Foreign Policy and Party Politics

by HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG

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DURING the war both our political parties adopted — to their own advantage and the salvation of a thankful people — the maxim that “politics should stop at the water’s edge.” It has come to seem, in consequence, a healthy and perhaps necessary condition of American security in more normal times as well. Is this true?

Partisanship is, of course, a habit-forming drug. We all remember how, after the First World War, “normal” party differences combined with extremes of personal obduracy to inaugurate a train of acts and failures to act which helped pave the way to a second disaster. Echoes of that feud still reverberated on the eve of Pearl Harbor. Our national future hung then, day after day, on the jeopardy of a half-dozen votes in Congress.

But though we know the dangers of partisanship, we also recognize as never before the dangers of one-party government. If stereotyped political processes were the only cure for exaggerated partisanship, we should have to agree that the cure was worse than the disease. There may be a catch, then, about the idea that foreign policy should always be bipartisan, immune from party debate, and that it can always present a united front to the rest of the world, free from chinks of partisan doubt and reservation.

In moments of supreme danger in Britain, rival parties unite to form a coalition government. But the British recognize that to prolong coalition regimes into normal times would land representative government in the single-party trap, and they have insisted on a return to the party system based on the assumption of disagreement between His Majesty’s Government and His Majesty’s Opposition.

In the United States, executive and legislative responsibilities are so differently divided that a formal coalition government is not practicable even in times of crisis. However, a President may achieve some of its advantages by taking opposition leaders into his Administration, as President Roosevelt did in June, 1940, when he invited Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox to join his Cabinet. He may also, by skill and patience, win enough nonpartisan support in Congress to pass particular measures and even to give effect to controversial long-range policies. Lend-Lease was adopted in the spring of 1941 by GO to 31 in the Senate and 317 to 71 in the House; 10 of the favorable votes in the Senate and 94 of those in the House were Republican. On July 28, 1945, the Senate accepted the Charter of the United Nations by 89 to 2; the nearly unanimous vote reflected the careful arrangements made long before by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to ensure that the measure would find favor in both camps.

But the American President and the members of his Cabinet, chosen by him and holding office at his pleasure, seldom can count confidently on Congress to support their policies even when the President and the House and Senate majority are of the same party; and when the Congressional majority belongs to a different party they of course are weaker still. This makes it incumbent on them to look for support among open-minded representatives of the rival party in Congress.

The opportunities and risks of our new position of world power were magnified tremendously after we became involved in the war and required the improvement of this hit-or-miss practice. President Roosevelt, who had already brought two Republicans into his Cabinet, now assigned many wartime offices to political opponents and business leaders who had been hostile to the New Deal. Looking ahead to the lime when partisanship would normally become rife again, he accepted the advice of Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles that the work of formulating the American position on post-war world problems should be begun at once and should be organized on a nonpartisan basis.

In a two-party system nonpartisanship means bipartisanship. The State Department’s task therefore was to inform key Republican leaders about the scope and nature of the undertaking which lay ahead, show them how the Department was thinking, and eventually secure their general approval of suggested solutions.

Secretary Hull had been in Congress when partisan fires destroyed Wilson’s hope for American participation in the League of Nations. He directed his first efforts, then, to making sure that the nature of the projected new international security organization would be argued out in an atmosphere free from the party rancors of 1910-1920. He was determined also to give the Senate no grounds for feeling that its treaty-making powers were being restricted to “taking or leaving” a fait accompli. He therefore called the Congressional leaders of both parties to repeated informal conferences in which the general lines of a practicable policy could be set.

In February, 1942, President Roosevelt authorized the formation in the State Department of an Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Problems, with Secretary Hull as Chairman, Under Secretary Welles as Vice-Chairman, and Dr. Leo Pasvolsky as Executive Officer. To this committee he appointed several Department officials and a small group drawn from private life (Isaiah Bowman, Norman H. Davis, Anne O’Hare McCormick, Myron C. Taylor, and the present writer). To permit ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to participate, he approved the addition in the summer of 1942 of Senators Connally (Democrat) and Austin (Republican).

