Disorderly States

MAY, 1914

BY HENRY JONES FORD

THE usual explanation is that the causes are either climatic or racial, but neither theory will bear analysis. The beginnings of culture were tropical fruits. Political system and governmental order first developed in countries where climatic conditions gave a hot-house luxuriance to vegetable growth, and nature itself kept renewing the fertility of the soil. These conditions were most amply provided in the alluvial deposits of river valleys in tropical countries. But peoples having such advantages are not left in undisturbed enjoyment of them, and organization of public authority is necessary for the guidance and protection of the community. If successful invasion takes place, the conquerors must develop means of holding what they have gained, or else they must in their turn yield control to more capable hands. The result of this selective process is the gradual formation of empire, whose first seats were all in tropical countries.

The principle is illustrated by Aztec culture in Southern Mexico and Inca culture in Peru, as well as by the great states that were formed in the valleys of the Nile and the Euphrates, with a longevity far beyond anything that European political history can show.

As the advance of art extended human mastery over natural resources, the economic basis of empire shifted, to the disadvantage of its original seats, but even then empire long kept close to its tropical source. During the many centuries in which the Mediterranean Ocean was a Roman lake it could not have occurred to any one that there was a connection between political order and a cold climate. That orderly states belong to the temperate zone, and that disorderly states belong to the tropics, are associations of ideas of recent origin, which upon any large view of history are seen to be fallacious.

The racial theory is even less substantial. Cant about Anglo-Saxon political ideals is very common, but neither the Angles nor the Saxons ever produced an orderly state. The British Isles were a favorite hunting ground for the tribesmen of Northern Europe until the Norman Conquest introduced a more efficient governmental system. There was not an orderly state in all Europe after the collapse of the Roman Empire, until the formation of national monarchies on the basis of royal prerogative. Professor Henry Sidgwick in his Development of European Polity points out that in the middle of the eighteenth century absolute monarchy was generally regarded as the form of government ‘by which the task of establishing and maintaining a civilized political order had been, on the whole, successfully accomplished, after other modes of political construction had failed to realize it.’ That is to say, European character was such that constitutional government was impossible and a strong dictatorship was the only practical way of maintaining order,— the same dictum now heard with regard to popular character in other parts of the world.

It may be said that even in the period of European absolutism the case of England showed that orderly government could be maintained without dictatorship, but some of the wisest heads then in England did not think so. France, under absolute rule, was reckoned much the superior of England in order and civilization. The historian Gibbon deplored the fact that circumstances compelled him to live in England instead of among a people ‘who have established a freedom and ease in society unknown to antiquity and still unpracticed by other nations.’ The philosopher Hume, in an essay published in 1741, points out that the limitations on royal authority in England admitted an intolerable tyranny of factions, and he concludes that ‘we shall at last, after many convulsions and civil wars, find repose in absolute monarchy, which it would have been happier for us to have established peaceably from the beginning.’

The reputation of England for political stability is quite recent, as history runs. Up to the nineteenth century it was a notorious example of a disorderly state. Levity and turbulence were regarded as English political characteristics. A curious physical explanation was advanced, which even John Milton appears to have taken seriously. In his treatise on A Free Commonwealth, he refers to ‘the fickleness which is attributed to us as we are islanders,’ and he remarks that ‘good education and acquisite wisdom ought to correct the fluxible fault, if any there be, of our watery situation.’

The English self-governing commonwealths now rank as orderly states, and it appears to make no difference in this respect whether they are in a cold climate or in a hot. Canada extends far into the Arctic region; but Australia is in the same latitudes as countries of South America where there has been much political disorder; and South Africa is in the same zone as Southern Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Canada is both French and English, and racial and linguistic difference is accompanied by radical religious difference, — circumstances making against the theory that its political order is a racial product. Canadian politics were long in a state of turbulence, public discontent breaking out in rebellion in 1837-38. The situation became so serious that representative government in Canada was abolished and the country was governed for some time by an appointed council, whose first ordinance suspended the habeas corpus act. The existing state of political order in Canada dates from the British North America Act of 1867, giving Canada its present federal constitution.

