Napoleon and Efficiency

IT is generally acknowledged that Napoleon was more than a military man, for his surviving works have to do with civil administration; and I believe it possible to distinguish among his personal precepts and systematic methods twelve principles, still vital, still applicable, perhaps, to an executive to-day.

The first four of these govern intimate acquaintance with affairs of the day. Napoleon regarded accurate information as the fundamental basis of progress.

(1)A leader has two means by which he must keep himself informed, one of which is worthless without the other: complete figures (états, or records, as Napoleon called them) and thorough investigation of any detail learned by chance.

(2)The alteration of a single figure in a record necessitates bringing the whole up to date. For example, if the Records of the Navy included a list of battleships in each port, it was not enough that the departure of two ships from Brest en route to La Rochelle should be reported to the Emperor by letter, to be placed in the files beside the preceding list — the old list had to be removed immediately, and replaced by another, giving full details.

(3)Verification of detail must always be undertaken personally, and can never be done too minutely. In order to check up on his household expenditures, Napoleon himself one day counted the pieces of sugar in the sugar bowl, weighed them, and surprised the grocer with a visit to verify the price of sugar: he knew that day how much he had been cheated. When reviewing artillery, he customarily strode up to a battery chosen at random and felt the stuff of the men’s uniforms; then, climbing on a gun carriage, he would lean over the spokes of the wheel and make sure that everything on the gun carriage conformed to regulations.

(4) In business, the balance in the bank is of the utmost importance (this is so easily forgotten!): it should always be at one’s fingertips.

While Napoleon was in power, it was a constant practice of his to carry with him a notebook marked ‘France’ which contained, on different pages, the following notations: account with the Bank of France; personal account of the Emperor (he included here an unofficial war reserve); taxes received during the year and how much still in anticipation; sums payable by the state, and on what dates.

He always practised this maxim, although it did not originate with him: ‘A messenger? If it is good news, let him wait; if it is bad news, show him in.’

The next four rules concern the transmission of orders.

(5) The secretary of a chief must not in turn have his own undersecretary. Napoleon had a difficult time with his secretary Bourrienne, who, in giving orders to undersecretaries, interpreted them to suit himself. He would disavow any responsibility for delay, would ensure anything but secrecy, and would assume too much importance. When Menneval became civil secretary, he made an excellent one, but he was not allowed to have any help. Accuracy, promptness, secrecy, and the objectivity desirable in a secretary were the immediate result. Menneval, worn out, had to retire. He was replaced by a secretariat, with each person responsible for a special job; Laron Fain was entrusted with the most important tasks, but nobody was in full charge of the secretariat.

(6)Orders of the chief must be transmitted in two ways: the actual execution through the hierarchy of officers, but the information going directly to all ranks.

The chief must leave to each officer the carrying out of the details of his orders, since such details would be far too great a burden for him; but in apprising everyone of his general intentions he must be assured of close coöperation in the whole undertaking, thus avoiding loss of time.

This task Napoleon assigned to Berthier, his lieutenant general. The orders of Napoleon as commander in chief were relayed to his corps commanders. But each brigade commander also received, so far as possible, a note saying, ‘My general plan is so-and-so; you will receive your actual orders from your superior officer.’ This custom saved a great deal of time; the brigade generals, while awaiting orders, would take preparatory steps, and unified action was assured. At Waterloo, Napoleon no longer had Berthier, a poor general but an excellent secretary. It has since been asserted that if this dual system of transmitting orders could have been employed that day the outcome might well have been different.

(7)A project which depends upon a series of successive budgets must be executed in units, each complete and independent in itself.

This rule was applied to building construction, and held not only for state and city budgets but also for private organizations. It was especially appropriate for all enterprises which could not depend upon a fixed budget for the following year.

Napoleon himself supplies an example in the Mémorial: if a three-story château is to be built in four years, do not have the foundations built this year, the first story next year, and the second two years from now; have a wing at the end of the first year which is habitable and complete, another wing next year, then the centre, and finally the extras. If, on the one hand, it seems more economical to complete all work of one kind at once, nevertheless construction in sections has its advantages — with one part completed, mistakes may be seen quickly and corrected economically.