No public announcement was made about the committee’s composition and duties, or even about its existence. At first, it met twice weekly in the office of Under Secretary Welles; after a few months, Army and Navy officers and representatives of other governmental agencies were drawn in, several other experts were included, subcommittees were appointed to make special studies, and the meetings of the general committee were transferred to the office of Secretary Hull. About that time, Senators George and Thomas (Democrats) and White (Republican) and Representatives Bloom and Johnson (Democrats) and Eaton (Republican) were added. For over a year the enlarged committee met under Secretary Hull’s chairmanship for a second review of all manner of post-war problems — political, territorial, economic, and organizational.

The earliest concrete product of these studies and discussions was the American draft of what became the Moscow Declaration, the first landmark on the road to a United Nations organization and the first assurance that the Soviet Union would participate in it. Secretary Hull was able to carry the American draft to Moscow in October, 1943, in the knowledge that it was the result of painstaking study and with the assurance that it had the approval of key representatives of both parties in Congress. It was accepted by Molotov and Eden with the change of only a few words.

President Roosevelt again showed his determination to avoid a partisan fiasco like that of 1920 when he appointed three leading Republicans — Senator Vandenberg, former Governor Stassen of Minnesota, and Representative Eaton — to share responsibility with Secretary Stettinius and three Democratic colleagues for drafting the United Nations Charter at San Francisco. This allotted the Republican Party three times as much participation at San Francisco as President Wilson’s appointment of Henry White had given it at Paris.

President Truman followed the precedent by asking Senators Vandenberg and Connally to help Secretary Byrnes draft the peace treaties with Italy and our minor enemies; and he named Senator Austin as Delegate to the United Nations. These appointments, and that of John Foster Dulles as an alternate delegate to the General Assembly, showed that the Democratic Administration still felt the need for two-party backing in tackling its most difficult foreign problems. They represented as close an approach as is possible under our present system to the formal fusion of party forces which occurs in England in times of crisis.

2

THE Democrats did not, of course, invent the nonpartisan approach to foreign affairs. As early as 1940, Wendell Willkie began embarrassing the Administration by giving it interventionist advice. He was one of the first national leaders to call for American solidarity against the Nazis; and when the Lend-Lease bill was introduced in January, 1941, he came out publicly in its support and announced that he was about to visit England, then undergoing the blitz.

In March, 1943, two Democratic and two Republican Senators introduced the Ball-BurtonHatch-Hill resolution calling for the early establishment of a United Nations organization; and two months later a resolution of Representative Fulbright asking for the establishment of international machinery to maintain peace, and for “participation by the United States therein,” received 163 favorable Republican votes in the House and only 26 opposed. September, 1943, brought further proof of the new Republican attitude. The Post-War Advisory Council of the party, meeting at Mackinac Island, favored “responsible participation by the United States in postwar cooperative organization among sovereign nations” and urged that the nation’s role in “helping to bring about international peace and justice shall not be the subject of domestic partisan controversy and political bitterness.” Governor Dewey, probable Republican nominee in the Presidential election to be held the following autumn, helped push this resolution through by suggesting a continuing military alliance between the United States and Britain after the war, thus repudiating his party’s former isolationism and challenging old-line leaders to split with him or orient themselves afresh.

After Governor Dewey had been nominated, Secretary Hull invited him to consult on the international organizational policies about to be given a first decisive formulation at Dumbarton Oaks. Governor Dewey accepted, and named John Foster Dulles as his representative. On the security issue the two reached agreement. On other post-war problems the Republican nominee retained freedom to express himself as he liked. As things turned out, no irretrievably harsh things were said about, foreign policy in the course of the campaign, and President Roosevelt entered upon his fourth term without having aroused important Republican opposition to his main post-war objectives. The readiness of three prominent Republicans to accept appointment as delegates to the San Francisco Conference confirmed this fact.

