Seward's Attitude Toward Compromise and Secession, 1860-1861
OF the great leaders of the war period, none has been so commonly misunderstood and so frequently misrepresented as William H. Seward. This has been chiefly due to an erroneous conception of his attitude toward compromise and secession during the five months between the election of 1860 and the outbreak of the civil war. Personal jealousies, party rivalries, and sectional prejudices are a part of history, but they should not be allowed to distort it. The reader of to-day desires to learn the facts : and it is the sole purpose of this paper to give a brief and unbiased narrative of those which best show Seward’s acts and opinions during that critical time.
It was a new epoch in our history that began in November, 1860, when South Carolina took her first steps toward secession. Except in Kansas, the political conflicts for many years had been essentially constitutional and peaceful. Now they were revolutionary and threatened to be violent. Unfortunately, those who favored the resistance of slavery at every step were to be in a helpless minority for three months, while the secessionists had the advantage of the same period of time in which to prepare for the final contest. The radical Republicans insisted that, as their party had not violated the Constitution, they must yield neither to the demands for compromise nor to secession, but that all the States must remain in the Union and abide the effect of the changing opinion of the North.
As the weeks advanced, the breach widened and the strength of disunion increased. Many of the Garrisonian abolitionists welcomed separation as the means of realizing their dogma, “ No Union with slaveholders.” The New York Tribune proclaimed that if several States should decide to secede, they should be allowed to depart in peace, in deference to the sacred light of revolution. The Bell-Everett party and most of the Democrats were opposed to enforcing the laws at any point where the secessionists offered resistance. And practically all of the inhabitants of the Southern border States demanded at least the adoption of measures — best expressed in the Crittenden compromise propositions — that would make slavery secure where it then existed, and in every part of the United States south of the Missouri Compromise line, and that would remove the obstructions to the return of fugitive slaves. With one voice the thousand commercial interests of the great Northern cities also called upon Congress to avoid war by making some such concession to the South. The danger of war had frightened so many that it looked as if the victorious party would come into power with its strength much reduced since November, with an organized confederacy of several States before it, and with an opposition at home that would make any attempt to resist secession futile, if not foolhardy.
Appearances soon indicated that Buchanan’s indecision and the anger of the coercionists would render haste on the part of the secessionists both easy and urgent. If the Union was to be maintained, it must be done under the leadership of Republicans. Yet the members of the other parties felt confident that the ulterior purpose was to make unconstitutional inroads upon slavery ; therefore they were unwilling to support them in a policy of force. But the Republicans could not even command all their own partisans. Hence it was evident to all calm observers that they could begin a war, but that defeat was almost certain. Their logic and courage were admirable, but their statesmanship was inadequate.
I.
Seward was one of the first Republicans to perceive that the dilemma was a serious one ; but never for a moment did he consider the obstacles insurmountable. His past no less than his present position in his party gave him special responsibilities and opportunities in such a crisis. His political leadership since 1849 had been such that every one regarded him as the foremost Republican. At times he had debated like a radical, but he had always acted upon the maxim that the highest statesmanship consists in getting the best results from actual conditions. He had never looked to other than lawful and peaceful means of ridding the country of slavery. He had both great optimism and great patience. In spite of the bitter political hatred which the South had felt toward him, no one on his side of the Senate had such pleasant personal relations with the other members of Congress. Although he was not offered the Secretaryship of State until after Congress convened, it was universally believed that be would he the real leader of the coming administration. Quite independent of his own wishes, and because of his preëminence, the country had settled down to the belief that he would have some leading plans to announce, and that his actions would be indicative of Lincoln’s present opinions and future policy.
