International Conflict for Beginners

On each side of that choice some consequences are likely to be favorable to the government and some unfavorable. The effective pressure upon a government to decide one way or the other depends upon the difference between the perceived net “payoff” of making the decision weighed against the perceived net “payoff” of not doing so. Although these payoffs are almost never subject to quantitative valuation, it is useful to try to sketch out to the best of our ability a balance sheet as it would look to the government we are trying to influence, if that government prepared one.

As an example, consider the choice facing the government of North Korea in February, 1968, after it had seized the United States Navy’s electronic reconnaissance vessel Pueblo and its crew in waters off the coast of North Korea. The United States government, insisting that the ship had been illegally seized on the high seas, demanded the immediate return of the ship and the crew. To the government of North Korea the choice, presented in terms of a balance sheet, may have looked something like the following:

I. NORTH KOREA’S CHOICE JUST AFTER THE PUEBLO SEIZED (“we” = North Korea)

If that is anything like a fair estimate of the choice as it looked to the government of North Korea, it is not surprising that the ship was kept despite the United States’s demand for its return. The lefthand column constitutes what we have been calling the offer—the consequences that result from making the desired decision. From the North Korean point of view it was not an attractive offer. The righthand column constitutes what we have been calling the threat, yet from the North Korean point of view it looked pretty attractive.

The normal first reaction is to try to exert influence by making the threat side less attractive. In the Pueblo case the United States sent naval ships toward Korea in a “show of force.” The United States endeavored to increase North Korea’s fear of military reprisals, should they keep the ship and crew. But this was a difficult task. It was not the lack of U.S. military capability in the area which North Korea was relying on to prevent military reprisals; it was the fact that North Korea held the crew as hostages. The North Korean government had undoubtedly assessed the risk of our retaliation before they seized the Pueblo, and there was little that the hasty movement of U.S. naval vessels in the area would do to change that risk.

A well-considered program for trying to exert influence on North Korea would look at the whole balance sheet as it appeared to them and consider what might be done to change the decision we were seeking and to change the consequences which they might expect to follow from making or not making that decision. In such an analysis the possible changes on the offer side of the balance sheet usually hold out greater unexplored opportunities for influence than those on the threat side.

There are various ways of exerting influence by making it appear more attractive to another government to do what we would like it to do. Before turning to the general problem, let us consider what might have been done in the case of the Pueblo.

The analytical task is to construct a hypothetical or target balance sheet which we think might cause North Korea to make the decision we would like it to make. We should also sketch out a separate balance sheet for ourselves and determine whether th potential benefit to us of trying to exert this influence is worth the costs.

The approach is illustrated by the following suggestions, which were prepared just after the Pueblo was seized:

II. PROGRAM: A POSSIBLE SCHEME DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE NORTH KOREA

The hope would be that if the United States pursued such a program, this would, in a few weeks, confront the North Korean government with a choice which looked quite different from the one they faced when they decided not to return the ship and crew immediately upon the demand of the United States. It might then appear to be roughly as follows:

III. TARGET BALANCE SHEET NORTH KOREA’S CHOICE AFTER THE PROGRAM (”we” — North Korea)

If we had confronted North Korea with such a choice, we might have reasonably expected it to decide to return the crew. Before concluding that we should initiate such a program, however, we would have to strike our own balance sheet and consider the pros and cons, along the following lines:

IV. OUR CHOICE: SHOULD WE ADOPT THE SUGGESTED PROGRAM? (“we" = the U.S.)

Faced with such a choice, the United States government might reasonably decide either way. Perhaps the fate of some eighty crewmen would not he so crucial considering the casualties being suffered in Vietnam, and the United States would conclude not to initiate the suggested program designed to obtain the return of the men. What is being argued here is not the wisdom of the suggested program but rather two things: that this kind of analysis helps one think clearly about such a problem, and that a government’s choice can be radically and often easily affected by actions designed to change the “offer”—the consequences to them of doing what we want them to do.

Further, it is not being suggested that such an analysis is a substitute for detailed knowledge or historical understanding of the people concerned. Quite the contrary. As is apparent from the example, this form of analysis directs attention to questions of national attitude and interest which are likely to affect a government’s decision and should help formulate those questions in a way which will make it easier for experts to be of help to decision-makers.

