Italy Abroad
I
FATE has decreed that Italy, more than any other European country, must participate in that sphere of foreign policy where international relations are most complicated. She is geographically situated at a point of intense friction between France and Germany, the two most warlike European nations, whose antagonism has made the history of our peninsula an uninterrupted series of foreign invasions and oppressions. Obliged to develop a naturally poor soil, deprived of the first necessities of life, suffering from a lack of capital resources, and saddled with the vast needs of a constantly growing population, Italy could not fail to identify herself with the advancement of some international régime that would guarantee peace, liberty, and free exchange. Necessity compelled her to join whatever cooperative effort directed itself against a hegemony established by force of arms.
Until Fascism came into power Italy’s foreign policy had always been governed by this consideration and had even resisted the mirage of colonial expansion. She was the last nation to join the concert of great European Powers, all of them struggling for supremacy, and she felt that her position and purpose could not be better defined than by the words ‘proletarian nation’ which her own sons had given themselves. The bitter needs of daily life, the necessity for security, and the realization of the duties which her principles involved, soon taught her that she could be a great Power only if she became the interpreter and even the inspiration of agreements and understandings between all nations.
The policy she followed during the fifty years before the Great War was necessarily directed to this end. In a Europe built on the fragile pedestal of equilibrium, the Triple Alliance offered her the one means of existence and peaceful prosperity, since it afforded protection from her two possible adversaries, Austria-Hungary and France. The sudden outburst of the Great War quickly proved the extreme importance of Italy’s attitude. There was a moment, it is true, when there were secret discussions of the conditions under which Italy would intervene, and it was vaguely hoped that she might be able to launch a Nationalist programme. It was, indeed, this hope that inspired those two honorable gentlemen, Salandra and Sonnino, when they concluded the famous London Pact on the twenty-sixth of April, 1915, which assured their country of increased territory even beyond the frontier limits to which she was justly entitled.
But there is another side to the story. At the end of the war Italy was aflame with Nationalism, but she was not long in recovering her true sense of responsibility. Ever since July 1919, Italian foreign policy has openly recognized that its essential rôle was the pacification of Europe and the methodical elimination of international discord even at the price of the nation’s own prestige. The essence of this policy which Nitti and Sforza inspired and created cannot be better expressed than in the words of Count Sforza himself: ‘In our own egotistical interest, which once more coincides with the interest of Europe, we ought to favor all attempts tending to consolidate peace and to combat all alliances beneath which we feel or suspect the old machines of war that were destroyed on the Piave. Only the kind of person who has just discovered Machiavelli can believe that Italy is able to derive any advantage from European dissensions.’ The results steadily achieved by Italian diplomacy between 1919 and 1922 in following this programme were vast and fruitful indeed, as the following manifestations prove. In applying the Treaty of Versailles, Italy made every effort to bridge little by little the abyss separating France and Germany, and to combat anything that did not take account of the inescapable fact that a compact nation of sixty million people, situated in the middle of Europe, cannot — even if it has lost the war — be forcibly expropriated of the genius of its race, or shorn of its national dignity, or methodically blocked in its desperate efforts to raise itself from defeat. Italy, through the voices of her spokesmen, did not hesitate to draw attention to the dangers of such a policy and to show how absurd it was to base the economic reorganization of Europe on the hope of hypothetical and impossible reparations. We preached instead the necessity of a progressive understanding between victors and vanquished.
Italy was the one victorious Power that sent no troops of occupation to the Rhine. She was also responsible for the San Remo Conference in 1920 and for the Conference at Spa, where for the first time the representatives of the Allies and the representatives of the German Reich discussed reparation terms together.
In adjusting its affairs with Yugoslavia, in applying the Treaty of St. Germain, and in attacking the delicate problem of Fiume, the Italian Government pursued the single objective of eliminating as soon as possible any cause of dissension with its Eastern neighbors. In consequence, cordial negotiations were quickly opened with Yugoslavia which presently bore fruit in the Treaty of Rapallo. At the same time, the Italian Government extended the principles of international law into new provinces by solemnly affirming its duty to respect German and Slavic minorities in its territories and by keeping its word.
In a similar spirit Italy offered to alter her Albanian policy and, by spontaneously renouncing the position guaranteed her in the Pact of London, helped to extinguish one of the most dangerous firebrands of Balkan wars. During 1920, Italian troops evacuated Albania, and the country’s independence was promptly recognized. Furthermore, Italy was the only great Allied Power that did not participate direct ly or indirectly in the unfortunate anti-Bolshevist crusade organized by the so-called ‘White’ generals. The country’s loyal abstention from any such adventure was further shown by its refusal in 1919 to yield to the solicitations of the English and occupy Georgia.
