French Naval Ideas
I
No nation more sincerely welcomed President Harding’s ingenious initiative inviting the nations to convene at Washington, with a view to studying the limitation of naval armaments, than did France. France approved of this idea with all the more satisfaction because she was disinterested. It was with regret that she contemplated the armament fever which had seized the three big naval Powers, not because she dreaded, for herself, the development of these forces, but because she feared the consequences of a disquieting rivalry between her late allies. Indeed, the French nation never imagined that, one day, it would have to support the weight of the naval forces of England, the United States, or Japan. We remember the enthusiasm that greeted M. Briand’s words in the French Chamber, when making the following announcement of Harding’s invitation: ‘From over the seas, we are invited to go to-morrow to examine certain problems and to seek ottt all possible means of preventing further fires from breaking out. At the first hour, when the vigorous appeal of the United States resounded, I had the honor of answering “ Present ” on behalf of my country.’
France proceeded to Washington full of hope. She highly appreciates the results that have been achieved there. She understands that this event has a considerable worldly effect, and she discerns the importance of the mutual sacrifices which had to be consented to, in order to obtain agreement between the partners. She reverences, in particular, the attitude of the United States by which they have abandoned their armament programme in favor of the cause of Peace. However, why deny the fact that, with France’s joy at seeing several vital questions settled and the clouds on the distant horizon vanish, there is mingled a little bitterness. She has the impression of having been ignored, though we hasten to acknowledge that this is partly her own fault. She committed a psychological error by omitting to investigate American public opinion and by not preparing it sufficiently in advance to have it en rapport, before the meeting, with the French naval ideas in so far as these are reasonable.
The French delegation proceeded to Washington with a certain ingenuousness which can be attributed only to the conviction, held by France, that her projects would be favorably accepted and would not, in any way, destroy the harmony of the Conference. Therefore, the misunderstanding which occurred at Washington is not without, foundation, arising as it does from the reciprocal lack of understanding of the naval situation of both countries. American sentiment was all the more astounded by the demands of the French nation, because these were quite unexpected, and certain personalities, anxious to set the parties at variance, did their utmost to falsely interpret these demands. However, it is never too late to dispel an equivocation and we take the liberty of bringing forward — after Washington — certain ideas which would have gained by having been brought to light before Washington.
In the first place, it is all-important — before discussing the results of the Conference — to mention certain preliminary elements which will throw some light upon the debates. To begin with, let us view the present, standing of the French navy, pointing out what it would have been without, the events of 1914. The French naval power comprises in all, seven battleships—four of the Jean Hart type, armed with 12 guns of 305 mm., and three of the Bretagne type, armed with 10 guns of 343 mm. The conception of these ships originates from before the war. The four of the Jean Bart, type were put into use in 1913, and the seven ships all belong to the 1906 programme. The best among them — the displacement of which does not surpass 23,000 tons — is not superior to the Florida type, which, in the United States navy, is already considered as antiquated. As to the Jean Bart type, it is similar to the American battleships, North Dakota and Delaware, for which a clause in the Naval Treaty provides for their condemnation. Apart, from these battleships, France does not possess a single battleship or cruiser, battle cruiser, torpedo boat, or even submarine. As a naval power she at, present no longer exists; she still has the list of officers answering her past fame, but no longer possesses the material. The reason of this is easily understood from the fact that the Naval Holiday — which was the basis of all discussions at Washington — was adopted by the French Republic in 1914. The last ship she had built was the Languedoc, the keel of which was laid down before the war. This ship, therefore, remained idle, as well as five others of the Bearn type which were launched during the hostilities in order to clear the slips. France did not even build any torpedo boats, as the twelve ships which were incorporated in her fleet as sea-patrols, during the course of hostilities, are inferior coal-burning vessels which she secured from Japan. France’s naval holiday, therefore, has been complete and absolute for the last eight years.
Her situation would have been completely different without the grievous events of 1914. In 1913 the tonnage building in France amounted to 243, 000; in 1921 it had fallen to 22,000,which figure includes a certain amount of valueless tonnage, such as dispatch boats and sloops, rafts of the submarine war.
