An Experiment in Labor Democracy

I

AMERICAN workers, in this period of the recovery, give evidence of dividing into two major distinctive groups, the employed and the unemployed. This article and the conclusions reached during its preparation apply only to employed workers. They have gone through the misfortunes of the depression and the trying uncertainties of the recovery and have solved their personal problems by getting jobs which they want to hold. Their attitude toward industry is more friendly than is apparent in the constant protests of the unemployed or the partially employed. Their major concern is to increase their working time per annum so that their wage income will not only increase but be steady.

Such workers are not concerned with the class struggle. They are not classconscious; they resist the implications of social stratification. When so-called liberals refer to the ‘class struggle’ in the United States, they use, perhaps for want of more accurate phraseology, European socialistic terms which do not apply to American conditions.

As soon as the American worker finds himself employed on a fairly permanent basis, he not only discards the ideas and slogans of the unemployed worker, but he reverts to American traditions which are democratic and capitalistic. He has no desire to accept a Communist or a Fascist philosophy of action. He wants to fit into the characteristic social and economic environment to which he is accustomed. The current swing to the Right in the United States is as apparent among employed workers as among small manufacturers and retailers who have survived both the depression and the recovery. The survivors have a renewed faith in the American experiment in democracy.

As long as this remains an American characteristic, enduring American institutions must follow the democratic formula. Labor organizations, representing employed workers, must follow the American plan of a free choice of representation by a system of publicly conducted elections. Not only must the representative of labor be selected by his immediate constituency, but he must be subject to pressure by that constituency alone. In a word, he must be truly representative. He must also be so acceptable to industry that he gets results for the workers without imperiling their wage income by strikes and other disturbances.

From this standpoint the Wagner Bill goes utterly wild in its implications. There can, however, be little question that the New York Senator also seeks cooperation between capital and labor; if he has been misdirected into perpetuating a class struggle in the United States, the error must be due to the complexities of drafting legislation rather than to ulterior motives. He undoubtedly confuses the interests of the employed and the unemployed worker by massing them together, which is also the practice of the American Federation of Labor, whose membership consists of both categories. The Guffey Bill is different; its collective-bargaining clauses can only be described as vicious and designed to set class against class.

The term ‘collective bargaining’ has been introduced into the discussion of, and legislation with regard to, the American labor problem. This phrase was undoubtedly accepted in the haste attending the writing of the NIRA; it contains the hidden meaning of a class struggle which could not have been premeditated, since it does not reflect the attitude of the American employed worker.

A more satisfactory term is ‘employee representation’ in management, for that is actually what the collective-bargaining clause of the NIRA has come to mean. It has indicated a method of coöperation between capital and labor within industry.

If, by collective bargaining, employee representation is meant, then the problem arises: How is representation to be determined with scientific accuracy? President Roosevelt, in his statement settling difficulties in the automobile industry, said: —

1. The employers agree to bargain collectively with the freely chosen representatives of groups and not to discriminate in any way against any employee on the ground of his labor union affiliations.

2. If there be more than one group, each bargaining committee shall have total membership pro rata to the number of men each member represents. . . .

4. The government makes it clear that it favors no particular union or particular form of employee organization or representation. The government’s only duty is to secure absolute and uninfluenced freedom of choice without coercion, restraint, or intimidation from any source.

This statement by the President made it impossible for the American Federation of Labor or any group to assert its right to represent all of labor in the automobile industry, for he did not designate the form or type of employee representation. In fact, Mr. Roosevelt made it inevitable that some new and impartial organ should be established to give the workers an opportunity to select their own representatives. It was impossible to utilize existing agencies, for, whereas group representation was recognized, the proportional characteristic of that representation threw the ultimate decision back upon the individual worker. In the recent Chevrolet strike in Toledo, this principle received further affirmation, the company proposal, which had been rejected by the Federal Union, being submitted to the whole body of workers for decision.

The application of a referendum to the individual employed worker brings into existence a wonderful opportunity to test, by a laboratory experiment, two important elements in industrial relations: first, the kind of representation that the American worker prefers; second, whether, while selecting that type of representation, the worker implies a desire to change the existing political and economic order. For instance, if, in the course of such a selection, a very large number of workers should indicate a preference for Communism, it would be possible to reach the conclusion that these workers desired a fundamental political change.

