Let's Face It
by RALPH E. FLANDERS
THE Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms, which are the official expression of our spirit and purpose in this war, have met no popular response comparable to that given to President Wilson’s “Fourteen Points.” The difference is that they are offered to a disillusioned world — a world which has seen one war won and the peace lost, and can discern in our latest emergency nothing which can be cured by restatement of our ideals, no matter how noble such restatement may be. Our generation is concerned, not with a restatement of ideals, but with the means by which they may be approached.
We are sure to find, at the end of the war, that commitments have been made and situations have arisen that seem out of step with the Atlantic Charter. For instance, is the Soviet Union to have a free hand in the Baltic, with Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland? England’s refusal to concede that point was the reported cause of Russia’s choice of an ally in 1939. Has Russia given up her determination? Can England refuse to accede now? Can we do more than lodge a formal (and ineffective) protest in that event, despite the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms?
“Look!” you can hear the isolationists say. “Haven’t we been telling you that this is just another European war, fought for a new distribution of power? Once again we’re the cat’s-paw in Old World intrigues.” The isolationists will still be wrong, but they may be dangerously effective in again withdrawing us from useful world influence if they catch us off balance — thrown there by a sudden realization of the difference between high ideals and hard facts. To be safe, we must face that difference now.
Again, it is conceivable that at the end of the war the only popular government which can be formed in Germany will be a communistic one. The same may be true of Italy. It may be true of France. Can we take any steps to prevent such an event? Ought we to in any case? The result might be the extension of the political power of the Soviet Union over the greater part of Europe, leaving (it may be hoped) a few little enclaves of liberal democracy to carry our concept of the Four Freedoms. If and when that time comes, the ghosts of the appeasers will rise from their graves and say, “We told you so.” Victory will turn sour in our own mouths, unless we have foreseen such possibilities and discounted them in advance. Let’s face it now!
Great Britain
To set forth our historical and natural relations with Great Britain would take a book. Fortunately, that book has been written, and it is on the background of Walter Lippmann’s U. S. Foreign Policy that this brief sketch will be drawn. That book is required reading in a very literal sense. From the day of its publication, no American citizen can pretend to any competence in understanding our international policy unless he has considered its contents and its conclusions.
The world may well assume that America and Great Britain will stand together in the next world crisis. We did it once. We did it twice. The chances are that we shall do it again. Only renewed and widespread outbreaks of ill-informed Anglophobia can destroy that presumption, so necessary to world peace.
But at the same time let’s face the difficulties in the way of a common understanding between the two peoples. One of them has been the conviction on our part that British diplomacy has been more astute than ours. There has been much truth in this, particularly where British commercial interests have been at stake. British prosperity — full employment for the common people of Britain — depends on the scope and profitableness of Britain’s world-wide business. No government official, whether in or out of the Foreign Office, ever forgets this for a moment. Let us recognize this fact, and take it for granted. And why not, ourselves, take a leaf from Britain’s book? It is years since responsible and powerful United States government officials, whether in or out of the State Department, have sought to advance our foreign trade on any except the ethereal plane of reciprocal trade treaties. Assistance to business that increases employment is a major responsibility of the State Department.
Another necessity we must face is that of not raiding the basic enterprises on which Britain depends. One of these is shipping. Without her shipping she would be weak. Admiral Land’s announced intention to build up a great American merchant marine needs discussion and review. It cannot be done without great subsidies. These will weaken us. A policy which weakens both us and our allies needs critical examination. Let each country do that which it can do best and both will be strong — if they can depend on each other.
British “imperialism” is an incitement to moral indignation for a large and vocal group of our fellow citizens. But who is there among us who would feel competent, to solve the “Irish question” with a full knowledge of the bloody differences that exist between groups in Ireland itself? Who among us can offer a plan whereby the British can “free” India with safety to the millions of mutually hostile races and religions in that teeming country? Is our own Negro problem solved or on the way to solution?
Let us trust to Britain’s past history in this matter of her “imperialism.” That history is one of steady progress of her dominions and colonies from the status of exploited subjugation to independent nationhood, tied by self-interest and loyalty to the British throne; and the motive power behind this massive change has been that combination of practical wisdom and deep moral force which resides in the breast of the individual British citizen. Let us trust it and him.
Lastly, there is the Englishman’s irritating assumption of place and power, his innate and unreasoned assurance that the English have been, are, and always will be right. The ground supporting that assumption has been washed away. We can now, if we so desire, look an Englishman in the face and say with truth, “You can’t get along without us.” We must also remember that we can’t get along without him.
