Victoriano Huerta: A Sketch From Life

JUNE, 1914

BY LOUIS C. SIMONDS

I

A CHARACTER cannot be understood out of its setting, and the character of Victoriano Huerta cannot be understood by those who do not understand Mexico. And who does understand this land of endless contradictions and anomalies? I, after a residence here of thirty years, have never answered a question about Mexico to a newcomer or visitor, without thinking a few moments later of half a dozen facts that run counter to the information I have given. Nevertheless, we foreign residents of long standing, if we have made any use at all of our opportunities for observation, have at least a synthetic knowledge of Mexico, though, when we try to bring it out in words, we apprehend, at times with too much reason, that we are not conveying to our hearers or readers the exact impression that is on our own minds. It is one of those cases in which while, when we are asked, we know little, when we are not asked we know a good deal. And to us, thus prepared, the character of Victoriano Huerta seems to fit in naturally with the scheme of things in Mexico; it is by no means out of joint with its surroundings. It has been Huerta’s misfortune that his character has been wrested from its setting and judged, almost without a hearing, at the bar of a higher or at least a different civilization.

It should surely seem an interesting fact that all the men who, in the last half-century, have shown any capacity to govern Mexico have been largely or wholly of the indigenous race. Juarez was a full-blooded Indian of the Zapoteca tribe, settled from time immemorial in portions of the territory forming the present State of Oaxaca, the builders perhaps of the palaces of Mitla. President Sebastian Lerdo de Tejada was of pure European descent, and he was driven from the country by the Revolution of Tuxtepec which elevated Porfirio Diaz to power in 1876. Though Diaz, according to his biographies, was able to trace his maternal descent in part to an eighteenth-century emigrant from the mountains of Asturias and his paternal descent to one of those early Andalusian settlers in Oaxaca who gave to its chief city the name of Antequera, from the town in Southern Spain where the Christian chivalry used so often to foregather for their forays into the territory of the Granadine Moors, the fact is that the former President showed in his physique and temperament the predominant characteristics of the Mixteca, divided by long-standing tribal feuds from the Zapoteca. Señor Madero was of European descent — his family, I have been told, were originally Portuguese Jews who settled in Mexico in colonial times; and in his attempt to govern Mexico according to his own enlightened and humane ideals he failed as disastrously as Maximilian had failed. Victoriano Huerta is not, as has been stated, a full-blooded Indian: he is about half Indian, though in sentiment undoubtedly more Indian than Caucasian. He is descended presumably, in respect of his Indian strain, from those warlike Xalixca whose name has survived in that of the present State of Jalisco and who gave so much trouble to Cristobal de Oñate and Pedro de Alvarado.

It is one of the revenges of time that this land of Mexico, which witnessed the march of the conquering Spaniard and for whose development the European and American have done and are doing so much, should after all be Indian-ruled. It may be objected that these Indian Presidents have governed often in the interest rather of the population of European extraction or descent than of the mass of aborigines. Such an assertion opens a broad question which this is not the place to discuss. The vital fact is that it is possible to discover in some sort in Victoriano Huerta the historical successor of Ilhuicamina, Axayacatl, Ahuizotl, and the other chieftains who held sway in Anahuac before the coming of the white man.

By no means do I wish to imply that modern Mexico cannot and ought not to be governed by a system infinitely more enlightened than that of the ancient Aztec monarchs. Nor do I wish to represent Mexico as, strictly speaking, an Indian republic. All that I seek to make clear is that the Indian element, ignorant and backward as its masses are, makes itself felt, if only by sheer weight of numbers, in the direction of national affairs.

If the importance of this Indian influence, which perhaps would be denied by many a Mexican of Spanish descent, but which is a fact for all that, be borne in mind by my readers, they will be drawing nearer to the angle of vision from which the character of Victoriano Huerta should be judged.

II

Huerta’s biography, up to the time when he came into prominence by the coup d’état of February 18, 1913, affords slender scope for elaboration.