II

The automobile industry is particularly suitable for such an experiment. In the first place, roughly 350,000 men and women are employed directly in this industry. They represent every bracket of skilled and unskilled workers. They represent every type of American — native Americans of old families, firstand second-generation immigrants, Canadians, Northern and Southern Europeans, and Negroes. Higher wages paid in this industry have attracted to it men from all parts of the country and from all sorts of other industries. Its ramifications spread into countless allied crafts.

It is a seasonal industry, but in some of its divisions it has provided all-yearround employment. As a new industry, it has no physical holdovers from another industrial era, such as sweatshops and tenement employment. Finally, there is a vast public interest in the industry arising from the popularity of the automobile with the American people and because of a widespread ownership of stock in automobile companies. Its activities are usually frontpage news; anything concerning it is bound to have the full glare of publicity.

These circumstances make the experiment in selecting employee representation particularly important, for if the methods employed in the automobile industry are successful, then other industries are likely to pursue the same methods. Success can be measured by one yardstick only — namely, if strikes are avoided, if problems which arise in the industry are solved by conference and negotiation, and if labor shows a disposition to coöperate with capital. From the standpoint of employee representation, the success of the democratic experiment can be established only by the extent of workers’ participation in it. Opponents of the plan have tried to cause it to fail by non-participation and by the use of the strike weapon.

III

The history of the experiment is an important chapter in the record of labor in the United States. As far back as 1923—1924, an attempt was made by the American Federation of Labor to organize the automobile industry. This attempt failed, and with its failure are associated improvable charges that the labor leaders sold out to the automobile companies. At any rate this is clear: the labor leaders dropped the attempt to organize, and workers who had associated themselves with this effort were penalized and became antagonistic toward the American Federation of Labor.

Between 1924 and 1933 no serious attempt was made to organize the automobile workers. It is true that several craft unions exist in the industry, particularly in the making of parts; but no unions came into existence in the large plants, and it was utterly clear that the two principal producers of cars in this country, General Motors and Henry Ford, were unwilling to recognize unions in their plants.

In the summer of 1933, when the A. F. of L. was engaged in an organizational drive in every industry in the United States, William Collins, who had been in the earlier effort, came to Detroit to organize this industry. With him was associated Francis Dillon. Both represented the American Federation of Labor.

Collins is described as an Irishman who was brought up in England on non-socialistic, Manchester tradeunionism. Most men speak well of him, maintaining that he is a non-racketeering labor leader who really has the interests of the workers at heart, but who places organization first, even before the will of the workers. In his efforts in the summer of 1933, he was not at all successful in Detroit, but he seems to have accomplished much in the General Motors plants in Flint. It is noteworthy that Henry Ford was strictly ignored in this organizational drive, probably because it was certain that his position would be utterly uncompromising.

No attempt was made to organize an international union, which is the standard form of autonomous craft organization employed by the American Federation of Labor. Instead, a form of vertical union was organized which received a federal charter directly from the A. F. of L. This was a recognition of the fact that craft unionism would be unavailable in this industry. The principle of industrial trade-unionism was definitely recognized.

During the summer and autumn of 1933, Mr. Collins devoted himself to long and formal negotiations with various companies regarding discrimination in the employment and dismissal of workers, but his efforts were not productive of notable results, and finally, during February and March of 1934, he threatened to call an automobile strike. In fact, small and sporadic strikes were already taking place. The usual long list of demands was issued, including a 20 per cent rise in wages, which was prohibitive, first, because an increase had already been granted, and secondly, because cars were selling in a resisting market.

President Roosevelt and General Johnson were deeply concerned over this situation, because the automobile industry was the first to show signs of recovery, and its relationship to steel, electrical appliances, lumber, glass, and so forth, made it pivotal in the entire industrial recovery programme. The manufacturers and labor were asked to come to Washington to discuss the situation.