(8)Always have a number of projects in mind, even if you are not ready to carry them out.

This rule, in my opinion, has been badly misunderstood; Napoleon’s many uncompleted projects have been attributed to his excess of imagination. But the plan for the campaign into Italy was put into written form by Bonaparte as a young officer with little chance that he would carry it out personally. When the day came, the plan was ready and it made history. Later, in camp at Boulogne, Napoleon realized the impossibility of invading England; but he was fortunate to have gathered together all the elements which permitted him to undertake the campaign of Ulm within a few hours — the most startling of all his campaigns. Once you begin a project, it becomes a combination of forces, united and in line. If the end in mind is revealed as impossible, why allow available strength to be dissipated ? A new undertaking may perhaps be effected successfully.

Enterprises which succeed depend upon two things: carefully conceived plans, and the right opportunity. The more plans you have ready, the more chance you will have to find the right opportunity. Among uncompleted plans left by Napoleon, there was one for the conquering of Algiers: a competent reconnoitring officer had designated the point of debarkation, the method of attack, the means of battering down the defense. Nine years after the death of Napoleon, the opportunity was presented; the plans were unearthed, and Algiers was taken. This posthumous success of one of Napoleon’s superabundant plans led to the creation of the loveliest of the French colonies.

The last four rules are less technical, rather sentimental and moral in tone, but none the less practical. They have to do with the choice of men and methods of accomplishment.

(9) Extended communication with a subordinate, even of lowest rank, must be preceded by thorough and objective investigation.

Napoleon owed his immense popularity in large part to his observation of this rule. He did not ask his generals if they were pleased with a certain captain before talking with him. He had the captain’s records brought to him and was able to say, ’In such-and-such a year you were in such-and-such a place doing so-and-so. . . . You earned your Cross at Austerlitz. . . .’ The effect on the men was noticeable: to speak to a man regarding the opinion of his superiors toward him is to encourage him to pander to his superiors; to speak to him of his services is to encourage him to do well.

The following rule does not apply to private enterprise, but it should be remembered even though it has often been ignored in the ‘public interest.’

(10) The permanence of an undertaking is more important than the immediate return.

Napoleon boasted that he never refused permission to build a bridge or dig a canal — even when the official reports were unfavorable and the failure of the enterprise was highly probable. ’It will contribute something,’he would say. In other words, in twenty years the immediate lack of return would be forgotten; but the bridge or canal would remain.

(11) The inspectors of an enterprise must be unfamiliar, so far as possible, with the executive staff.

The importance of this rule was first brought home to Napoleon as a result of the graft among the functionaries of the Directoire. He followed it all his life; for instance, he entrusted the supervision of the household effects of the Crown to trustworthy General Duroc rather than to a professional expert. Also, he was accustomed to appoint members of his State Council to posts of inspection and supervision.

When a group of specialists have worked and grown up together, you cannot ask one of them to supervise another; even if he is honest, because of a certain esprit de corps he will tend to hide weakness rather than to point it out. Furthermore, accustomed to the difficulties of the profession which he is inspecting, he will be indulgent toward technical errors that he might have committed himself. Therefore, in dividing work, choose specialists for its execution, laymen for its supervision.

Finally, the Rule of Rules which Napoleon observed all his life; —

(12)There are no unimportant details in executing any task (‘ Pas de détails dans l’exécution').

Suppose, for example, that in carrying out a project several small details are neglected. Bonaparte, while planning the strategy of the campaign into Italy, thought neither of shoes nor of hay. But when it came to carrying out his plan he discovered that his troops were too badly shod even for the preliminary marches, and that the horses were improperly fed. He used the last available financial resources he had to furnish each man with a pair of shoes; he discovered that the feed was weighed on a false scale, and he took steps to remedy this abuse. The campaign might have failed for these reasons as well as through tactical errors.

Every great organizer has, at times, found it profitable to observe Napoleon’s maxim: no details are unimportant.