He was born of humble parentage at the village of Colotlán, State of Jalisco, on December 23, 1854. His early years were spent in his native place and he received the rudiments of education from the parish priest. He proved an apt pupil, displaying proficiency in penmanship and arithmetic, and while still a mere stripling was able to earn some money by book-keeping, such as sufficed for the primitive commercial requirements of the locality.

But even then his boyish ambition was to be a soldier. By chance a copy of the old Monitor Republicano fell into his hands, in which he read an official advertisement of the conditions for the admission of young men into the Military College of Chapultepec. From that moment he formed the set resolve of securing entry into that establishment, although he had no very precise idea as to how his object was to be compassed.

Accident, however, favored his design. One day — I suppose it must have been in the winter or late autumn of 1871 — General Donato Guerra, who was still serving the government of President Juarez, although later he joined the Revolution of La Noria, started by General Porfirio Diaz, arrived at Colotlán at the head of a small body of troops. Having some dispatches to send off, or some military orders to issue, General Guerra inquired for an amanuensis, and young Huerta, who was standing near by and heard the inquiry, offered his services. The lad performed the task to Guerra’s satisfaction, and Guerra was so struck by his assistant’s look of intelligence and alertness, that he asked him his name, what he was doing, and what he wanted to be. The boy, who probably wore only the humble cotton garb of the Indian, with coarse straw hat, scapular, and sandals, looked Guerra steadfastly in the face and said that he wanted to enter the Military College, in order to be a soldier and rise in time to the rank of general. Guerra laughed, and laying his hand on the lad’s shoulder, said, ‘Very well, then, my boy, come along with me!’

So Huerta bade good-bye to his native village, his relatives and friends and journeyed in Guerra’s company to the City of Mexico, where he was by Guerra presented to President Juarez. ‘Here, Mr. President,’ said Guerra, ‘is an Indian lad who wants to be a general!’ Juarez forthwith directed that the youth should be enrolled as a Chapultepec cadet. Thus the first part of Huerta’s boyish dream was realized.

Young Huerta distinguished himself in his studies at the Military College, particularly in topography and astronomy. Year by year he carried off the chief prizes in his class, and at one of the prize distributions he was publicly mentioned by General Agustin Diaz, then director of the College, as a credit to the establishment and one for whom the future held great things in store.

Huerta graduated from the Military College with the rank of lieutenant in time to serve with the forces of President Lerdo de Tejada at the battle of Tecoac (November 16,1876),and share in their defeat at the hands of General Porfirio Diaz.

Tecoac was the decisive battle of the Revolution of Tuxtepec. Lerdo fled to the United States where he resided till his death (April 21, 1889), and Porfirio Diaz became the dominant figure in Mexican politics.

For the next thirty years or more, Huerta’s military career was largely of the routine order, though he had a hand in putting down various of the sporadic outbreaks of Mexico’s endemic political unrest which occurred during the Diaz administration.

During considerable periods he was assigned to special duty on the Geographical Survey Commission, and it is conceded that his work in this capacity was always carefully and accurately done. Señor Leandro Fernandez, one of the most successful cultivators of the exact sciences in Mexico and Minister of Communications in the Cabinet of President Diaz, used to say that the only member of the Geographical Survey Commission whose calculations never needed correction was Victoriano Huerta. It has been said that Huerta distinguished himself at the Military College in astronomy and topography, and, of course, these attainments stood him in good stead for his work on the Commission.

In 1895 Huerta took part in quelling the incipient revolutionary movement of Canuto Neri in the State of Guerrero — for, as has been intimated, Mexico did not altogether lose the revolutionary habit during Diaz’s thirty years of peace, and Guerrero has always been a political storm-centre. On the conclusion of this campaign, Huerta was assigned to garrison duty at Acapulco, the port of the State of Guerrero, and shortly afterwards was made post commander at Chilpancingo, the state capital, where he remained until 1897.

