A Political Parallel

To one who studies the present political situation so far as it relates to the preliminary canvass for the presidency, many points of close similarity to the condition of things prior to the nominations in 1844 will present themselves. In the subjoined attempt to institute an historical parallel between the two periods, it is our purpose to avoid a discussion — even a consideration — of political principles as such. They will be referred to only as it becomes necessary to introduce them, in alluding to the position of parties with regard to them, as elements of the situation itself. That is to say, the point of view here taken is, as far as possible, that of a foreigner studying the political problems of this country without being interested in them, unable to see that moral questions are involved, and treating them, as well as the candidates who profess or reject these principles, simply as pawns in the game. It will be well, in order to avoid confusion, first to present in some detail the history of the preliminary canvass of 1844, and then to call attention to the points of its resemblance to the present situation.

Van Buren had been defeated in 1840. Log cabins and hard cider, the Democrats thought, had been more interesting and attractive to the people than the principle of the sub-treasury. The defeat had mortified the Democrats as much as it had amazed, distressed, and annoyed them. They could not find words to express their contempt for the victorious Whig canvass. They well-nigh lost faith in the infallibility of the people, which had been a cardinal point of their doctrine so long as the people returned Democratic majorities. That doctrine was to be saved as an article of faith only by holding that the people had been seized with a temporary madness, and that they would fully recover their senses before the next election. Like the good political fighters the Democrats were, they were determined not only to win the election of 1844, but to win it with the candidate who had suffered by the humiliating defeat of 1840. It was a favorite expression — one of which Mr. Ritchie, editor of the Richmond Enquirer, a leading Democratic newspaper of the day, was the author — that the party had been “ wounded ” in the person of Mr. Van Buren, and that it could vindicate itself fully only by replacing him in the presidential chair.

The canvass of 1844 began before Harrison had taken the oath of office. When Mr. Van Buren declared, after his defeat, that he could not consent again to be a candidate, there was a loud and apparently unanimous chorus of disapproval and dissent. He was assured that he had no right to refuse the Democratic party the privilege of vindicating itself by reëlecting him, and he withdrew his refusal. In doing so he seemed to be yielding to the wish of a united party.

Even when mutterings of dissent showed that all Democratic leaders were not ready to admit that Mr. Van Buren was the inevitable candidate of his party for 1844, the movement was apparently of little consequence. At that time South Carolina was expected to do things that would be called, in the slang of the present day, cranky. When South Carolina presented Calhoun for the nomination in 1844, no one supposed that it signified anything important; it was merely a manifestation of South Carolina’s persistency in never falling in with plans which she did not make. Colonel Johnson, of Tennessee, fancied himself to be a candidate, but scarcely any one else took him seriously. Up to a short time before the convention, no one ventured to put his advocacy of the nomination of some other than Van Buren on the ground of opposition to the ex-President. Though hints were occasionally thrown out that Van Buren was less “available”—that is, that he would get fewer votes—than some other candidate, it was evident to all observers that among the Democratic people, everywhere except in the narrowest circle of the Washington leaders of the party, the defeated candidate of 1840 was not merely the favorite candidate, but the one for whom, above all others, they wished to record their votes. Moreover, they were decided in their preference, and held to it firmly, until their wishes were overruled by the men whom they had trusted to carry out their plans.

Meantime, however, three things were working against the success of Van Buren. The first was the willingness of other men to supplant him in the candidacy. Calhoun was ambitious, and was confessedly a candidate for the nomination. As such he declined formally to make a public tour, and gave as a reason that it might be interpreted as a movement to further his own interests as a candidate. Besides the candidacy of Colonel Johnson, to which reference has already been made, there were what would now be called little “booms’ for Buchanan, Cass, and others. Except Calhoun, no one of these gentlemen was hostile to Van Buren ; they probably expected that he would be nominated, and in that event they would support him; but they put themselves in a position to profit by any turn events might take. Mr. Tyler must not be forgotten, for he, too, had a few friends who urged his claim to the gratitude of the Democratic party.