Australia has had a less troubled history, but any theory that its political order results from the character of the inhabitants must reckon with the fact that the colony made its start as a convict settlement. Darwin, who visited it in 1836, noted that ‘the whole community is rancorously divided into parties on almost every subject,’ and that ‘among those who, from their station in life, ought to be the best, many live in such open profligacy that respectable people cannot associate with them.’ He thought conditions were such that society ‘can hardly fail to deteriorate.’ The organization of South Africa, and the competency of its government, present a surprising phenomenon following so closely after a war between the Dutch and the English elements of its population, and it is inexplicable on any climatic or racial theory. Indeed, if racial or linguistic homogeneity were essential to political order, every country in Europe would be in a bad way, and particularly Switzerland, where there is a high development of orderly and efficient government although four languages are spoken in the country, all apparently holding their ground.

Although it is impossible to account for political order as a climatic or racial product, there is a general principle that holds good of all political forms, — the biological principle of the correlation of structure and function, which is merely a scientific way of stating the familiar business principle that order and efficiency are products of sound organization. It is an invariable rule that the development of political order is connected with improvement in the organization of public authority. In England it was obtained by breaking down the old partitions of authority and by consolidating power. Instead of perpetual contention over the scope and limitations of royal prerogative, the system of cabinet government was instituted, which brings authority in its entirety under the direct control of public opinion. The notion that royal prerogative has been in any way superseded or impaired by the growth of popular rule in England is a fallacy. Crown authority is now greater than ever, and it is still on the increase. What has happened is that it has passed into the custody of the leaders of the party in control of the House of Commons, so that crown authority and parliamentary authority have been united.

The late Professor Maitland’s Constitutional History of England observes that ‘we must not confuse the truth that the King’s personal will has come to count for less and less with the falsehood (for falsehood it would be) that his legal powers have been diminishing; on the contrary, of late years they have enormously grown.’ That is to say, royal prerogative having been converted into a formula of popular sovereignty, free use is made of it as an agency of democratic administration. Sovereignty is essentially a unit, and it is only since constitutional adjustments were made connecting executive and legislative authority in one organ of sovereignty that England has ranked as an orderly state.

In accomplishing a sound organization of her own public business, England incidentally provided safe methods of government for her colonies, and their position as orderly states belongs to this period. The process has, however, been much more than mere transmission of parliamentary institutions. Care has been taken to found the system on strict business principles, and to correct defects when revealed by experience. The constitution of Canada is a short act of settlement, free from abstractions and concerned wholly with the actual organization of authority. Its fundamental principle is the connection of the executive and legislative branches, and its fundamental regulation is that no appropriation can be made except upon the recommendation of the administration. The business conditions thus established impart to the government its tone and character. The administration appears before the representative assembly as does a general manager before a board of directors, and so likewise it is the duty of the administration to prepare and submit for consideration all needful measures.

It is a familiar business principle that sound accountancy is the foundation of sound business. In introducing responsible budget control, the English constitution established the cardinal feature of the orderly state, but Australian experience showed the need of auxiliary precautions, and the course pursued is even a better instance of scientific method than is supplied by the case of Canada, whose needs were met by forms of the ordinary British pattern. In some Australian states, democratic tendencies caused the introduction of elective senates, and then there were two legislative bodies, each of which could claim to derive authority direct from the people. Thus it might happen that an administration would have its policy marred or frustrated by a hold-over senate. Conflicts occurred, resulting in legislative deadlocks, and disorders ensued, requiring the intervention of the English government. As English experience afforded no precedents for treating such a situation, recourse was had to Scandinavian experience. An expedient was adopted that was first introduced into political procedure by the Norway constitution of 1814. It is that when a bill has been twice passed by the assembly and rejected by the senate, the two houses shall meet in joint convention to vote on the measure as one body, a two-thirds vote in its favor being requisite for passage.