The rumors of the secession movement called Seward to Washington before the end of November. There he found, as he wrote, that the madcaps of the South wanted to be inflamed, so as to make their secession irretrievable, but that the Republicans did not appreciate their designs or the real dangers. Before Congress had time to consider any of the many compromises proposed, the leading secessionists issued an appeal urging every slaveholding State to seek “ speedy and absolute separation from the unnatural and hostile Union.” This stirred up and fed the Southern fires. On December 20, 1860, South Carolina passed her ordinance of secession. Then she sent commissioners to Washington to seek recognition of her independence, and dispatched agents to urge other States to hurry into secession and to choose delegates to a Southern Congress. The business interests of the North were greatly affected. No one could anticipate events for more than a few hours. Yet secession was still in a theoretical stage ; there had been no overt act, although many were threatened. Buchanan had not made clear what his position would be under such circumstances. Naturally, Lincoln had as yet shaped no definite policy, and did not want to be held responsible for one before his time.
Such was the political status when the New England dinner was held in New York, December 22. Expecting to spend Christmas in Auburn, Seward had declined an invitation to be present. However, senatorial duties had made it necessary for him to be in Washington Monday, December 24. Leaving home Saturday morning, the 22d,late that evening he arrived at the Astor House, where the New England Society was still at table. As soon as his presence in the hotel became known, a special committee was sent to fetch him. He went with reluctance, and was received with such enthusiasm that he was compelled to speak.
Although history seems quite to have overlooked it, Seward was a great wit in private life. With a humor in perfect harmony with the circumstances of his impressment and the mood of the banqueters over their liqueurs and cigars, he began by saying that he had heard they were all Yankees, and he inferred that they would therefore want to know all about him. In colloquial phrases, with a pun or two. and with amusing repartee at their interjected questions, he made several diverting references to some of those present, and to a few questions in state and national polities. He believed that the old centripetal force of common interest which had drawn the States into a confederation, and which the fathers had concisely expressed in E Pluribus Unum, still existed. Therefore secession must be a passion, a delusion. a “ humbug,” even, which could not withstand a calm debate. If the North would keep cool, the suns of sixty days would give a much brighter and more cheerful atmosphere,
Seward has been severely criticised because he was jovial, patient, and overoptimistic, rather than grave, vigorous, and precise. This censure disregards two most important facts : that it was still too soon for the Republican leaders to have shaped a definite policy ; and that, in any case, this occasion would have been a most unfit one on which to explain it. It was necessary for Seward to speak in order to prevent damaging inferences ; he had spoken extemporaneously, and without creating excitement or announcing a definite policy. His opinions were soothing and tentative. and the very extraordinary applause with which they were received was good evidence that they were opportune.
During the holidays the excitement in Washington greatly increased. It was rumored, and widely believed, that the capital was to be seized by the secessionists. Seward’s intimate relations with loyal Democrats in the Cabinet, in the Senate, and in the South enabled him to keep himself informed of all that was occurring; and he made frequent reports to Lincoln. By January 3, 1861. the secessionists had gained such strength at the White House and in some of the Departments that Seward considered it necessary to “ assume a sort of dictatorship for defense.”and to work night and day against the contemplated revolution.
The question of separation was hotly discussed in all the slave States; and it was everywhere alleged that the Republicans intended to put anti-slavery ideas into practice after the inauguration. However, in North Carolina. Arkansas, and the border States, the majority deprecated the dissolution of the Union. Fortunately, Virginia still favored remaining in the Union unless slavery or state rights should be interfered with. The very fact that the leaders of the cotton States were riding with whip and spur aroused a considerable feeling of resentment. But without encouragement this was sure to disappear; for everywhere in the South there was a strong prejudice against the North, and a very sensitive predilection for a slaveholding confederacy. Before the end of January. Charles Sumner had become convinced that it was not improbable that all the slave States, except possibly Maryland (and Delaware, doubtless), would be out of the Union very soon. There were but two rational courses of action for the Republicans. Sumner saw the two horns of the dilemma as plainly as Seward, and expressed the exact problem a few days later by writing,
People are anxious to save our forts, to save our national capital; but I am anxious to save our principles.” Talking of force and of saving principles served a good purpose in keeping up the flagging spirit of many at the North, but it also helped to fuse, rather than separate, the different forces at the South.
