North African Arms Race
While politicians and observers debate about the arms race between Israel and Egypt, the other four North African nations are quietly building up their own arsenals. They include some of the most sophisticated planes and missiles in the world today. To counteract heavy Soviet investment in Egypt and Algeria, Libya alone will spend $1.135 billion on weapons over the next five years. The Americans have been sending arms to Morocco so it can defend its borders in case fighting with Algeria resumes. Ostensibly for the same purpose, Algeria has asked for and received MIG-21 planes. While a present motivation for the North African arms race is the maintenance of a political balance between Soviet and Western influences within North Africa, it is possible that all these weapons could be combined in the cause of Arab unity in the event of another holy war with Israel.
The political and military reasons for the demand for arms are only equaled in significance by the political economies of the supply of arms. While North African countries may have some real, and some supposed, enemies who threaten their political sovereignty, so also do they have political friends and “trade” partners who are ever so pleased to take — or better, encourage — arms orders. Britain in particular has reaped enormous benefits. When, as a candidate, Richard Nixon proclaimed that he would send Phantom jets to Israel, he pleased not only American Jews who support Israel, but also the arms producers and the U.S. Treasury; for the budgeteers of the Department of Defense, the increased production of F-5’s reduces the cost of each plane. Thus the supply of arms is limited only by the ability of a buyer to pay cash or receive easy credit. Demand is fostered by politics and fear.
Algeria
Algeria is the chief actor in the North African drama. Its present defense policies are a response to a war with Morocco, sparked by an old border dispute. In the autumn of 1963, only a year and a half after independence, the Algerian forces, a straggling collection of guerrilla and volunteer troops, mostly remnants of the revolution, suffered a clear defeat at the hands of the far more highly mechanized, integrated, and professional Moroccan forces. The defeat was a rude awakening, particularly for Houari Boumedienne, then chief of staff, who became president when he overthrew Ben Bella a year and a half later. Even before Boumedienne came to power, in the summer of 1965, the Algerian government had committed itself to building up an armed force that could prevent a repeat of the 1963 debacle. The Soviet Union, anxious to increase its influence on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, was more than willing to help. Beginning in 1964, and especially since 1966, the Algerians have been stockpiling Russian MiG’s, tanks, and artillery, so that they now have at least a four-to-one equipment advantage over the Moroccans, and they completely outclass the Tunisians. The estimated value of the Soviet equipment is $250 million. In addition, the Algerians are spending 24 percent of their budget (or about $168 million) on defense. Although outside observers believed the Algerians would pause to consolidate and integrate their present forces, the Algerians seem determined to keep the arms flowing in, and the leveling-off that was expected has not occurred.
For Algerian leaders, a strong and powerful army is an expression of nationalism. Algeria hopes to gain recognition as a major Arab power. Backed by MIG’s and missiles, its words at an Arab summit are likely to carry more weight. But an extensive military establishment breeds its own problems. Today’s army officers fought for Algeria’s independence and do not like their present place on the fringes of political decision-making. Disgruntled, they attempted to overthrow Boumedienne last December. While Boumedienne is still in power, he has learned that to keep the army happy is to keep them supplied.
The Soviets have given the Algerians what the Algerians wanted: not obsolete junk, but high-quality modern equipment. At present, Algeria is overarmed. It has from 125 to 150 MIG’s (mostly the high-class MIG-21), but lacks the trained pilots to man many of them. It has patrol boats equipped with the Styx sea-to-sea guided missiles, but needs time to master the technical difficulties of the Styx guidance system. Presumably, the nearly 2000 Soviet military advisers currently in Algeria are helping to remedy these deficiencies, for during the ArabIsraeli war of 1967 it was made clear that the Soviet policy of supplying equipment without the knowhow was of little use to the Arabs.
Algeria’s short-term goal is clear: defense against possible future attacks from Morocco. At present, Algeria holds all of the land in dispute between the two countries, including the Tindouf region, with its rich iron-ore deposits. The Algerians are afraid that Morocco will someday try to make good its claims on this territory. They regard Morocco as irrevocably backed by the United States, and despite American denials, are convinced that the United States has an agreement with Morocco which guarantees American support in the event of a war with Algeria.