During this same period the Italian Government’s emigration policy consisted in applying on a large scale the policy of free emigration as a means of regulating employment. In seeking this end many negotiations were undertaken with France and likewise with the Argentine Republic, Brazil, and the United States.
II
When Fascism came into power, Italy as a nation, and as a collective body of ideas, traditions, and interests, suddenly found herself unable to continue developing a foreign policy that was true to herself. The dictatorship did not represent the triumph of any principle or programme. To be sure, many borrowed ideas helped to mask its intrigues — Nationalism, imperialism, bourgeois conservatism, and antiBolshevism; but each of these ideas was successively denied. Of recent years we have witnessed Italian Fascism endeavoring in the name of Nationalism to establish alliances with the Pan-Germanic element. In the name of imperialism it has offered its services and sympathies to the Monarchist Party in France, and in order to support capitalist institutions it has endeavored to seal agreements with Bolshevist Russia.
The truth is that Italian foreign policy had to give place to Mussolini’s personal politics, as he himself admitted when he cynically declared to a French journalist that Italian foreign policy was the province of a single individual.
It therefore becomes necessary to unveil some of its secret motives, all of which can be roughly reduced to these two fundamentals: First of all, since Europe’s great need is for peace, Fascism exploits this desire, winning the indulgence and tolerance of the Great Powers by means of a theatrically aggressive attitude. In the second place, it keeps setting in motion new and ever greater intrigues to solidify reactionary groups wherever they appear, with a view to creating a general antidemocratic attitude which would surely be disastrous in the long run for Italian interests, but which would favor the consolidation of the dictatorship.
The idea that at first obsessed Mussolini was to utter a series of sensational declarations. In 1922 he told the world at large that he was going to deal with international problems from precisely the opposite point of view from that which all his predecessors had taken. Although diplomatic discussions were foreign to him, and although he was ignorant of the questions of the hour, he hoped that international politics might be regulated by the same forces and the same methods with which he had dominated his country’s domestic life.
Events, however, soon obliged him to choose between the English and the French points of view in foreign affairs, and he did not hesitate to decide in favor of France, where the Bloc National seemed to guarantee his policy of force the greatest assistance. Paris at that time had just begun applying the Nationalist remedy, and ministerial and military circles alike were dazzled by a charming but chimerical prospect. This prospect, or rather mirage, was the removal of the German frontier to the left bank of the Rhine. Looking toward the past rather than toward the future, France gave herself over to pursuing this lovely impossible dream.
But a clash between two powerful forces finally steered French policy along the paths of wisdom. On the one hand, the industrial barons had laid down an ambitious programme of controlling the whole Continental oil production. On the other hand, the illusion persisted that certain legal formulæ in the Versailles Treaty had to be judged as if they were Holy Writ, and that any ensuing complications would have to be taken for granted. In January 1923, these two divergent theses came to grips when the French and English points of view on German reparations struggled for mastery. Bonar Law, although at death’s door, came to the French capital with a generous offer in the hope of preventing a decision that would lead to irreparable disaster. The controversy was decided, as we know, by the cringing attitude of the Italian ambassador, who had been ordered to follow Poincaré. The Ruhr was occupied and European recovery retarded about two years.
It was at this moment that Mussolini conceived the idea of forming a Continental bloc against England, an idea which even France carefully refrained from taking seriously.
Then of a sudden came the tragedy at Janina, which cost the lives of the members of the Tellini Mission. The Duce believed that the hour had at last arrived to show the world his qualities of leadership and the irresistible force of his new diplomatic methods. The unfortunate occupation of Corfu, accompanied by his Napoleonic outbursts against Greece, merely succeeded in bringing about the collapse of his illusions. On this occasion, however, his defeat helped him to resume the path of prudence. He felt the universal hostility in the air and decided it would be wise to confine himself to proud isolation.
Between September 1923 and October 1924, even profane eyes could detect a serious crisis in Fascist foreign policy. The bitter lesson of Corfu, the constantly changing French policy toward reparations, and the arrival in power of the British Labor Party, convinced the Fascist leader that he had to assure an alarmed Continent of his peaceful intentions. In January 1924, he complacently forgot his earlier ultimatums to Yugoslavia and concluded the famous Nettuno conventions with Pashić, which embodied part of a project Count Sforza had long since prepared. Meanwhile, however, new events were occurring.
In May 1924, the Cartel des Gauches won a brilliant victory in France and raised to power the very men who regarded the Duce as the apostle of White reaction. In June the civilized world learned the ghastly fate of the martyred Giacomo Matteotti. Mussolini felt that he was banned. To irritate France and England he pretended to throw himself into the arms of Soviet Russia, and made believe that these two proletarian nations stood shoulder to shoulder against the sordid imperialism of the great West European Powers. In order to reopen the breach between France and Germany and resume the conflict that had set France and England at loggerheads in January 1922, he secretly bent every effort to depreciate in advance whatever results might be gained by the Conference of London, where experts were endeavoring to come to some agreement in regard to German indemnities. In order to ridicule the myth of democracy, he did everything in his power to wreck the Geneva Protocol signed by Herriot and MacDonald. But it is impossible for the spokesman of a great country to satisfy his caprices with impunity, and within a few months it was more than clear that Italy was on the point of losing all prestige and all international influence.