In the year 1901 Guerrero was the scene of new revolutionary disorders, headed by a group of malcontents of whom the chief was Rafael del Castillo Calderón. Huerta was dispatched to suppress this outbreak, a task which he satisfactorily accomplished.

Later on in the same year he was sent to combat the revolting Maya Indians in the State of Yucatán, and he achieved the complete pacification of the Peninsula in October, 1902. In recognition of his services in this connection, he was promoted to the rank of general of brigade, and thus the second part of his boyish dream became a reality. The cotton-clad Indian youth of Colotlán had attained the rank of general.

In some way, however, Huerta became, it is said, an object of distrust to President Diaz, who kept him in the background.

Here, then, at the very threshold of our subject we are met by a fact of no small interest. Diaz, in the plenitude of his powers, was undoubtedly a good judge of character, and the question arises: had he cause to distrust Huerta or had he become in his old age abnormally suspicious?

Be that as it may, Huerta’s name was seldom mentioned even in connection with military reviews and parades, and from 1907 to 1910, having obtained leave of absence from the army, he was engaged in the exercise of his profession as engineer at Monterey. So that, when, in the spring of 1911, the agrarian revolt started by Emiliano Zapata in the State of Morelos began to assume serious proportions and the newspapers announced that General Victoriano Huerta was to command a military column specially organized to combat the movement, I am sure that even the majority of Mexicans outside military circles, and certainly the majority of foreign residents, heard then of Huerta for the first time.

When, after resigning the Presidency on May 25, 1911, General Porfirio Diaz left the City of Mexico for Vera Cruz in the early morning hours of the following day, to go into exile, — voluntary exile it has been called, but, in reality, enforced exile, for such is the spirit of Latin-American politics, — Huerta commanded the military escort of the special train. Though women and children, the members of Diaz’s family, were on the train, it was attacked by rebels during the journey. True to his old fighting instincts, Diaz, though racked at the time by a cruel malady, grasped a rifle and was preparing to take his place in the firing line; but Huerta gently interposed, saying, ‘It is for this sort of work that I was sent with you, General!’ Diaz, for all that, alighted and used his pistol until the maderistas were beaten off.

III

Señor Francisco L. de la Barra was now ad interim President of Mexico, and one of the first questions claiming his attention was the menacing situation in the Slate of Morelos. The equivocal attitude of Zapata left no doubt in any reasonable mind that he never had any serious intention of abandoning the life of adventure which he had found so congenial to his taste and so profitable to his pocket. Señor de la Barra reluctantly came to the conclusion that military action was necessary, and selected General Huerta to conduct the campaign.

Huerta’s appointment to the Morelos post led to the first clash between him and Madero. Madero ingenuously believed that he could compose the Morelos situation and he hastened first to Cuernavaca and then to Cuautla in an endeavor to accomplish that object. He earnestly entreated de la Barra that in the meantime no aggressive movement should be made by the Federal forces under Huerta. But while Madero was conferring with Zapata at Cuautla, it was learned that Huerta,acting under the general instructions which he had received from President de la Barra, was advancing against the rebel positions around Yautepec. This was resented by Madero, who considered that his life unnecessarily had been placed in jeopardy; for a man of the suspicious temper of Zapata might easily have believed that the parleys which Madero was holding with him, while the government forces were preparing to strike a decisive blow at the main nucleus of his followers, involved a treacherous plot to entrap him. Madero, in published statements, declared that Huerta’s conduct in this connection was ‘questionable’ and ‘inexplicable.’ So insistently was this charge reiterated by Madero that at last in October, 1911, Huerta wrote to him, demanding an explanation.

‘Concerned,’ wrote Huerta, ‘by the charges which a person so considered as yourself has seen fit to make against me, charges which I repel with all the energy of which I am capable, I most respectfully exhort you to say exactly wherein my conduct was “inexplicable.” This request of mine cannot be regarded as unreasonable, for you must be aware that I am a man of the people, a soldier and the father of a family, with no fortune to bequeath to my children but my honor and good name.’ Huerta added that he had requested President de la Barra to grant him his full discharge from the army, so that he might recover the liberty of the citizen to vindicate his character.

