The Atlantic Report on the World Today: Washington

on the World Today

IN THE normal course of an election year no American Administration would deliberately do anything to become more deeply involved in the war in South Vietnam or to accelerate that war in any way. But predictions about the course of American action in the next few months are largely meaningless because events beyond Washington’s control will determine what Washington does.

It is for this very reason that many critics have assailed Administration policy in South Vietnam. They have argued that the United States has become overextended, that it is a captive in a grave situation without the power reasonably to influence events.

Nevertheless, the decision was taken months ago to prevent a Communist victory in South Vietnam. That decision stands. It is the basic guideline to an understanding of what Senator Dirksen calls the “enigma” of American policy. No one in Washington knows when a general’s coup or an assassin’s bullet will topple a government. No one can predict the course of popular support for an Asian government. No one knows what move Hanoi or Peiping may make next.

Firm intentions

But the determination to make a stand in South Vietnam, however difficult the challenge may be, has not wavered. When Mr. Johnson flew to South Vietnam in May, 1961, at President Kennedy’s recpiest, it was not only to bolster and reassure the Vietnamese but to bolster and reassure Thailand, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines, all of which he visited on the same trip.

India has been the principal consideration in the development of nearly all recent American policies in Asia. If India can be maintained as a growing, hopeful society on the side of freedom, the power of Communist China can somehow be checked. A Communist victory in South Vietnam would mean almost immediate collapses in Thailand and Burma and would put India and the Philippines very much on the defensive. In both those countries powerful parties urging an accommodation with Red China would promptly arise.

Because President Johnson wanted Hanoi particularly to know that American intentions are firm, he made his declaration that those who arc engaged in “external direction and supply” of the assault on South Vietnam “would do well to be reminded and to remember that this type of aggression is a deeply dangerous game.”

From the time that he first examined the problem for President Kennedy, Mr. Johnson, a directactionist in most things, wanted to act more boldly to punish the Communists in the North, to make Hanoi’s gamble as costly as possible. There are many officials in Washington who are convinced that if more pressures were put on North Vietnam, the Ho Chi Minh regime, which clearly wishes to maintain its independence of China, would withdraw some of its support of the guerrilla fighters in the South.

But it also has been apparent, as Secretary Rusk has said, that “the basic problem . . . the central problem . . . is in South Vietnam, even though supported from the North. In other words, whatever happens in the North, there is a large problem in South Vietnam to be dealt with.” That problem is political as well as military, and under the best of circumstances will take much time to resolve. Nevertheless, as the President indicated, his policy toward Vietnam can have two blades, one of which may be aimed directly at the North in stepped-up support of South Vietnam harassment of the Hanoi regime.

The President’s warning was made after President de Gaulle’s call for the neutralization of Southeast Asia, and it served to help make clear the Administration’s belief that neutralization is a fanciful concept while aggression is being committed. For De Gaulle to have proposed neutralization in the face of the difficulties with the Communists in Laos, where they are violating the neutrality agreement, convinces Washington that his proposal was an utterly cynical one.

Anxiety about De Gaulle

When President Johnson and Secretary Rusk replied softly to news conference questions about the French leader’s proposal, they did so deliberately. They decided that nothing could be gained by a debate with De Gaulle on the eve of his Latin-American tour. They were convinced, moreover, that De Gaulle was in no position to determine events in Southeast Asia. But no one of late has caused so much anguish in Washington as President de Gaulle. It is difficult to understand how he can argue for the complete independence of the nation-state in Europe and advocate the neutralization of states in Asia.

Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council, said in a speech in Brussels, “It is important that the Communists in Asia understand well that the West is not ready to turn over Southeast Asia to Communist rule, either directly or through a process of neutralization which the Communists and others would understand as tantamount to Communist hegemony. Our interest is the continued independence of the nations of Southeast Asia.”

A strong stand does not mean that the United States should fail to take advantage of any political opportunities to reach accords, specifically including arrangements with North Vietnam if that regime would agree to cease its aggressive acts.

While De Gaulle’s recognition of Communist China has not caused as much trouble in nonGommunist Asia as Washington expected, there are deep forebodings regarding the effect it will ultimately have on the United Nations. State Department vote counters do not believe that the United Nations General Assembly will change its attitude toward Peiping this year. But they know that some day the problem will plunge the United Nations itsell into its gravest crisis, and De Gaulle’s action has hastened the day.

The Republican primaries

The surprise vote in New Hampshire that propelled Henry Cabot Lodge into the political spotlight at home while he is serving as ambassador to South Vietnam has not made the Administration s task in Saigon easier. This is true despite the widespread belief among politicians of both parties that Lodge has only an outside chance of winning the Republican presidential nomination.