In this era of nuclear weapons and deterrence, the Department of Defense has become quite sophisticated about making threats. We have no comparable sophistication regarding the making of offers. This is true despite the fact that the process of exerting influence through offers is far more conducive to international peace than the process of exerting influence by threats.

Change the beneficiary

One way to improve the impact of an offer is to focus on the beneficiary of the offer and his relationship to those we are asking to make the decision. We may he able to improve the effectiveness of the offer by changing those upon whom it has its primary impact. If may be possible, for example, to have the beneficial consequences of a decision fall on those who are more closely involved in the decision. When we attempt to exert influence on a government, we often consider the other country as a single unit. Instead we should look to those within the country who will be making the decision. The offer to all Rhodesians of “free participation in a political democracy” if they would return to constitutional government was not much of an offer to those who had the power to make a decision, the Ian Smith government. They were not going to be better off in terms of power. An offer addressed to them should probably have dealt with ways of lessening their fear of a takeover by an illiterate black majority. When we have identified those to whom the offer is being made, we want to be sure that it appeals to them.

Make the offer more attractive

The primary way to improve our offers is to make them look better to the government we are trying to influence. I have used the word “offer” to designate the entire set of consequences to the adversary government of making the decision we want them to make. As we have seen, there are costs as well as benefits to them in this set: there are minuses as well as pluses in the offer. They will presumably be losing some things by changing their minds and by making the decision we want them to make. As the example about North Korea showed, we can change the substance of the offer both by improving the advantages they see in making the decision and also by reducing or alleviating some of tire costs to them of going along with us, costs which also fall on the offer side of the balance sheet.

In April, 1965, the United States offered one billion dollars in aid to both Vietnams if peace could be restored. But the idea of a one-billiondollar U S. aid program may not have seemed attractive to the North Vietnamese. Political leaders who saw themselves as risking their lives in furtherance of national independence, socialism, and anticolonialism may have regarded the prospect of extensive and indefinite economic involvement by a capitalist country in the affairs of Vietnam as more of a threat than a promise. By using their terms, their language, and by changing the style ol this offer, we might have made it much more attractive to them. We could, for example, have turned one billion dollars over to the Asian Development Bank to be used for reconstruction and development in all of Vietnam, it being understood that North Vietnam, if it wished, could consider its share as compensation for damage done by American bombers and artillery fire. The entire program could have been set up to be administered by Asians. Such a scheme would have been far more attractive to North Vietnam and therefore would have exerted, for the same dollar price, far more influence.

This example demonstrates that if we are going to offer the donkey some turnips, we had better be sure he likes turnips. We need to have at least some perception of an adversary’s values. We ought not to assume that they are a mirror image of ourselves, oriented to the things we would like in the same circumstances.

Reduce the disadvantages of making the decision

Perhaps more important to the adversary are the minuses in the offer: the disadvantages to them of going along with the decision we want. One way to improve the offer is to lessen the costs die adversary will incur by making our decision. It is not sympathy for an adversary but common sense that we should make it as easy and attractive as possible for him to do what we would like him to do.

A government is often deterred from making the decision we want by the high political costs anticipated from making it. Where there are costs in continuing its present course, but also costs in changing its mind, inertia may exaggerate the effect of the costs of change. The Pueblo example given above suggests the desirability of working out all the reasons which another government may have for not deciding the way we would like it to decide, and of then seeing what we can do to minimize those costs.

Make our offers more credible

In addition to changing the substance or content of an offer, we can exert influence by making it appear more likely that what we say will happen will in fact happen. As to any statement about the future, there is necessarily some element of uncertainty. To the extent that we are seeking to exert influence by holding out attractive consequences lor a government if it should make the decision we want it to make, the more certain we can make those consequences the more successful we will be. We will increase the impact of our offers if we make them more credible.

Much of our national defense budget has been devoted to the problem of making our threats credible. We have spent billions of dollars on nuclear weapons for the sole purpose of convincing other governments that eve have both the capability and the intention of implementing a threat of nuclear retaliation. There is voluminous literature on threats. The distinction has been explored between threats narrowly defined and “warnings,” consequences which will result naturally or which we will be compelled by self-interest to impose and which are therefore more credible.