Madero, who was then on his high horse, answered without giving any satisfaction, and manifesting complete indifference with regard to Huerta’s announced intention of retiring from the army. Some time afterwards, however, the two men met and talked over the situation. It was declared that the breach had been healed and that Huerta had reconsidered his decision to quit the service.

IV

The inauguration of Señor Madero as President occurred on November 6, 1911, and soon after that event, at a banquet given in honor of the new Executive by his friends and supporters, Huerta was one of the speakers, and among other things he said: ‘Señor Madero, you did wrong in distrusting the army. Such distrust is the greatest offense that can be done to a true-hearted and loyal army, and few armies are more so than that of Mexico. You did wrong in distrusting it. The Mexican army knows its duty and will never fail in its fulfillment. The constituted government can count on the army unconditionally.’

Some persons, reading these words in the light of subsequent events, will accuse Huerta of insincerity; but I believe that Huerta meant what he said when he said it.

Nevertheless, no responsible duty was assigned to Huerta, until, in the late spring of 1912, the insurrection against Madero, headed by his former partisan Pascual Orozco, in the State of Chihuahua, began to demand energetic treatment.

Huerta was sent north at the head of a division of the three arms, and defeated the orozquistas at the battles of Conejos (May 12, 1912), Rellano (May 22 and 23, 1912), and Bachimba (July 3, 1912).

The importance of these successes has been variously judged. Huerta was reproached with not having always followed up his advantages as promptly and efficiently as he might have done, thus crushing the movement once for all, and he answered the charge by pointing out that the equipment supplied for the cavalry arm of the division was deficient.

The regular campaign in Chihuahua having been brought to a conclusion and the state capital reoccupied, General Huerta was recalled to the City of Mexico. In recognition of his services in the north, Señor Madero’s government promoted him to the rank of general of division.

Yet certain organs of the press openly declared that Huerta was again an object of suspicion to the government, and probably they were right. Señor Madero offered to send him on a military mission to Europe and he declined.

Toward the end of January, 1913, almost on the eve of the military uprising headed by Bernardo Reyes, Felix Diaz, and Manuel Mondragón, an interview was given by Huerta to one of the newspapers of Mexico City in the course of which he was asked whether he believed himself to be viewed with suspicion by the government. ‘I cannot,’ he replied, ‘answer that question as it ought to be answered, for in truth I have no other ground for believing that I do not enjoy the government’s confidence than the order removing me from command in the north and the fact that I have been offered a commission abroad which, without the smallest disregard for the law, I have entreated the government to allow me to decline, for the reason that I am still convalescing from a recent illness and that I have a numerous family whom it would be impossible for me to support in Europe. Besides, my recall from the north and the offer to send me to Europe may well have been intended as a distinction.’

Huerta took occasion in the same interview to reiterate the army’s loyalty: ‘When I had the honor of escorting General Porfirio Diaz, after his resignation, to the port of Vera Cruz, I told him that the only redeeming feature which I perceived in the existing strife was the army. ... At a banquet given in honor of the President of the Republic, Citizen Francisco I. Madero, I took the liberty, with all the respect due to the Supreme Magistrate, to exhort him never to distrust the army, for to do so would be to question its high spirit of morale and to deny what is undeniable, that it is the sole prop of our country’s honor and integrity.’

The next month was destined to furnish an interesting commentary on these declarations.

V

Clearly, in spite of fair words, the critical days of the military uprising in the City of Mexico, which began on February 9, 1913, again found relations strained between Seòor Madero and General Huerta. Nevertheless, on the morning of that day, Huerta placed himself at Senor Madero’s orders and was given supreme command of the military operations in the capital against the felicista rebels.

It is charged that those operations were conducted with lukewarmness and that General Felipe Angeles, who has since joined the carrancistas, was the only Federal officer who displayed real zeal and efficiency in the government’s cause.