The naval programme in course of realization during 1914 comprised the launching of the seven battleships above mentioned, which were then the most powerful in the world, as they were intended to carry 12 guns of 343 mm. for a displacement of 25,200 tons. France’s political aim consisted in keeping in the Mediterranean superior naval forces to those of the two most powerful fleets, that is to say, the Austro-Italian. This objective was largely realized by the French projects. The seven battleships still in dockyard would have been launched before 1917, and a new programme would have been undertaken in place of the one which was then in course of completion.
The French nation, therefore, devoted all her energies exclusively to the defense of her invaded territory and abandoned all projects of naval construction. The activity of the numerous shipbuilding yards existing in France was absorbed by land-manufactures, including those which were executed on behalf of her allies. She realized perfectly well how matters stood, and was aware of the fact that she was losing her rank as an import ant naval power; but she presumed this fall would be but momentary. After the Armistice her shipbuilding was not resumed, as she was relying on the German boats interned at Scapa Flow. The manner in which these were disposed of is well known. Even after this deplorable incident, France’s naval constructions still remained idle. In fact, at the time of writing these lines, the meagre credits for construction, relative to the building of three light cruisers and of a few torpedo boats or submarines, — the project of which has been dragging on for practically the last two years in the Parliament’s files, — have not yet been voted.
Is this naval imperialism?
II
This voluntary renunciation of all naval prospects would, in the absolute necessity, explain itself if France had no need of a war fleet; but she has, and it is quite easy to point out how indispensable this is to her. Without relating a few historical points, it is hardly possible to realize the state of mind in which France proceeded to Washington. Of all the countries in the world, France has always been, and still remains, the most envied and the most threatened. The most envied because of the richness of her soil and her mild and attractive climate; the most threatened because she is not protected by natural frontiers and is surrounded by powerful nations. Without mentioning the conquest of the Gauls by Julius Cæsar, or the hundred-year occupation of France by the British, one can well realize that France has never been at rest. The invaders, after coming from the southeast and northwest, came from the southwest and north, with the Imperials, that is to say, the Spaniards, Flemish, and Austrians united, who, for over two centuries, fought desperately against France. On several occasions her soil was trampled as far as the gates of Paris. Rid of the Imperials after outrageous and uninterrupted battles, the French nation would have attained peace, had it not been for Prussia; from the day of her birth this nation succeeded to the Western Empire in her aims of invasion and destruction. Napoleon’s wars, however condemnable they might be, find, to a certain extent, their justification in the revenge for these continual and cruel invasions.
On sea alone, again, France has never been without enemies. The Spanish, the Dutch, the British, and even the Berbers scoured the Mediterranean as far as the outskirts of Marseilles. France has a coast line of 2700 kilometres. An annoying circumstance, which proves to be a great weakness, and of which Americans are well aware, is that France is astride on two seas; she has, therefore, been compelled to maintain two distinct navies, one in the north, which used to be called the ‘Ponant,' the other in the south, which was called the ’Levant.’ The distinction is such that, for a long time, these two navies were submitted to entirely different regulations. On looking up the history of France, it, will be found that most naval defeats took place close to the Straits of Gibraltar, at the time when her northern and southern naval powers were attempting a junction.
Another reason which militates in favor of the Third Republic’s naval power is the existence of an immense colonial empire. France has always been adventurous; under her old kingdom she created extremely important colonies, but was robbed of them through failing to maintain a navy under Louis XV’s reign. As a result of having neglected for several years the construction of ships, the king witnessed the almost instantaneous annulment of the strenuous efforts made by his loyal subjects during a period of two centuries.
Thanks to an unprecedented effort, the Republic has to-day succeeded in acquiring an overseas domain, the population of which amounts to over 52,000,000, covering a superficial area of 10,000,000 square kilometres, and in which the movement of trade already surpasses 7,000,000,000 francs. Is the Republic going to commit the same error as the Crown? By depriving herself of ships, does she not run the risk of losing, in a more or less distant future, this precious colonial wealth ?
A last reason renders the French navy indispensable. In fact, on this point, it can be said that France’s situation is very peculiar. Her territory is at present divided into two parts: the Metropolitan France and the African France, as of yore the Roman Empire.