On the other hand, little attention has been devoted to the problem of making our offers credible, the problem of convincing another government that the alleged advantages of their making a decision we would like them to make will really materialize. Government officials and critics ought to pay more attention to this element of policy it only because it has been so neglected. Moreover, the credibility ol offers may be even more critical than the credibility of threats.

For one thing, even a small chance of having to pay a great cost is an adequate basis for a governmental decision, whereas a small chance of a fairly large benefit is not. A threat may be effective even though it is not highly probable that it would be implemented, It is easy for a political leader to justify, to his government and his own domestic audience, taking a course of action because there was a 20 or 30 percent chance that, if he did not, the country would be heavily bombed. A country can be deterred from doing something by a small risk of disaster. The consequences of the course of action that was avoided remain uncertain. No one knows for sure what would have happened. This uncertainty protects the government which can easily defend its decision to avoid the risk.

Political leaders are not, however, prone to take action on a small chance—a bet—that it will produce very good consequences. Ho Chi Minh might have believed that if the North Vietnamese stopped fighting and withdrew, there was a small chance, but a good one, of a highly favorable outcome: the United States would honor its promise to withdraw completely within six months. But no matter how favorable the outcome, so long as the chance of it appeared small, it would be politica1ly indefensible for him to take that chance. He would not be able to go back to his people and say, “We accepted the American promise because we figured there was a 30 percent chance we could get what we wanted at no further cost. It was a sound bet under the circumstances. It was a worthwhile risk to take. It just didn’t go our way.” A government wants to be highly certain that if it makes a decision in order to derive some benefits, those benefits are going to materialize.

Some ways to make our offers credible

One way to increase the perceived probability of our implementing an offer is to increase the objective probability. By making a commitment bom which we cannot back down we can show an adversary that we will have to come through on the offer. Even if the North Vietnamese believed that President Johnson was personally committed to the

offer of a billion dollars in aid, they probably correctly believed that a different Administration would feel less bound. They might have thought the offer incredible because it would be difficult: to get it through Congress in the event of peace. II we had actually appropriated the money for distribution when peace was established (perhaps with the interest to be paid to us in the interim), it could not only have been more attractive because of Asian administration; it would have been far more credible. North Vietnam would have known that if peace came, we could not prevent the implementation of the offer. By committing ourselves, we would have exerted more influence.

Specificity increases the credibility of an offer. For one thing, a specific offer shows that we have thought about what we would be prepared to do and have worked out the details. It is a demonstration of our present intentions. Greater specificity also demonstrates greater commitment, and therefore makes for greater credibility. The political cost to us of backing out of a specific promise is greater than that of backing out of a loose or ambiguous one. The more explicit the promise, the more difficult it is to find excuses for nonperformance. By being specific, we are buying influence at the cost of flexibility. By becoming committed, however, we demonstrate to the adversary that we are serious about the offer.

A general offer to make sure that the rights of a white minority in Rhodesia are protected does not carrv as much weight as a draft treaty or a specific constitution that the government of Great Britain would be willing to sign. An offer to pay a specific sum of money on a particular day carries much more conviction than an offer to pay a fair amount at an appropriate time. On Vietnam, President Johnson contributed to the credibility of his offers by being more specific than he might have been. The words “one billion dollars" added credibility to an offer of economic assistance after the war. To say we would get out in six months increased the credibility of our statement that if peace could be restored, United States troops would be withdrawn. Not only does “six months” show we have thought about our offer, it shows we are more committed. It becomes more costly politically for the United States to fail to produce on that offer. Therefore it is more credible, and exerts more influence. An offer to withdraw our troops “in due course” would not exert much influence.