II.
The enthusiasm and applause in Washington had been almost entirely on the side of the Southerners. The angry but ineffectual logic of the Northerners had naturally been no match for the picturesque and defiant declamation of their opponents. Time and the discussion of constitutional grievances had deepened Southern convictions and exhibited the helplessness of the Republicans. It was announced that Seward would speak on January 12. His opinions were awaited with the greatest anxiety, and it was said that so many people had never before assembled in the Senate Chamber.
Seward announced his purpose to seek a truce from dogmatic battles, and to appeal to the country — to the seceding South no less than to the acceding North — on the question of union. Lest any might interpret his mildness to mean acquiescence in secession, he said, “ I avow my adherence to the Union in its integrity and with all its parts, with my friends, with my party, with my State, with my country, or without either, as they may determine; in every event, whether of peace or of war ; with every consequence of honor or dishonor, of life or death.” The only way to dissolve the Union, he maintained, was by constitutional amendment; but Congress should, if it could, redress any real grievances, and then supply the President with all the means necessary to defend the Union.
For thirty years Seward had believed and frequently declared that the Union was natural and necessary, as well as a political and economical advantage. He considered our people homogeneous, and our government cohesive and beneficent. Disunion would bring us humiliation abroad, and civil war and ruin at home. It would endanger slavery, rather than preserve it ; for it would forfeit all but a small fraction of the territory of the United States, and remove every constitutional restriction against a direct attack upon slavery. Dissolution would not only arrest, but extinguish the greatness of our country : it would drop the curtain before all our national heroes ; public prosperity would give place to retrogression, for standing armies would consume our substance ; and our liberty, now as wide as our grand territorial dimensions. would be succeeded by the hateful and intolerable espionage of military despotism. The issue, then, was really between those who cherished the Union and those who desired its dissolution by force. Thus the question became simplified. and the names and interests of parties were really subordinate to the welfare of the country. He pledged himself so to regard it.
We shall not see Seward’s real statesmanship if we fail to note that it was as much his duty to avoid saying anything that could be turned to the advantage of secession as it was to urge considerations that would strengthen the Union directly. He now averred that there was no political good which he would seek by revolutionary action. Then, in those sentences which are sure to be misunderstood if it be forgotten that his chief purpose was to soothe the South, he announced, “ If others shall invoke that form of action to oppose and overthrow government, ... I can afford to meet prejudice with conciliation, exaction with concession which surrenders no principle, and violence with the right hand of peace.”
As evidence of what he was willing to do for the sake of peace and harmony, he formulated his views under five heads:—
First, he acknowledged the full force of the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution, but thought that the special provisions for its execution should be so modified as not to endanger the liberty of free blacks, or to compel private citizens to assist in the capture of slaves. He also favored the repeal both of the personal liberty laws of the free States, and of the laws of the slave States restraining the liberties of citizens from the other States, where they contravened the Constitution.
Second, slavery in the States was free from congressional control, and he was willing to make it so permanently by constitutional amendment.
Third, after the admission of Kansas as a free State, he would consent to the consolidation of all the Territories into two States, and admit them without restriction as to slavery, if the right to make subdivisions into several convenient States could be reserved. But he thought that the Constitution did not permit such reservation. So this had no practical bearing. If it were feasible, he would prefer to have the present difficulties settled in a regular constitutional convention, “ when the eccentric movements of secession and disunion shall have ended, in whatever form that end may come, and the angry excitement of the hour shall have subsided, . . . then, and not till then, —one, two. three years hence.”
Fourth, he would favor laws to prevent invasion of any State by citizens of any other State.
Fifth, as he regarded physical bonds, such as highways, railroads, rivers, and canals, as vastly more powerful than any covenants, he would support measures for a Northern and a Southern railroad to the Pacific.