Thus both parties helped cement the nonpartisan understanding which permitted the writing of an acceptable United Nations Charter. Both joined, too, in the explorations and exchanges of information that led to a measure of agreement on certain of the specific problems which the State Department had to deal with after the victory. The initiative was President Roosevelt’s. The spadework was done by Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles. The effort was continued by Secretary Stettinius at San Francisco, and afterwards by Secretary Byrnes. It was reciprocated by important Republican leaders, in Congress and without.

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DID a procedure which brought such splendid results have drawbacks also? If so, even though the disadvantages may be less important than the achievements, we should identify and record them so that they may be minimized in any future mechanisms adopted to facilitate interparty collaboration.

Sometimes an effort to achieve unity in foreign policy by discovering the “greatest common denominator” in opposing party views, and by agreeing privately to adopt it, may involve a certain risk. One side — perhaps what history would say was the “right” side—may compromise its principles and whittle down its requirements until the common denominator arrived at represents too little to be worth having, or at any rate less than might have been had.

The question arises, for example, whether, in arguing with the Senate leaders, Secretary Hull may have lowered his sights more than was absolutely necessary. Did he accept a plan for an international organization which was not quite as effective as he might have won at the risk of a little more Republican disagreement, a little less satisfaction of natural Senatorial desires to see a course set which could not possibly lead to any but the smoothest of waters? The 89 to 2 vote by which the Senate accepted the United Nations Charter was a tremendous justification for his aims. But the overwhelmingness of that vote suggests that an even stronger Charter might perhaps have been written at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco and have been passed by the Senate with only slightly greater (and still negligible) opposition.

If Wilson had been a little more pliant and Lodge a little less vindictive, we might have had a living instead of a stillborn League of Nations. Was the reverse true a generation later? When President Roosevelt went to Yalta he had to take account of Stalin’s wish to make the principle of Great Power unanimity — that is, the veto — cover as much of the United Nations procedure as possible. Did he, in dealing with the Soviet demand, underestimate the Republican support at his disposal for creating an effective international organization? As it turned out, many Republicans, including Senator Vandenberg, regretted that a single permanent member of the Security Council was empowered to limit the Council’s right to discuss and investigate situations threatening war. If Hull and Roosevelt had been more confident and exigent, less impressed by the disastrous results of the 1920 debate, might we have had not merely a living organism but also one in which the veto power was more restricted?

There is bound to be doubt, also, about the terms on which members of the legislature are to be invited to participate in executive action, whether as planners or as negotiators, and about the terms on which they may be willing to share this responsibility. We touch here on the old question of the relationship of Congress to the Executive, so long debated in many fields of planning and action. It happens to have a particular relevancy in our present examination. Are Senators, for example, to be invited to consult on the whole gamut of foreign affairs, general and particular, current and future? If so, does the Administration risk giving them a whip hand in a vital area of its own proper domain? If their participation is to be limited to certain phases of foreign policy, can they be sure that other phases, related to the ones on which they are being consulted, are being dealt with in accordance with the same estimate of the national interest?

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THESE are not academic questions, as one or two recent episodes have shown. Mr. Bartley C. Crum told the Zionist Organization of America last fall in Atlantic City that because Senator Vandenberg had been helping write the United Nations Charter and the peace treaty with Italy he must share responsibility for the Administration’s Palestine policy. Was Mr. Crum right in assuming that Senator Vandenberg had even been consulted about Palestine — or, if he had, that his views had been accepted by the State Department? Very possibly he was completely wrong. Even if Senator Vandenberg disapproved the Administration policy toward Palestine he might hesitate to say so for fear of weakening public belief in his wholehearted support of what seemed to him even more important features of the Administration’s foreign policy — for example, resistance to Soviet expansionist tendencies.

We cannot ignore the fact that in the circumstances mentioned (quite apart from any question of Senator Vandenberg’s possible embarrassment), public discussion of a public question by a leader of public opinion was curtailed. This curb on the potential “opposition,” though quite unintentional, may extend to the discussion of the most important matters.

