Latin America

ON THE WORLD TODAY

THE inclination of most news commentators and seers when the United Nations campaign in North Africa opened was to assume that it would have quick and decisive effects on the attitude of various Latin-American countries toward the war. Some of them even went all-out with practically unhedged predictions of Latin-American expeditionary forces overseas, of war declarations by the South American republics which so far have only broken relations with the Axis, and of a swift rush for the United Nations bandwagon by those “prudent" neutrals, Argentina and Chile.

It is now time, perhaps, to make a brief audit of some of this “off the cuff” prophesying. One’s first conclusion must be that, while the turn in the war’s fortunes indicated by the African actions has had several important beneficial effects, most of them are subtle in their expression thus far and slow in producing direct or important repercussions. And there have been other results of the African struggle which have added to, rather than detracted from, Latin America’s war confusions.

All quiet on the “Bulge Front”

The clearest development which has sharply affected Latin-American reactions is, of course, that with Dakar under United Nations control, South America has been made safe from attack or invasion. This has deprived Axis agitators in the countries where they are active — which includes practically all the South American republics — of their stock argument that intensive war collaboration with the United States was dangerous and unnecessary. At the same time it has strengthened the pro-Ally elements everywhere and has given them courage and mental ammunition with which to fight for closer collaboration.

In result, since the North African exploit, pro-Ally forces have gained in political prestige in practically every republic, and this has accounted for several developments, not of major importance, perhaps, in the general war picture, but significant of changing political orientations in various governments. In Brazil, for instance, General Goes Monteiro, long suspected of believing in Axis military victory if not of positive pro-Axis political sympathies, has quietly retired from his post as Chief of Staff. His duties have been taken over by top military men who are convinced that Brazil’s war declaration in August — to which Góes Monteiro was cold — was politically advantageous for the republic as well as patriotically necessary.

In Argentina, the pro-United Nations leaders have redoubled their pressure on the Castillo administration to alter its neutrality policy, in spite of the handicaps they are working under because of the government’s “state of siege" ban on open discussion of war issues. In Chile, there has been at least one monster demonstration of pro-Ally sentiment — a parade of 50,000 citizens, the biggest in Santiago’s history, with all the appropriate trimmings of oratory and “follow up" pressure politics. In Mexico, there have been rising indications that the government is now planning active military participation in the war, instead of sticking to its original announced intention of merely preparing itself for defensive emergencies.

Still more important, the preliminary success in the African campaign, coupled with the effects of the Russian winter offensive, has shaken the confidence of even the friends of the Axis in Latin America that Axis victory is in the cards. And this appears to be subtly changing the attitude toward the United Nations, and especially toward the United States, of governments both friendly and otherwise.

Axis agents vamoose

The friendly governments, for instance, now feel less temptation to hedge against Axis victory by allowing their own pro-Axis elements and a few “pet" Axis nationals freedom to circulate and to agitate. Consequently there has been a marked stepping up during the past few weeks, especially in the more lukewarm of the “relations-breaking” countries, of the enforcement of repressive measures against fifth columnists.

Also, the neutrals are affected by similar delicate considerations of expediency. Thus even the Castillo administration in the Argentine has suddenly begun what looks to be a serious roundup of the more openly active Axis spy rings. In spite of the “state of siege" restrictions, the Argentine bureaucracy went so far as to permit a Pearl Harbor anniversary rally on December 7 in honor of President Roosevelt. And in Chile, President Ríos late in November issued a statement about Chile’s relations to the United States and the United Nations which, if it failed to clarify the republic’s final intentions, certainly was meant to be conciliatory.

It is easy, though, to make too much of these favorable straws. At the present writing they indicate that the Latin-American governments are slowly adjusting their minds to much more certain prospects of a United Nations victory, but hardly to drastic changes of their own war policy.

The present administrations in Argentina and, to a slightly less degree, in Chile may find it quite as difficult to abandon neutrality after distinct Allied successes have been obtained in Africa or in Europe, as it was before. For, from the point of view of the Castillo and Ríos regimes, “face" is involved. Both domestic political opponents and United Nations spokesmen have scolded them constantly for waiting to choose sides until they can line up with the sure winners. Human political vanity, then, — Latin-American brand, — will make it perhaps even harder for these groups to go over to the Allies when the United Nations begin winning than it might be for leaders whose neutrality had been less under fire.

Food for a rescued Europe

Nor is it likely that commercial advantages will tempt them directly. The Argentine ruling faction, which habitually and consistently holds to the theory that the Americans are a race of materialistic traders, can hardly be lured into the war on the Allied side — as a New York Times writer somewhat naïvely proposed recently — by offers of huge orders of grain and meat to feed the starving populations of Europe when their rescue from the Nazis is accomplished. Argentine traders like President Castillo know that a demand for Argentine foodstuff surpluses will be inevitable once the Allies are in a position to start relieving the European population. Hence they suspect, with a possibly misleading canniness, that neutrality may make the Argentine bargaining position stronger.

A positive break of either Argentina or Chile with the Axis, followed by alignment on the Allied side, indeed can hardly be expected except through a change of administration or as a result of some direct clash of either republic with an Axis power. As time goes on, it is perfectly possible that such a clash may be sought, although Chile, after the African invasion, passed up an opportunity to break with Japan over a practically direct threat from Tokyo that Japan would declare war if Chile should sever diplomatic relations. It is possible, though, if Allied operations continue to go well for the first few months of 1943, that any such event as the sinking of an Argentine or a Chilean ship by the Axis would bring about a reaction far different from the sinkings of last summer.

On the other hand, changes of administration in the two neutral countries appear less and less likely. President Ríos, in spite of the vacillations of his war policy, appears to be strengthening his hold on the domestic political scene by exercising a firm control over Congress and two successive Cabinets. In Argentina, President Castillo is jockeying his National-Democratic Party into a position to “boss” the 1943 presidential election and incidentally count the ballots — by the happy Argentine expedient of replacing governors of states suspected of harboring opposition majorities with Federal “interventors.”

Darlan, Hitler, and Spain

The confusing elements introduced into the LatinAmerican situation by the North African developments have mainly to do with the Darlan problem and the military threat to Spain.

The acceptance of Darlan as chief in French North Africa, and even more his recent formation of an “ Imperial Council” to govern there, has troubled the liberals in the Latin-American countries who for the long pull are the United Nations’ best friends on the Western Hemisphere front, and has strengthened the Axis agitators. It is now possible for the latter to urge their old thesis that the war is simply a struggle between rival imperialisms in which Latin-American nations have no part because they can only emerge from it as victims, or partial victims, of the imperialism of the winners. Furthermore, the Latin-American liberals see in the acceptance of Darlan a depressing callousness on the part of the Allies to their own struggles for emancipation from political repressions, particularly in the dictator-ridden countries.

The possibility of a Hitler thrust through Spain at Gibraltar troubles the United Nations elements in the Latin-American countries moderately because of its military dangers, but far more because it is likely to have the effect of dividing Latin-American opinion on the war a good deal as it was divided during the 1936-1939 Spanish civil conflict. As these groups view the outlook, Spain will only be attacked after an elaborate propaganda campaign from the Nazis, charging that Spanish neutrality has been violated by the Allies — a campaign which, it is cynically expected in Latin America, will be heartily supported by the Franco government and its emissaries and fifth columnists in the southern countries. If anything like this happens, present dark premonitions would have it, the large pro-Franco groups in every Latin republic’s population will be stirred into action, and the war unity of several important countries will be measurably, if not dangerously, weakened.