The second of the elements of opposition to Van Buren was the strong feeling in the minds of some sagacious leaders that he was not available, — that he was doomed to certain defeat if he were again to be a candidate. The Whigs, no doubt, — unwisely, as the event proved, — sowed the seeds of distrust of Mr. Van Buren’s strength. They were sure that he would be nominated, and exultingly declared, “ We have beaten him once, and can do it again.” Not a few of the Democratic leaders reasoned that a candidate who had been once defeated on a plain issue would be defeated again on the same issue. They were in favor of shifting the ground and of changing leaders. This view of the matter was not often presented, but those who held it advanced their idea with great boldness, persistency, and plainness of speech. Finally, there was a decided disposition, in some parts of the South, to distrust Mr. Van Buren. Calhoun frankly did not have confidence in him. Yet, for the most part, the South was ready to accept him once more, and he had no more unwavering champion than Mr. Ritchie, of the Richmond Enquirer. In spite of the efforts made by the friends of Mr. Calhoun, and by the ultra-Southern party generally, the delegations from many of the slaveholding States went to the convention under instruction to vote for Mr. Van Buren.

Mr. Benton, whose devotion and loyalty to his friends, through disaster as well as in victory, sometimes blinded his judgment, and who adhered to the fortunes of Van Buren as sturdily as to those of General Jackson, has massed all the evidence that he could collect that there was a long-maturing plot and intrigue to cheat Van Buren out of the nomination. Beyond all doubt there was a plot, but it may well be questioned if it was so deep laid or so malicious as Mr. Benton represents it. There is little reason to think that personal hostility to Van Buren — outside of the Calhoun coterie, be it remarked — entered into it. The Democrats wished to win, they meant to win. With most of those who plotted the defeat of Van Buren it was merely a question with what man they could win most surely. The rank and file of the party answered promptly that Van Buren was that man ; most of the leaders made the same answer; a few, and they the most pertinacious and determined, thought differently ; and some men added that, since the party was resolved to win, it would be best to have the victory under a candidate of whose readiness to meet the demands of the real leaders of the party —those, namely, of the South — there could be no question.

Apparently the opposition was to be all in vain. The voices of the few were drowned in the general shout in favor of Van Buren. State after State, with almost wearisome uniformity, appointed as delegates to the Baltimore convention men who were known to be friendly to Van Buren’s candidacy, and instructed to support him. At that time, the systems of choosing delegates to national conventions were various, but, whatever the system, Van Buren was successful. The number of States at this time was twenty-six. The delegates from sixteen of them were instructed, more or less positively, to support the defeated candidate of 1840; and these States included not only every New England State, Ohio, and New York,—Van Buren’s own State, — but also Pennsylvania, the home of Buchanan, and Michigan, the home of Cass. In December, 1843, Buchanan withdrew from the candidacy, and in the following month Calhoun refused to have his name presented to the convention. South Carolina, by the way, chose no delegates, and was not represented in the convention. Colonel Johnson did not withdraw, but his candidacy was about as serious a matter as was that of General Butler before the Democratic convention of 1884, or that of General Alger before the Republican convention of 1888.

So the contest seemed to have been decided, and Van Buren’s triumph appeared to be secure. Cass was the only candidate of any prominence who had not withdrawn, and he was not supported by his own State. The name of Levi Woodbury was brought forward, in a tentative way, but the suggestion did not meet with an enthusiastic response. Thus, two or three months before the time of the convention, the opposition had, to all appearance, exhausted itself, and it was given out that there was no longer a doubt that Van Buren would be nominated.

Nevertheless those who were parties to the " plot ” had not given up their cause, hopeless as it seemed. Just at the last moment they found the vulnerable point of the candidate who had up to that time been assailed in vain. Rarely has there been, even in the history of that most fickle of people, the French, such a sudden revulsion, such a rapid downfall, as when the Democrats turned against Van Buren in the spring of 1844. Exactly one month before the Baltimore convention was to meet, Niles’s Register remarked, in its issue of April 27, “ That ex-President Van Buren will be the nominee of this convention is as confidently expected as that Mr. Clay will be the nominee of the Whig convention.” After what has already been said of the constitution of the convention this does not seem to be a rash statement. Yet, on May 11, the same paper reported that, “ notwithstanding the apparent certainty three weeks ago that Van Buren would be the nominee, there is now great uncertainty of the result.”

