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The impulse came from without. Chinese self-complacency suffered a rude
shock in the Japanese War of 1894. On account of the lack of
centralization and of a common patriotism, this shock would probably have
remained without a deep influence upon Chinese life had it not been
followed by other and more serious catastrophes. It was, however, the
signal for inroads upon China by all sorts of political and economic
influences from without. The division of China impended. The masses of the
people, at first vaguely restless, were soon deeply moved by fears and
passions akin to panic, unrestrained yes, even assisted, by high officials
who were themselves not clear in their political aims. So they rushed
headlong into new trouble by attacking the foreigners and their legations.
Again China was to receive a poignant impression of her own weakness. This
warning was accentuated when Russia made herself at home in Manchuria, and
refused to listen to Chinese demands. The militant and political genius of
Japan evinced itself; by contrast with Japanese victories and diplomatic
successes, the Chinese at last came to perceive the depth of inefficiency
to which their national life had sunk. Most touchingly this feeling
expressed itself in the formation of "national humiliation societies."
Hundreds of thousands became members, and women gave up the wearing of
rings, with the exception of one upon which were engraved the words
"national humiliation." Thus was China shocked into a feeling of her own
weakness, and of the dangers that beset her on account of the absence of a
strong national political spirit.
The question was how to escape from this humiliating condition. That some
change was necessary was recognized even by the most conservative, but the
remedies suggested went all the way to the revolutionary proposal of the
establishment of a republic. The government was fully impressed with the
seriousness of the situation. It tried to find its path to a policy of
national reform. It abolished the artificial system of education under
which the officials of China had hitherto been trained, established public
schools, and provided for instruction in science, law, history, and
politics. It sent study-commissions to foreign countries to gather
accurate information suitable to Chinese conditions, from all the
countries of the world. The reports of these embassies were published in
large editions, and were eagerly read by the educated throughout China,
forming a basis for political information.
The task of reform before the government was, indeed, an appalling one. To
transform the easy-going system of administration, under which the Empire
had lived for centuries in time of peace and in the absence of all foreign
competition, into a centralized, modern engine of national action, is in
itself an undertaking that calls for the greatest originality and
statesmanship. But the educated people of China were not satisfied to have
the government concern itself with the administration alone. They
instinctively centred all their demands about the cry for a national
parliament. How could the nation be one before there had been created an
organ to express its national public opinion? It was argued that, as all
efficient countries are provided with parliaments, as Japan had
strengthened herself by creating such an institution, the establishment of
a national assembly must be the first step of actual reform. Thus reasoned
reformers of all degrees of radicalism.
The government recognized the justice of these demands. It understood that
in the great movement for public efficiency which it had undertaken, it
ought to be able to count upon the cooperation of the Chinese people and
of the natural leaders of Chinese society. What better institution could
be conceived for gathering up all this powerful social support than a
deliberative assembly? But the government was as yet by no means decided
as to the character and form which should be given to this institution. By
the highly important decree of September 1, 1900 it, however, put itself
on record as favoring a constitution and the participation of the people
in matters of government.
The last three years have been full of nervous action and reaction.
Attempts to arrive at clear ideas with respect to great questions of
policy have been interrupted again and again by personal controversy,
court intrigues, and the panicky fear of revolutionary movements. The
forces which the government has to deal with are complex in the extreme.
The imperial clan itself, being non-Chinese, must avoid the appearance of
following a mere family or clan policy. The privileged position occupied
by Manchu officials had long been irksome to the influential Chinese. The
mitigation of these jealousies, the unification of these two elements in
the official world, or at all events the adjustment of their mutual
claims, was therefore one of the first problems to be faced. The Empress
Dowager always had reason to fear that the great national renaissance in
China might take an anti-dynastic direction. The efforts of high Manchu
officials to avoid such a result led them, in 1900, to make common cause
with the Boxers. From the point of view of the imperial house, it is a
most serious question how far the nationalist enthusiasm and tendencies
can be harmonized with continuance of Manchu domination. That the true
solution lies in the absorption of the Manchus by the mass of the Chinese
people, and in the suppression of artificial privileges, is recognized by
the government, many of whose recent measures have been based upon such a
policy.