This was Seward’s “ compromise. None but those who had unconstitutional aims could object to the first point. The Republicans of the Senate committee on the state of the country had approved the substance of the first four, excepting the clause about a constitutional convention, which would have been considered above criticism. The last Republican platform had declared that the control of “ domestic institutions ” (of which slavery was the chief) by the State was “ essential to [the] . . . endurance of our political fabric.”It had also denounced lawless invasion, and favored “ a railroad to the Pacific.5' The proposition to consolidate the Territories into two States, and then admit them without restriction as to slavery, would have been contrary to the unwritten pledge of the Republican party if it had been likely that either would come in as a slave State. If the right to subdivide those two States could have been reserved, the result would surely have been to the advantage of freedom. But Seward considered the plan impracticable.
If this had been a “ compromise ” speech, would not Lincoln have perceived it? In a letter of January 19, 1861, strangely enough still unpublished, he clearly approved of it. Only a few others among Seward’s friends were in a mood to understand the speech. In the House there was talk of condemning it in a party caucus. In the excitement, nearly every one demanded a declaration that would mean permanent peace or an early war. The zeal of the abolitionists and of the secessionists had bred a fanaticism that made the importance of the Union seem small indeed. While Garrison attacked Seward, he called upon the North to “ recognize the fact that the Union is dissolved,”
But, as Seward had announced, his purpose was to appeal from the dogmatic leaders to the unprejudiced people, to array unionists everywhere against secessionists, so that the proposed Confederacy, instead of the Federal government, should be fronted by a vast and compact opposition. Did this speech and a somewhat similar one of January 31 improve the situation ? Thenceforth hundreds of thousands of Northern Democrats saw that they and the conservative Republicans had a common cause. Intimate relations with many of his old Southern Whig associates revived and brought important information to Seward and strengthened the Union. Within a week from the first speech Virginia— although both of her Senators were determined secessionists — invited all the States to join her in a peace conference in Washington, February 4. North Carolina and every border State welcomed the proposal. This of itself was a practical guarantee against revolutionary movements in these States and in Washington pending the conference. On February 2, Kentucky requested the Southern States to stop the revolution, protested against federal coercion, proposed a national convention to amend the Constitution, and declined to call a state convention to consider secession. On the 8th. Tennessee decided against a state convention by a popular majority of over thirteen thousand. About the same date, Virginia chose a large majority of unionist delegates to a state convention. Later in the month, North Carolina rejected a proposition for a convention. The other Southern border States became calmer, and hoped for the Union. History may some day make it plain that it was Seward who stemmed and turned back the flood for a time, but here it is only maintained that not one of all these points would have been gained if Seward had spoken like a partisan and a coercionist.
Neither in Seward’s words nor in his actions was there any timid supplication for peace. About the middle of January he voted for Senator Clark’s resolution, insisting upon the preservation of the Union as it was, in opposition to Crittenden’s, which implored harmony by making great concessions to slavery. When, on January 31, he presented a memorial praying for a peaceful adjustment of the disturbances, he told the Senate that he had asked the committee who had brought it to manifest, on their return to New York, their devotion to the Union above all other interests and sentiments, by speaking for it, by lending it money if it needed it, and, in the last resort, by fighting for it. For several years slavery in the Territories had received the support of all three branches of the government. During that time, Oregon, Minnesota, and Kansas had been admitted as free States, while the number of the slave States had not been increased ; and there were but twentyfour slaves in all the Territories. What had been a vital question in 1850 had, he believed, now ceased to be a practical one. In lieu of it there had come up the fearful question of dissolution. If all that he had mentioned should fail, and if the Union was to stand or fall by the force of arms, he advised his people, and decided for himself, to stand or fall with it.
III.