The mobilizing of the North African forces is absolutely necessary to the French Republic, to compensate for her lack of population as compared with Germany. Rightly or wrongly, France believes that Germany contemplates revenge which she would carry out the day she deemed herself the strongest. We know that the majority of the German population is disgusted with war; but we know also that this population has always allowed itself to be led by a turbulent minority. The security of the Marseilles-Algiers route, which is a prolongation of the Strasbourg-Marseilles railroad, is an axiom of France’s policy. Thus one can realize what part her navy will be called upon to play in the safeguarding of her territory, the protection of her colonies and even in her mobilization. Is there any imperialism in wanting to ensure this safety?
Imperialism is the word used by our former enemies to render us suspicious. We are convinced that our loyal and generous American friends refrain from associating themselves with such a reproach when reflecting upon these vital contingencies. Fortunately for her, America has no enemies; the nations surrounding her are as if nonexistent. Even Japan is too distant from her to constitute a very dangerous and serious foe. Whereas France has to support the very heavy consequences of her past history; what is called her imperialism is simply her instinctive fear of invasion, a fear which the generations pass on to one another. France’s history, so full of blood, of destruction, and of valor, is inseparable from her present state of mind. Think of the systematic invasions of the beautiful French plains, the devastation of the provinces, the injuries perpetrated by the soldiers, the atrocious wounds which will not be healed for years to come, and the ruins that are no sooner repaired than others succeed them.
On considering the matter from this point of view, you will not accuse of imperialism a nation that is endeavoring to uphold her honor and the inheritance of the gods. Can it be said of a man whose house has been frequently robbed, that he is premeditating a murder because be purchases a revolver to protect himself against the return of his criminal visitors? Particularly in the case of the navy, if France committed an error, it was in forgetting the exigencies of her history.
III
Such was France’s situation on answering President Harding’s invitation. Let us now examine what the French demands actually were, and how these were accepted in connection with the four special points discussed at Washington, relative to capital ships, aviation, light cruisers, and submarines. For capital ships France demanded 515,000 tons — which amount was acceded to Japan — against 525,000 tons to England and America. It is known that this claim was rejected, France’s share having been fixed at 175,000 tons. We, and also numerous colleagues of the French press, loyally admit that, for several reasons, our delegation was wrong in proffering such a demand. One of the reasons is that she ran counter to the principle of the Conference, whose aim it was to create a naval holiday. France implied, it is true, that she had enforced this naval holiday for the last eight years. However, the fact remains that her demands were contradictory to the object Washington had in view. She ought to have either withdrawn from the Conference or fallen in with the spirit in which it had been inspired. On the other hand, being perfectly aware of the impossibility of building such a tonnage within ten years, France had still less ground for demanding it, the state of her finance not permitting such an expense. Besides, she has a good many other things to attend to before building capital ships, since she is short of light steamers and submarines, which are far more necessary to her than battleships.
The situation of the French Admiralty was paradoxical. France shocked the sentiments of the Washington Conference by making a written demand for capital ships while renouncing the construction of a whole series of ships, the undertaking of which was contested by no one. Furthermore, she owes money to America and England, and to-day she, who has always been owed money, finds herself unable to settle her debts. She, therefore, perfectly well understood Mr. Hughes’s letter of the 16th December, 1921, which ran as follows: ‘It is not against France’s interests to wish that her industry and resources be consecrated to economic recuperation, rather than devoted to the construction of new capital ships. It would be very disappointing to us to learn that, just at the time we are wanting to help France all we possibly can, it is her intention to dedicate hundreds of millions to the building of warships.’ The delegation could not do otherwise than bow in submission to this argument, the more so because they were persuaded of its accuracy.
However, it is thought in France that the delegation could have dispensed with adopting the principle of a theoretical limitation which places her on the same level as other secondrate nations, and which classes her with Italy. By the agreement, France may retain 175,000 tons and start building in 1927, 1929, and 1931. As stated, this is as reasonable an amount as she is able to construct, but this figure corresponds exactly to the one granted Italy, while, as above mentioned, the whole of France’s policy tended toward maintaining a superiority of forces in the Mediterranean. For centuries she fought to realize this idea; through a simple treaty, and at a time when the Mediterranean route is most indispensable to her, to assure the mobilization of her African army, she finds herself losing that which has given her so much trouble to uphold. Admiral Wemyss quite well realized this point when he wrote: ‘The safety of France’s communicat ions with North Africa is to her of the utmost importance, owing to the fact that a great portion of her army comes from that continent.’