The government, acting through its high Chinese and Manchu officials, has
to deal, further, with all the interests, desires, and tendencies among
the four hundred million people of the eighteen provinces and of the
dependencies. That the desire for a unified national life and for an
effective expression thereof has become so strong that resistance to it
would invite revolution, is fully recognized; but, as elsewhere, the
people is composed of many elements, discordant and confused in their aims
and ideas. The masses of the people, the peasants, tradesmen, and coolie
laborers, have not as yet come into political consciousness. They are
simple-minded, easily guided this way or that by their leaders, but also
apt to run into sudden frenzies of anger or panics which, when once
unloosened, have all the force of an earthquake or typhoon. The
intellectual class, on the other hand, composed of men of education and of
commercial and industrial importance, is, as that class usually has been,
desirous of placing the institutions of the country upon a basis less
broad than that of a pure democracy. Only the most radical reformers
clamor for universal suffrage. The middle class is merely demanding
parliamentary institutions through which the intellect of the nation may
manifest itself in politics. On account of the constitution of Chinese
society, the influence of these men on their own neighborhoods, is greater
even than that of the middle class in other countries. It is they who do
the political thinking, and whose ideas are willingly followed and
supported by the less educated. If the government could appeal directly to
the masses of the people it might ignore the middle class; but it seems
impossible to organize the Chinese state on an efficient basis, to
concentrate all the vast human energy which it contains, without taking
into account the desires of these natural leaders in the various
communities.
The government has definitely embarked upon the policy of parliamentary
institutions. Foreign as this conception is to the inherent character of
Oriental authority, the exigencies of political life have prevailed, and
the great counselors of the empire have placed the institution of a
parliament among the leading reforms which are to give China a new
vitality. By imperial edict in September, 1907, it was decreed that the
constitutional government of the state should rest upon the principle of
mutual counsel. Two houses of Parliament are held the necessary foundation
of government; and, though the time is not yet ripe for the creation of
both, as a basis for the future institution the decree established a
council of government to be known as Chih Cheng Yuan, or the Department of
Constitutional Study and Investigation. The Manchu prince, Pulun, and a
high Chinese official, were appointed respectively president and
vice-president. Other members were from time to time appointed by the
throne. This department, in the beginning, is to be concerned with the
work of investigating foreign institutions, and the conditions and needs
in the provincial and national life of China. On the basis of its
findings, it is to make suggestions to the throne with respect to
fundamental laws which it may deem advisable to have promulgated. Its
character at the present time combines, therefore, the functions of a
commission of inquiry, and those of a legislative body. It is intended
that gradually this body shall grow into what will be the upper house of
the Chinese national parliament.
The majority of the present members of the council consist of high Chinese
officials, whom the government has long known and trusted. But in the
spring of 1908, an appointment was made which influenced the desire of the
government to have a representation of the more advanced views among the
reformers. The appointment was that of Yang Tau, a man who had lived
abroad as a student, and a follower of Kang Yeu Wei, the original reform
leader of China. While loyal to the dynasty, he represents most advanced
views on institutional reform. His firm attitude in political matters was
preserved by him in his official position. Shortly after his appointment,
he delivered an address of five hours before the council in which he
discussed twenty measures of constitutional legislation which had been
suggested. In his peroration, he declared that he had come up to the
capital not for office nor for honor, but for the settlement of this
life-and-death question for China. If he could not assist the government
in forming the assembly, he would rather leave and help the people in
various provinces to obtain it, regardless of whatever danger he might
himself incur. He is firm in his unqualified belief that the assembly is
the condition of all other reforms. In May, 1908, a vote was taken in the
council as to how soon a constitution should be granted. Yang Tau and
three others voted for the shortest period -- two years. Seven counselors
favored a period of five years, eight a period of seven years, twelve a
period of ten years, and one believed it wise to defer the grant of
parliamentary institutions for twenty years. It is interesting to note
that the members who voted for the shortest period had been educated
according to the old school, or in Japanese institutions, while those who
had an American or a European education generally voted for a longer term,
in most cases that of ten years.