What had happened meantime ? The question of the immediate annexation of Texas had all at once been cunningly thrust forward as the controlling political issue of the day. A chronology of the Texas question, far from explaining how it became so suddenly the most momentous issue in American politics, only causes Wonder that the plotters succeeded in raising an excitement over it. Texas had been conceded to Mexico by the treaty of 1819, against which Clay had protested as the “ alienation ” of American territory. In 1827, and again in 1829, Clay and Van Buren, each as Secretary of State, had made offers to buy Texas. In 1836 Texas declared its independence, and after a short war secured it. In 1837 Texas made application to the United States for annexation ; but a proposition looking toward annexation was defeated in the Senate by a nearly two-thirds vote. The matter rested until 1843, when the subject of annexation was revived by American politicians, and the matter was declared to be one of great urgency, because, as it was represented, Great Britain was planning to make. Texas British territory. No evidence of this assertion was ever furnished ; and it was no doubt as untrue as it is incredible. Yet, even after this " scare ” had been sprung upon the country, the people did not become excited about it until the anti-Van Buren managers were ready to act. Indeed, not all the Democrats who might have been expected to support a measure of annexation — its advocates called it “ reannexation ” ■—were in favor of it. Benton and other Democratic Senators were loud in their opposition. So little did it seem a measure upon which the Democratic party would insist to such an extent as to render a candidate ineligible unless he were warmly in favor of it, that there were rumors afloat in April, 1844, that Calhoun, who had recently become Tyler’s Secretary of State, would not sign the treaty of annexation. These rumors found believers. Of course they were untrue ; but they came from such sources that an unwary candidate for the Democratic nomination might easily take them as an indication that it would be safe to oppose the treaty. Nevertheless the treaty had been made and signed by Calhoun on April 12.

The time had now come to turn the South against Van Buren. The plans were most shrewdly laid, and they worked to a charm. The acquisition of Texas would give the South room for expansion, and it would be an easy task to persuade the slaveholders that any man who objected to the annexation was an enemy. It only remained to entrap Mr. Van Buren, who might be expected both to be opposed to the scheme and to be wholly unaware of the disposition of the South. A neutral nobody, who represented himself as an unpledged delegate to the Baltimore convention, was selected to write to Mr. Van Buren to ask his views on the question of “ the immediate annexation of Texas.” The instigator of the inquiry was an opponent of Van Buren, Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi, who became Polk’s Secretary of the Treasury. Mr. Van Buren replied. He was not in favor of immediate annexation. He was in favor of annexation at the proper time ; but the absorption of Texas, under the circumstances then existing, involved war with Mexico. This is not the place to discuss the question whether this reply was the word of a statesman so faithful to las convictions that he would not recant his faith even to secure the highest honor his country could bestow, or the attempt of a politician to concede much to the South for the sake of its support, and to withhold a little in order to retain the support of the North. Whatever may have been its purpose, the publication of the letter ruined Mr. Van Buren’s prospects for the candidacy.

The change of feeling was almost as sudden as the shifting of the wind when a tornado is approaching. All at once, men who had been warmly in favor of Van Buren devoted themselves energetically to his defeat. The South, at this moment, was well-nigh frantic. The cry of “Texas or Disunion ! ” was raised. Even the few who still clung to their old candidate could not help seeing that the men who had declared Van Buren not to he strong enough to carry the election had made their assertion come true by introducing a wholly new issue into politics.

The account need be carried no further. The plot succeeded all too well. Van Buren went into the convention with a majority o£ votes, but not the two thirds which Democratic custom — not then very long established—required. The opposition insisted on the two-thirds rule, and enough of Van Buren’s supporters yielded to the demand to insure its adoption. Since they could not help seeing that the adoption of the two-thirds rule put Van Buren’s nomination out of the question, some of them, at least, must have voted for the rule in order to assist in his defeat, while seeming to follow out their instructions. On any other theory it is difficult to account for their course. At all events, the two thirds for Van Buren were not to be had ; and after the convention had begun to flounder and become confused, the name of Polk was brought forward, a “ stampede ” was cleverly managed, and in a few moments the great object of the plotters had been fully accomplished.

A few words only are necessary to tell the story of the Whig canvass. From the moment when it became evident that Tyler was to disappoint the expectations of those who had selected him, Clay had been the recognized leader of his party. Even those who had effected his defeat in the convention of 1836 acknowledged and regretted their mistake. During the three years preceding the election no candidate save Clay was even considered. He, too, was asked his opinion regarding “ reannexation,” and expressed views that differed not very much from those of Van Buren. But this caused no diminution of his popularity, and he was nominated as the spontaneous and unanimous choice of the Whig convention.