In the absence of debate, major difficulties arrive like rockets and burst with devastating effects. One effect may be to damage the quality of the decision that is taken; this will put in doubt whether it ought to be maintained. Another may be to weaken public acceptance of the decision; this will put in doubt whether it can be maintained.

It is a conspicuous fact, for example, that the policy for Germany enunciated at Stuttgart by Secretary Byrnes did not evoke criticism, general or detailed, from Senator Vandenberg or his Republican colleagues in the Senate. Presumably the policy was developed largely in Berlin, since Secretary Byrnes in the midst of exhausting negotiations on other subjects could hardly have been expected to work out in his own mind or in direct discussion with his habitual advisers a program involving action on so many political, economic, strategic, and psychological fronts.

The question to ask here is not whether a policy which aims to restore the German economy, while consolidating Germany under a national government and leaving the Ruhr and other parts of the German industrial arsenal in German control, was wise or opportunistic. The question is whether a decision so narrowly conceived as the one announced by Mr. Byrnes may perhaps have been, involving a choice between various methods to forestall Germany from resuming Bismarck’s old play of East against West, was subjected to adequate debate in Congress and in organs of opinion.

The public seems to have sensed a dearth of debate and to have desired enlightenment. There was confusion as to what our aims in Germany were; as to which of them (for they often seemed contradictory) took precedence; and as to how those that did were to be attained. For this reason the speech on the German problem made by John Foster Dulles on January 17, evidently on behalf of an important section of the Republican leadership, awakened quite unusual interest. The Republican Party seemed to be beginning to originate and propose policies of its own. The public welcomed this as an omen that there might be more discussion and perhaps a crystallization of opinion in advance of the meeting at Moscow.

It did not come. As late as February 18, the New York Herald Tribune felt impelled to write of the Moscow Conference, less than three weeks away, that “we have not the faintest idea of the proposals which our representatives should advance or even of the principles which should lie behind them.” And it demanded “some real debate” on “a self-consistent program” that could “enlist some unity” behind it. The public instinct which this editorial reflected was sound. Vital decisions are now to be taken — as to whether we want most to destroy Germany or restore it, and on all the debatable subheads under either choice. They must be fortified by wide public acceptance and strong public determination if they are to be real and lasting. Without adequate debate they may be neither. In that case our whole policy in Europe will suffer shipwreck.

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THE transcendently important matter of how to control atomic energy has a high place in the present argument. To the surprise of the American people, this problem, as I write, has been in course of merger, at the insistence of Soviet Russia and with the approval of Britain and France, in the whole question of whether limitation of all armaments is feasible, and, if so, how. Our government first discussed the control of fissionable materials in the Acheson-Lilienthal committee; and it entrusted the position there recommended to Mr. Baruch for negotiation in the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations. The inadequacy of a piecemeal approach became plain when Mr. Molotov and Mr. Gromyko at the turn of the year demanded that the whole question of armaments— not merely all “weapons adaptable to mass destruction,” in the careless phraseology of the Moscow agreement, but all armaments — be studied and discussed simultaneously. This put our negotiators “on the spot.” We had no policy on general disarmament.

The Soviet suggestion seemed logical to the other members of the Security Council. And to us it offered a chance not merely to conduct negotiations about just how our proposed outlawry of atomic weapons was to be made effective by inspection and control, but simultaneously to try to secure, as part of the same deal, a reduction in other arms and forces. But instead of being able to jump at the Soviet proposal, wo found ourselves in the logically untenable and psychologically unattractive position of having to demur at the discussion of weapons which all nations possess, while pressing for the elimination of the one weapon which we alone possess.

Eventually we accepted the proposal for simultaneous discussion of atomic and conventional weapons. But not till after the public had become too thoroughly confused to understand why it was necessary for our representatives to make sure that the new Commission studying arms limitations would be specifically excluded from infringing on the jurisdiction of the Atomic Energy Commission.