As was to be foreseen, the government sided with the more conservative
view, and in its edict of August 27, 1908, it decreed that during the next
nine years reforms should be undertaken step by step which would prepare
for the granting of a constitution by the year 1917. The edict proceeds:
"The Constitutional Laws will then be definitely decided upon by us, and
the date for the opening of the parliament will also be announced by that
time." A detailed scheme for the reforms referred to in the decree had
been worked out by the Council of Constitutional Study, and was
promulgated at the same time. It indicates, with considerable
definiteness, the parts of the reform which are to be accomplished every
year. Thus the work is to begin, in the current year, with the
promulgation of regulations concerning the local self
government in cities, towns, and districts, and of regulations for a
census; the Ministry of Finance is to reform methods of taxation and
accounting; citizens' readers on government are to be published; codes of
civil, commercial, and criminal law are to be edited.
The work of administrative reform is to go on gradually, until, during the
last of the nine years, there are to be promulgated the Constitution
itself, the laws of the imperial household, and the rules and regulations
of the Parliament and of elections. There is likewise to be created a
special council of imperial advisers, probably suggested by the Japanese
Privy Council (composed of the Genro), and a national budget is to be
prepared. It is therefore to be expected that when parliament comes into
being, the new administrative machinery will already be in running order,
and the government will have the political situation well in hand. In the
preparation of the various measures of reform, the administrative
departments are to cooperate with the Council of Constitutional Study. The
latter body thus becomes the central organ for a great amount of
legislative activity of a constitutive character. When the parliament at
last assembles, most of the important questions of organization will
already have been settled. Throughout the preparatory era, special
attention is to be given to public education, to the end that, by 1917,
one-half of the male population of China shall be able to read and write.
The government has always insisted that representative institutions should
not be granted before the people had acquired sufficient knowledge to
understand their nature and to use them properly. Education is evidently
looked upon as a conservative, as well as enlightening, influence.
The decree of 1907 with respect to the Central Council of Constitutional
Study was followed within a month, by an edict establishing in the various
provinces similar bodies, which were to deal with all proposals for
provincial legislation. These bodies were to be appointed by the
provincial governors, from among the notables and heavy taxpayers of the
provinces. It was also indicated that the members of the national council
might be selected from these provincial bodies. The policy of this edict
was reaffirmed and made more definite by an edict issued in July, 1908,
which also introduced the elective principle. The decree runs in part as
follows: "The consultative council is an institution in which public
opinion will be ascertained, and from which the members of the central
council may be recruited. Let our people point out clearly through the
councils what are the evils that should be abolished in their respective
provinces and what are the reforms that they desire. But let them also
remember the duty which they owe to the court and to the country. Violent
discussion should be prevented, lest the order and safety of society might
be disturbed."
The plan worked out by the Council of Institutional Study determines with
considerable detail the qualifications which must be possessed by members
of the provincial council -- such as official and scholastic status,
property, etc. The councils will be consultative merely, and will be
largely under the influence of the provincial officials. The electorate is
limited to those who possess the qualification of experience in public
office, a high-school degree, or the ownership of property worth five
thousand dollars silver. The first provincial elections took place in the
spring of this year: they did not, of course, elicit so much popular
interest as would have been shown in the case of national elections. But
the very fact that the principle of elective representation has thus been
introduced into Chinese political life in a quiet and orderly manner is of
supreme importance.
In order to advance the cause of parliamentary institutions in China,
there have been formed a number of political associations. Such are the
Association for Preparing Constitutional Citizenship, the Association for
the Study of the Constitution, the Constitutional Discussion Society, etc.
The expression of public opinion in China has been facilitated through
these associations. They started a movement as a result of which sixteen
of the provinces sent representatives to Peking during the summer of 1908,
for the purpose of presenting memorials to the throne favoring the
establishment of a national parliament. These associations devote
themselves to the discussion of public policies, both foreign and
domestic. Political problems are considered, and proposals are worked out
for legislative action. This activity is merely one of the indications of
the aptitude of the Chinese people for public discussion. They have,
indeed, in the past not been without training for this purpose; and in
creating a national assembly and provincial councils, the government is
not building in the air.