There were “ mugwumps ” in those days. One thing presented itself to their minds as the great object of statesmanship in their time. — to prevent the further encroachment of slavery. While they sympathized rather with the Whigs than with the Democrats on other issues, they would not be partners with either Clay or Polk, because they trusted neither of them on the one paramount question. They followed their consciences resolutely, although their doing so gave the victory to the party which was bent upon carrying the very measure to which they were most strenuously opposed, and although the election of 1844 ushered in sixteen years of increasing arrogance and mischief-making on the part of the slave power.

We turn now to consider the situation during the past three years. At the outset, some of the main facts are strikingly similar to those observed during the years succeeding the “ log-cabin campaign.”Mr. Cleveland was elected in 1884. was a candidate and was defeated in 1888, and since that time has been, by all odds, the most prominent man of his party, and universally regarded as being more likely than any other man who can be named to lead that party in 1892. Against Mr. Clay’s popularity among the Whigs in 1841-44 may be set that of Mr. Blaine among the Republicans. When the examination is made more in detail the parallel is still quite close.

Let us take first the attitude of the Republicans toward Mr. Blaine, and observe how remarkably his standing in his party corresponds with that of Mr. Clay forty-eight years ago ; for, while it is not known whether or not Mr. Blaine would be willing to accept a nomination, it is probably not an over-statement to say that nine men of every ten who call themselves Republicans would rejoice at an opportunity to vote for him again, and three quarters of the rest would support him willingly. To put it in another way, were President Harrison to decline emphatically to be a candidate, and were Mr. Blaine simply to refrain from declining, not a delegate would be chosen to the Republican National Convention who would not be a cordial supporter of Blaine after the nomination ; and there would not be more than a handful of delegates who would go to Minneapolis to support any other candidate as his " first choice.” It is by no means the intention to represent Republicans as disloyal to President Harrison, or as dissatisfied with him. They regard him as an able, safe, and judicious chief magistrate, fully in sympathy with their own political aims. They have not been affected or influenced by the studied attempts to belittle him. They are in no sense ashamed of him, or of themselves for having’ elected him. They admire the tact and grace of his bearing, and his facility and felicity of speech on occasions when he is brought in close contact with the people, as on his California journey. They will vote for him again, in case he shall be the nominee, with satisfaction alloyed only by their strong wish to vote for Mr. Blaine. But this exception simply emphasizes the fact that Mr. Blaine is almost universally the real first choice of his party.

How have the Democrats been disposed toward Mr. Cleveland, and how are they disposed toward him to-day?

In a general way, it may he answered that the rank and file of the Democratic party have been as favorably affected toward their last President and their last defeated candidate as were the Democrats of 1842 toward Van Boren. At the same time we discover three elements of opposition to him, answering closely to the three heretofore mentioned as having existed against Van Buren in the canvass preliminary to 1844, namely : first, the ambition of other men to become the candidate in 1892 ; secondly, the suspicion that Mr. Cleveland may not be the most available candidate ; thirdly, a distrust of his willingness to carry out one part of the policy on which the controlling leaders of the Democratic party seem to have resolved.

As there was very little in Van Buren’s personal qualities to correspond with the attractiveness people found in Henry Clay, so Mr. Cleveland has little or none of the magnetism ” which is attributed to Mr. Blaine. Democrats do not stand by Mr. Cleveland from motives of personal affection, but because they find in him qualities of political courage which they admire. That must Democrats do adhere to his fortunes is perfectly apparent to every observer. They think that he gave the country not only a good administration, but a good Democratic administration. They supported him in 1888 with perfect good faith, and regretted his defeat as well as that of the Democratic party. They have all along — of course there are exceptions to all these statements — regarded him as the probable candidate in 1892; and, if one may judge from observation where exact information is wholly unobtainable, they are much more than passively willing that it should be so. At the same time, as was the case in 1844, they would not mourn long over the defeat of their favorite, provided the convention were to give them another candidate who could be elected. It is necessary to observe that we are speaking now of Democrats born in the party, and of those who joined it before 1884; not of those who in that year seceded from the Republican party, and who then and since, whether they call themselves Democrats or Independents, have regarded Mr. Cleveland as the best if not the only Democrat who could command their suffrages.