Of the military aspects of the question, I cannot speak authoritatively; I can but record my impressions. It seems to me that, if, when the attack on the National Palace, in which General Bernardo Reyes was killed, had been repulsed, the motley throng that surrounded Generals Felix Diaz and Manuel Mondragón had been vigorously followed up and attacked, or if the Ciudadela had been more tenaciously defended, the seditious movement might have been crushed at the outset. Huerta, however, who had not yet assumed command, was hardly responsible for this initial remissness. But thereafter, a delay, not easily understood, occurred before active operations against the Ciudadela, the rebel stronghold, were begun, and the felicistas were able almost unopposed to occupy important strategic positions and to throw up barricades. The result was that when the attack on the Ciudadela was initiated on the morning of Tuesday, February 11, the remaining chances of taking it by storm were slender. Nevertheless, as an observer of what followed during the week, I am convinced that more might have been done to prevent the introduction of supplies and provisions into the Ciudadela, to maintain the morale of the Federal forces at a higher level, to check the operations of felicista spies and agents who carried information to the Ciudadela and almost openly sought to tamper with the loyalty of the government forces, as I myself frequently witnessed.

Huerta must have been cognizant of these conditions. Why, then, did he not try to remedy them and improve the opportunity for vindicating practically the loyalty of the army to the constituted government which he had so often and so recently proclaimed? The plain fact is that it is very hard for the Mexican army to feel any enthusiasm for a civilian President, Huerta’s protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. This is a fundamental fact which with difficulty can be adequately grasped in the United States, but which must always be taken into account in passing judgment on persons and events in Mexico.

It is said that every evening Madero exasperated Huerta by querulous reproaches with respect to the slowness and inefficacy of the military operations. The unfortunate President, had very vague ideas about military affairs and he had been driven by events to the last stages of nervous perplexity. More than once Huerta believed that an attempt was to be made by Señor Madero to arrest him. One evening, Madero, it is said, rapping the table, demanded of Huerta that the Ciudadela must be taken next day, although the last soldier fell in the assault. It became evident that a final rupture between the two men could not long be deferred.

VI

The end came on Tuesday, February 18, when Huerta became a party and prime mover in a prætorian conspiracy to depose and imprison the lawful Executive.

Huerta assumed control of affairs, as he informed the Nation in a proclamation which read: —

‘In view of the very difficult circumstances through which the Nation has been passing, and particularly in the last few days the capital of the Republic, where, owing to the deficient government of Señor Madero, conditions may truly be described as almost anarchic, I have assumed the executive power, and awaiting the immediate assembling of Congress to act on the present political situation, I hold as prisoners in the National Palace Señor Francisco Madero and his cabinet, to the end that, the matter once decided, we may seek to conciliate men’s spirits in these historical moments and labor unitedly for peace, which is a matter of life or death for the Nation.’

A form of resignation was obtained from President Madero and Vice-President Pino Suarez on February 19, and was accepted by Congress and thus, by processes which externally at least were in accordance with constitutional requirements, General Huerta became Provisional President of Mexico.

I will not attempt to exculpate what cannot be exculpated. All that can be done is to see what can be said in extenuation of General Huerta’s act.

I was traveling in Europe during almost the whole of 1912, and, therefore, did not observe at close range the steps by which the Madero administration had steadily declined in public favor in the course of that year. But when I returned to Mexico in December, 1912, I found that not only the bulk of Mexicans, but many foreign residents, Americans and others, who at the start had believed in Madero and desired the success of his administration, had become convinced that he was ’impossible,’ as nearly all of them put it.