This expedient was introduced in Australia with characteristic British modification, the joint convention not taking place until the two houses have been simultaneously dissolved and their successors have been elected, which must take place within ten days after such dissolution. Then if disagreement still continues, the two houses meet in joint convention and a majority of the whole decides. This arrangement, which put an end to legislative deadlocks, was adopted in the constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia. It was put in the constitutions given to the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony when those countries were reorganized after the Boer War. It is also a feature of the constitution of the Union of South Africa. It is owing to the care with which the public business has been organized, and with which the transaction of its affairs has been conditioned, that the English commonwealths now rank as orderly states.

The same relation between structure and function may be descried wherever orderly and efficient government is found, look where we will. The present state of order in France is the result of constitutional adjustments radically different from those which resulted in the failure of previous experiments. Incidentally that experimentation produced a form of municipal government that has gone all over the world, and it works well wherever it has been adopted, whether it be in Japan or in South America. In general character it is the same system as is found in our own business corporations, the municipal councilors organizing like a board of directors by electing one of their number to be the presiding officer and the head of the executive management. It is well known that some of our own business corporations, organized after this simple pattern, administer larger revenues than any of our states. The same principles of organization hold good when applied to the management of the public business. The issue of the Consular and Trade Reports for December 3, 1913, mentions the fact that the municipality of Buenos Aires had awarded a contract for the building of 10,000 houses for employees and workmen, construction to be at the rate of 2000 houses a year. Such transactions on public account are not unusual in the large cities of South America, and their competency to engage in them is attested by results. Is that competency to be attributed to climate, or to race, or to the fact that they took over from the French code a sound system of municipal government?

Illustration of the point has been carried to an extent that might seem superfluous were it not that there is an obstinate American prepossession to the effect that the character of government is determined by the character of the people. This attitude of thought obstructs intelligent comprehension and salutary treatment of some acute problems in our foreign relations. It has become a matter of the most serious importance that consideration should be given to the fact that institutions mould character. The case of Scotland is a classic instance, cited by the historian Lecky as evidence of the transformation of character through changes of environment, introduced by legislation. He remarks that prior to the Revolution of 1699, ‘of all the nations of Europe, there was probably not a single one which was so violent, so turbulent, so difficult to govern as the Scotch.’ The measures which ‘in a few generations raised Scotland from one of the most wretched and barbarous into one of the most civilized and happy nations in Europe,’ give him occasion to makes these wise observations: —

‘Invectives against nations and classes are usually very shallow. The original basis of national character differs much less than is supposed. The character of large bodies of men depends in the main upon the circumstances in which they have been placed, the laws by which they have been governed, the principles they have been taught. When these are changed the character will alter too, and the alteration, though it is very slow, may in the end be very deep.’

Of course some political capacity is prerequisite to the organization of public business, just as there must exist some business capacity before there is a basis for the organization of private business. But the disorderly states whose condition most concerns the United States do not present the case of peoples who have yet to attain political consciousness. Their position as civilized states is at least so well established that they are not regarded by other powers as presenting a proper field for extra-territorial jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the sanguinary violence of their politics, cultured society is found in them, and evidences are displayed of ability in art, literature, science, and jurisprudence. It is safe to say that if a society has reached the stage of civilization, material exists for the formation of orderly government. The public business can utilize motives of honor and distinction that do not operate in private business. If in order and efficiency the transaction of public business falls below that of private business, and the tone of its morality falls below the ethical standard of the community, the fundamental defect is in the organization of public authority. The remedy lies in better constitutional arrangements. The case presents no difficulties that have not been successfully dealt with by such methods. It is a matter of political engineering — the adjustment of the mechanism of government to the forces that move it. The prime cause of trouble in the disorderly states of America is that at present they have unworkable constitutions.

It must be admitted that modern history furnishes little or nothing of precedent or guidance in political reorganization through international action. The European state is a military product, the outcome of a process of rigorous selection on the principle of efficiency, an incident of which is the maintenance of public order. A state unable to develop efficient government invited destruction, not reorganization. Such was the fate of Poland, although the intelligence and vivacity of the national character, properly organized, would have sustained a noble commonwealth.