III
Luckily for Fascism, the British elections occurred in October 1924. Mr. Baldwin and his Conservatives, obsessed by the idea of safeguarding the Empire from the agents of Moscow, believed it urgently necessary to station a policeman in the Mediterranean. No one seemed better fitted for this rôle than Mussolini, who quickly saw the advantages he could reap and did not hesitate to offer enthusiastic support to his former foe. The bargain was sealed at once. Italy would be at the orders of Downing Street and serve English interests in Turkey, Egypt, Abyssinia, and Russia. England for her part would shut her eyes to Italy’s seizure of Albania and would help in the projected exploitation of Eritrea in Africa.
It was at this moment that Mussolini first devised his scheme of establishing Italian supremacy in the Balkans. Thanks in part to the glorious maritime traditions of the Venetian Republic, the Balkans had always seemed to Italy an extremely interesting part of the world. In spite of the hostile vigilance of Austria-Hungary, Italian commerce even before the war had successfully opened up profitable dealings with Montenegro, Serbia, and Rumania. After the war this programme of peaceful penetration was diligently resumed, with the definite view of opening up a large market for surplus Italian products. This was the idea that inspired the policies of Nitti and Sforza, who believed that the Adriatic problem could be solved only by having Italy establish firm friendship with her Eastern neighbors. The collapse of democratic government in Italy, however, upset this policy of agreements and alliances.
Mussolini had his own plans for the Balkans, which differed from the plans of his predecessors in this vital respect: Italian penetration, instead of following the route of commercial exchange with the sole view of opening up the hinterland for the benefit of Italian industry, allied itself with the general staff and endeavored to encircle Yugoslavia and give Rome control over the mercenary insurrectionists in the Balkans. England had already allowed this movement full freedom of action, and therefore Mussolini at once set about gaining political and economic control of Albania and concluding a life-and-death alliance with the Hungarian Regency. He then set about extending his sphere of influence to Bulgaria and later to Greece and Rumania, thus hoping to undermine the Little Entente.
The first step in his plan was quickly gained, though with some difficulty. As soon as the Italian troops had left Albania in September 1920, the country took up the work of national reorganization, and, thanks to the disinterested assistance of Giolitti’s Cabinet, succeeded in getting the Council of Ambassadors to issue its famous declaration of November 9, 1921, which once more proclaimed the independence of Albania. Until 1924, nothing remarkable occurred save for an abortive attempt at rebellion on the part of the feudal Beys, led by Ahmed Zogu, which broke out in May 1923, at the instigation of the Italian Minister. In December 1924, London ordered the great offensive against Albania to begin. It was engineered with the assistance of Greece and Yugoslavia, under the pretext of setting up a barrier against Russia, since the Albanian leaders were about to open up diplomatic relations with the Bolsheviki, at the insistence, to be sure, of the Great Powers.
Two armed bands suddenly attacked the tiny republic on its northern and southern frontiers. One of these was organized on Yugoslavian soil and the other in Greece, and they both won quick successes. Ahmed Zogu immediately became president of the republic. He promptly paid off the men who had helped him by handing out some land to Yugoslavia, by offering England the petroleum concession, and by giving Italy the banking monopoly of the country.
In 1926 Italy sealed the Tirana Pact with Ahmed Zogu. This placed Albania under the political control of Rome, which was empowered to appoint the members of the Albanian Government; and in 1927 a second pact of alliance was signed at Tirana, which placed Albania under Italian military control. The structure which was thus erected under British protection was finally crowned by Ahmed Zogu’s recent elevation to the throne.
IV
At the same time that it was occupying Albania, the Fascist Government entered into a close political and military alliance with the Hungarian Regency. The fruits of this alliance have included the secret arming of Magyar troops in flagrant violation of the treaties, open support of the Hungarian pretension that certain articles of the Treaty of Trianon should be removed in order to release Hungarian optants from Rumanian legislation, and even an indirect campaign for the revision of the entire Trianon Treaty.
I do not deny certain defects, contradictions, and even iniquities in the five peace treaties on which it was hoped to build a new Europe. Although these treaties were inspired by the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, they are actually nothing more or less than a weapon in the hands of the conquerors, who are enabled to pursue their own ends under cover of a magic formula. Nevertheless, I still maintain that it is insane to attempt reopening the discussion of all European frontiers under the pretext of correcting a small injustice, especially so soon after the Armistice. The truth is that all the treaties of 1919 are so intimately interlocked that it would be impossible to demolish one without ruining the others. Moreover, history teaches us that it is hard to make territorial adjustments without resorting to war, and revisionists of good faith recognize that they must wait until Europe has really settled down to a peaceful existence, until the League of Nations is firmly entrenched, until France is no longer obsessed with the idea of security, until the East European countries are firmly established, until England has swallowed some of her impossible pride, and until Russia has definitely disarmed.