Though in theory the Chinese government is absolute, its representatives
and agents have never been able to disregard the public opinion of the
community in which they were working. It is practically impossible to
impose any new tax without conciliating the opinion of the leading men of
the neighborhood. Should any official neglect to put himself in touch with
these forces, his decrees would be disregarded. The Chinese have always
been accustomed to take communal action. Rather than pay a tax to which
they had not consented, they would close their business houses and engage
in a boycott or strike, until their grievances had been listened to, and
the matter in controversy had been adjusted in accordance with their own
sense of equity. The Chinese people are grouped in various guilds and
associations. The affairs of these bodies are managed by discussion in the
meetings of the guild officials and members. The demand for a national
assembly is therefore the natural outgrowth of a practice which is deeply
ingrained in Chinese social life. The political associations which have
been mentioned would readily grow into political groups and parties, were
a parliament once established. It is of course a question how far party
action could be made a valuable and potent political force in China.
Bitter struggles may be expected before the true functions of political
parties have been determined, and permanent groupings established. The
experience of Japan teaches us how difficult it is to adapt party action
to a system of highly centralized authority.
When the people of a Chinese neighborhood resist the imposition of a new
tax until certain grievances have been adjusted, they are exercising the
essential function of parliamentary government. The powers of the "Mother
of Parliaments" grew up in this manner, and the financial functions of
parliamentary assemblies are always the centre of their action. It is here
that the whole question of Chinese partiamentarism hinges. In order to
carry through the vast reforms planned in the administration, in the
school system, in the construction of railways and roads, in the
maintenance of a modern army and navy, the Chinese government needs money
in quantities that increase in a geometrical progression. The burdens of a
foreign debt imposed upon China in 1894 and 1900 must also be considered.
Altogether it is plain that, even with effective fiscal reforms, the
present sources of public income in China are inadequate. Compared with
the taxes in such countries as Japan, India, or the Philippines, these
levied in China are very moderate indeed. Sir Robert Hart expressed his
belief that it need not cause any particular difficulty to increase the
income of the Chinese government tenfold. But no matter how rapidly the
Chinese people may be developing a strong and devoted patriotism, they
will continue to resist as much as ever the arbitrary imposition of new
taxes. In order to provide itself with the necessary funds, the Chinese
government must reconcile the opinion of the nation to its policies. If
this is to be done through the multitude of local officials distributed
over the Empire, the results will be inadequate, and official action will
be constantly embarrassed by great friction and outbreaks of violence.
Altogether the simplest and safest method of dealing with the nation in
this matter would be through a body of representatives. As the kings of
England commanded the knights of the shires to come together for the
purpose of adjusting taxation, so the Chinese government could well afford
to command the provinces and prefectures to send their representatives, in
order that mutual arrangements might be made for adequately supplying the
ever-increasing financial needs of the empire.
The Chinese government is evidently determined to solve the problem of
institutional change on the basis of the ascertained needs of China and in
relation to the existing institutions of the empire. Among the
constitutions of modern civilized states, that of Japan has most of
suggestiveness for the Chinese legislators. The dignity and importance of
the imperial office is there maintained. The Japanese parliament is given
a great latitude of discussion and cooperation, but the real power of
government is in the hands of the council of the elder statesmen. The
parliament, indeed, has the sole right of authorizing new levies of
taxation; but while at times the government has been seriously embarrassed
by the lack of funds, in the long run it has been able to obtain a vast
increase of taxation. With all the bickerings in the Japanese parliament,
it has on the whole assisted in binding the national loyalty to the
government, and it has certainly brought about a stronger national
feeling. But China differs from Japan in being a federal state. The
Chinese provinces, vast nations in themselves, could never be reduced to
the level of mere administrative circumscriptions, like the Japanese fu,
or the French prefecture. In this matter the constitutions of such
countries as the United States, Germany, and India, have much to teach the
Chinese. It is indeed one of the major problems in Chinese legislation
to-day how to adjust the relations of the provinces to the strong central
authority which is being created. So far very little headway has been made
in working out a definite and clear system of the relations between the
provinces and the central government. The constitution of Germany is much
admired in China. What makes it attractive is the importance of the
imperial office, as well as the fact that the federal relation is
effectively elaborated, and that the popular element in the state is
reconciled with the demands of a powerful central administration.