Prepossessions derived from European history would lead one to expect that political evolution would eventually result in the formation of orderly states throughout the Americas by the same selective process as in Europe, the incapable being destroyed by annexation of their territory; but there are considerations that make against this view. American states are developing under conditions that did not apply to European states. These are, —

1. The great scope of modern banking operations and the international fluidity of capital. This condition is peculiar to this period of the world’s development.

2. The Monroe Doctrine. This condition is peculiar to the American situation.

Up to the seventeenth century it was state policy to prohibit the exportation of money, each country striving to hold on to its stock of gold and silver. That policy was not so much abandoned as destroyed through inability to enforce it; but antipathy to investment of capital outside of national jurisdiction continued up to our own times. This feeling was manifested by the British government during the last century. Speculators in foreign concessions were made to feel that they could not count upon much sympathy or support if they came to grief. But a great change has taken place in national policy, a convenient mark being the financial control which was established over Egypt in 1879, originally by England and France in conjunction, but which since 1883 has been maintained by England alone. It is virtually a receivership, instituted because Egypt, under native administration, failed to meet obligations contracted with European banking interests. This of course has greatly emboldened capital, and banking companies now hunt investments throughout the world. It has become a function of diplomatic service to promote such enterprise. Recently the spectacle has been presented of great powers contending for the privilege of obtaining for their banking companies the right to make loans to China.

Here, then, is a change in the international situation which removes incentives for political improvement that formerly existed. Rulers are no longer dependent upon the immediate resources of their own government for the satisfaction of personal ambition. Opportunities which used to be closely limited to current receipts from taxation may now be capitalized by means of foreign loans or by the sale of concessions. The cases of Egypt, Korea, and Persia, show what the national consequences may be. The process of foreclosing upon nations and instituting a receivership of their resources is now so systematized that it may be effective without apparent breach in the legal continuity of authority. Egypt still figures in the gazetteers as a tributary state of Turkey under the government of the Khedive, who, upon the recommendation of England, appoints a financial adviser without whose concurrence no financial decision can be taken. This practically suffices to put the administration of the country in the hands of a receiver appointed by England, who has no higher title of authority than merely that of British Agent and Consul General. The native government of the country is nominally intact, although practically it is a British province.

Such terms as spheres of influence, pacific penetration, protectorates, and client slates — now become familiar in world politics — denote adjustments in empire by which the great powers are taking over the administration of all states unable themselves to maintain order and fulfill their obligations. This is the test of capacity which republican government in China must meet in order to preserve its territorial integrity and its national independence.

The process cannot be justly characterized as immoral. The end of the state is the perfection of human life, and the elimination of deficient or effete forms of the state is a concomitant of the advance of the human species in the scale of being. Upon this ground the Monroe Doctrine has been attacked as being essentially vicious, in that, it shields American states from their proper responsibilities and maintains preserves for disorder, corruption, and violence. Another inference made from the same premises is that the Monroe Doctrine entails upon the United States imperial responsibilities, so that it is the duty of our government to police the Americas and supervise state behavior in that field. This aspect of the Doctrine offends and irritates the great nations of South America, and is a source of estrangement between them and the United States. Just what that. Doctrine means cannot remain a matter of academic discussion. Events are manifestly pressing toward a practical interpretation of it.

As originally promulgated it was no more than a diplomatic intimation meant for a particular situation then existing. It was evoked by a movement in world-politics claiming to rest upon the highest possible moral grounds. After the final overthrow of Napoleon Bonaparte, and the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty in France in 1815, the Czar of Russia proposed to the allied powers the treaty of the Holy Alliance, by which they bound themselves to take as the sole rule of their conduct ‘the precepts of the Christian religion.' This treaty, entered into by Russia, Austria, and Prussia, and concurred in by France, provided for meetings devoted to ‘the examination of measures which shall be considered most salutary for the repose and prosperity of the people, and for the maintenance of European peace.' England refused to join, on the ground that the plan was impracticable; and when there were indications that, as part of the scheme of restoring public order, the Holy Alliance intended to take in hand the revolted Spanish colonies in America, the English government actively exerted its influence against the project, and made overtures to the United States for joint action. While that suggestion was not entertained by our government, President Monroe took independent action, and in his message of December 2, 1823, made the statement of policy since famous as the Monroe Doctrine. Pointing out that it is the established policy of the United States not to meddle in European affairs, Monroe went on to say that, —

‘It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent [of America] without endangering our peace and happiness. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference.’

