The Case Against the Admirals

THIS is an angry, hard-hitting book. With no attempt at style other than good, rapid-fire journalese, the author comes out fighting in his first chapter. Some of his initial punches may seem to be just a little bit below the belt. He starts right in, referring to the controlling thinkers of the Naval staff as “the old Navy Cabal" — which is certainly creating prejudice in the minds of the jury before they have heard the evidence. He makes a passing reference to the possible support of the “Battleship Admirals" by the modern prototypes of the old “Steel Plate Ring.” In so doing, be tends to weaken what most readers will admit to be a very strong case. His principal indictment is based primarily on the Army’s and Navy’s misconception of the role of the Air Forces, their obscurantism, their selfish struggle both to hinder the proper expansion of the Air arm and at the same time to exploit it for their own purposes as a supporting “weapon.”

Mr. Huie is willing to admit that the Army, at long last, has seen the light, that land-based aviation received proper support and independence during World War II, and that the General Staff is now working sincerely in the interests of national defense by advocating unified command. The Army has made its act of contrition, but the Navy is still truculent and lacking in true religion and virtue.

The author tells one sordid story after another; he piles an Ossa of double-dealing on a Pelion of duplication; he quotes chapter and verse — and at the end you feel that the Admirals haven’t a sea leg left to stand on. It is probable that his book contains many inaccuracies of detail and many overstatements. This is regrettable but relatively unimportant. The essential thing is to determine the validity of his general indictment.

The Navy, he says, enjoys great prestige; it has great pride in its traditions; it is a privileged order. As a result of the campaigns of World War II, it now finds itself in a shocking position: instead of being “The First Line of Defense,”with corresponding command, it may now, unless a strong line is taken, develop into a mere “Supporting Force.”The great “Naval" battles of the Coral Sea and Midway were fought by airplanes alone — the capital ships were two hundred miles from the action. If the fighting function of the Navy is to be limited to carriers and their train, nothing much remains except to act as supporting forces to transports and merchant vessels. This is a dreadful thought. A unified command might result in bringing it about. Therefore the Navy will fight — as one man — against unified command. Those independent Admirals like Nimitz and Halsey who indorsed unified command changed their minds after they returned to Washington and were told what to think and say by the whole lodge in executive session. They came out for “coöperation,” such as existed so splendidly in the Pacific campaigns.

Of course, says Mr. Huie, the answer is that the coöperation, if it existed at all, was terrible; that the true story is one of constant bickerings between the services, of “jurisdictional" squabbles, of competing public relations officers, of extravagance and duplication. The public is not yet informed about the MacArthur-Nimitz controversies, or the Panama Canal story, or the actual performances of our battle fleets.

These are the things Mr. Huie tells and they should be read and considered. Time, I believe, will substantiate most of his contentions. The burden of proof is now on the Admirals. They are fighting hard for their places and privileges. Have they right and the public interest on their side? Mr. Huie says no, and points to the record. Taxpayers should read his argument.

R. E. D.