Russia
Our necessary relations with Britain are clear, though by no means easy of attainment. Our future relations with Russia are not clear — except on one point. The point is that Joseph Stalin will act undeviatingly in the interests of the Soviet Union and the administration of which he is the head. It is also clear that, in the defense of Soviet territory, he has called on every citizen for a sacrifice on a scale so far exceeding Russia’s sacrifice in the Napoleonic wars, or that of the Western allies in this war, that we stand before the spectacle in amazement and humility.
This dictator and his regimented people have saved the free, democratic peoples of Europe and America for their own sake, not ours. The situation is portentous; it is big with unknown events. What posture shall we assume as we face the East? The course of events is hidden behind a veil, yet our position can be reasonably determined. On the strictly material side, there will be no advantage in dealing with Stalin as if we were to be disarmed comrades after the war is over. He is a realist himself, and he will have no respect for nations who are not prepared with “power to match their commitments,” to use Lippmann’s phrase. The hand held out to Russia will be friendly, but it must be strong.
It would be folly for us to attempt to use our power in supporting the old cordon sanitaire of weak, saprophytic nations as a buffer between us and them. May we not, indeed, find many of those peoples ready to seek the protection of the Soviet Union, weighing its proved strength on the one hand against the dubiety of Western support on the other? But how far west will Stalin come? Is this a military or an ideological problem? Russia needs ice-free ports. The Baltic countries partly serve this need. This situation creates problems with Sweden and Turkey. It is highly probable that Russian military conquest will not seek to go beyond the minimum requirements in the European theater of war. These minimum requirements we must make up our minds to accept.
Russia, however, has invented and effectively employed a new type of warfare which is not, in its beginnings, military at all. She has devised that novel thing, ideological warfare. It is real warfare: it attempts to overthrow existing sovereignty and replace it with obedience to a Soviet authority.
It can never seem anything but calamitous to have to engage in military warfare, often as we have had to do so. But in this ideological war we can join with confidence and joy. We can be glad to fight it on our own ground, for the war will be waged by conquering involuntary unemployment and continuing our old progress toward a higher, more broadly distributed scale of living. In such a contest, I think that Communism has no chance. That war can and must be successfully waged in Britian and America.
China
In China our problem is threefold: we must cope with the possibilities of China and her relations with Britain and with Russia. It is in the interests of world peace that there be in Asia a strong power friendly to us and not filled with the lust of conquest. That country does not now exist.
China is our candidate. She is friendly to us. She places her hope in us. China is superbly rich in manpower, moderately so in known mineral resources. These latter are located in Manchuria and the northern provinces, and in the south and west. New finds are being reported continuously in the hitherto neglected western provinces. The central valleys and the eastern coast are poor in minerals, rich agriculturally. China, until recently, has never been a unified nation. Even now the resistance to Japan is being made by two separate, almost antagonistic groups: the Communists and the Kuomintang. Yet the war has developed, especially among the young, a national consciousness which under favorable conditions may be depended on to spread and to strengthen. It is on this desired and not impossible event that we base our hopes.
LET’S FACE IT (continued)
China’s aspiration presents a problem for Britain. It may mean giving up the Crown Colony of Hong Kong. More seriously, it will complicate Britain’s problem in India to have that country neighbor to a strong, independent Asian power. Britain must and will resign herself to both requirements. Russia will probably insist on an all-year port with easy rail access on the Pacific. Will it be content with the old arrangement of the Manchurian Railway running through Chinese territory? For Manchuria will again become their territory if the Chinese have their way. The Chinese must retain much of it if they are to have the mineral resources needed for their industrial development. The problem of the port alone can doubtless be arranged if Russia does not seek a conquest of resources and if she does not conquer Manchuria and North China ideologically.
We are in fact engaged in a race with Russia in the Far East, and we are off to a poor start. For more than one reason she has refused and will probably continue to refuse the use to us of Siberia as a base for bombing Japan. When Germany is finished we may find Russia herself bombing Japan out of the war, to the great increase of her prestige in China, and with a consequent strengthening of the Communist influence. Here is a real contest between allies, and we are second-best in position and prospects.
The heart of our problem in Asia is this: How can we now and in the next few months give such support to the Chinese as will enable them to reconquer their lost territory and consolidate their nation, along lines permitting effective coöperation with the Western powers in maintaining world peace? That problem we have not yet solved, and the time is short.
As to our policy at the end of the war, Walter Lippmann has said the word that must be said. Read his book. While this article extends his argument and doubtless diverges from his ideas in various respects, yet it is based upon that book and cannot be properly criticized without reference to it. We must have a foreign policy, and must have resources provided to support that policy; and of those resources powerful allies are an essential part. Even we are not strong enough to face a hostile and predatory world alone. With allies we can hold a just peace. Without allied strength, world organization is an idle dream.