The extension of our own political system to the East through the acquisition of the Philippines manifestly impairs the position taken by President Monroe, which was equivalent to saying, ‘ You keep hands off our part of the world, and we’ll keep hands off your part.’ If we have a right to take over the administration of a country in the East, why has not a European state as good a right to take over the administration of a country in the West? If we explain that it is simply a temporary arrangement, to be discontinued when the subject people are fit for independence, how can we disallow like professions from a European power extending its control over an American country? Such a system of control as England maintains in Egypt would leave the outward form of national autonomy intact. It might be contended with much force that it would not be even a temporary extension of European political systems since international receivership respects the forms of local authority and abstains from interference with the language and customs of the people. If the Monroe Doctrine in its traditional form were a rule of international law binding our national policy, it would be susceptible of applications that might be embarrassing to our national interests; but it is merely a political principle, taking such shape as our national interests may require, good so far as we are willing and able to make it good. Its present shape has to be adapted to present circumstances, which are created by conditions unthought of, and indeed inconceivable, when the Monroe Doctrine was originally promulgated.

From the foregoing survey the contingencies which may arise from international disturbances caused by disorderly states appear to be either annexation, or clientage, or reorganization. The first of these was about all that was in mind when the Monroe Doctrine was first proclaimed, and it has been an effectual barrier to that process. But clientage, as now developed in international practice, opens possibilities of control that can be met only by a corresponding development in our own national policy. Such a development is taking place. It is what has been called the Wilson Doctrine. The first public statement of it was made in President Wilson’s speech at Mobile, October 27, 1913. He said, —

‘You hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in Latin America. You do not hear of concessions to foreign capitalists in the United States. They are not granted concessions. They are invited to make investments. ... It is an invitation, not a privilege, and states that are obliged, because their territory does not lie within the main field of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions, are in this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate their domestic affairs, a condition of affairs always dangerous, and apt to become intolerable. . . . I rejoice in nothing so much as in the prospect that they will now be emancipated from these conditions, and we ought to be first in assisting that emancipation.’

The effect of the Wilson Doctrine in checking schemes of foreign exploitation in American states has been already displayed in announcements of the withdrawal of European capital from negotiations for concessions. The exclusion of such influences will tend to weaken the springs of revolution, by conditioning the introduction of capital upon the existence of investment conditions. The attitude of the United States could not be one of indifference to the development of such conditions. The positive phase of the Wilson Doctrine is, therefore, reorganization, which is exactly the reverse of clientage. The one aims to establish the authority of the state with which it deals, while the other aims to supersede that authority.

Interference in other people’s affairs is proverbially a delicate matter, but there are occasions when it may be right and necessary, and by the exercise of tact and caution the business may be managed without giving offense. The idea may be novel to the people of the United States as a feature of our public policy, but the exercise of organizing influence is common practice as between private business concerns. It is an everyday affair for a bank or a large business house to make accountancy suggestions to customers. Constitutional government is essentially the application of sound accountancy to the public business. The principles of organization in public business are now sufficiently well known to admit of their intelligent application to the case of disorderly states. The task is not an easy one, but events tend to make it our duty. In performing it, the United States might well coöperate with such great states as Chile, Brazil, and Argentina, which have succeeded in establishing stable institutions after an experience that should give special value to their suggestions. An essential requisite of success in such exertions of influence is to avoid anything like arrogance. Polite and conciliatory manners, abstention from professions of philanthropy, and habitual continence of speech should characterize all agencies of our national policy. With the opportunities these qualities can secure, the case of the disorderly states admits of cure, not by impairing their sovereignty but by invigorating it.