Italy was quite satisfied with the results of the Washington Conference; it is indeed a dream come true for her to see the scept re of the Mediterranean pass into her hands. The equality of tonnage between Italy and France is, in reality, marked by a superiority in favor of t he peninsula. Apart from the fact that, to possess a superiority over a fleet which has the choice of the offensive, it is necessary to maintain a fairly marked margin of tonnage, so as to be protected against momentary lack of available material, it is easy to demonstrate that, in comparison with France, Italy enjoys a privileged tactical situation. She is able to concentrate all her forces in the Mediterranean and to protect them in the Adriatic, whereas France is compelled to disperse part of them in the North Sea, part in the Atlantic, and part, in the Mediterranean. She cannot allow her important shores of the Atlantic and of the North Sea to remain defenseless, especially since the Treaty of Versailles has granted Germany eight battleships of 10,000 tons and eight light cruisers.
Whether it is wished or not, the fact remains that the Washington Conference has been a triumph for Italy. We should not like to say that through it France has suffered a defeat; but what may be asserted is that she forsook all her history’s traditions by placing the mobilization of her African army — necessary to the defense of her Rhenish frontiers — under the control of her two neighbors. A coalition of Spain and Italy would prevent this mobilization from taking place.
It does not enter into anyone’s mind in France that a conflict could arise between herself and her Latin sister; but what diplomatic instrument has not been put into Italy’s hands in recognizing the principle of the superiority of her naval forces over France! France, who accepted with good grace the crushing supremacy of England, America, and Japan, accepts with grief the reduction of her status quo ante bellum as a Mediterranean naval power.
The situation as regards aviation remains the same. On this point, we might be permitted to think that the limitation of the French navy is still more characteristic. Her tonnage for the transport of airships is limited to 60,000, against 135,000 to America and the British Empire, and 81,000 to Japan. France anticipated that, on the contrary, she would have been allowed to compensate the inferiority of her defensive tonnage in capital ships, by the possibility of developing her naval aviation, which answers to a merely defensive aim. But, again, on this point the Italian situation has been assimilated to that of the Republic.
We would ask our readers to glance at the coasts of both nations: they will at once see that Italy could assemble her troops and (this is merely a hypothesis) bombard Toulon or Bizerta; whereas France’s troops, which would be split up all along the Atlantic coast, could not participate in any Mediterranean battle.
In regard to France’s naval aviation, has not the Washington Treaty ignored her geographical situation by putting her at the mercy of her eventual adversaries from either north or south, and by having her play the part of the ‘Curiatii’ in that famous battle where they succumbed through being divided. May it please God that France shall never have the opportunity of putting her war navy to use; for it is certain that her power, offensive and defensive, is very much compromised.
In regard to light surface-craft, — cruisers, torpedoes, and the like, — we know that the Conference eliminated France’s requests, and she not accepting the proportion offered her, the Conference broke up without having fixed any limitation for this type of tonnage. It is very difficult for us to plead such a cause; we will, however, draw attention to the following points.
What is the use of light craft? To defend a country’s shores and to protect the entry into ports of commercial steamers. For this, the Republic would have to provide for four protection zones: one in the north, from Brest to the Belgian frontier, for the ports of Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Rouen, Le Havre, Caen, St. Malo, and the rest; a second one from Brest to the Spanish frontier, for the ports of Nantes, St.Nazaire, Bordeaux, and Bayonne; a third one in the Mediterranean, for Marseilles, Cette, and others; and a fourth in North Africa, for the ports of Algiers, Tunis, and Oran. Light craft is also used for the protection of commercial shipping; that of France is about to attain a tonnage of four millions compared with 2,500,000 in 1914.
But it is particularly for the defense of her colonial empire that she needs cruisers. We have already remarked upon the importance of this empire of 52,000,000 inhabitants, which is second in rank to that of England, whose position is yet more favorable than the French Colonial Empire, inasmuch as her possessions are not so scattered. France’s colonies are yet too young to possess, as the British Dominions do, their own particular fleet. Therefore, in these conditions, it was difficult for France to submit to a situation which did not grant her any privileges, particularly in regard to the Powers which have no distant possessions.
In time of peace, cruisers are just as necessary to France, to maintain the liaison between the metropolis and her colonies dispersed in the five continents.
