Toward Peace

I

IT is possible that our American friends may care to hear, from one who is quite independent of official pressure and suggestion, how Europe is getting on without American official help, and whether we have made any progress of late in that pacification which is certainly a very ardent desire on the part of most people, however strange and occasionally absurd may be some of the methods to which we have had to resort in order to attain our purposes.

I think that we may expect the sympathy, at least, of a great body of opinion in the United States, for, without complaining of the action of your country after the war, all the world knows that the reversal of the American undertaking to go bail for French security after the Peace has been the main reason for the very great difficulties which we have encountered in putting Europe on its legs again. On the other hand, we have had the active sympathy and the very valuable help of several American citizens who have taken a prominent if unofficial part in reconstruction, and their names, at least, will always be remembered with gratitude by this generation and will assuredly be greatly honored by the historians of the future.

The London Conference of 1924 is certainly a landmark in the reconstruction of Europe. France and England had to settle their differences and to agree upon a common policy before anything serious could be effected. If that was done it was primarily thanks to the Dawes Plan, and next to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and M. Herriot, the Prime Ministers of England and France, who, by mutual concessions, created an atmosphere which permitted the great work of pacification seriously to be begun.

Europe owes a debt to these two Prime Ministers for having determined that the long wrangle over Reparations should cease. Possibly M. Herriot made the greatest sacrifices because France had been so long convinced that the Ruhr sanctions would succeed. That they had some influence upon German resolutions must be admitted, but M. Poincaré missed a chance of coming out of the business with a certain amount of glory when he failed to seize the chance offered by the cessation of active opposition on the part of the Germans. He made no use of that moment, and in the end the patience of the French became exhausted. They put out the Bloc National, and returned a party of the Left to power.

This very great change represented a real reversal of French sentiments, which was not immediately recognized in England. France had grown tired of isolation; she had been disturbed by the condition of her state finances; she had come to regard a militarist policy with aversion; and with some dread she remembered that she was up against a nation of sixty millions who were constantly increasing, while the birth rate of France showed no signs of improving. The French people decided that they had taken the wrong road and would follow M. Poincaré no longer. They decided that their best course was to revive the Entente Cordiale with England, and for this purpose they were prepared to make terms which would enable our two people to work together. That was the instruction which the French general election of 1924 gave to the Herriot Government when it assumed office, and M. Herriot carried it out when he made terms with us at the London Conference.

Before indicating the possibilities of the revival of a real Entente Cordiale I must refer to what followed in September during the fifth meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations. The League has many merits and some defects. No one should wish idealism to be banned from a world that has little enough of it, but in the realm of practical affairs idealism must be kept within bounds. The worst thing about the League is that the majority of its members appear to be idealists. All applaud each other’s speeches in the Assembly and form a mutual admiration society in which each tries to cap the idealism of the last speaker, and to go one better. Upon this most unworldly, enthusiastic, and devoted band there descended three representatives of our late Labor Government, with the firm and fixed determination that they would strike a deadly blow at war.

The plan was simple. Establish first of all that arbitration should be compulsory. Accept next that compulsory arbitration provides security. Conclude that security permits disarmament, and the thing is done. So it would be if the premises were right — but they happen to be wrong. Compulsory arbitration has many warm admirers, and aforetime I have been permitted to advocate it in the Atlantic Monthly, hoping that the United States would take the lead in it. If we have arbitration as a law of the world in disputes between Powers, then it must be compulsory, because if these Powers are permitted to claim that honor or vital interests prevent them from arbitrating, then the whole virtue of arbitration falls to the ground. It was a great point gained at Geneva that arbitration should be compulsory, and even if the present form of the Protocol disappears it will be necessary to return to the principle of compulsory arbitration.

