France

ATLANTIC

July 1953

on the World today

FRENCH governments have been changing often enough in recent, years to make the French feel that their state is growing steadily less capable of confronting the grave national and international challenges that face it. The impression has been gaining strength that France is being forced to trot ignominiously behind the crusading chariot of American diplomacy.

It has been in large part as a reaction against this feeling of increasing national impotence and diplomatic helplessness that the French have shown themselves so hypersensitive of late to American overtures in the cold war. They have been afraid that the Eisenhower Administration would be forced into adopting an aggressive foreign policy in the Far East in order to redeem its campaign pledges. Such a policy, the French fear, is likely to turn the cold war into World War III.

The replacement of General Bradley, well known and respected in Paris for his moderating influence on American policy in the Pacific, by Admiral Radford as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has done nothing to calm the prevailing fears. Nor has the departure of General Ridgway appeared altogether an unmixed blessing. For while it means that the NATO armies will now have at their head an American general who is generally considered to be a more brilliant strategist and a greater diplomat than Ridgway, it also means that Eisenhower will have one more close adviser whose name is linked with the Far East and who, it is argued iu Paris, is likely to support an Asia-first line.

Much more alarming to the French, however, has been the steadily increasing power that Senator McCarthy seems to be gaining over American political life and public expression. Indeed, it would be hard to exaggerate the damage done to pro-American sentiment by the witch-hunting tactics of the Wisconsin Senator.

At best, the French have never been very happy about following Americas lead in the diplomatic initiatives of the cold war, and it is significant in this regard that they greeted Churchill’s recent overtures with approval, although they resented not. having been consulted. But so far they have generally been content to accept America’s righi to a role of leadership, not only because of their economic dependence but also out of a genuine respect for the United States as one of the great free nations of the world.

France’s misgivings

Of late, however, the French have begun to hav e misgivings about the right to a role of leadership of a people who seem to be submitting with disturbing meekness to a thought-stifling tyranny exercised with increasing impunity in the name of national security.

The sad truth of the matter is that a good bit of the large reservoir of pro-American good-will which was stored up in France after the Liberation and the start of the Marshall Plan has unfortunately been dissipated in the course of the past year. Not a little of this has been due too to the somewhat heavy-handed pressure which until recently American diplomats, businessmen, and even labor leaders tried to exert in French North Africa. The advent of the Eisenhower Administration has — on this point at least — been a reassurance to the French, who have been promised there would be no further American encroachments in this domain.

It would be a gross exaggeration to try to claim (as some Frenchmen do) that all of the present agitation has been due to American encouragement of native demands. It is significant that the local unrest became noticeably accentuated not long after the swing to the right of the French political pendulum which began to lake place in 1f)50 and which was confirmed by the elections of 1951. This shift encouraged the French colonists in North Africa to put increasing pressure on the government in Paris and on local administrators to oppose Moroccan and Tunisian demands for self-rule. But American support of native agitation, while it lasted, aggravated an already tense situation.

As long as he was Foreign Minister, Robert Sehuman attempted to adhere to the moderate policy which the French government had been following since the war, although as t ime went on he found it increasingly difficult to resist the pressure of the right-wing parties, traditional advocates in France of the strong hand in colonial policy. But this personal opposition, although incapable of stemming the prevailing tide of opinion, was enough to incur Sehuman the open hostility of the right w ing and in the end cost him his job.

No enthusiasm for NATO

The replacement of Sehuman by Georges Bidault at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the beginning of this year consolidated the influence which the French colonists in North Africa exert on French policy in this part of the world, but in ot her domains it did not result in any of those far-reaching changes in the orientation of French foreign policy which many newspapermen were predicting at the time that the Mayer government was formed. René Mayer was certainly a more determined advocate of the European Army project than was his predecessor, Antoine Pinay.

Bidault showed none of Schuman’s enthusiasm for the European Defense Community, but this was only to be expected; for Robert Sehuman is one of those few Frenchmen who, like Jean Monnet, have a right to be considered as European as they are French. Bidault, in this respect, is much more a typical Frenchman, and he represents far more accurately the present mood of the National Assembly. What he lacked in convicion, however, he made up for by a greater display of finesse than his predecessor.

From the start Bidault understood that his role must be limited to insisting on the changes that must be made in the treaty draft to make it palatable to a decidedly recalcitrant Assembly. For the rest, he was careful not to commit himself rashly in support of a measure which is about as popular with the average deputy as castor oil.

It is not surprising, under the circumstances, that the so-called “Bidault Protocols,”which were presumed to the Confercnce of the Six Foreign Ministers in Borne last April, should not have been the work of Bidault at all. In fact, they were the work of those same unseen hands at the Quai d’Orsay which had earlier drafted the statutes for the Sehuman Plan and the FDC project.

Fear of the German army

Another example of the powerful, behind-thescenes influence which the Quai d’Orsay wields was afforded last autumn at the time of the great debate over the European Army. The day after the Radical Party Congress at Bordeaux had heard Edouard Herriot, the octogenarian dean of French politicians, speak out against the project, a newspaper correspondent asked Premier Pinay what he thought of the speech. With the genius he possesses for saying what his average compatriot is thinking, Pinay replied that, while he was in favor of the constitution of a European Army, he was opposed to the idea of the Germans’ participating in its General Stall". “The Germans,”he said, “must not be allowed to have a part in the running of it. Let them furnish soldiers and nothing else.”