In view of his other preoccupations, Secretary Byrnes almost certainly had not had time himself to study the relationship of atomic energy to a general limitation of armaments. Moreover, in view of the inadequate liaison between upper and lower echelons in the State Department, the officials directly in charge of these problems, even if aware of the potentialities of the situation and given time and strength enough to evolve a more comprehensive program, would probably not have had adequate access to the Secretary for a thorough review and determination of policy.

How might Senators Vandenberg and Connally have been most useful in such a situation? Conceivably, by standing off at a little distance and observing the general trend of our international negotiations. They were in fact performing direct services of great value to the nation, even though not precisely those foreseen under the theory of the separation of powers. It seems at least possible, however, that had the two Senators not been forced to spend so much time in London and Paris instead of in Washington, they would have noticed (as their senior responsibilities in foreign affairs would normally have impelled them to do) that the narrowly defined road followed by our government in the atomic discussions, like the broad and wandering track marked by our various positions toward the German problem, was running into a morass.

Some defeatists argue that world problems have become so complicated that foreign policy can only be improvised. Those who still think it must be planned may at least introduce for discussion the question whether it was wise for the two ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to be preoccupied with an affair like the statute of the Free City of Trieste at the same time that it was engrossing the Secretary of State.

The procedure may have had even more grave results. Many other Senators besides the two mentioned are keenly interested in foreign affairs. It would be only natural if these others felt that they should not interfere in the conduct of foreign policy as it was being practiced by their two colleagues, successive chairmen of the Senate committee responsible for recommending action in the foreign field.

While the makers of American foreign policy were enjoying unusual freedom from criticism, their British colleagues were accepting open and vigorous criticism in London. Taking up one particular reproach, Prime Minister Attlee announced on November 9 that British policy on the future of Germany must be placed on the anvil of public discussion. This did not mean that the whole tenor of British foreign policy was going to be called in question, but merely that the Prime Minister thought he would be stronger at home and carry more weight abroad if specilic aspects of his policy were reviewed publicly pro and con. He did not ask all the members of his own party to refrain from criticizing details; still less did he ask Conservative supporters of his broad objectives to do so.

The incident suggests that the Labor Government and the Conservative Party may have a sounder relationship as regards British foreign policy than the Truman Administration and the Republican Party have as regards American foreign policy. If so, are there improvements to be made in our practice within the framework of our present system of government?

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A_ CONSIDERED foreign policy represents a synthesis of complicated aims, modified by the practical necessities of compromise. It seems clear that if improvements are to be made they should allow for the fact that although honest men may be expected and indeed pressed to reach a wide measure of agreement on fundamental aims, they must retain the right and opportunity to disagree on the compromises found necessary to achieve them.

Several ways have been suggested for integrating the administrative and legislative functions of our government in dealing with foreign affairs. One is that a bipartisan committee of Congress should be formally constituted to work with the State Department in the whole field of foreign policy. This idea stems from the wartime advisory committee in the State Department, as transformed by Secretary Hull in the spring of 1944 into two consultative committees — one of members chosen from the Senate, the other chosen from the House.

Another plan (though by no means an alternative) has been put forward by Representative Kefauver; namely, that the rules of the House be amended to permit Cabinet officers and heads of agencies to come onto the floor to answer questions; presumably the Senate in that case would adopt a similar procedure. Another, advanced by Thomas K. Finletter in a recent book, Can Representative Government Do the Job?, is that there should be a Joint Executive-Legislative Cabinet to enable Congress to participate with the Executive in making policy in all fields, foreign and domestic. This far-reaching proposal would seem to require a constitutional amendment authorizing the President to dissolve Congress and call general elections.

Whether any action will now be taken on such procedural devices depends in part on how Senators Vandenberg and Connally feel about, them after their experience with bipartisanship in action during the past year or so. They will doubtless judge any proposal by whether or not it seems likely to increase the advantages and decrease the disadvantages of ad hoc partnership with the Secretary of State. Both Senators announced in December that from then on they were going to devote their main attention to their duties on Capitol Hill, though of course holding themselves ready to respond to special calls from the State Department. This may presage general demands from the Senate for an enlargement of its prerogatives in formulating the foreign policies on which it will later be required to pass in treaty form.