With this was coupled the excellent American suggestion that the aggressor in a dispute should be the Power that refused to arbitrate. That was a slightly rough-and-ready but still a Solomon-like means of identifying the Power that was in the wrong. Such Power was then to be banned with bell, book, and candle, and all the mighty powers of the League were to be directed against him. That sounded all right till we looked into the matter, when we found that the League could not move a ship, an aeroplane, or a man, for the excellent reason that it had no military forces at its disposal. The League, in short, could only recommend certain action to the Leaguers, but each separate Power became the judge of what it should do. The aggressor might find the world ready to move all its armies and fleets against him, or it might not. Certainly no country would be in a hurry to attack a previously friendly country, and in fact the possibly complete powerlessness of the League jumped to their eyes. In spite of this, the idealists and others, led if not driven by our Labor men, said, ‘Here is your security,’ and proceeded to call a disarmament conference for June 1925. Nay, more— it was artfully contrived, in order to keep everybody in line, that if the disarmament conference failed the whole of the Protocol should be scrapped. It was artful, because there was much good in the Protocol, and many if not all the States represented at Geneva desired to keep the good things. I can only believe that France and a few followers swallowed the Protocol holusbolus because they wanted to keep in with England; for certainly few Frenchmen approve of the proposed conference of next June.

The fact was that no real security was offered by the League to a country which disarmed, and that consequently no country could disarm. If we all disarmed how could we keep an aggressor in order? Disarmament is not a plank of the League Convention. What the Convention lays down in Article VIII is that each Power should reduce its armaments ‘to the minimum compatible with national security,’ and that is a perfectly sound and reasonable provision to which no exception can be taken. In this case each State preserves its sovereign rights, and is not bound to enlarge or reduce its forces according to some arbitrary scale arranged by the League. An artificial scale for the reduction of armaments is a wholly impracticable proposition. No one ever has found or ever will find a formula for reducing the world’s armaments in an equitable manner. I sat on a Peace Conference at The Hague in 1899, when we attempted to square this circle and hopelessly failed. Even supposing that we were all idealists, and all disarmed, the strongest Power would be the one with the largest population and with the most complete industrial equipment which could rapidly be diverted to the manufacture of war material.

The Japanese threw a bomb among the idealists at the close of the session, when everybody wanted to get away.

The injury done was patched up by phrases which may mean anything or nothing. If they mean that the Japanese may break the written or unwritten laws of the United States and the British Dominions respecting the yellow races, then the phrases are useless, for everyone knows that neither the United States nor the British Dominions will admit any claim of the sort without war, nor will care a hang for any arbitral decision which may order them to do so. If the phrases do not mean this, what do they mean? The immediate effect of the Japanese amendments, as finally drafted, has made it impracticable for us to sign the Protocol until the Dominions have been consulted.

But this particular issue is not the only reason why the Protocol must be amended. The disarmament conference of next June is not honestly acceptable to any leading nation. It is founded on a complete illusion; and no one will be more relieved than the French when they learn that the conference is postponed sine die. On the other hand, much of the Protocol is good and worth preserving, and our Conservative Government certainly hopes to preserve it when all the unreasonable things have been taken out of it.

Disarmament and even reduction of armaments cannot come in a hurry or by the fiat of any League or SuperState that may arise. If a means for arbitrating compulsorily be accepted by the world, and a long course of a few score years demonstrates that the plan works, and succeeds in the difficult cases and against great Powers, then it is conceivable that, little by little, armaments will fall for the simple reason that there is no employment for them. A century of peace may not be too long for a trial of the perfected League system; and in the meantime the best thing to do is to perfect the League and not to destroy it by visionary proposals.

II

Americans who are anti-Leaguers may well smile when they see what a morass the idealists have led us into at Geneva, but human beings commit follies at all times, well-intentioned ones as well as others, and our present business is to revise the Protocol on the first occasion open to us and to bring ourselves back to the world of realities. No doubt this will be done, and when it is done the Geneva Protocol will stand and may prove a benefit to the world. If there are no new principles in the Protocol or in a revised Protocol there will be better definition of the Covenant, and that is something. Our Labor men tried to disarm the world by a coup de main. They have failed, and the sooner we get back to common-sense arrangements the better for the world. Does any American believe that, had an American been a member of the League, these follies would have been perpetrated?

Meantime Europe has to look after itself and is doing so by a system of regional accords that are considered a much better protection than the shadowy forces of the League of Nations. Many of us here wish to see a regional accord of a purely defensive character arranged between England, France, and Belgium, designed to enable us to combine in case of attack upon our European territory, and strictly regional in its scope. We want it because there is at present no security for France and Belgium on their eastern frontiers, and because we cannot permit that a hostile Power should again overrun Belgium and northeastern France. It is true that Germany has been to a large extent disarmed, and that the French army is still strong, but the weight of Germany’s sixty millions, the constant proofs which we receive that a gigantic system of camouflage is in operation to renew German effective armaments, and the hostile attitude of German Nationalists, make it necessary for us three States to come together, and to prepare plans, and to guard against the contingency of surprise.

