The Problem of Reconstruction

I

I SHOULD like to discuss the special problem of political reconstruction after the war. The reader will understand that I am concerned only with the general outlook.

We shall be faced with a completely disrupted social system, in confusion physically, emotionally, and ideologically. This statement certainly applies to Europe, and to large portions of Asia and Africa. Also it must be remembered that sociological disruption is the most contagious disease known to mankind. Thus the first requisite is that order be imposed. There can be no civilization apart from a well-organized system of interrelated activities, within which the intimacies of family life can be developed.

Human life discloses many types of social order existing in the world, and — what is more perplexing — a great antagonism between adjacent groups in respect to differences of kinds of order, kinds of emotion, and individual human beings produced by those various types. The love of humanity as such is mitigated by violent dislike of the next-door neighbor.

For this reason, no single world-wide solution of the social problem can be successfully adopted. Each special district must be studied with a view to the immediate solution applicable to it. There can be no one general system of social coördination which does not destroy the special capacities of smaller groups. The essence of the world-wide sociological problem is the study of the modes of grouping mankind subject to some coördination of the various groups. Of course, this conclusion is a commonplace for all successful government. In this country there are forty-eight states, and the District of Columbia, all supervised by the central government. Also in each state there are cities, and townships, and counties, each with its freedom of action within limits.

Thus there must be a careful study of the possibilities of grouping, and of coordinating groups in different areas — for example, in the Mahometan world of the Middle East, including Egypt; and in Central Europe, stretching from the Baltic to the Ægean Sea, with Russia and the Mahometan world on one side and Germany and Italy on the other. Then there is Western Europe, with its various groupings. Also there is the coordination of these groups.

But we have omitted the fact that, owing to modern techniques, the world in the future will be immeasurably more compact than in past history. India, and China, and the Oceanic Islands of the Eastern and Southern Oceans, and the two Americas which separate the ancient East from the ancient West, will be in essential, immediate connection with the small European and Mahometan worlds which first claimed attention. Traditional statesmanship must be infused with the dramatic novelty which the immediate future presents. The people most responsible for this duty can compare the modes of action in the past with the novel possibilities of the future. It is their business to inform the populations and to guide the statesmen. Above all, it is their business to coöperate with each other, and not to exaggerate the petty views of the universe which their own specialties present.

II

A stable order is necessary, but it is not enough. There must be satisfaction for the purposes that are inherent in human life. Undoubtedly the first essential requirement is the satisfaction of the necessities of bodily life — food, clothing, shelter. These economic factors are dominant up to the level of moderate enjoyment. They then almost suddenly become the mere background for those experiences which form the distinction between mankind and the animal world. It is the imaginative originality of mankind that produces ideals, good or bad. We live guided by a variety of impulses — towards loving relationship, towards friendship, towards other types of enjoyment such as games, art, ideals of mutual enterprise, and ideals disclosing some sense of immortality. This intimate development of human experience enters into political theory as respect for each individual life. It demands a social structure supplying freedom and opportunity for the realization of objectives beyond the simple bodily cravings.

Of course any one group of human beings, however large, has a very finite set of appetitions, depending on past history and on the sort of prevalent ideals. In every social system there are exceptions, mostly foolish, but some of them beyond price. It is of the essence of good government to provide some adequacy of satisfaction both for the large communal motives and for all reasonable exceptions on which progress depends. It cannot be repeated too often that the only security for progress is a sincere respect for each individual human being.

As we approach these problems the first words that occur to us are ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy.’ ‘Freedom’ apart from relevant ‘opportunity’ is a meaningless notion. Robinson Crusoe could do what he liked on his island: but, until the savages turned up, there was nothing for him to do. The history of mankind with its wars is the tale of groups of people seeking opportunity by the oppression of their neighbors. Sometimes these wars sink into minor disturbances and are conventionalized, as in the late Middle Ages and in the eighteenth century.

The enthusiasm for crusades — Mahometans attacking Christians or Christians attacking Mahometans — illustrates the poverty of life in the Middle Ages. Also slavery, or half-slavery, by eliminating the claims of a large portion of the population, preserved the limited store of opportunity for the fortunate minority. Today the notion of a master race is being revived, and most of us are agreed that it means the moral degradation of mankind.

Within the last four centuries there have been three dramatic disclosures of new large-scale opportunities. I put aside the Italian Renaissance, for it concerned only a fortunate minority. It was the last spurt of the Middle Ages. Thomas Aquinas would have enjoyed it.

The first disclosure was the discovery of a new world — namely, the halfempty continent of America, as the immediate result of the new technique of oceanic voyaging. The real discovery was in fact the new art of navigation, and America was the first gift derived from it. The history of civilization opens a new chapter at this period, by reason of this increase of opportunity. The problem of existence was not solved; but hope entered into human life as never before. The three countries most concerned — namely, Spain, the Netherlands, and England — for the period of about one hundred and fifty years, starting with the sixteenth century, exhibited a stage of excited hopefulness, while unfortunate Germany was torn to pieces by disputes inherited from the mediæval world. France was balanced between the two periods, and developed the brilliance of the old European civilization. The intensity of the French Revolution showed that novel opportunity had not penetrated throughout the nation.