Senator Vandenberg in an interview on December 17 showed that he had a more specifically Republican objective in mind. He inquired, in effect, whether the Administration intended to expand or contract the area of bipartisan cooperation in foreign policy, and laid down the “ indispensable” condition that in either case it must now be clearly defined. Republican cooperation, he said, has been limited to launching the United Nations and working on the minor European peace treaties; it has not extended to Latin America, the Far East, or the Middle East. “Our responsibility,” he said, “must be identified.” Plainly he was restless at being consulted on segments of policy only, and at sometimes finding himself in the position of having to negotiate in public on the basis of policies which he had not helped formulate.

The Administration will of course be the other factor in determining whether or not some new instrument of cooperation is created. The President and the Secretary of State might see considerable “compensating disadvantages” in letting the Senate acquire the habit of negotiating as well as rat ifying treaties. They might feel more friendly, however, to the idea of setting up an advisory committee of State Department officials and majority and minority members of the Foreign Relations Committees of the Senate and House to discuss the general objectives of American foreign policy and exchange information and opinion on current problems. This is the most modest version of the most modest innovation so far suggested.

Even if such a committee remained merely advisory, however, it would differ essentially from the State Department’s wartime advisory committee in that it could not — even without Senator Yandenberg’s warning — avoid covering the whole field of foreign policy, including the most controversial current issues. It is interesting to consider what attitude participating Senators and Congressmen would take toward the Administration’s policy, as a whole and in detail, when they spoke in the Senate or to their constituents. Would the Administration find that it had merely armed them with the detailed information needed to make a devastating attack on its policies? Or would they be expected to refrain from comment, except of a judiciously approving nature? Either alternative has evident disadvantages. But these might be outweighed by the evident advantages; and not the least of these would be that a rudimentary machinery existed, ready to fill a more comprehensive role in an emergency.

By itself, in any event, a Congress and State Department advisory committee would not perform the same function as the recent ByrnesVandenberg-Connally partnership, which brought Republican and Democratic Senators into the formulation of day by day policy and into negotiation with foreign representatives.

The Administration may not feel that it needs Republican Senators at international gatherings as much as it did. By common consent the United Nations has become a cornerstone of our foreign policy; even the McCormick, Patterson, and Hearst press would be hard put to suggest a practicable way of conducting our foreign relations without it or against it. Senator Vandenberg can be counted on to carry through the Senate the treaties with Italy and the Axis satellites which he helped draw up. The future shape of Germany is still to be settled, however, and the ramifications of this problem reach deep into our domestic economy besides touching some of our cherished political convictions and hopes. If the Administration program includes appropriations to feed the German people, Congress will have to debate it; and the outcome will be settled by the Republican majority.

As Senator Vandenberg has made clear, the Republicans will find it harder to manage bipartisanship successfully than before they secured control of Congress. Now they have formal responsibility for whatever action Congress takes. Tho November victory exhilarated formerly isolationist elements in the party and gave them a hope of renewing their influence; this has already begun to make trouble for what has been called the party’s “new leadership.”

On the other hand, the Republicans as a whole will plainly see advantages in steering clear of controversies in the foreign policy field. Nonpartisan agreement on the foreign issues most heavily charged with dynamite has been of inestimable benefit to them over the past couple of years. They feel confident of victory in 1948 on the Democratic domestic record, and fear only surprise issues that might come to the surface in foreign policy debates. Incidentally, the possibility that Senator Taft, for example, might recognize the merit of this course now, but if elected President might display unexpected isolationist tendencies, is a recommendation to the average voter for full and early debates on questions of international as well as of domestic policy.