One of the special problems much discussed in China relates to the best
basis upon which the representation in a national parliament may be
founded. We have already seen that the introduction of universal suffrage
is not contemplated at present. The government originally favored councils
appointed from among representative men, somewhat in the manner in which
the councils of the Indian government are made up. The idea of
representation of interests has also been strongly put forward by Chinese
publicists. The government ordered a special study to be made of the
Austrian system, under which special representation in the Reichsrath is
accorded to urban and rural communes, to industrial and commercial
associations, and to universities. It is possible that some such plan may
ultimately be adopted in working out the details of the Chinese
constitution. This would take account of the communal feeling existing in
such districts as the fu and hsien, as well as the associative relations
of the guilds and of industrial companies. If the system is not directly
founded on this basis, a similar result will probably be obtained by an
adjustment of the qualifications for electors.
So far as the general policy of the Chinese government at the present time
may be determined, stripped of temporary vacillations and of the merely
hortatory elements so common in Chinese documents, it may be expressed in
the following rough outline. Governmental authority must be maintained,
but the officials must govern in accord with public opinion, though not in
detail dependent upon it. The character and morale of official methods
must be improved. The tests for appointment to office must be based upon
modern science and practical efficiency, while the character and
personality of the candidate too must be taken into account in making
selections. Salaries will be increased in order that the officers of the
government may not depend upon illegal fees and exactions. The general
efficiency of the system is to be improved through the enforcement of
stricter responsibility, and through scientific accounting. In all this
work, the people should assist the government and give it their
confidence. Such representation as will be accorded them ought to
strengthen the state by enlisting popular sympathy and cooperation. But a
constitution cannot be imported from without, it must build upon the
living forces in the nation and utilize them for the general ends of the
state. The government, therefore, must be allowed to take time to feel its
way, in order that the institutions, once introduced, may actually fit
into the political and social life of China.
The Chinese government would, of course, be reluctant to give up the
substance of power to representative assembly. This fact is made the basis
of the argument advanced by the ultra-revolutionary forces that China can
be endowed with true national institutions only through a revolution in
which the dynasty would be utterly overthrown and a purely elective
government established. But it would seem that in the Chinese situation at
the present time, Burke is rather a safer guide than Rousseau. The
government would, indeed, defeat its own purposes, and might bring on even
sadder catastrophes than China has already suffered, if it should attempt
to dam up the great forces of public opinion that are now seeking to
express themselves. A national parliament must be created; and it must,
moreover, be a body truly representative of the intelligence and energy of
the nation. We ought of course not to expect too much of such an
institution, as parliaments are not ideal in any part of the world. But
when public opinion has thus been enlisted, there will have been created
an inquest of the nation, through which the government may readily
ascertain the feeling of its subjects throughout the empire. New imposts
of taxation will be given authority by acceptance through representatives,
and the financial administration of the empire will benefit through
parliamentary control.
But all this is only a beginning. An institution like a parliament brings
with it new difficulties, party controversies, the introduction into
political life of personal ambitions, although on a far higher plane than
that of court intrigue. So the difficulties of China will not vanish by
the creation of this organ. China will, indeed, have endowed herself with
an instrument that may be used toward bettering her general condition. But
the real work of reform must be done in the administration. There the
confidence of the people must be won. The corrupt methods which have
obtained in the past must give way to strict accountability, and to the
maintenance of just and legal charges. The great public works which the
government is undertaking call for unusual capacity and devotion in the
public service. Should there be over-centralization, the development of
the provinces would suffer; and yet these great units will have to submit
to a more direct, centralized control than they have felt in the past, in
order that the nation may act as one body and bring to bear its
concentrated energies. Thus it is clear that, with the achievement of
parliamentary institutions, the real work of China will have just begun.
But if these institutions can be so adjusted that they will constitute the
expression of a true union between the government and the people, the
solution of the other difficulties and problems will have been rendered
far easier than it would have been in the hands of an administration
working at cross purposes with an independent public
opinion.
"A Parliament for China" by Paul S. Reinsch, The Atlantic Monthly, December 1909; Volume 104, No. 6; pages 790 - 797.
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