An account of this German camouflage has recently been given to our public by Brigadier-General Morgan in the Quarterly Review for October last, and from many other sources confirmatory evidence comes in that Germany is continuously endeavoring to repeat the methods by which Prussia jockeyed Napoleon between the years 1806 and 1813. Many of us feel that we cannot allow this practice to continue any longer without precautions, and we hope that these precautions, which, if adopted, will certainly be of a purely defensive character, may help to arrest Germany in a dangerous course of action and keep her within bounds. At present no arrangements whatsoever have been made by the old Allies for conjoint action in case of danger, nor can there be until the signature of a triple accord enables the respective staffs to set to work.

It is needless to say that, if this course is taken, it will be because the Anglo-American guaranty of France failed, for reasons which every American knows, and because, whatever may be the relative strength of the responsible forces to-day, they may not have the same relation in future. France herself is reducing the service of her annual contingent to one year, and it goes without saying that her army will be less good and more costly. In fact, Europe appears to be tending toward the armies of the old professional stamp. We have this system, of course, on account of the numerous garrisons overseas, inclusive of India, that we have to keep up, and Germany has a professional army under the Treaty of Versailles. The armies of the immediate future look like becoming militia with a strong permanent cadre; but what changes these new armies will eventually entail in the conduct of war cannot, for the moment, be assessed.

Many of us are dissatisfied about this situation. Belgium no longer possesses the shield — or rather the supposed shield — of neutrality and inviolability, and the provision of Article XXXI of the Treaty that there should be a convention between the Allies on the one part and Belgium and the Netherlands on the other, to which convention Germany agreed in advance to adhere, has never been carried into effect. We have all been too busily engaged in wrangling over imaginary reparations to bother about this convention, and it is high time that it were drafted and signed. Historically, England is mainly responsible for the existence of modern Belgium, since English statesmanship, from 1814 to 1839, took the lead in effecting the arrangement which ultimately left Belgium in that position of neutrality and inviolability which she occupied until international law was broken by the Germans, under the plea of military necessity, in August 1914.

The neutral position of Belgium was naturally abrogated by this greatest of modern international crimes, for it had proved a lure to lead Belgium to her ruin. Something has to replace it; and it is not creditable to us that the situation of Belgium has not been defined as the Treaty foreshadowed. Belgium indeed made a military alliance with France in 1920, but it must be accounted an imperfect safeguard, for either Power can get out of it when the pinch comes.

III

That was the position when the Conservative Government won its greatest triumph on October 29 last, and those of us who had been watching the situation carefully asked ourselves what should be done. I thought it advisable to run over to France and Belgium last October to consult the leading statesmen of those countries, for it was evident that it would be useless to make suggestions to which all three Powers could not agree. It did not take long to find out that all the leading statesmen in France and Belgium were very anxious about the position, and that all whom I consulted, whether they were in the Governments or out of them, were of opinion that only an Anglo-French-Belgian accord could secure peace. By this was meant a mutual agreement to protect each other’s European territories, whenever and by whomsoever they were attacked. The arrangement desired was strictly defensive and purely regional in its scope.

It was a considerable obligation for us to assume, but after turning the whole thing over I thought that we should assume it. Belgium was an old protégé of ours; we had been her friend and protector for a century. France was our ally of the war time, and we could not afford to see these two countries overwhelmed when Germany recovered her strength. Nor could we afford to find these countries hostile territory if Germany beat them. It was plain to me that we could not keep out of such war if it arose, and it therefore seemed a more prudent course to make due preparations in advance than to allow ourselves once more to be surprised. All the foreign statesmen told me that nothing but such accord would secure a lasting peace, and most of them hoped that the signature of such a document would induce Germany to abandon the idea of a war of revenge, which idea not only existed but was growing in intensity.