The second enlargement of opportunity began about two and a half centuries after the first. It was the Industrial Revolution, which gradually developed from the middle of the eighteenth century, with its two culminations in the invention of the steam engine and the invention of the railway. Human life was transformed.

I am inclined to believe that its best effect was in opening the whole extent of North America to the European population. This was due to the steamboat and the railway. But nothing great in human history is due to a single cause; and we must also add the influence during the American Revolution of great statesmen guiding a peculiarly intelligent people.

At least the new techniques transformed life throughout the world, more especially in Europe and America. In Western Europe during the second quarter of the nineteenth century there was a period of optimism. The problem of human life seemed to have been solved, and the first International Exhibition in London, during the year 1851, celebrated this glorious triumph with the creation of the famous Crystal Palace.

Alas, something was missing. It may have been the want of intelligence among statesmen and industrial leaders. It may have been that the development of techniques was less fundamental than it seemed. Whatever the reason, the Crystal Palace, very symbolically, has been burnt down; and the nations are now struggling to avoid the ancient evil, which is the selfish mastery of the few over the many.

At the present time we are in the first phase of the third enlargement of opportunity, perhaps the most important crisis in the history of civilization.

The intellectual development of mankind, with its self-conscious criticism, has a recent growth of some five or six thousand years. Its earlier stages seem to consist of traditional legend with the minimum of coördination. But about two thousand and six hundred years ago a widespread movement of critical judgment on the nature of things had established itself. The European races derive their special systems of thought from the brilliant races in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East, more especially from the Greeks. But in the course of ages the centre of activity has moved backwards and forwards through many races from Mesopotamia to the Strait of Gibraltar. It has also spread northward. There were analogous movements in China and India; and the three intellectual growths fed each other intermittently. But the European systematic thought has shown the greatest energy both in self-criticism and by its contact with practical activity. Today it is refashioning the ways of thought and action in every civilized race of the world.

The result has been a gradual broadening of opportunity. But this growth has been intermittent and wavering. Slavery became serfdom, and serfdom became free laborers on the edge of starvation. The status of the workers improved, although the slums of industrial cities disgraced industry. Indeed, at the very moment when the Industrial Revolution was in its prime Malthus managed to prove that the mass of mankind must always live on the verge of starvation. He was answered only by the nearest approach to an appeal to Divine Providence that men like John Stuart Mill dared to make. Every factor involved in human existence is too variable to justify these sweeping statistical deductions based on past experience.

As an historic fact, the gradual introduction of novel techniques has broadened the amplitude of opportunity for the mass of mankind, slowly and waveringly. Within the past five or six hundred years there have been certain crises in this slow advance, due to these novel techniques. These critical techniques are not the most interesting facts for abstract thinkers, but their immediate effect was overwhelming. For example, the evolution of transoceanic navigation, as distinct from coastal voyaging, is not very interesting for abstract learning. But it changed the history of mankind. Again, the thoughts of Galileo and Newton were of supreme interest, but the habits of mankind between the dates 1690 and 1750 were very slightly altered. The total effect was that fortunate people had a new theme of intellectual enjoyment. Indeed, within this period the introduction of cheap spirits, such as gin, probably did more harm to English life than all the noble thoughts of the Royal Society did good. But the growth of science did arouse an alertness of intellect. The result was the Industrial Revolution in the hundred years between 1750 and 1850.

III

Today we are at the beginning of a new crisis of civilization, which gives promise of producing more fundamental change than any preceding advance. The growth of science in every department of thought seems to have reached a stage where the whole spread of knowledge discloses new possibilities for practice. This holds throughout the whole range of activities, from medicine to engineering, from mining to aerial flight, from the use of the microscope to the waves of energy from remote nebulæ, from psychoanalysis to geology. The whole of human practical activity is in process of immediate transformation by novelties of organized knowledge. It is no longer a question of a new detail such as gunpowder, or printing, or the power of steam, or novel machinery, or a new aspect of religious thought. Today the whole extent of learned thought is transforming every activity of mankind. This is the largest epoch in human history. Historical knowledge is essential, but very dangerous. The old phrases are misleading. For example, in this country it is no longer sufficient to tell young people to ‘go West in a covered wagon.’ In my own country, the old habits must be completely reformed. Again, we must insist, history is essential for the direction of action, but its naïve application is very dangerous.

Still more dangerous are the simpleminded generalizations of specialized scientists beyond their own limits of special knowledge. The truth is that we must work together. Historians must study the new possibilities of action; and scientists must learn the old checkered history of human emotion passing into large-scale social activities.

There is one prophecy upon which I will venture. It is that throughout the vast land areas of the Old World — Russia and China, for instance — the example of North America will be predominant. Perhaps also America has something to learn from Russia and China.

Also, forgive me when I conclude with a confession of personal political faith. I do not trust any extreme, abstract plan of universal social construction. Such plans are important for the stimulation of the imagination. But in practice every successful advance is a compromise. The general ideal is the wide diffusion of opportunity. The sort of opportunity relevant to each special case depends on special characteristics of the populations involved.