From all the information available, it was clear from the start that no agreement could hold if labor were represented either by Mr. William Green or by Mr. Collins. Organized workers demanded that they should be allowed to elect their own representatives, and they did not elect Mr. Collins. So far as I can learn, altogether twenty-three labor delegates went to Washington to attend the President’s conference; among them were delegates from Wisconsin, St. Louis, and Cleveland, whom the A. F. of L. sought to exclude on the ground that they had not been invited, but really because the delegation was too large.

Piecing together the various accounts of what happened in Washington, we find that a fight took place over this issue. Richard L. Byrd, Acting Secretary of the Pontiac Federal Union, a worker in the plant, attained prominence by leading the attack on Collins, insisting that the non-Michigan unions should attend. It would seem that this was really unimportant, but the delegates were seeking to establish the principle that the automobile workers must manage their own affairs, that no one could speak for them who had not been selected by them. It would be an exaggeration to say this involved an attack on the A. F. of L., but it was a very definite assertion of the right of the men to select their own leadership. Finally a conference was held in General Johnson’s office. I have put together the following account from various descriptions of what took place.

The General asked the labor delegates whether they had selected their spokesman who would sit on the Automobile Labor Board when it was eventually organized. Mr. Collins replied that they had, but one delegate interjected, ’Like hell we have!’

This brought the fight to General Johnson’s office, and he said it was up to the delegates to select their man before he could go any further. He then left the room, telling the delegates to hold an election during his absence. The Assistant Secretary of Labor, Mr. McGrady, is reported to have acted as teller.

Four candidates were nominated: Arthur E. Greer, president of Hudson No. 27 of the Associated Automobile Workers of America; John A. Bailey, president of Buick local of Flint, who was the A. F. of L. choice; A. L. Cook, Fisher Body Flint local of Federal Labor Unions; Richard L. Byrd, of the Pontiac Federal Union.

There was no majority on the first ballot, and Bailey and Byrd had to stand again for a final run-off. Bailey represented the A. F. of L.; Byrd did not represent opposition to the A. F. of L., but the principle of complete autonomy in the automobile industry. Byrd was elected, the votes standing 13-10.

On Saturday, March 24, negotiations between the labor delegates and General Johnson were adjourned indefinitely, but subject to call by General Johnson. The following day the delegates assembled at the Annapolis Hotel to discuss their position. They were not satisfied that things were moving smoothly. They felt that they were men from the country who had suddenly become involved in Washington politics and intrigue. They found themselves in an atmosphere of unreality.

The first step they took was to ask Mr. Dillon, the A. F. of L. representative, to leave the room, on the ground that they wanted a meeting of automobile workers with no one else present. Here was undoubtedly the first positive break with the A. F. of L., for it was a clear decision that no one could regard himself as an automobile worker’s representative who was not actually selected by the men in the shop.

Whether the men suspected President Roosevelt or General Johnson or the A. F. of L. is not clear. Certainly they suspected someone of trickery. Probably they suspected everyone. At any rate they sent President Roosevelt a telegram at about noon, announcing that unless a settlement was reached that day (Palm Sunday) they Avcre going home that night. They were weary of Washington politics.

At about two o’clock in the afternoon, General Johnson sent for them. He would take them to see the President, with whom they remained from four o’clock to six-thirty. At the Conference with the President, Mr. Green and Mr. Collins were present, at whose invitation I have not been able to ascertain; the men in the automobile industry who gave me the account say ‘they had butted in.’

The President stated the terms of his settlement of conflict, in the automobile industry. This the men accepted. In fact, after the meeting with the President, the delegates went to the A. F. of L. building in Washington, where they formally voted to accept these terms. There is no question of Mr. Green’s assumption of leadership at this meeting, which was quite harmonious.

IV

As a result of the settlement, on March 25, 1934, the Automobile Labor Board was established by the President. The Board consists of three members: Dr. Leo Wolman, the chairman; Nicholas Kelley, representing capital; and Richard L. Byrd, representing labor. Dr. Wolman is Professor of Economics at Columbia University. He has had a long history in the labor movement, particularly in connection with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, of which Sidney Hillman is president. General assumptions at the time of the appointment were that the representative of the public would lean in the direction of favoring labor. Mr. Kelley is the general counsel for the Chrysler Company and is the son of Florence Kelley, probably the most important woman labor leader of her time. He may be regarded as a typical big business executive. Richard L. Byrd was chosen by the labor delegates as already described.