So I gave the whole argument in the Daily Telegraph of November 12, 13, 20, and 24, and was supported by two editorial leaders of great weight and authority. All these articles have been extensively translated by the press of France and Belgium, and have, in some papers abroad, been given verbatim. It is known that Mr. Baldwin’s Government in England is ready to give attention to the security of our two neighbors, but as I write I cannot tell what the decision of our Government will be. We have caused to be postponed the consideration of the disarmament conference, but until conversations and negotiations have ensued between us and the FrancoBelgians no one can say exactly what will be done.

My view is that Germany would never have broken loose in 1914 had she been aware that she would find England across her path, and had the fact been clearly stated to her. That would be a serious reflection on our Government were it not the case, as everyone is now aware, that our Cabinet of 1914 was not united until Germany broke the Treaties of 1839 and violated Belgian neutrality. It was then too late to check the fatal march of the German armies; but at least, if we cannot recall that fatal indecision or all the horrors of the World War, we can make clear to Germany now that we are not going to repeat the error, and that we shall resist her with all our might if her Nationalists lead her into fresh adventures.

We want peace, and the old adage, Si vis pacem, para bellum, holds good despite the League and Geneva. We can even say that we are equally following the Pacifist version, ‘Si vis pacem, para pacem,' for that we should be doing too. The Germans are a strong and combative people who have never acknowledged any law but that of force. It is no good preaching peace to the Germans. Their cherished armies and navies have been beaten. They are unable to forget or forgive, and unless they are fooling themselves as well as us they mean to wage a war of revenge at the first favorable moment. I do not imagine that the moment is very near, but opinions differ rather upon the exact number of years than upon the intention. We have no illusions left respecting Germany, and since the policy of fulfillment practically ended when Dr. Wirth was upset, we have ceased to worry about the question whether Germany intends to be a good European or not. On all the evidence she means to break out again when she can, and everything in her military history and present policy points to no other conclusion.

IV

In what way can the United States help in averting another war? Let me recall my old argument of 1921 in this magazine, and repeat that the restoration of European currencies — not ours — on the basis of the redistribution of gold is not only the best thing to do for the nations which are suffering from the evil, but the best thing for England and the United States. We two are in much the same position respecting foreign labor: namely, that we are undercut by the relatively cheap labor of our competitors. A combined movement of the United States and England to restore the currencies would succeed, but so long as we look on and do nothing the present disadvantages to our respective trade will continue. The efforts of some recent minor endeavors in this direction have been crowned with success, and it is evident that a larger scheme has at least as good a chance of succeeding. It is the inevitable step that must be taken before we can all settle down to business again and see our industries flourish.

But this is certainly not all. Not without fidgeting can an American look at the list of members of the League and remember that the team of dissidents includes the United States, Russia, Mexico, and Turkey, and that eighteen American Powers are members of the League. In the American team of dissidents are three Powers which cannot be called progressive except by a misuse of words. We need America badly at Geneva, but as she stands out we are learning to get on as best we can without her. Her presence and power at Geneva, if she came in, would be immense and wholly salutary. We should not have such mistakes as were embodied in the Geneva Protocol had the United States been represented at the fifth Assembly of the League. We need the moral force and sterling common-sense for which the United States stands to be voiced at the League Meetings, and until these forces are represented Geneva will take ten times as long as otherwise to complete its work, if indeed it can ever do so.

But there it is. The United States will not lend her official countenance to the proceedings, however much she may take part in the work by more or less elusive, evasive, and private effort; and so we go on, postponing to the Greek kalends any real result from what is, in origin, an American conception. But there are eminent statesmen in Europe who hope that the Pacific agreements, signed at Washington, the European accords that have been or may be signed as temporary safeguards and alleviations, and the Convention itself may in time be joined together in a world policy of peace, dominated not by idealism alone, but by men of affairs with a practical sense of the realities of things.

It is no good denying that if the United States aids in this great work, and more particularly if she takes a lead in it, all our difficulties would vanish, and the present generations of Americans would not be described by future historians as a people who cared much for their rights and little for their duties toward humanity at large. History rightly associates power with responsibility, and though we know — or think we know — that the outlook of Americans is essentially the same as ours, we still regret that, in the hardest part of our still unfinished task of the World War, we are left to bear a burden and a responsibility incurred by all the Allied and Associated Powers of the war years.