A more distant enemy, as far as the Algerians are concerned, is Israel. It is unlikely that Algeria will provoke a war with Israel, but it will come to the aid of the more militant Arab allies, Egypt and Syria, in case there is another war. In June, 1967, Algerian MIG’s flew to the front, and its troops marched across Tunisia and Libya, only to arrive when the war was over. Algerian troops are today stationed at the Suez Canal.
Although Algeria has accepted large supplies of Soviet arms during the last four years, it has been careful not to compromise its own national sovereignty. Boumedienne is determined that his country will not become a Soviet puppet. He is renowned for his acute xenophobia, which hampers the Soviets as much as it does the Americans. Soviet officials failed to persuade the Algerians to sign a nonproliferation treaty, and Soviet officials, like the Americans, cannot leave the city of Algiers without special permission. Algerians sent to the Soviet Union for military training are often sent to France afterward for further instruction, to neutralize any residue of Russian ideology. The Soviets understand Boumedienne’s position and have cooperated in minimizing their visible influence. They know that the Algerians will continue to receive Soviet equipment. No other country is likely to provide such good equipment on such favorable terms. Although there is talk of a small-arms deal with the French, it will be more of a gesture to show that the Algerians are not totally dependent on the Soviets than a wholesale shifting away from Soviet aid. It is surprising too that teams from American consulting firms are advising the Algerian government on economic planning.
Morocco
Understandably, the arms buildup in Algeria has alarmed Morocco. The Moroccans do not trust the Algerians, and are not pleased that the Soviets have recently been improving the skills of Algerian pilots and technicians. Immediately following their military victory in the border dispute of 1963, the Moroccans paused in the arms race. At that time, Algeria had a long way to go to catch up. But since 1965, the Moroccans have had to respond to Algeria. They are not trying to match Algeria’s forces, but merely to diminish the Algerian advantage in military equipment to perhaps two-to-one. Because of their superior abilities as soldiers, the Moroccans are confident that they do not need massive equipment. Furthermore, they feel that economic development has priority over defense. While Algeria is spending 24 percent of its budget on defense, the Moroccans have allocated only 12 percent, and it is expected that this figure will remain constant for the next few years.
Although the Moroccans received 80 reconditioned T-54 tanks last year from Czechoslovakia in exchange for $I6 million worth of primary products, they generally prefer to buy equipment from the West. Ideologically, they feel more at home with the Americans than with the Russians. King Hassan promotes large-scale private investment in the country, and has been soft-spoken even on Vietnam. In return, he receives economic aid from the United States and gets good terms on loans for the purchase of planes and equipment, including to date 12 fully armed jet fighters (mostly F-5A’s). Implementation of a further agreement providing for the purchase of $14 million worth of modern antitank and other equipment has been delayed by opposition in Congress stemming from the June, 1967, war. Nevertheless, 85 U.S. military advisers and 400 other military personnel in training capacities are at present in Morocco, and Western influence is strong. The Soviets supply only nonmilitary technical assistance advisers, from 50 to 100 attached for 3 years to each of 3 development projects: a dam, a thermoelectric plant, and lead mines.
While the Moroccans are clearly disturbed by the thought of another border blowup with Algeria, they have not yet taken the logical next step of asking for F-104 Starfighters, an American answer to Algeria’s MIG-21’s. They are confident that Boumedienne is not about to initiate an attack. They realize, however, that Boumedienne’s own position is hardly secure, and they are not comforted by the recent attempted coup in Algeria. As an Arab leader, King Hassan cannot renounce his country’s claims in the disrupted border area without arousing more criticism than he can afford. He has, therefore, tried to reach a peaceful agreement with the Algerians, suggesting that the two countries share equally the profits from the iron mines on the condition that Algeria recognize Morocco’s sovereignty. These conditions did not begin to satisfy Boumedienne, who is, in the short term, happy with the present de facto border.