The problem that faced the Board immediately was to define collective bargaining. President Roosevelt in his statement of March 25, 1934, sought to reduce 7(a) to what he termed ‘plain language’: —

(a) Employees have the right to organize into a group or groups.

(b) When such group or groups are organized they can choose representatives by free choice and such representatives must be received collectively and thereby seek to straighten out disputes and improve conditions of employment.

(c) Discrimination against employees because of their labor affiliations, or for any other unfair or unjust reason, is barred.

But this very plain language was not altogether helpful. For how was the Board to determine whether the workers had really organized into a group or groups? Or suppose workers wanted to be represented, but did not choose to join any group? Suppose the American Federation of Labor or the Communist unions or a company union asserted that it represented all the workers or an appreciable number of them, how could the Board determine whether the assertions had any foundation? Why not let the workers, the whole 350,000, speak for themselves? After all, we elect Presidents, Senators, governors, and judges at democratic elections — why not elect labor leaders at democratic elections?

The Board’s attitude toward employee representation was altogether sound. It did not expect miracles, or an overnight victory for some new theory of employer-employee relationship. It was seeking a method to find the true representatives of the workers, which could be applied year after year and which would be both efficient and just. Its attitude is stated in the following paragraph of a report: —

The Board regards collective bargaining as a peaceful process which can only be successfully worked out with patience and with understanding. It is perfectly clear from our experience that long-formed habits cannot be overnight changed by fiat, and that the experience and skill requisite to successful negotiators cannot be suddenly supplied by mandate. Both the industry and employees have already gone a long way in learning what is required of them under the law and orders of the Board, and in adjusting their policy to these requirements. The opportunities which now exist in the industry for employees to present their grievances and to have them considered and disposed of in joint conference are of inestimable value to the automobile workers and are so regarded by them.

The recognition of the democratic principle, with proportional representation for groups, ran counter altogether to the conception of a class struggle, as it did to the assertion of any particular group that it alone represented the workers. Furthermore, the recognition of the right of the workers in the plant to declare their decisions by a public but secret vote vitiated all attempts of outsiders to make assertions which could not be proved one way or the other. It limited voting to men actually employed in the industry and left out those who for one reason or another wanted a voice in the industry without being employed in it. It guaranteed the worker the right to have a voice in representation whether or not he joined any organization. He could be represented whether or not he paid initiation fees and dues. He was free to be an individualist or a socialist as he chose. This method of employee representation retained for the worker an uncoerced personality.

On December 7, 1934, the Board announced its intention to hold elections. In a proclamation it stated: —

The nominating and final elections will be held in the plant under the sole and direct supervision of agents of the Board, to ensure freedom and secrecy. The employees, according to the ballots being prepared by the Board, will nominate and vote for their representatives and will, if they so desire, specify the group with which their candidate is affiliated. The total of such specifications throughout the plant for each group shall determine the proportion which each of such groups will have on the bargaining agency. Those who do not specify a group will be treated as a group. Representatives will not be restricted to employees. Arrangements will include opportunity for employees not working at the time to participate.

The elections are conducted by the Board, representing the government, and are under the supervision of Professor Francis E. Ross of the University of Michigan. He employs a staff of men who care for the ballot boxes, act as tellers, and so forth. His men mark the precincts in the factory (for both the primary and the final elections); notices are posted in the factory announcing the election and indicating where the workers are to vote. These notices stipulate the time and place of the election, and the rules under which the election is held: ‘On the ballot used at this primary election, you may write in the name of any person you desire to have represent you in dealing with the management, and the labor group affiliation, if any, of your candidate. Representatives will not be restricted to employees.’

Foremen, subforemen, and group or gang leaders¹ who act in a supervisory capacity are not eligible to vote.

After the primary, the names of the two persons in each district (within the shop) who receive the largest number of votes appear on the final ballot and in the final election. One man is selected for each district, and the districts are numerous. For instance, I have before me the list for the Hudson Motor Car Company, which shows fifty-one districts in all their plants. Elections are, of course, held within the plants.