Mussolini’s defense of the Hungarian demand for treaty revision was skillfully prepared by Lord Rothermere’s Conservative papers. It was first revealed by an interview between Lord Rothermere and the Duce, and then by a speech before the Italian Senate, in which Mussolini affirmed that the Treaty of Trianon had done violence to Hungary and that treaties are not untouchable, but should be reopened for discussion in case of need. This strange attempt met with no great success and merely produced a firmer solidarity among the Little Entente.
The Duce’s intrigues in Macedonian Bulgaria were no more successful. It was obvious that Italy had connived with revolutionary bandits in the recent bloody reaction throughout the Balkans. Indeed these efforts became so evident and dangerous that England and France believed it necessary to protest at Sofia and invite the Bulgarian Government to take measures against bandits who were enjoying the secret protection of Rome. Although Mussolini’s Balkan policy was at first inspired and encouraged by England, it is now alarming even the most proFascist partisans on the other side of the Channel, as the naval agreement with France proves.
V
Let us now turn to the latest report presented in the Italian Chamber by Signor Torre, President of the Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs. This report affirms Italy’s right to maintain her exclusive tutelage over Albania and confesses that Fascist foreign policy will bend every effort to break up the Little Entente. Fundamentally Mussolini is following the former programme of the Austrian Empire and is adapting to his own purposes the old slogans of ‘Divide et impera’ and ‘Drang nach Osten.’ He is exciting antagonism in the Balkans with a view to dominating there himself. He is exploiting the traditional hatreds that divide the nations of Eastern Europe with a view to becoming the arbiter of peace and war.
The development of this programme and the adoption of such methods could not fail to clash with the prudent policies of Downing Street. To be sure the Conservative English Cabinet had been hypnotized by the Bolshevist menace and by danger of a grand Slavic alliance, and had believed that it would be wise to give Fascism the task of blocking a possible Soviet outlet on the Mediterranean. The Conservative Government refuses, however, to pay for this police service by abandoning English trade in the Near East to Italy, and by allowing the Duce to toy with the peace of Europe. Baldwin’s Government soon perceived that the crazy attitude of Fascism and its Balkan policy would seriously alarm France, and it is well to recall that one of the most characteristic Fascist manifestations consists of anti-French provocation. From its birth. Fascist Italy has ranged itself against the France that stood for the rights of man and against the France from which modern European civilization radiates.
Every means was employed to separate these two Latin countries by an abyss of misunderstanding and dislike. This is proved by the absurd campaign for the annexation of Nice, Savoy, and Corsica; by Italian penetration into Tunis; and by the public encouragement to German Nationalists to form an antidemocratic and antipacifist government.
The tolerance of the Quai d’Orsay has been almost unbelievable. It is well to recall, for instance, that all Italian Consulates in France have been openly transformed into centres of espionage that direct their efforts against the employees of the department of public safety. In December 1927, when the Franco-Yugoslavian Treaty was signed and M. Briand expressed the hope that Italy would associate herself with this peaceful act, Mussolini unleashed a violent press campaign against Italy’s Latin neighbor and alarmed all Europe, although a few days later he was obliged to admit to the Council of Ministers that this very treaty was remarkably loyal and quite in accord with the normal relations between States. The following January, M. Briand offered to discuss problems bearing on the two nations, but the Duce impudently replied that the first condition of any discussion would be the recognition on the part of France of Italy’s predominance in the Balkans and in the Adriatic, and that France would have to modify her Yugoslavian policy, admit Italy into the administration of affairs in Tunis, and expel all anti-Fascist exiles from French soil.
Thus it is hardly astonishing that English policy toward Italy is undergoing a prudent change, now that certain adjustments have been made in the personnel of the Foreign Office. The sudden discovery of the AngloFrench Naval Agreement caused the Duce to explode against such irreverence toward the Kellogg Pact.
This last outburst reveals most clearly the characteristics and aims of Fascist international activity, and it is by objectively appreciating this attitude that civilized people will best learn the lesson of Fascist experience. It is this: —
The work of the League of Nations will amount to nothing but a play on words if the great organization at Geneva still hides behind the convenient principle of nonintervention and pretends to forget that it came into being to make justice reign on earth, and that it is useless to renounce war as an instrument of national policy if one lacks the courage to brand as illegal any attempt to embody this very policy in the person of a despot whose power, based on brute force, extends beyond the influence and control of public opinion.