After his public utterances on the crisis, nearly five weeks intervened before the Republicans came into power. A feverish unrest still pervaded Congress. Every day brought forth angry debates and startling rumors. Since December, Seward had been in the most confidential relations with Attorney - General Stanton, Secretary Holt, and General Scott, who were working together and collecting troops to be able to resist any attempts at forcible revolution. Lincoln had expressed special fear lest, at the time for counting the electoral votes, the revolt might begin with Congress. But before that day had arrived, the peace movements and the alertness of a committee of the House, which Stanton and Seward had inspired, rendered such a plan impracticable. Seward knew that as long as the peace conference could be kept in session all the States there represented could be held in the Union, and he privately urged the leader of the radical Republicans to avoid remarks that would excite the Southerners. His untiring efforts for a policy of peace, patriotism, and union reached out in all directions. At a dinner at Senator Douglas’s he proposed this toast: “ Away with all parties, all platforms of previous committals. and whatever else will stand in the way of the restoration of the American Union!” In concert with Stanton, he caused the flag to be displayed throughout the entire North on Washington’s Birthday, 1861. Perceiving that the best way to save Washington from attack indefinitely was to keep the Virginia convention out of the control of the secessionists, from the time it assembled. February 13, he followed and greatly influenced its action from day to day, much as if it had been a political one before which he was a candidate.
After Lincoln came to Washington, February 23, he submitted a copy of his prospective inaugural address to Seward for criticism. In it Lincoln had planted himself firmly upon the last Republican platform. In several places sentences were lacking in tact, and occasional phrases and words had a flavor of dogmatism or severity, considering the times. It concluded with the suggestive sentence, “ With you, and not with me, is the solemn question of ‘ Shall it be peace or a sword? ’ ” It was all intended in a kindly spirit, and some passages were generous and touching, but the other parts would have more than counteracted them.
Seward went through the entire copy, making a sentence here and there less positive, rounding many of the phrases, and softening some of the adjectives. He counseled the omission of a few careless and useless sentences; and where Lincoln had gone so far as to say, “ A disruption of the Federal Union is menaced. and, so far as can be on paper, is already effected,” Seward changed the last part into “heretofore only menaced, is now formidably attempted.” Seward suggested that, in lieu of the conclusion quoted, the address should end with “some words of affection, some of calm and cheerful confidence,” and wrote the wonderful paragraph about “ our bonds of affection” and “the mystic chords,” which Lincoln adopted, and which, only slightly changed, has gone into political literature as one of Lincoln’s most touching passages. In returning the copy, Seward frankly stated his belief that if the passages referring to the platform were retained, even in a modified form, Virginia and Maryland would secede; that within sixty or ninety days Washington would have to rely for its defense upon a divided North ; and that there would not be one loyal magistrate or ministerial officer south of the Potomac. Lincoln adopted nearly all of Seward’s suggestions, and omitted the objectionable passages. The well-balanced firmness of the speech gave confidence to the North, and its fraternal and generous sentiments had a good effect upon the whole South.
The peaceful installation of a Republican administration marked the passage of the first objective point in Seward’s policy. Viewed in the light of the sober facts, his policy, up to the 4th of March, was governed by statesmanship and skill such as no other man was able to command. The very prudence and tactfulness with which he had met the questions of this trying time provoked the most damaging but mistaken criticism upon his attitude. His utterances were sometimes diplomatic, even enigmatic and contradictory. He was often silent when many thought the occasion demanded speech. As to any specific action of the government regarding its lost property or toward the seceded States he spoke no word, because he knew that his opinion would not improve the status. His was not the silence of uncertainty or of assent, but of calm judgment. — of the practical philosopher when he sees that speech will add new complications.
Lincoln, although he had favored retaking the government property that had been seized, had offered to concede to slavery more than Seward and other Republican leaders would approve. He frankly wrote that he was practically indifferent about fugitive slaves, the slave trade between the States, and slavery in the District of Columbia, if what was done was not altogether outrageous. On the point which Seward left uncertain Lincoln said, “ Nor do I care much about New Mexico, if further exclusion were hedged against.”