The Republican leaders may decide that they must have either much more or much less participation both in planning and in executing foreign policy. Even if they decide on much less, President Truman will ask himself whether in 1948 the Republicans will in any case be in a position to favor a less enlightened foreign policy than the one they have helped execute in the last few years. It is no reflection on them to note that in 1939, 1940, and 1941 they were under a practical as well as an intellectual compulsion to change their former attitude. The American people had reached a point in their education which did not permit the Republicans to repeat their 1920 role. Into the void left by our failure to help construct a world community the Nazis and Japanese had irrupted. In 1945 the American people knew too much to be led again down the old road of world chaos.

President Truman would probably be right to doubt that in the period from Secretary Marshall’s assumption of office to the next election the state of the world will permit anyone to seek the mandate of the American people by promising a return to isolation.

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To sum up. All the people have a stake in decisions in the field of foreign policy. That stake may include, and twice in our time has included, “their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor.” They have a right, then, to ask their leaders to rule out partisan considerations in trying to reach agreement on basic national objectives. These admittedly are not easy to define in general terms, but are not hard to recognize in practice. In settling the methods to attain them, debate is necessary; but party leaders may legitimately be asked not to press differences to the point where the goal itself is brought into jeopardy. On lesser issues, the operation of the party system normally requires that there be debate both as to objectives and as to methods. Any device promising to facilitate understanding between the responsible representatives of the two parties should be given a trial. But it is the spirit in which the party leaders determine to cooperate, rather than the precise form of the mechanism available, which will determine the outcome.

The responsibility of the State Department for planning foreign policy, under the President’s authority, cannot be escaped. A corollary of this responsibility is that its officials should give more attention to performing it. If an adequate staff were freed to develop policy concepts and plans for giving them effect, as distinct from “handling” routine or emergency matters as they arise, and if their work were freshened and made more realistic by the suggested exchange of opinion and information with key members of Congress, the foreign policy of the United States would take on the weight, coherence, and steadiness it now so often seems to lack.

The fact remains that the Secretaryship of State is a political office. Secretary Marshall’s categorical statement that “under present conditions” it is not to be considered such refers to a special, not a normal, circumstance. The Secretary of State is the appointee of the President, who is, under our system of government, the leader of his party as well. In other words, the Secretary of State is ordinarily a political officer of a party Administration; and so he should be, that the public may know where to fix accountability for success or failure in the conduct of foreign relations.

Men who are wise in the ways of the world, and know that there is always plenty of discord and a shortage of concord in human activities, rightly enough feel thankful for any moment of political harmony: there will be discord enough in due course; let us not speed the arrival of the inescapable turmoil. But precisely because divergencies of opinion are inevitable, we may do well, taking the long view, to prepare not to be thrown off balance when discord comes. One precaution is to realize that even disagreement has compensations, and that “unanimity” may come too high.

Our experiments in bipartisan collaboration during the past five years have taught us more than we ever knew before about its possibilities in the successful conduct of foreign affairs. I hope this analysis of the record will not be twisted into an argument in favor of unbridled partisanship. My sole aim is to provoke closer thought about the occasions when collaboration is necessary and proper, and about the methods best calculated to make it fruitful.

The country will hold in grateful remembrance that Roosevelt, Hull, Welles, Stettinius, and Byrnes on the Democratic side sought Republican cooperation for purposes essential to its well-being and safety; and that Willkie, Dewey, Vandenbcrg, Austin, Stassen, Dulles, and others on the Republican side seized the opportunity to give the United States full, prompt, and enthusiastic participation in the United Nations. Even so, we may keep the view that the Anglo-Saxon political genius lies in the ability to reach great decisions through debate and experience, and we may still conclude that, year in and year out, our foreign policy will be better understood, and therefore in the long run will be better, if it is made primarily by the appointed officials of one party who are responsible for making it, and ratified by the elected officials of both parties who are responsible for ratifying it.

Democracy relies for success on the interest and knowledge of its citizens, brought to life and focus by public debate; it will not function at its best, and may not function at all, if too many vital decisions are taken in private. Debate in Congress and discussion on the street corner and in the press are the red corpuscles in its blood stream. “It was government by discussion,” said Bagehot, “that broke the bond of ages and set free the originality of mankind.”