The Far East

ON THE WOULD TODAY

NEVER before has the United States been such a conspicuous fact on the horizons of Asia. We have been involved in the greatest internal political crisis in China since 1924. We are ruling half of Korea. Our military equipment and our moral attitudes are of everyday importance to seventy million Indonesians. We have interceded in behall of Siam, in the face of British desires, in a way that underlines for Asiatics our involvement in the question of their freedom.

We have abandoned isolationism, but we are only beginning to develop the broad awareness that must inform our new responsibilities. How many Americans, to take a simple example, recognize the implications of our undertakings in Korea? The Moscow communique of last December, on the subject of Korea, commits us with the Russians to “the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles.''

We agreed to set up “a provisional Korean democratic government . . . for developing the industry, transport, and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.”We have put a fiveyear limit on the achievement of this task and have not only undertaken to make Korea a democratic country but are bound to act in collaboration with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China.

The United States has never before been involved in this sort of commitment. One would think that so responsible a burden would evoke serious discussion in the United States. We know that it does not.

In Korea we face not only a test of our ability to achieve a working relationship with the Soviet Union, but also a test of what we mean by the establishment of an independent state and of democracy.

We have to coördinate the administrations of North and South Korea, establish a Korean provisional government, and set up procedures for a four-power trusteeship. It is no simple task. The Russians have indoctrinated large groups of Koreans in the North, and we have imported into Korea self-appointed leaders, such as Syngman Rhee, who have lived on American promises for many years. Thanks to the Japanese, few Koreans have had experience in administration; none has had an opportunity to exercise political leadership.

The contrast between the social and political ambitions of the main Korean political parties is almost as sharp as that between the Kuomintang and the Communists in China. And Korean economy, linked to that of Japan, which is now cut off from normal economic contact, is further dislocated by the split between the North and the South.

The Moscow communique recognizes the importance of establishing an economic basis for democracy in Korea, but what is this economic basis to be? Do we or the Koreans decide? Are we acting merely from military expediency or have we a clearly thought-out plan for the economic development of Korea? If we have a plan, the American people are entitled to be fully informed about it.

Our responsibility in the Philippines

The world will watch with particular care Korea and the Philippines. Korea is promised nationhood and independence after forty years of Japanese rule: the Philippines are promised them after forty-seven years of American rule. The international complexities of the Korean question make the problem of the Philippines look simple. Success or failure in Korea must always be shared with other powers, but in the Philippines we alone are responsible. What are the prospects? We are directly responsible for the Philippines until July 4, 1946. The symbol of that responsibility is Paul McNutt, High Commissioner appointed by the President with delegated powers so great that they seem to leave nothing to the Department of the Interior. In April the Philippine national elections will be held to choose a president, a vice-president, two thirds of the senators, and a new lower house. The elections dominate the situation, not only because they are the first in over a decade, but also because many other issues depend on their outcome.

Independence is not the foremost of these issues. Both President Osmeña and Senate President Manuel Roxas seem to stand firm on the question in spite of rumors that certain American and Philippine groups would delay it or even “re-examine" the whole matter. There has been talk of the Philippines as a forty-ninth state.

The real issue is collaboration with the Japanese. The United States has made clear its disapproval of the continued presence of collaborationists in the Philippine government. The personal position of Osmena is unassailable — he left the Philippines with MacArthur, with whom he returned — but some of his supporters are suspected of collaboration.

The same suspicions hold for supporters of Roxas. But Roxas is himself alleged to have coöperated with the Japanese and their puppet government. Many of his former colleagues are in fact still being held for trial. Roxas claims to have been cleared by MacArthur, but he is under violent attack by the Democratic Alliance, whose members played a large part in the guerrilla movement. They insist that Roxas was a collaborator and deny his claim to coöperation with guerrilla forces during the Japanese occupation. It does not look as if he will be brought to trial.

There are two new elements in the elections. The first is a split in the ranks of the old Nationalist Party, and the second is the challenge to that party’s monopoly of political power for the last forty years. It is difficult to see any real conflict of principle between Osmena and Roxas. Certainly, both represent the same general interests, and neither advocates serious social change. The attempt of Roxas to describe his faction as the liberal wing of the Nationalist Party, as contrasted with the conservative wing under Osmena, is merely a cheap political maneuver.

The American-Philippine pressure

We shall influence the struggle between these two men whether we wish to or not. If the Tydings rehabilitation bill and the Bell trade bill authorizing twenty years of free trade become law, without serious change, before the elections, the Osmeña group will be materially assisted. Roxas will obviously do everything he can to raise issues to delay passage of the bill.

The play of American-Philippine interest behind the scenes in Washington will be worth watching.

The second political change, the challenge to the Nationalist Party’s monopoly, may have far-reaching consequences. The Democratic Alliance is composed of the Hukbalahaps, the National Peasants’ Union, the League for National Liberation, the Federacidn Obrera de Filipinas, and other smaller groups. It lacks wealth, experience in office, and well-known leaders. Its geographical base lies in Central Luzon, the scene of agrarian troubles long before the war.

It is here that the Hukbalahaps, one of the most famous guerrilla groups during the war, finds its greatest support. What was a local agrarian movement of peasants against landlords has been strengthened by the fact that the landlords were unable to collect their share of the crops during the war. This local movement, long associated with the Communist and Socialist factions in the Philippines, is now attempting to organize on a national scale.