Salmon P. Chase probably stood third among the Republicans. He took for his motto at this time. “ Inauguration first, adjustment afterwards,”— overlooking the evident danger that the revolution might meantime advance so far as to prevent both. He was especially indignant at the idea of “ surrendering New Mexico to slavery,” but he was willing to adopt a Douglas-like plan of organizing all the Territories without any mention of slavery. At one time he was in favor of frankly recognizing the principle that slavery was a state institution, but at another he was very indignant, at the proposition to make the Constitution unalterable on this point except by consent of every slave State. He first urged General Scott to make himself military dictator in order to save one fort in Charleston harbor, but finally he was willing to let seven States depart in peace if the loyalty of the border States could be secured.
Charles Sumner was one of the noblest and most brilliant of the Republicans, yet the best that his statesmanship could offer at this time was to write privately of “backbone,” and of being “firm. FIRM. FIRM.” He did not venture to make a speech on the crisis, because he knew that it would be more serviceable to secession than to the Union !
IV.
After March 4 the Republicans had the means for effectual action, and were therefore responsible. As the Postmaster-General, Montgomery Blair, was the only member of the Cabinet who favored anything like real coercion, there were but two courses open: to defend what was still within our possession and to collect the revenue ; or to avoid whatever would precipitate war. in the belief that all, or most, of the border States would soon come out clearly and frankly against secession, and that this would shortly result in the disintegration of the Confederacy itself. Seward thought that a continuance of the conciliatory policy would not dissuade the Republicans from the use of force as a last resort, and that it would be most likely to bring all others at the North and many at the South up to it. if necessary. The Confederacy had been organized but a few days when loud protests were made in many places against the slave-trade prohibition in the provisional constitution, against the tariff, against the export duty on raw cotton, and against several other features of the new government. In the Southern border States, unionists insisted that if violence between the Federal government and the Confederacy could be prevented a little longer the strength of secession would rapidly decline. Seward credited this, while he rejected their doctrine that coercion in any form would be unconstitutional. The consummation of his policy would require time, patience, and the avoidance of irritating incidents.
The best informed military and naval authorities in the United States service declared that it would be impossible to provision Fort Sumter without a larger land and naval force than could be commanded at that time. This led the new administration to believe that its evacuation was so probable that an announcement to that effect was given out in order to prepare the public mind for it. Virginia continued to be the key to the situation. The state convention was still in session in Richmond, with a majority of about two to one against secession under existing circumstances. The unionists expected to adjourn until autumn, after calling a convention of the loyal slave States at Frankfort. Seward continued to support and encourage them. At the same time he refused to hold any official intercourse with the Confederate commissioners who were seeking recognition.
As yet Lincoln had not finally decided aboutabandoning or reinforcing Sumter. On March 15, he requested each member of his Cabinet, to give a written opinion on the question. Seward expressed his belief that loyalty would revive, even in South Carolina, if the unionists in the slave States were supported so as to indicate that the alarms put forth by the disunionists were groundless and false, He thought that it was the policy of conciliation which had caused the dismemberment to be arrested, and to the preservation of this policy a little longer he looked as the only peaceful means of keeping the border States in the Union. Through their good and patriotic offices he expected to see the Union sentiment revived and the seceding States brought back. He saw that they had no right to expect such patience, and that there were conditions under which they would forget their loyalty, yet he considered it would be wise administration to be tolerant. a little longer.
If the relief of Sumter should be attempted. the fact would become known in advance, he maintained, and the fort would be taken before the expedition arrived ; that if the attempt should be successful, the benefit would not be commensurate with the evil effects sure to flow from the civil war which it would inaugurate, and which, he thought, the administration could not prosecute to a successful end. “ I would not provoke war in any way now,” he said. “ I would resort to force to protect the collection of the revenue, because that is a necessary as well as legitimate public object. Even then it should be only a naval force that I would employ for that necessary purpose, while I would defer military action on land until a case should arise where we would hold the defensive. In that case, we should have the spirit of the country and the approval of mankind on our side.”
Of the six other members of the Cabinet, Blair alone positively and clearly favored provisioning Sumter, on the ground that evacuation would demoralize Northern unionists and encourage Southern secessionists. Chase also answered the question affirmatively, but he would not have done so had he not drawn his conclusions from misapprehensions.