To assure proportional representation to groups, provision is made so that after the final election, if those representatives ‘receiving the largest number of votes for all districts do not provide proportional representation on the bargaining agency for all substantial labor groups, additional representatives will be added from among candidates receiving the next highest votes in the plant in any group entitled to more representatives.’

In both the primary and the final elections, a printed ballot is provided. In the primary election the ballot contains a blank space for the name of the nominee and the labor group affiliations. In the ballot for the final election, these data are printed and the worker makes a mark against the printed name.

There is no possibility of identifying the voter after the ballot has been cast. In the right-hand corner of the ballot is a small perforated space in which appears a numeral, which is torn off before the worker has voted and is destroyed. The purpose of the numeral is to check the number of ballots used, to prevent fraudulent voting.

The worker appears before a clerk of the Board, who has a voting list, that includes his name and his time-clock number. He identifies himself and is handed a ballot; then he goes into a booth which is closed after him. He marks his ballot, comes out of the booth, and throws his folded ballot into a sealed ballot box. The ballots are counted by Board tellers, and after the results are recapitulated the ballots are placed in a safe-deposit vault in Detroit.

In some districts there has been a small amount of electioneering, but by no means enough. When the workers are fully accustomed to the democratic method of selecting employee representatives, electioneering will undoubtedly become brisk. It is part of democracy that there should be a campaign for the candidates.

Two elements in this election must be emphasized. First, the workers can select any person to represent them, a man from the conveyor belt or a leader in Washington. The Board does not determine the qualifications of the representative — it only counts votes. Secondly, if a worker declines to indicate a labor group affiliation, it is assumed that he belongs to a mass of individualists who do not choose to be affiliated with any labor group. These unaffiliates, for purposes of proportional representation, are regarded as one group.

V

In this democratic election of employee representatives, up to April 19 a total of 163,150 workers have voted in the primary elections in 63 automobile plants. They represent 85 per cent of the workers eligible to vote. If account is taken of those who were absent from the plants on the days when the voting took place, it appears that 89 per cent of those at work in the plants actually voted.

It must here be noted that the American Federation of Labor had instructed its members not to participate in the election. The A. F. of L. does not approve of this democratic method of selecting labor representatives and frankly used its influence to cause the elections to fail. Are we, then, to assume that the 11 per cent who did not vote are all A. F. of L. adherents, and, if so, is that a measure of the maximum strength of the A. F. of L. in the automobile industry?

Taking the report of April 19, we find the following interesting figures: —

These figures show a very clear majority for individualistic representation. The percentage has been somewhat decreased during the past weeks, but the size of the majority is unmistakable. It is indicative of an unwillingness on the part of most workers in this industry to be represented by outsiders. It is an assertion that the automobile workers seek to manage their own affairs.

The next highest group arc the company unions, showing a representation of 13.3 per cent. The two ‘Rightist’ elements, then, show a representation of 81.9 per cent of the workers in the industry voting in a secret ballot. It is significant that the company unions represent a larger group than the Federal Unions affiliated with the A. F. of L. If it is true, as so many liberals suggest, that the workers desire to repudiate the company unions, then this was the chance to do it. Even an American Federation of Labor official, counseling his men not to vote, admitted that if they cast a blank ballot no one would know who did it. Why, then, could these men not have used this opportunity to repudiate the company union? The only answer is that they did not wish to.

The American Federation of Labor is next on the list, with 8.6 per cent. This vote represents a large increase over previous voting, when the Federation showed about 4 per cent. Either the Federation has quietly notified more of its members to vote, or in some of the plants the attitude toward the plan is more favorable. For instance, in one plant in Toledo, the A. F. of L. carried every district. However, here arises another question of statesmanship. So far the American Federation has ignored the election, but some of its members have been elected employee representatives. If any one of them is seated as an A. F. of L. affiliate, does that mean that the A. F. of L. accepts the system of democratic elections of employee representatives? Here again the Federation will face the necessity of making a decision on a question of principle, which it will prefer to avoid. At any rate it faces the fact that the elections are actually taking place and that the workers are voting. It may charge influence and even coercion, but so far there has not been a scintilla of evidence that the votes do not represent the freely expressed opinion of the workers. Unsubstantiated charges by a disappointed organization are to be expected and can be ignored.