For a long time there lias been a strong belief that the two most active candidates would knock each other out, as they almost did in New Hampshire. and that the convention would turn to a compromise candidate. Lodge remains a possibility, of course, but Washington experts believe that Governor William W. Scranton of Pennsylvania or Richard M, Nixon may have the edge.

For further political signs and portents, Washington is turning its eyes to California, now the most populous state, where voters this year have at least two opportunities to make political history. In the June 2 primary. Rockefeller and Goldwater are offered a chance to repair the damage they did to their reputations in New Hampshire.

California has eighty-six convention votes, and both candidates are concentrating on the state which, with South Dakota, has the last primary before the Republican National Convention meets in San Francisco July 13. While the victor in the California primary may very well not win the nomination, the loser surely will not win it. Both, however, will retain some leverage, because of the support already pledged to them, to influence the choice of the nominee. Goldwater’s strength in this respect may be decisive. Because both candidates understand what is at stake in the party, they are sparing no effort in California. Their California supporters also are waging hard campaigns, because they know that the contest has become a battle for control of the Republican Party now and in the years ahead.

In recent weeks, Californians interested in the party’s future in the state have become active in the Rockefeller-Gold water contest in increasing numbers. During the winter, despite the decline in Goldwater’s strength following President Kennedy’s death, the senator was widely recognized as the leading contender. But lately there has been a Rockefeller gain as middle-of-the-road Republicans have thrown their support to him. Senator Thomas H. Kuchel, the leading Republican in the state and a respected vote-getter, and other prominent Republicans have declared for Rockefeller, partly because they are determined to stop Goldwater and keep the reins of power in the hands of the moderates. Republican National Committeman Joseph L. Martin, Jr., of San Francisco resigned his party post to be free to campaign for Rockefeller and to fight what he called the Birchers and the rightist lunatic fringe. “The compelling reason for my decision,” Martin said, “is a desire to do my part to prevent the Republican Party from becoming a branch of the John Birch society. . . . The stakes in June are nothing more nor less than the survival ot our party.”

Former Senator William F. Knowland, chairman of the Goldwater campaign in the state, replied that Martin was “the political hatchet man for the Fastern liberal establishment,” thus demonstrating that he had learned the language of the extreme right. California Republicans will tell a lot about the future of American politics when they cast their ballots in June, even if they do not pick a winner.

Fair housing in California

The other major issue for California voters this year involves civil rights. The debate on the rights issue began even before the Senate became engaged in the great filibuster, but it will last even longer. On November 3, Californians will be asked to decide whether a fair housing act should remain on the statute books. Their answer will influence the course of similar legislation in other states.

Last year the California legislature passed a bill sponsored by Democratic Representative Byron Rumford forbidding discrimination in the sale or rental of real estate. Almost immediately after the bill became law the California Real Estate Association began a campaign to nullify it. The association obtained more than a half million signatures to a petition requiring a popular referendum on the law. If approved by the voters, the resolution not only would kill the Rumford Act but would write into the state constitution a ban on any antidiscrimination laws which affect real estate.

Governor Edmund G. Brown and a majority of California Democratic leaders are arguing strongly for the Rumford Act and against the Real Estate Association’s resolution. Republicans are divided. But Republican State Chairman Caspar W. Weinberger has warned his fellow Republicans that the repeal campaign could cost his party as dearly in 1964 as the divisive fight over right-to-work laws did in 1958, the year Brown beat Knowland for the governorship by more than a million votes. Polls in the state indicate that the fight will be bitterly contested. The voters were almost evenly divided as the battle opened.

Mood of the Capital

President Johnson’s continued refusal to provide any leadership on the urgent question of the presidential succession has disappointed many of his supporters. Now is clearly the time to act. In finding a solution, the country should have the leadership of the man who recently succeeded to the highest office in the land. The President’s silence is no doubt dictated by a reluctance to offend Speaker of the 1 louse John W. McCormack, who is next in line to the presidency. But the President’s duty to the nation should override all other considerations.

Former President Eisenhower, former Vice President Nixon, the American Bar Association, and other individuals and groups have endorsed the proposal for a constitutional amendment to permit a Vice President upon assuming the presidency to nominate a new Vice President. Nixon would like to see the electoral college confirm the new nominee; others would like to provide for confirmation by the two houses of Congress; still others think the best plan would be to allow the Senate to act alone, as it does now7 in all matters involving confirmations.

The President has recognized that a constitutional amendment may be needed, but he has said that he does not expect any “realistic progress” this year. Many members of Congress believe that the fight should be pushed now when the need is greatest. They sense a broad agreement that the country must have a Vice President at all times and that this is the year for action.