The present disrupted state of communications is a serious obstacle to such ambitions, but it is not likely that Osmeña will make a really serious effort to outlaw the Democratic Alliance. If the election is close, he can probably count on its support in spite of wide differences of policy and interest. Another consideration is that if the Alliance is outlawed, it will have to be suppressed by military force, since the Hukbalahaps and many other guerrillas still retain their arms.

If the situation is not handled carefully, we have in the Philippines all the makings of a civil war. The fact that we continue to maintain a large number of troops in the Philippines is being interpreted both there and elsewhere as an indication that we are ready to play an active role in the suppression of the armed groups in the Democratic Alliance.

Revolution without civil war

The same general pattern can be traced in Korea, the Philippines, and China. It is the attempt to assure national independence and develop democratic institutions in three countries, each suffering from acute internal social and political conflicts in different stages of development. We do not have the same direct obligations to China as to the Philippines. Nor are we bound in our dealings with China by the same international agreements that govern our dealings with Korea. But we have committed ourselves in China up to the hilt. We are using our political and military influence to see to it that China’s development towards unification and democracy is achieved without civil war.

These are worthy purposes, but it is well to remind ourselves that we have gone a long way towards imposing certain very broad decisions on the Chinese government and people. We have to reckon with a natural resentment on the part of many Chinese because of this interference in their internal affairs and because of the patent dependence of China for her economic future and international position on American support. Nor should we forget that our intentions, however honorable they may seem to us, are not always generously interpreted by our allies. The Russians see no essential difference between our actions in China and their own influence on the internal affairs of Iran.

The Chinese naturally act within the pattern of decisions which we have made and clearly intend to enforce. The struggle for power between the two major factions continues but takes different forms. The barrage of accusations that each side levels against the other is part of the jockeying for position.

The main question concerns the terms on which the Communists will lay down their arms. They have been in a weak military and political position ever since V-J Day, but the choice between driving a hard bargain in negotiation with the Kuomintang and continuing a struggle to the death must have been a hard one to make — it must have brought about divided counsel in Yenan. The chief thing the Communists had to decide was the strength of American determination to finish the civil strife and to see that the Communists, as a legal party, should enjoy the civil and political rights which are their share of the bargain.

There is a direct relation between the size of our armed forces and the strength of our policy, whatever its objectives, in Korea, the Philippines, and China. Demands to bring our troops back home before they can be replaced play directly into the hands of our competitors. It is by our armed forces that we are judged.

The enormous military effort of this country in the war against Japan is not generally understood or appreciated in Asia. Soviet propaganda in China has stressed the role of the Soviet Union in winning the war against Japan; the Chinese in reconquered areas are stressing the part that China played. Soviet propaganda organs in Shanghai and Tientsin are using American news to give the impression that we are torn by internal strife and fears of new wars, and that only the Soviet Union is sincerely seeking peace.

Telling our truth in China

No one can remain blind to the battle of ideas in which we are now engaged and into which other governments are throwing their full weight. It would be pleasant to live in a world of free and unfettered information. But we do not. We are losing ground every day in China, not only because our policy and position are being actively misrepresented by other governments, but also because we are not putting sufficient weight behind the telling of our own story. It has never been more important for our policy to be fully understood in China than now. And it has never been more difficult to tell our story.

We have a strong policy in China, but strong policies involve great risks. There is the risk of putting too heavy a burden on backs too weak to bear them — the National Government may not be strong enough to fulfill its part of the bargain. There is the risk that the American people, if they do not fully understand what is at stake, may not be willing to see the matter through. It is unnecessary, however, to run the further risk of being misunderstood and misinterpreted.

The forms of representative self-government are being fostered and elections are being held, parties and platforms are emerging, and issues are being debated in all this vast area — China, the Philippines, Korea, and Japan.

Trusteeships needed

But in the great colonial territories of Southeast Asia, the responsibility has been assigned by decision of the High Commands of the United States and Great Britain to our British ally. In this area the United States has nothing to do with the disarming of the Japanese or with the restoration of civil government. We agreed to this course in January of this year. We are under plenty of criticism from our allies about our handling of areas in which we have a direct responsibility and are, therefore, quite free to criticize what has happened in Indonesia, Malaya, Burma, and French Indo-China.

There is plenty to criticize. Unquestionably, a good deal of the trouble in Indonesia and French IndoChina came from initial mistakes. Much blame can also be laid at the door of the Japanese. But the basic difficulty lies in the contrast between our handling of the Philippines, whatever its limitation, and the reluctance of the colonial powers to surrender political sovereignty.

There is still one bridge that we can help to build that might assist in bringing about a solution to the tragedy of Indonesia and French Indo-China. It. is the bridge of trusteeship. No one will seriously assert that the people of either of these countries, however much they may wish for independence, are at the moment capable of organizing it successfully.

No one can deny, however, that they are unwilling to trust their future to the countries which failed to protect them from the Japanese. The only solution is joint trusteeship and a definite schedule for complete emancipation. To seek refuge in “individual trusteeship” is to seek refuge in a legal formula which destroys the whole concept of trusteeship.