When asked by me why he was ‘impossible,’ they seemed unable to name any particular measure or policy of his which they considered especially open to criticism, and I inferred that they meant simply that he had been placed by force of circumstances in a position for which he was unfit and with which he was unable to cope. Madero, too, had come into power hampered by the great expectations which, wittingly or unwittingly, he had raised. He had overthrown an administration which at least gave Mexico peace and prosperity, and naturally the public wanted to know what he had to give the country in its stead, and as justification of the bloodshed and turmoil and loss of wealth, credit, and material progress which had been incidental to the overthrow of the Diaz régime and which did not cease even when that régime had been overthrown. It was beginning to be thought that Madero had nothing to offer. It was clear that, however sincere his intentions, he could not at once give the country the coveted boon of democracy, which, as any careful student of history might have known, must rest on the character and gradually formed habits of a people rather than on the will and idealistic aspirations of one man. In a word, the inevitable reaction had set in and Madero was paying the penalty for an excess of popularity.

This phase of public sentiment might have passed, and though undoubtedly it existed, it was made by the opposition press to appear more formidable than it really was. But, in any event, General Huerta could not be expected to escape the influence of a view pervading, for the time being, all classes of society, and it was human nature that he should be the more receptive to it in that he well knew that he had never been completely trusted by Madero and had on some occasions been publicly criticized by him.

Then, too, during the days of the bombardment in the capital the antiMadero view was constantly being urged on Huerta by prominent Mexicans, — senators, judicial functionaries, bankers, business men, and others. He was continually being pressed to stop the fighting and put an end to the dangers and sufferings to which the peaceful inhabitants of Mexico City, native and foreign, were being subjected.

In these representations members of the diplomatic corps to some extent joined. Mr. Hamilton Fife, who some months ago visited this country for the Times and Daily Mail of London, has stated in a letter published in the Weekly Times of December 26, 1913, in reference to the fighting in the capital of February of last year: —

‘He [General Huerta] was appealed to by senators, deputies, foreign residents, and with especial force, as he himself has told me, by Mr. Henry Lane Wilson, the American ambassador, to end the carnage in the streets.’ Mr. Wilson has himself made similar statements, in so far as his own share in the transaction is concerned. Speaking, for example, at the University Club of Brooklyn on the night of January 10 of the present year, Mr. Wilson said, ‘I did beg Huerta and Lascurian, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to end the bombardment.’

Now, as Madero was determined not to yield, Huerta clearly could not ‘end the carnage in the streets,’or ‘end the bombardment,’ without disobeying and throwing off his allegiance to the Executive. The further inference is obvious.

The compact between Huerta and Felix Diaz which involved the deposition of Madero — the first clause declared, ‘From this moment the formerly existing executive power is repudiated, etc.'— was entered into and signed beneath the roof of the American embassy and under the American flag.

I would not be understood as criticizing ex-Ambassador Wilson. He, too, I know, was entreated by all classes of society to use his influence to ameliorate the situation in the capital, and I believe he was actuated throughout by motives of humanity.

But, in any event, it is perhaps not so strange that Huerta, who was educated as a soldier, when ‘begged’ by Mr. Wilson to end the bombardment, should have regarded the ambassador as actually speaking for the United States. And when, in addition, it is remembered that he was urged to the same effect by prominent compatriots, and the almost intolerable conditions, which the prolongation of hostilities in the capital was causing, are taken into account, some excuse may possibly be discovered for an act which has been so severely judged in the United States.

But I am not writing an apology for Huerta. I am merely laying before my readers the elements which must enable them to judge Huerta’s character as exemplified by the turning-point in his career.

VII

A more delicate subject remains to be examined. A characteristic of Juarez, the great Indian President of Mexico, was his implacability and obduracy. He could not be made to perceive, for example, the broad reasons of equity, and even of policy, which militated in favor of Maximilian’s pardon, though they were ably urged upon him in personal conferences by Maximilian’s attorneys, Mariano Riva Palacio and Rafael Martinez de la Torre. Great as he was in some respects, Juarez simply could not rise to the plane which would have enabled him to see that to spare the life of the ill-advised Austrian archduke would have elevated Mexico and its administration immensely in the eyes of the civilized world and would have saved the Republic from a blot which may still have to be expiated. Nothing could shake his adamantine resolve that Maximilian should die.