There was in Seward’s opinions a policy peculiar to himself. His efforts to hold the border slave States in line were closely related to his declared intention to avoid using force, except for the purpose of collecting the revenue. The expressions of no other member of the Cabinet clearly implied that the task of saving slave States, still loyal, might warrant the evacuation of other forts near Confederate territory. As the time was revolutionary, the most liberal view would permit the overlooking of the letter of the Constitution, and the bringing of Seward’s plan to the revolutionary touchstone of necessity and probable success. That it was not necessary to the preservation of the Union was proved by later events. Its success depended upon whether it would satisfy those for whom it was devised.
The Confederate President and Secretary of State had already decided upon the three following points as the prerequisites of continued peace : first, the United States should agree not to reinforce any of the forts they still occupied, pending a delay of twenty days : second, if the question between the Confederacy and the Federal government should be referred to the Senate, or later, to Congress, all the forts within the Confederacy should meantime be evacuated; and, third, the Confederate tariff laws should be enforced. One of the stanchest Union men in the South was John A. Gilmer. On March 7 he wrote to Seward, “ The seceders in the border States and throughout the South already desire some collision of arms in attempts to collect the revenue or in some way about the fortifications ; ” and he added that if there should be any fighting, the Union men would be “ swept away in a torrent of madness.” Judge Summers, who was the head and front of the Union party in the Virginia convention, had told that convention, four days before, that secession was “an existing fact,” and that the Confederacy was “ now performing the functions of an independent government.” Moreover, the committee on federal relations in that convention had already reported, and subsequently passed, a proposition which expressly stated. as a condition of continued loyalty, that no attempt should be made to exact payment of imports upon commerce. Seward was therefore resting upon a broken reed.
Lincoln still hesitated. Office-seekers were consuming nearly his entire time. It was daily becoming clearer that the larger part of the loyalty of the slave States depended upon a recognition of the right of secession. The fighting courage of the Confederacy was now rapidly growing, while that of the North was beginning to wane. Before the month had elapsed trustworthy information showed that the supposed sentiment for the Union in Charleston was a myth. About the same time General Scott recommended that Fort Pickens, as well as Fort Sumter, should be surrendered.
On March 29 Lincoln again requested written opinions. Seward’s views as to Fort Sumter were unchanged, but he favored calling in a younger adviser than Scott, and added, “ I would at once, and at every cost, prepare for war at Pensacola [Fort Pickens] and Texas: to be taken, however, only as a consequence of maintaining the possessions and authority of the United States.” The opinions of the Cabinet exhibited an agreement on one point, — that secession was to be confronted with force; and that meant that the Confederacy would have to begin a war or confess its weakness. There had been a radical change in Seward s policy. Lincoln favored his suggestion about Fort Pickens, and gave him what was practically carte blanche in arranging a speedy and secret expedition for its relief. At the same time, by Lincoln’s order, Captain Fox was preparing an expedition to be sent to Fort Sumter in case it should be decided to provision it.
Up to April 1 Lincoln had adopted no active policy, except in the one instance when Seward had taken the lead and done all but the technical planning. Perhaps this was due to Seward more than to any one else, but the fact remained. Confederate commissioners were about to ask recognition of the Confederacy from the leading powers of EuropeSpain had just seized San Domingo ; France, Spain, and England were contemplating intervention in Mexico ; and Russia was alleged to have given assurances of friendly support to the Confederacy. The necessity for decision and activity in foreign affairs was hardly less than in domestic. This, together with Seward’s preeminence in the past, his general recognition as “ premier,” and Lincoln’s slight political experience, doubtless convinced him that circumstances would warrant his laying before the President some careful suggestions about a definite policy. He thought that further delay to adopt and prosecute measures for foreign and domestic affairs would bring scandal upon the administration and danger upon the country. He favored hurrying through with applicants for office, changing the question from slavery to “ Union or Disunion.” Excepting Sumter, he “ would maintain every fort and possession in the South.” Evidently, in the expectation that the possibility of a foreign war would relieve Southern unionists from the embarrassments which reinforcing Southern forts would cause them, and make retreat for the secessionists less difficult, he suggested that we “ demand explanations from Spain and France categorically at once; . . . seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia ; and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence . . . against European intervention; and if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France, would convene Congress and declare war against them.” He thought that, whatever policy might be adopted, it should be the duty of some one to be incessantly active in it, and that all the others should “agree and abide.” These propositions showed how fondly — desperately, even — Seward cherished the belief that a civil war could be avoided. Unfortunately, this new plan involved the possibility of a war between the eastern and western hemispheres. Lincoln rejected Seward’s propositions in a kind but not complimentary manner.
