The Need for Constitutional Reform

by William Yandell Ellioit
[Whittlesey House, $2.50]
How long can the New Deal stay within the Constitution? This estimable document, will endure a lot of stretching, as has been demonstrated during the past couple of years, but there are limits to its elasticity. At the present rate of speed it is self-evident that the pressure for economic and social reform will in time necessitate a revision of the nation’s fundamental law. Professor Elliott of Harvard believes that such an overhauling will be found essential very soon because there can be no real or permanent recovery without it.
About half the book is devoted to a discussion of the reasons why the Constitution ought to be rewritten and the other half to a discussion of what the revamped Constitution ought to contain. Professor Elliott reaffirms his allegiance to democracy as a scheme of government., although he admits that his proposed changes would give us a political system vastly different from what we have. It would be shorn of virtually all the distinguishing features which have been associated with American government during the past hundred years.
To begin with, the principle of checks and balances would he thrown overboard. Candidates for the Presidency would be nominated by the House of Representatives, and the people would then choose one of them by direct election. The President-elect would select his own Vice President with the right of succession, thus assuring to the office a man of presidential calibre, not a mere balancer of the ticket.
The Senate would cease to represent the states. Instead the country would be divided into regional commonwealths, with eight Senators (elected by regional legislatures) allotted to each. To the elective Senators there should be added by presidential appointment, a group of ‘fifteen nationally known figures representing different types of expertness or of cultural distinction.’ Members of the House of Representatives would also be chosen from these regional areas by a system of proportional representation, but the President would have the right to dissolve the House once during his term and thus seek a new vote of confidence from the people.
Various radical changes in governmental procedure are likewise proposed. The Senate would no longer have power to amend financial measures. Changes in the budget, as submitted to the President, would require a two-thirds vote. The President would be given the right to veto individual items in any bill, thus putting an end to the practice of adding ‘riders.’ The Cabinet would be enlarged for special purposes into an executive council with a permanent secretariat. A general Economic Advisory Council, appointed by the President, would become a regular part of the governmental mechanism, with the duty of studying all projects of economic legislation. Finally, the powers of the Supreme Court would he curbed by taking out of the Constitution such requirements as ‘due process of law which limit legislative freedom in matters of social policy.
All in all, the author has mapped quite a sweeping programme. Students of political science will agree with some features of his plan, but will question both the soundness and the practicability oi others. Professor Elliott, as a matter of fact, has realized this so fully that he does not set forth any of his proposals as matured conclusions, but merely as tilings worth arguing about. One doubts that he would he willing to go to jail for any of them. Certainly they are worth discussion if there is any likelihood of our having a constitutional convention within the next half-dozen years. The book contains plenty of ammunition for political controversy.
WILLIAM BENNETT MUNRO