IV
There still remains the important question of submarines. England had demanded the complete suppression of this arm. Each time science invents a new destructive arm, those who would be the first to suffer from it are the ones to object to its use. It is, unfortunately, the price of progress to perfect both the art of making man happy and that of destroying him. But the forward movement has always been the stronger. The reasons which would have led to the suppression of the submarines cannot be prominent so long as the use of the torpedo, of which the submarine is the improved support, has not been abolished. It is not because Germany made a barbarous use of her submarines that other nations should not be able to utilize them in a more sensible manner. England’s reasoning that submarines could be of utility only against enemy commerce, and that they had no military value, was contradicted by facts. On perusing the history of the war, it will be found that the submarine played a very active part in naval operations.
The Washington Conference has in that respect selected the best possible means of rendering neutral the abuse of the submersible, by very precisely defining its utilization. The Conference cannot be too highly congratulated on this essentially humane deed.
We do not wish to detail the resolutions which have been adopted, and which are known to all, concerning the submarine war. But, as we are speaking solely of French naval ideas, we cannot allow France’s attitude respecting this question to pass unheeded.
A misunderstanding occurred. The text of an article, written by a marine officer, was selected to suggest that France approved of the Germanic warprocedures. Besides the fact that this article involved only its author, the theories thereof are diametrically opposed to those officially professed. One has only to read the course of strategy by Captain Laurent, professor at the Naval War School, to find a denial of the text referred to, expressed in these almost exaggerated terms; ‘The best among us, struck by the formidable wreckage which has been the result of the German submarine war, find it in us to excuse this outrageous event, which was in contradiction to all divine and human laws. We cannot manifest too strongly our opposition to this turn of mind; it does not become Frenchmen to follow such shameful traces.’
This is the true and only viewpoint of the Staff of the Rue Royale.
And it is not alone on the utilization and the limitation in number of submarines that the debate arose. The Conference offered 31,000 tons to France; she was demanding 90,000 tons; that is to say, an amount equal to that of the most generously endowed nations; England and America. France’s reasoning, which we submit to the reflection of our friends, is the following. Not only does it seem that the French Republic should have had a number of submarines equivalent to that of the great naval powers, but, reasonably, she should have been granted a larger figure. The submarine, especially the type France purposes building, is essentially a defensive war-instrument, its object being, in a certain way, to act as an antidote to capital ships. By demanding this antidote, France believes herself to be serving the cause of peace, for she is trying to safeguard the world against the dangerous virus which would be brought about by the abuse of capital ships. She likewise invokes, in favor of the submarine armament, all the reasons that have been cited for light cruisers; the extension, and especially the unevenness, of her shores, the dispersion of her colonies, and the necessity of safeguarding the Marseilles—Algiers route. Moreover, French technologists consider 90,000 tons as necessary to provide France with a sufficiently efficacious defensive, especially as she has to supply stationary flotillas in four different zones, not including her colonial zones.
V
We think that we have stated very frankly the French naval ideas, just as they exist in competent, circles. The impression is that France ill prepared her ground at Washington, by failing to acquaint her allies with her point of view. The demands she made concerning capital ships were a surprise and a shock to the sentiments of the Conference.
France might have avoided this error. The magnificent results obtained at Washington have been highly praised, and much gratitude is shown to President Harding for having obtained these results, so favorable to the peace of the world. But there is a shadow on the scene. France realizes that she slightly upset the Washington partners’ agreement, and even impeded the drift of the Conference’s aim regarding light boats and submarines.
Could France accept the limitations that were imposed on her? We leave it to our readers to answer this question. We would ask them, before they render unprejudiced decision, to take into consideration the moral, geographical, and historical situation of France, whose heart is still bleeding from the traces of invasion, and who is vainly waiting for the amends which are due.
She reflects that, at Washington she lost the control of the Mediterranean, in favor of Italy; she agreed to this abandonment — which is contrary to all her traditions — only in the hope that, in the first place, her situation as a great colonial power would be recognized by the concession of a light-craft tonnage, proportionate to her worldly necessities, and that, on the other hand, she would be granted a submarine flotilla and an aviation arm capable of assuring the safety of her Atlantic, Mediterranean, and African shores.
This gives an explanation of the French Republic’s attitude at Washington with reference to the grave questions we have just examined.