The expedition to Fort Pickens — Seward’s in conception — was dispatched with entire secrecy and success. Captain Fox was soon ordered to supply Fort Sumter. As Seward had prophesied, it was assaulted and captured before relief could reach it; and as he had also foretold, this marked the beginning of a civil war.
v.
The severest reproaches that have been cast upon Seward’s actions during these months have been the assertions that, in order to save the Union, he was ready to surrender the vital principle on which was based all that was best in his own senatorial career, namely, hostility to the expansion of slavery ; and that, after his party had assumed control, he himself recognized officially that seven States were out of the Union.
As to the first point, it may be pertinent to add to the foregoing narrative that a careful study of all the accessible material on the subject, both in print and in manuscript, and correspondence or conversation with a score or two of Seward’s intimates of that time, have not brought to the writer’s knowledge a scrap of reliable evidence to show that Seward would, under any circumstances, have favored the Crittenden compromise, or any compromise whatever that would have deprived Congress of the claimed right to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia or in the national forts ; that would have guaranteed slavery anywhere outside of the States, or have granted to it anything that would materially have checked the steady and constitutional development of a policy which, in time, would surely have led to its extinguishment. To call that a compromise which did not involve a sacrifice of one of these points is a misuse of words. However, it is only fair to say that Seward. Lincoln, Chase, Wade, Fessenden, Trumbull, and practically all of the Republicans not affected with the frenzy of abolitionism would have been willing to yield any or all of the minor party aims, if they could have been assured that they would have satisfied the South, and prevented the dangers and miseries of a civil war. The essence of statesmanship is to save the vital principles, and to concede whatever else may be necessary to making progress without revolution.
The assertion that Seward recognized disunion is generally based upon a passage in a dispatch of April 10, 1801. to our minister to England, which has often been quoted by those who had special pleas to make. On its face one sentence seems to bear out the charge, but subsequent sentences indicate the contrary so explicitly and positively that only the self-deluded and those who have not read the whole have made or will make the unwarrantable accusation. Any other conclusion would accept the absurdity that Seward had contradicted for the moment, merely, the opinion of all his past and future years.
In some matters of tactics and judgment, Seward, like all of his associates who were constantly active, made several serious mistakes. The policy that was statesmanlike and all-important before March 4 led straight into one that was weak, delusive, and dangerous after that date. It would have been about equally difficult to maintain the Union long without the policy of January 12 and with that of March 15 or of April 1. Yet he was so undogmatic and resourceful that it is not altogether improbable that he might have turned from a dangerous course before it was too late, had one been adopted. This was shown by his versatility and energy on March 29 and after April 1. However, it is fortunate that he ruled where he was right, and was overruled where he was wrong.
Envious rivals of Seward and overzealous biographers of his contemporaries have united in magnifying his mistakes, and in overlooking or depreciating his services and abilities. All who wish to judge him fairly must remember that during these months circumstances placed greater expectations and responsibilities upon him than upon any other Republican ; and none of his colleagues was so energetic, so inquiring, and so liberal minded in his efforts to save the Union. And neither Lincoln nor any member of his Cabinet, had a policy that suited the circumstances of both the period before and that just after the 4th of March.
Frederic Bancroft.