It is possible that once the Algerians stop accumulating arms and equipment and begin consolidating their army, a border incident will, with instructions from Algiers, explode into a war. What happens next will depend in part on the wishes of the Kremlin and the White House. The Soviet Union is clearly not pleased with the pro-Western leanings of the present Moroccan government and would be glad to promote its downfall. Even in this day of missiles, the Soviets can hardly be uninterested in the possibility of controlling the southern side of the Strait of Gibraltar, and hence the Western access to the Mediterranean.
Libya
Perhaps the most startling development of the North African arms race is the sudden entry of the Libyans. Immediately following the discovery of oil in the Libyan desert, Libya chose to stay out of the arms race. But in February, 1968, it joined in with a vengeance, signing a contract with Great Britain for a Rapier missile system and pledging to spend $1.135 billion on defense over the next five years. Of this, $500 million will be paid directly to the United Kingdom for the missiles and their installation. Another $500 million will be spent on infrastructure, and another $135 million will be distributed throughout the ministries. To meet these commitments, the Libyans have postponed their five-year plan and estimate a $36 million deficit on this year’s development budget.
The Rapier system will include Bloodhounds, Rapiers, Jet Provosts, and 3000 British advisers and technicians. Once the system is installed, the Libyan government plans to keep the British in Libya to operate it. Both the King and the Premier think the British are less likely to panic in a crisis than the Libyans.
Selling the Rapier system to Libya was a coup for the British. Since the Libyans are paying cash (over a five-year period), the contract will have a significant effect on the British balance-of-payments crisis. American firms had bargained for the contract but withdrew at Washington’s request. There will be benefits for the United States nevertheless. Since World War II America has controlled Wheelus Air Force Base. Anti-American riots in June, 1967, forced negotiations for American withdrawal. Now, however, the Libyans are anxious to keep American skills on their soil. Wheelus will definitely remain in operation. Formerly used to train U.S. European-based squadrons, it will now become a joint base for training U.S. and Libyan Air Force units, and will service much of the new British equipment.
To keep the present investments in perspective, it is important to realize that the Libyan buildup starts from scratch. The Libyan Army has 7000 men, the Navy 400, and the Air Force 300. Libya owns 6 C-47’s and 3 T-33’s. Ten F-5’s are on order. The total military force will grow in the next 5 years to as many as 14,000. Although by Egyptian and Algerian standards this is small, the Libyans believe that the days of large land armies are over, and the major increase attendant on the Rapier system will be in fighter aircraft.
The most reasonable explanation for Libya’s sudden and vast outlay for arms is that the Libyans want to defend themselves against the Soviet buildup in Egypt and Algeria. In discussing the arms purchase, Libyans mention the danger of potential Israeli aggression, but this seems to be lip service to Arab politics rather than deep-seated conviction on the part of Libyan citizens. They have no time for Arab revolutionaries and trust neither the Algerians nor the Egyptians. Although Libya pays large amounts of Danegeld to help Egypt and Jordan, the Libyan press condemns the payments, and frequently criticizes Eastern Arab “blundering.” Nasser’s photograph no longer graces the shops and offices of Tripoli and Benghazi, and Egyptian teachers, needed because of manpower shortages, are being replaced as quickly as possible with Peace Corps volunteers. While the Libyans do not wish to fight the Egyptians or the Algerians, their new military strength should both help the Libyan delegation at any Arab summit meeting and discourage any revolutionary forces from meddling in Libyan affairs.
Furthermore, the Libyans want to be able to protect their airspace. They were visibly disturbed when Soviet and Belgian planes violated Libyan airspace en route to the Congo, and while it is unlikely that the Rapiers will actually be used to bring down Belgian or Russian planes, it is equally unlikely that the Russians and Belgians will in the future neglect to ask permission before flying within range of a sophisticated missile system.
Rich enough to buy its equipment wherever it pleases, Libya has no need for Russian aid, with its customary conditions. Its main concern is to keep on good terms with its oil markets, primarily Western European nations, and it will probably continue to buy its arms from the West. Strategically, Libya docs not offer Russia as much enticement as Morocco, with its access to the Strait of Gibraltar, and the Soviets will probably leave Libya alone.
