The Atlantic Report on the World Today: Washington

ON THE WORLD TODAY

THE four negotiators of the Anglo-American trade arrangement are men of varied backgrounds. On the British side were Lords Halifax and Keynes: on the American side, Mr. Vinson and Mr. Clayton.

Keynes has an uncanny grasp of the issues of world finance and world trade, and he is as quick and articulate in expression as he is learned. Several of his bons mots leaked out of the hearings. On one occasion the Americans were pressing their case for the abandonment of Britain’s imperial preferences. A horse trade was under discussion. Cuts in the preferences were to be matched by cuts in America’s tariffs, and whatever preferences were left over were to be abolished within a certain time limit.

Lord Keynes listened to the arrangement, then observed wryly, “This is a peculiar horse trade, I must say, when your horse is doomed to die within a specified time of the deal.”

The shadow of Congress lay over the parley. How would the legislators react? The American negotiators asked this question constantly, but they never sought out any representatives to inquire. They took the view that a purely businesslike arrangement could not possibly be offensive to Congress.

The British felt that publicity should be left to the Americans; but when stories of the proceedings were published, the British squirmed. For instance, Lord Keynes was troubled to see appear in the newspapers tables which he had presented showing comparative sacrifices in the war. He was afraid they might be misunderstood as a British argument that the British should be recouped for their sacrifices, when he was merely trying to demonstrate British poverty.

The Americans were more at home with Lord Halifax than with the brilliant and intellectually arrogant Keynes. Halifax, who has been extremely popular in Washington, has gained a still higher respect in these negotiations.

Secretary of the Treasury Vinson and Assistant Secretary of State Clayton are men of salient character. Clayton began the conferences on a visit to London, and found the rug pulled from under him when Leo T. Crowley, as head of the Foreign Economic Administration, cut off Lend-Lease. He was as chagrined as the British. Clayton had been negotiating with the British on the assumption that LendLease would not be withdrawn before the negotiations had been concluded.

Truman drifts

The President’s great mistake so far has been the hitor-miss fashion in which wartime controls have been relaxed. There has been no plan. The War Production Board abandoned controls over scarce materials. It was then realized that there would be competition between domestic and foreign users. Accordingly controls have been retained on exports while the domestic pipeline is being filled. The consequence is that traditional markets may be lost. The wise thing would have been to set up a system of allocations till shortages were remedied.

In some cases war agencies or parts of war agencies which might well be perpetuated in peacetime have been broken up. For example, the Office of Strategic Services, the wartime intelligence service, has been demobilized without leaving more than a temporary arrangement to take its place. One essential feature of a central intelligence service — the monitoring of foreign broadcasts — has been abolished. By contrast the Office of Scientific Research and Development has been continued while Congress is debating the Magnuson bill, which aims at setting up a peacetime establishment.

Dissolution of the War Labor Board was ordered, but the Office of Price Administration was left alone. Therefore wages are “free” and prices are under control. The result is to make Chester Bowles’s task inordinately difficult.

The 1919 parallel

After the last war there was the same chaos. Emergency agencies and wartime controls were eliminated rapidly. It was expected that a smoothly working economy would be restored by the return of free competition. Soon, however, the government realized that the economic effects of the war had not ended with the armistice. A whole series of events suggested that the release of controls was too precipitate.

The record looks as if it belonged to the present. War Industry Board controls were revived in order to stabilize industrial prices and to stimulate flagging production. Private sources were called upon to continue the work of the virtually suspended U. S. Employment Service. President Wilson requested a revival of food control. An industrial conference was called to do for labor relations what the War Labor Board had done before it ceased to exist.

The Fuel Administration had to be called back because of the threat of a coal strike. Aid for stricken Europe had to be applied for after Congress had been urged to terminate financial aid to European reconstruction. We seem to have learned little from experience.

Refereeing labor

Secretary of Labor Schwellenbach never wanted the job at the Labor Department. He accepted Truman’s draft on condition that he could effect his own reorganization. He criticized the Bureau of Labor Statistics. He saw no point in keeping the War Labor Board. He wanted the National Labor Relations Board moved lock, stock, and barrel into the Labor Department. It was at the height of his reorganization that the labor strife broke out.

A man of judicial temperament and in many respects an admirable person, he nevertheless flopped resoundingly as a conciliator. When he took over the dispute in the oil refining industry, he adopted the 15 per cent offer of the employers and suggested that the remaining 15 per cent demanded by the workers should be arbitrated. Both sides refused to budge. Schwellenbach’s failure clearly shows how much the War Labor Board contributed to industrial peace.

Guessing about the atom

Mr. Truman has a passion for being decisive about everything. The habit has led him astray a number of times, particularly in connection with the atom bomb controversy. The May-Johnson bill, which would gag both science and public discussion on atomic research, is an Administration creature.

It is reputed to have been written inside the War Department with the tacit acquiescence of the Atomic Commission. The President, however, must have agreed to it. In one of his casual moments, he admitted that he had only half read it. The bill has created such a din in the scientific world that there is not a chance for it. The real forum is a special committee which has been set up in the Senate under the chairmanship of Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut.

Most of the scientists who have been in and out of the Capital for the past weeks are indisposed to talk about the politics of nuclear energy. They say they are not political scientists. They are intent only on getting a hearing in Congress.

The move to create some kind of world body to which to intrust the manufacturing know-how of atomic energy is gathering impetus. It has been spurred by off-the-record consultation with the scientists, all of whom say that the secret is a rapidly wasting asset. Within eighteen months, according to Professor Oppenheimer, other countries will be able to make atom bombs.

Sir James Chadwick, head of the British mission that coöperated with the American scientists at Oak Ridge, adds that in ten years or so we shall be able to canalize as well as explode the atom; that is, put it to peacetime as well as wartime uses. It is difficult to realize the speed with which mankind has been propelled into the atomic age. Steam and electricity came gradually, and we had time to accommodate ourselves to both. This is not the case with the atom. Even the politicians are now coming to think that the revolution is here.

THE MOOD OF THE CAPITAL

Mr. Truman still inclines to Congressional rather than to Executive government, and the result is compromise and a halting leadership. This is shown most especially in the developments concerning aid to Europe and the atomic bomb.

Mr. Truman has the right instincts, but he has neglected to surround himself with wise advisers. Two men on whom he has leaned, Jimmy Byrnes and Fred Vinson, now have administrative tasks which have taken them away from his elbow. John Snyder and George Allen are his prime confidants, but neither has the requisite background for his task.

Snyder, who is the head of the Office of Demobilization and Reconversion, is a solid citizen without many contacts or much imagination. George Allen, who is supposed to advise the President on what to do with the war agencies, has had only limited experience in administrative posts in the District of Columbia. If the President had a general staff around him, he would be able to supply leadership out of knowledge of the facts and the political possibilities, without at the same time doing any damage to his concept of his function.