Here surely was a case in which the Indian spirit and the Indian influence played a decisive part in shaping the destinies of Mexico.

Did the fate of Madero and Pino Suarez, the deposed President and VicePresident, come before Huerta, the present Indian President of Mexico, as the fate of Maximilian came before Juarez, though in a different form? This surely is the critical fact in the estimate of Huerta’s character.

Huerta himself has never been willing to answer the question, though it has been submitted to him in a precise written form.

For my own part, after inquiries among members of the diplomatic corps, resident American newspapermen and others who have gone to some pains to elucidate the point, I believe that Madero and Pino Suarez fell by the same hands, or by hands acting under the same influences, as were responsible for the death of Gustavo Madero, although Huerta may have been guilty of contributory negligence.

Huerta’s friends ascribe his reticence on the subject to the native dignity of which he has given not a few proofs, and they say he will clear himself when he can do so without seeming to yield to the pressure of irresponsible foreign opinion.

VIII

Thus far I have allowed Huerta’s character to speak for itself. But my readers may desire to know more specifically what manner of man is this who has sprung from comparative obscurity into a position of world-wide notice.

A stature above that of the average of Mexicans; a rather bulky frame; rugged features; a massive, firmly set jaw; a complexion not much darker than that of the native of southern Europe; brown eyes which frequently twinkle with humor and vivacity; a straggling, grizzled moustache — such are the physical characteristics of the man.

Huerta is a man of much greater native ability than his enemies would admit, and he has grown during the year just passed. He is not as great a man as his friends paint him, but he is a very much greater man than he is painted by the forces opposed to him in Mexico.

Intellectually, Huerta has one inestimable quality — a very direct mind. He readily distinguishes essentials from non-essentials, and, brushing the latter aside, he can get to the point at once, if he so desires. On the other hand, he has the sagacity, or the astuteness, or the slyness of the Indian, — call it what you will, — and when it suits his purpose can maintain an impenetrable reserve.

In the details of business and in the conduct of the administration, he is unmethodical, and in less important matters given to laisser aller. Though he works hard when he takes up a task, he is irregular in the distribution of his time. There are occasions when those nearest to him do not know where he is or how to reach him. This is what has given rise, from time to time, to reports of his disappearance from the capital, — reports telegraphed to the United States but for which there has never been the slightest foundation.

Some of his scientific attainments have already been mentioned. He still retains his interest in astronomy and topography.

He is unquestionably the most competent military man in Mexico at the present time, and although his military achievements cannot be compared with those of Porfirio Diaz — if for no other reason than that Huerta has not had the opportunities of the victor of La Carbonera and Puebla — nevertheless Huerta is the idol of the Mexican army to a greater extent than Diaz was toward the close of his administration. It is now clear that there was some latent disaffection in the army during the later Porfirian era. Not a few military men felt that Diaz did not pay sufficient attention to the army, and favored civilians and the ideals of civil rule. Undoubtedly the army is better looked after just now, and the improved appearance of the military, their more soldier-like bearing and garb, must strike every observer. But the cost of this has yet to be counted and paid.

Huerta takes a keen personal interest in all that concerns the life of the soldier. No detail is too small for his attention. When he visits a barracks, he delights the soldiers by showing, in his questions and investigations, his intimate acquaintance with all the minutiæ of their daily life.

Huerta possesses the gift of a rude eloquence, and is fond of illustrating his meaning by analogies and paradigms. When interested in a topic, he speaks with great emphasis. A recent French visitor who conversed with him said to me that at such times the President seems to underline his words with the play of his facial expression.

A man of the people, Huerta understands the common people, and is understood by them. This perhaps accounts for the paradox that, while economic conditions, as affecting the masses, are worse now than under Madero, — the mere prolongation of civil strife makes them worse, — nevertheless the people are less restive.