When news of this statement reached the Quai d’Orsay it caused considerable consternation, and no time was lost in getting in touch with the French Premier to explain to him that, while he could perfectly well say such things as Monsieur Antoine Pinay, he could not say them as Premier without setting off international repercussions. The upshot was that an official denial of Pinay’s statement was issued not long thereafter.

This little incident is a graphic illustration of the latent drama in the great conflict that has been raging in the conscience of the French people over the question of German rearmament. The average Frenchman would like, if he could, to forget the whole business; he would like to go on “being unable to see the Russian wood for the German trees,”to use Paul Reynaud’s phrase.

But if he is driven to the painful recognition that Western Europe needs German troops to defend itself, he takes refuge behind the insistence that the officers of the Wehnnaeht be prevented from taking over. The diplomatic form that this demand has taken has boon iho reiterated refusal of the Freneh — made on the highest and most official level — to consider the admission of Germany to NATO.

The diplomats of the Quai d Orsay, however, have more sophisticated reasons for believing that the European Army project is not only a necessity but probably the least bad in a choice of evils. Even d Moscow did agree to negotiate the reunification and “neutralization" of Germany, the Quai d’Orsay sees no gain in substituting an uncontrolled and presumably disarmed Germany of 70 millions for a smaller Germany of 50 millions which, though “militarized,” would certainly be easier to control through a tight alliance with the West.

But the Frenchman in the street considers almost any solution preferable to the reconstitution of German divisions. A reunited and “demilitarized” Germany appears to him, in comparison, to be a distant prospect; whereas the rearmament of Western Germany is an imminent reality.

The idea of negotiating with the Russians over the future of Germany has become more and more attractive in France as the dreaded day for ratifying the European Army project has approached. In part this is a natural reaction to the ominous prospect of a rearmed Western Germany, and in part it is a reaction to the new toughness which American diplomacy began to display last year — a toughness based, evidently, on the axiom that the best way to avoid being seduced by the subtle blandishments of Soviet diplomacy is to put cotton wool in one’s ears and to vaunt an air of truculent negation.

The war in Indo-China drags on

The war in Indo-China has dragged on so long and so inconclusively that many Frenchmen are beginning to think that the only thing to do is to fix up some sort of settlement with Ho Chi Minh and get out as soon as possible. A good case could certainly have been made out for such a course of action four or five years ago when the Viet-Minh movement was relatively independent of Chinese Communist influence. But why the VietMinh should be willing to negotiate today, when they are more powerful than ever, and above all when they have been completely infiltrated by the Chinese Communists, no advocate of this course can explain.

Several months ago the independent daily, Le Monde, closely followed by the somewhat leftist weekly, Observateur, launched the idea that it has been the powerful interest groups in Saigon and in Paris who have been making money out of the Indo-C hinese war that have systematically sabotaged all attempts to come to terms with Ho Chi Minh.

This serious allegation, however, seems to be something of an exaggeration. There is little doubt that a lot of money has been made out of the war in Indo-China, particularly through the notorious traffic in IndoChinese piastres which had been going on for years until the Mayer government devalued the piastre; and there is little doubt, either, that a lot of French politicians have been involved.

But very few people in Paris have ever had more than a hazy notion of what was really happening in IndoChina and of what should be done about it. For years the official myth in Paris was that it was not really a war, but simply a “rebellion” which it would take a few professional officers and a handful of colonial battalions to crush. Now that the equivalent of ten divisions are stuck out in the jungles of Indo-C hina, this myth is a little harder to swallow. But it has retained a surprisingly tenacious hold over the imagination of many deputies who find it convenient to close their eyes to the fact; that there is a full-scale war raging in the Far East which demands something more of them than the occasional voting of additional credits.

No serious attempt has been made to end the war by negotiating with the Viet-Minh or to fight the war in Indo-China through to a successful conclusion, with all the sacrifices that such a program would inevitably demand (the sending of conscripts to the Far East, rotation of troops, heavier taxation to cover the costs of the war, and, above all, a minimum military service of two years — which Sir Winston Churchill, among others, has recently been pressing on the French government).

The result of all this is that the war in Indo-China is more of a drain than ever on the French Army and the French Treasury. And the likelihood is that the French people will have to go on paying for it for several years more in two kinds of currency that are equally noxious to the health of the nation: inflation and an everincreasing economic dependence on the United States.

No solution for inflation

The immediate cause of the chronic inflation in France is the increasing deficit in each new budget. In 1951 there was a Treasury deficit of just under 400 billion francs. Last year it almost doubled (793 billions). This year there is talk of trying to hold it down to 650 billions, but it. is more than likely to hover around 800 billions. This means that the French government will continue to depend on loans from the Bank of France to cover no less than one fifth of the annual budget. This can only be done, of course, by increasing the amount of money in circulation, which is an inflationary device.

No decisive remedy to France’s current economic difficulties is likely to be found as long as a right-wing government remains in power. For the right-wing parties on whose support Antoine Pinay and, after him, René Mayer were dependent will inevitably resist any determined attempt to institute a reform in the system of tax collection, simply because this could only mean higher taxes on the upper and lower bourgeoisie and on the peasantry — precisely the elements in the population which these parties represent.

The French state will continue to depend on American charity to try to make ends meet. The irony of this situation is that the simultaneous existence of right-wing governments in Washington and Paris does not mean at all that they are going to be able to sing harmoniously in tune. The policies that the Republican Party stands for — retrenchment and high tariffs — cannot fail to clash head-on with any right-wing French government’s crying need for dollars. It is asking too much of France to expect her to maintain a forceful foreign policy in the Far East, arm new divisions in Europe, and at the same time remain financially selfsufficient.