would grant her the privilege of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with the Kiukiang-Nanchang line, in which considerable Japanese capital had been invested, as well as the railways between Nanchang and Hangchau and between Nanchang and Chaochow, provided that Great Britain would not object to the concession. These cities are in the Yangtse Valley, which England has long since staked out as her own sphere of influence. Whether England checkmated Japan’s scheme to secure the above-named railway concessions is not known, but the significant fact was that the British press severely criticized that particular phase of the Japanese demands. At any rate, Japan failed to get the concessions.
Most Britishers in China are antiJapanese. They believe that the Japanese are their inevitable rivals in the Far East, and cannot understand why their government should tie its hands by an alliance with Japan and render itself unable to check Japanese ambitions. They can see only the two billion dollars they have invested in China, and they resent the gradual incursions of Japanese trade into the field long monopolized by them. They often fail to see the situation in the broader light of international relations. What would have become of British prestige in the Orient had England, lending ear to the ill-considered counsels of her citizens in China, bade good-bye to Japan in 1911?
But this dog-in-the-manger attitude is not restricted to the Britishers. The Japanese entertain the same sentiment with regard to certain parts of China, notably Manchuria, where their investments amount to two hundred and fifty million dollars. The blame is on both sides. The idea of the exclusive ‘sphere of influence’ is pernicious and must be modified, if not abandoned. To one looking at the situation from a detached point of view, it seems incomprehensible that England cannot be more generous toward Japanese enterprise in the Yangtse Valley. The ‘valley’has an area of 362,000 square miles; certainly England cannot monopolize such a vast territory in addition to Tibet, 533,000 square miles in area. One fails to understand why she should be reluct ant to see Japan build there a few hundred miles of railway which would, after all, benefit her as much as Japan. In the Japanese sphere in South Manchuria, measuring 90,000 square miles, we know of no instance wherein British enterprise has been hindered by the Japanese. When in 1913 the British government, on behalf of the AngloChinese Corporation, sounded the Japanese government as to whether objection would be made to the corporation’s project to lay a railway between Kingchao and Chaoyang in Manchuria, Japan cheerfully indorsed the plan.
As for trade competition, no one should complain of his defeat so long as his successful rival observes the rules of sportsmanship. Despite all the unkind things that have been said about the Japanese, one must concede that their commercial success in China has been due largely to their perseverance, industry, agility, and frugality. You cannot succeed in business in the Orient by spending four hours a day in a luxurious office, devoting the rest of the time to golfing and dinners and social gatherings, while your Asiatic rivals work fifteen hours or more every day and are satisfied with offices or shops which offer no personal comfort. And this is merely one of the many factors that enter into the reckoning.
The growing friendship between the natives of India and the Japanese has furnished another cause for suspicion, not to say irritation, on t he part of England. It is nothing new that even bonafide Japanese travelers and merchants in India are subjected to espionage by British officials. Not only have the Englishmen in India been suspicious of those Japanese likely to come in contact with the radical elements of the Hindu population, but they have also shown a propensity to exclude Japanese commercial enterprise from the country.
On the other hand, the Japanese see no reason why they should act as England’s watchdog for India. Suppose India rose in rebellion while England’s hands were full in Europe: would Japan be required to quell the insurrection by virtue of the alliance treaty? The provision of the existing treaty is not clear as to Japan’s duty in such a case. Japan would undoubtedly prefer British rule in India to that of Germany or Russia, if the country had to be dominated by some European power; but the point is that she would be reluctant to take part in crushing the just aspiration of the Hindus for independence and freedom.
After all has been said and done, we might still have safely predicted the renewal of the alliance five years hence, had it not been for the difficulty of forecasting the post-bellum attitude of Russia. Once again we say, the key is in Russia’s hands.