Huerta has a blood feeling for the Indians, and to a sympathetic listener he will talk at length on the Indian problem, dwelling on the good qualities of the Indians, their wrongs, the disadvantages under which they have labored. He is said to hold that there will never be enduring peace in Mexico until the Indians secure their modicum of justice and a fair chance, and receive a reasonable portion of the soil of which they were the original possessors.

All who converse with Huerta note his quickness at repartee, his motherwit and ingenuity of verbal fence.

Though, as I have intimated, history may clear Huerta in respect of the death of Madero and Pino Suarez, I think it would be absurd to represent him as a humane man. He is doubtless not exempt from that utter disregard for human life which, when political expediency or the so-called reason of state intervenes, characterizes all successful military leaders in Mexico, particularly if they are wholly or largely of the Indian race. For the rest, one would have to be a superficial reader of history, and unacquainted with the bloodstained traditions of this country before and since the conquest, to be surprised at this trait. Any one needing ‘documentation’ on the subject might advantageously begin by reading or rereading Prescott’s ever-interesting account of the civil, military, and religious polity of the ancient inhabitants of Anahuac.

But, in general, Huerta is goodhearted and would rather do a kindness than the reverse.

He has, as he himself has often said, a numerous family, and his family life bears comparison with that of other Mexicans of his class. Like the generality of recent Mexican presidents, he lives, when in the City of Mexico, in his private residence, which is entirely unpretentious.

Huerta has the imperturbability of the Indian and the tenacity of purpose which was so marked a characteristic of Juarez. But he does not, as a rule, display the stolidity of the Indian. This is perhaps because he comes of the native race of the State of Jalisco, the gayest region of Mexico, its Andalusia. I have seen him on recent evenings driving in his automobile with friends on San Francisco Street, at the hour of the carriage parade, talking animatedly and smiling, as if the burden of administration, in this trying period of the nation’s affairs, left him the most care-free of men. Some persons conclude from this demeanor that Huerta does not realize the seriousness of the situation. But I attribute it to a genuine equanimity and a strong faith — mistaken or not — in the national destinies.

It is charged that his sociability leads him occasionally into undignified situations. He has been accused, in recent articles, of midnight carousals in

In these stories there is, I believe, not a little exaggeration. It must be borne in mind that the gay habits of the beau sabreur were somewhat characteristic of the past and passing generations of Mexican army officers, and during the Wars of Reform and French Intervention General Porfirio Diaz often found his abstemious ways bringing him into unpleasant encounters with his comrades in arms. Huerta’s appearance shows no traces of dissipation, and those who have business to transact with him find him invariably clear-headed.

General Huerta can assume, when he wishes, a suitable gravity, and even dignity, of demeanor. At official ceremonies his features settle into an almost hieratic rigidity, like an Indian stone effigy.

But he willingly lays aside the cares of state and shows the genial side of his character. He has driven to the Country Club, and delighted the young people of the American colony, who happened to be there with their parents, by taking numbers of them for a ride round the grounds in his large touring-car.

He may frequently be seen of an afternoon drinking a cup of tea in a small tea-parlor, generally accompanied by a single aide in mufti, sometimes by one or two friends.

One day he will drop into an American book-store, make a number of purchases, ask the proprietor about his health and that of his family, and take leave with a pleasantry on his lips.

And all these things he does, not with the air of a man aiming at effect or acting a part which he does not feel, but with the natural, easy grace which, when the Mexican, of whatever rank in life he may be, is in the mood to behave handsomely, sits so well on him.

Huerta’s courage is undoubted, and though he may have a keen eye for the main chance, I am sure he would not surrender to save his life or his belongings.

He himself has said that he is religious. I suppose he means that he is religiously inclined. If he knew the Roman poet, he might say with many of us, —

He has not forgotten his debt of gratitude to the good parish priest of Colotlán, who gave him his first schooling.

Such is Victoriano Huerta, as I see him: a character very human, very imperfect no doubt, but, almost biblical in a certain simplicity and intelligibility, and fitting, not inharmoniously, into this Mexican cosmos.