The next highest vote goes to the Associated Automobile Workers of America, which represents elements, restless elements, among the Federal Unions who resent the A. F. of L. policy of appointing the leadership of an industry from outside. They particularly resent the assumption that anyone can speak for the industry except the men in the shop.

Several of the organizations are the craft unions among the skilled workers. The Mechanics’ Educational Society of America is an organization of tool and die makers formed in the summer of 1933 as an organization for the intellectual improvement of the workers. Matthew Smith became its leader and turned it into a trade-union. Smith is said to be a Socialist and a brilliant conversationalist, but when he ran a strike in Detroit, in 1933, it was badly done from the standpoint of both the industry and the workers. The Auto Workers’ Union is a Communist organization which has now ceased to function.

If the election is studied from the standpoint of the workers’ attitude toward the political and economic organization of society, not more than 100 votes out of 163,000, or a very tiny fraction of a per cent, voted for a fundamental change. More than 90 per cent frankly endorsed the current order in society.

This vote may be terribly upsetting to those who have reached positive a priori decisions as to relations of capital and labor in industry. Statements are constantly emanating from Washington as to what the workers want and why. Here is a laboratory test. It is a carefully protected test to avoid any form of contamination. It wholly disproves the NRA theory that if the A. F. of L. were not recognized as representing all of labor a revolution would come immediately; it disproves the liberal theory that labor is antagonistic to capital; it disproves the Wagner and Guffey Bill theories that employee representation must be through the A. F. of L. because the workers want it so.

It proves this: there is now a clearcut cleavage in American industry between the employed and the unemployed worker. The employed worker is conservative, cooperative, and independent; the unemployed worker is clamoring for protection. The employed worker seeks to run his own affairs; the unemployed worker joins the A. F. of L. and similar organizations in the hope of getting a job. And it would appear, not from these election results but from the tone in this industry, that as the employed workers become more sure of their jobs, through the operations of employee representation and the safeguarding of seniority systems, they concern themselves more with the welfare of the industry than with the support of the union. This is the American characteristic of labor, and the election proves it conclusively.

It is pertinent to this discussion to call the reader’s attention to situations which illustrate the policy of the A. F. of L. The Chevrolet strike in Toledo, which began in May, was a frontal attack not so much on General Motors as on the National Labor Board. The objective of the A. F. of L. Federal Union in this factory was to force General Motors to reject the President’s settlement and the authority of the Automobile Labor Board. Other questions were secondary and, as the result shows, could have been readily solved by discussions between the workers and the manager of the Chevrolet factory in Toledo, for in this company a policy of decentralization is employed and local managers have large powers. This the workers know. There was no reason for a strike.

The Toledo factory presents an extraordinary situation. Whereas in nearly all of the factories in the automobile industry the A. F. of L. shows a very small following, in two it has real strength — the Cleveland Fisher Body and the Toledo Chevrolet. In the latter the Federation carried the primary election in every district, totaling about 1300 out of 2200 votes. It was the first time that the Federation fully partook in the vote. On the eve of the final election the local leaders struck to force majority rule instead of proportional representation. Instead of disciplining the local union for an unauthorized breach of an agreement to which the President of the United States is a party, A. F. of L. officials went to the support of the strikers, with the objective of discrediting the Automobile Labor Board and enforcing the principle of majority rule as specified in the not yet passed Wagner Bill.

As this article goes to press, the strike is settled. It has not brought about the collapse of the Automobile Labor Board, nor any change in the principles of the President’s settlement. But the fight will go on. Whenever an opportunity to strike offers, the Federation will use this weapon to project itself as the sole agency for collective bargaining. These strikes will continue no matter what effect they have upon the economic welfare of the country.

General Motors, in this particular instance, served the Federation rather badly. It met demands for increased pay liberally, thus forcing a clarification of the issue. The Federation never stated the issue with candor. It is not wages, it is not hours, it is not the welfare of the individual worker that is involved in such strikes. The single issue is recognition of the A. F. of L. in spite of the vote of the workers in the entire industry. If the reader will follow the situation with care he will find that one and one issue only is behind the strikes which are crippling the national efforts for recovery.