It is costly to bluff. Bluffing about an offer is more damaging than bluffing about a threat. It is easier to re-establish a reputation for carrying out threats. Any failure to exert influence by a threat can be followed by action demonstrating that this time the threat was not a bluff. If we fail to implement one threat, we can always implement one later. Also, bluffing on one threat may not lead an adversary to conclude we will bluff again. Backing down on the implementation of one threat may in fact make it less likely that we will fail to implement a later threat. One could argue that because the Soviet Union “backed down” when faced with a United States quarantine of Cuba, it destroyed its credibility and that the United States could safely ignore any threats the Soviet Union might make about its response if the United States should try to impose a comparable quarantine on the North Vietnamese port of Haiphong. One could make the argument, but it is not convincing. The Soviets’ ability to make a credible threat may even have been strengthened by their prior yielding. They can now say, and we may believe them, that having backed down once they cannot afford to back down a second time. It is not easy, however, to re-establish a reputation for honoring one’s promises. Having been caught bluffing and having acquired a reputation for broken promises, we may not get opportunities to demonstrate that we are now sincere. If we go into a store and say, “I gave you a bad check last week but this one is good,” the proprietor may not give us the opportunity to prove we are right.

Give them the benefits sooner

Governments are concerned about the time when the consequences of making a decision are going to materialize. Changing the timing of an offer may be an important way to exert influence. Governments are notoriously shortsighted; they apply a high discount rate. They are much more interested in what is going to happen next week than in what is going to happen next year. The more quickly they can expect the benefits of making a decision to come home to them, the more influence will those benefits exert. We should try to advance the delivery date of remote benefits so they appear more immediate, and therefore more important, to the adversary. And we should try to postpone, if we cannot eliminate, the drawbacks as they see them of making the decision. The high discount rate in government decision-making means that a distant benefit must be large indeed to justify incurring an immediate cost. We should try to reverse this effect. Following the example of commercial salesmen (“Fly now—pay later”) , we should try to make the benefits precede the costs: an offer of immediate benefits for future costs. To do so involves some risk that the costs, when they fall due, will somehow be evaded, just as there is a risk that the installment buyer will skip town and fail to make his payments. But the fact that there is a significant default rate on credit sales does not mean that credit selling is a bad business. In fact, it is highly profitable.

Give them a fading opportunity

Part of the offer designed to influence an adversary to make a decision should encourage him to make the decision now rather than later. Unless there are persuasive reasons for acting today, the tendency is always to wait and see. To make a given decision today is to give up the opportunity to get a better deal later. To postpone a decision leaves open the option to decide tomorrow and in the meantime to try to attempt to get better terms. The only cost is one day’s delay. In most international conflicts the stakes are high. Benefits to be gained by improving the terms are likely to exceed the cost of waiting one more day. This tendency is likely to recur day after day.

Those who control the agenda exert influence not only by formulating the questions but by affecting the timing of decisions to be made on them. Part of our offer should make it much more attractive to the adversary to decide today than to delay. We should try to present an adversary government with a fading opportunity. They ought to perceive the decision which we are asking them to make as an opportunity which they wall lose if they fail to act soon.

One advantage of offers over threats is that they can more easily be withdrawn before the adversary makes his choice. Rather than stating a price which is good forever, we should try to arrange offers or opportunities for decision which have an automatic expiration time. There is a great difference between saying “We are always willing to negotiate” and saying “We invite you to send a representative at the ministerial level to meet our representative in Colombo at 11 A.M. local time on Monday the twenty-fifth of this month.” The first offer is unlikely to be withdrawn. It provides no reason for accepting it on one day rather than the next. To the contrary, there is reason to postpone a decision, hoping that something better may turn up. An offer that does not expire is like an option that is good indefinitely. It tends not to induce a decision but rather to induce delay while one explores the possibility of better terms. Delay offers something to gain and nothing to lose. On the other hand, an offer that expires by its own terms is an opportunity that knocks and may not knock again. A fading opportunity undercuts the argument within the other government that by failing to decide they can keep their options open.

Though we want to present another government with a reason for deciding now rather than postponing the decision, there are drawbacks to confronting an adversary with a public ultimatum. Either the political cost of giving in to our ultimatum or the precedent which that would establish might be enough to prevent the decision. This problem, however, can be at least partly solved by having the time limits set by a neutral third party, by secret communications, by ambiguity about the deadline, or by constructing the deadline so that it appears to result from facts outside anyone’s control.

Roger Fisher teaches law at Harvard University. A longer version of this article will appear in his book of the same title, due this month from Harper & Row.