The existence of an opposition to Mr. Cleveland, a persistent and resolute opposition, is a fact quite as apparent as is the hold which that gentleman has upon his party. The opposition concentrates to a large extent upon another citizen of New York. Only once since the close of the war have the Democrats taken their candidate for the presidency from any other State than New York. Seymour, Greeley, Tilden, and Cleveland (twice) have been candidates in five of the six elections. Governor, now Senator, Hill has been able to turn the tendency of the party to seek its candidate in New York to his own advantage. To say that Mr. Hill is not merely ambitious on his own account, but hostile to Mr. Cleveland, that he is extremely desirous of obtaining the nomination, that he has intrigued and pulled the wires to get and hold control of the “ machine ” in New York, and that he has to-day the power to send to the convention a unanimous delegation in his own favor is but to say what every one knows.

But Mr. Hill could make no headway outside of the State where he exercises the powers of reward and punishment were there not other elements of opposition to Mr. Cleveland than a rival ambition. Van Buren, as President, staked his political fortunes on the subtreasury policy, was defeated, and was then opposed, as we have seen, on the ground that it would be bad policy to go before the country with a defeated candidate standing on a rejected platform. Mr. Cleveland risked all on a measure of tariff reform. He was defeated, and now we hear — not from the body of the voters of the party, but from some of the cold-blooded leaders — suggestions that to make the issue and the candidate the same would be “to repeat the folly of 1888.” The contest for the speakership did not turn on the tariff nor on the question of Mr. Cleveland’s candidacy, yet every one was conscious that when Mr. Mills was defeated, and Mr. Crisp chosen, tariff revision lost some of its prominence as an issue, and Mr. Cleveland’s cause was perceptibly weakened. All those who helped to bring about the result were not opposed to Mr. Cleveland: perhaps very few of them were or are so; but the fact remains that all who wish to compass the defeat of the ex-President also opposed Mr. Mills, worked night and day to prevent his success, and contributed the margin of votes that decided the result. Yet it may be said with much confidence that, outside of a very narrow circle, there is no Democratic hostility — that is, personal hostility — to Mr. Cleveland. So far as the speakership contest had a bearing upon the presidential canvass, the outcome meant certainly no more than that there exists within the Democratic party a more or less serious doubt if it will be wise to risk success upon the single issue of the tariff, and to place on that platform the candidate who, as President, distinguished himself as the great champion of a reform, and who has once suffered defeat as its champion.

Where then is the weapon, to correspond with the issue of “reannexation,” with which the leading candidate can be deprived of the two-thirds vote now. by well-established usage, required to effect a nomination by a Democratic National Convention? Do we not find it in Mr, Cleveland’s attitude on the silver question ? It would be absurd to suggest that the Democratic statesmen of the South are as deeply interested in the matter of free coinage for silver as their fathers were in the extension of slavery ; but we do find that almost every Democratic Representative and Senator from the South and West favors the measure, and that, one and all, they believe their constituents to he with them on that issue. Moreover, while they stand sturdily by the cause of tariff reform, they seem not to be willing that the silver question shall be forgotten or neglected. But Mr. Cleveland lias more than once placed himself in direct; antagonism to the silver movement. His more immediate followers and his most prominent advocates are all against free coinage, or at least are on record as urging that the present time is inopportune for bringing the currency question to the front. Most, of the members of the party in New England are against free silver ; so are Mr. Bayard and Mr. Vilas, of Mr. Cleveland’s cabinet. Mr. Carlisle and Mr. Mills, who have voted for free silver, now wish the question not to be an issue.

To continue the parallel further would lead us into the domain of prophecy, which we must not enter. The situation during the two periods, forty-eight years apart, has been shown to be strikingly similar, and it now remains for the next few months to reveal whether the parallel is to be complete to the end. What must happen to complete it ? A sudden blazing up of excitement in the Democratic party, and the hardening of a resolution that one who is not with the Southern wing of his party on the silver question must not be nominated ; the defeat not only of Cleveland, but of Hill; the nomination of a “ dark horse,” — Senator Gorman, Governor Boies, or some one else who favors free coinage for silver; the nomination of Blaine by the Republicans; the election of a Democratic nobody whose strength is derived from his obscurity. All very improbable, you say? Yes. Sometimes the expected happens in politics ; sometimes the unexpected.