Libya’s present pro-West position, however, is not entirely stable. The government is renowned for both corruption and adherence to tradition. The violent riots that followed the June, 1967, war reflected not only anti-American and anti-British sentiment but also disillusionment with the governing regime. In the autumn of 1967, King Idris appointed a new government, a balance between traditional leaders and young technocrats, and his popularity has increased accordingly. While the military has no political influence at present, the installation of the Rapier system may give it increased prestige. This in turn may lead to louder demands on the part of a jealous internal security force. Such a police force, directed by an ambitious minister, might conceivably stockpile small arms for a coup against which the Rapiers would be irrelevant.
As long as the present government remains in power and keeps the British personnel at the Rapier controls, it can be assumed that Libya’s new arsenal will be used with discretion. But in the event of another Arab-Israeli war, it is possible that Libya might ally itself with the very nations whose threatening military buildups seem to have been its motive for arming in the first place: and the missiles might then be turned against Israel.
Tunisia
Locked between Libya, rich in oil, and Algeria’s massive military force, Tunisia can only look in awe as its neighbors arm. President Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia’s benevolent dictator, knows he cannot compete with his neighbors’ defense investments, nor does he wish to. Tunisia’s scarce resources are better spent on economic development. Bourguiba urges his Arab brothers to stop squandering their wealth on weapons and concentrate instead on raising the standard of living.
Obviously, however, Bourguiba cannot wholly ignore Tunisia’s defense needs in the face of the stockpiles growing on either side of him. Bourguiba’s remarks at the recent opening of a new military academy indicated that he wants a small army of trained professionals.
There is a concrete incentive to increased military strength in Tunisia in the threat of Algerian aggression. The Tunisians think themselves superior to the Algerians, having achieved independence without bloodshed and chaos; the Algerians, for the same reason, regard the Tunisians with contempt. There is constant friction between the two over the exact location of the border in the El Borma oil field. Although the possibility of actual fighting on the border is remote (Algeria is not likely to make Tunisia another Yemen in the face of Tunisia’s many friends, including Libyans and their new Rapiers), the Tunisians want to be able to hold their own in a small skirmish. Algeria’s recent expenditures mean this is no longer a simple task.
Bourguiba has looked west for help. An outspoken critic of Communism, and a bitter rival of Nasser’s, he has not condemned American policy in Vietnam, although he has called for peace and a negotiated settlement. He has not squandered scarce resources on military might, and he has tried to calm Arab intransigence toward Israel. He has voiced the proper concern about the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. Consequently, the Americans have invested heavily in Tunisia, supplying approximately $50 million in development aid per year.
In early 1968, America’s assistance to Tunisia took on a new shape. The first of fifteen officers arrived in Tunis to establish a full-fledged military mission there. According to the present military agreement between Tunisia and the United States, the Americans may spend $10 million in Tunisia over the next five years. This will cover the expenses of the mission, the training of Tunisian officers, and defensive equipment consisting of light arms and antiaircraft emplacements. Most of the training will be done at U.S. bases in Germany, but some Tunisians will also be sent to the United States.
Being Tunisia’s military supplier is a dubious honor which the Russians are glad to leave to the Americans, who tend to overemphasize Tunisia’s importance in the North African balance of power. Given the present mood in Washington, those members of Congress who fear another Middle Eastern war will probably prefer to arm Israel rather than Tunisia. It would take far too much to enable Tunisia to defend its Algerian border with certainty.
For the moment, the North Africans are arming against each other. The need to protect their own borders and defend their national sovereignty has led them to search for arms. For political and economic reasons the Soviets, the Americans, and the British have become the principal suppliers. If the 1965 India-Pakistan war and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war are any indicators, the big powers will not become directly involved in a North African or Middle Eastern war. But the war would be fought with the new weapons, and the arms producers would be the benefactors as destroyed equipment is replaced and the level of preparedness escalated. The arms race would then drain an even higher percentage of the developing countries’ national budgets.
— Adele Smith