Ireland From a Scotland Yard Notebook

APRIL, 1922

BY CARL W. ACKERMAN

AFTER a journey through the south of Ireland, in the spring of 1920, I returned to my home in London to find the ‘key‘ to Scotland Yard among the letters which had accumulated during my absence. It was in the form of a note, penned hastily by the famous Director of Intelligence: —

METROPOLITAN POLICE OFFICE
7.5.20.
DEAR MR. ACKERMAN,—
If you could call on me to-morrow at 11.30 I have something for you.
Sincerely yours,
B. H. THOMSON.

Buried beneath other letters was another note: —

G. R.
81, VICTORIA ROAD, KENSINGTON, W. 8.
DEAR MR. ACKERMAN, —
I think I suggested your calling at 11.30 to-morrow morning. If it would suit you equally well it would be more convenient if you came at 10.45.
Sincerely yours,
BASIL THOMSON.

These messages opened the great iron gates to Scotland Yard. From the day they were received, until Sir Basil Thomson retired recently, it was my good fortune to stand with him behind the scenes and to witness the dramatic events which culminated in the creation of the Irish Free State.

I

At the time I arrived in England, in January, 1920, to organize and direct the foreign news service for a syndicate of American newspapers, Ireland was ‘at war.’ ‘We have now in Ireland two governments,’ said Sir Horace Plunkett, during a conversation at his country home in Foxrock, near Dublin, ‘a de jure government exercising its functions through an army of occupation, and a de facto government which has the greater force of the people’s will at its back. Sinn Fein has its Parliament, its civil and criminal courts. . . . Naturally there is continuous conflict between these two governments.’

In the United States, ‘President’ De Valera was campaigning with the dual object of influencing the American Government to recognize the Irish Republic and of raising funds to carry on the fight in Ireland. The tense political situation in the States, aggravated by the anti-British agitation by the Irish leaders, together with the impatience of the Vatican when confronted with conflicting reports from British and Irish Catholics, caused such alarm in Whitehall that government officials and their supporters were sharply divided on the question of policy. One faction urged the vigorous and ruthless suppression of Sinn Fein by military measures and an economic embargo. Another demanded that Downing Street offer Ireland Dominion Home Rule and peace.

Mr. Lloyd George ’sat on the fence’ while the Morning Post and former Prime Minister H. H. Asquith, leaders respectively of the war and olive-branch parties, denounced, ridiculed and chastised him for his fiddling while the south of Ireland kindled the fires which they feared might destroy the British Empire.

Shortly before the Easter holidays, when rumors were heard about the probabilities of another ’uprising’ in Dublin and Cork, I made my first visit to the Emerald Isles, accompanied by Mr. John S. Steele who for more than ten years had represented leading American newspapers in London. Through the generous assistance of Steele I met, for the first time, Mr. Arthur Griffith, then Acting-President of Sinn Fein, the philosopher and dreamer who founded the Sinn Fein party; General Sir Nevil Macready, Chief Officerin-Command of the British forces; Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, M.P., who refused to swear allegiance to King George and take his seat in Westminster; Mr. Fred Dumont, the American Consul in Dublin, members of the Catholic hierarchy as well as political agitators and sport-loving noblemen, who deplored the rebellion because it interfered with their recreation and incomes.

Instead of attacking British forces in the cities, the Irish Republican army burned and destroyed several hundred police barracks and offices of tax collectors by firing and dynamiting them at night. By this means the I.R.A. launched its military campaign against the ‘enemy,’ and responsible British officials in Dublin and London realized for the first time that they were confronted by an organized, ably directed revolution pregnant with danger to the Empire, to Anglo-American relations and to the economic and strategic unity of the British Isles.

No one sensed the danger more than ’B. T.’ Through his office in Scotland House, the house of mystery within Scotland Yard which was the G.H.Q. of Britain’s political and economical secret information service, passed all secret reports relating to Ireland from the United States, Rome, Paris, and Ireland itself. Here they were read, analyzed, and recorded. Through Sir Basil Thomson they reached the Prime Minister, Sir Hamar Greenwood, ChiefSecretary for Ireland, and other Cabinet ministers. Convinced that the British Government and people would never agree to the absolute separation of Ireland from the ‘Commonwealth of Nations,’ and doubtful of the possibilities of suppressing the Sinn Fein movement by military measures, Sir Basil endeavored to arrange for an exchange of views between dependable representatives of the two belligerents.

At the meeting in his office on May 8, he expressed the opinion that, as a preliminary to any peace movement, it would be necessary for all parties to realize what he had learned after the most careful investigation — that the real leaders of Sinn Fein were not the men then in the public eye. He showed documents, which had been seized in Ireland, written by Irish Republicans, which indicated that a ‘mysterious person’ named Mr. Michael Collins, Commander-in-Chief of the ‘Irish Republican Army’ and Mr. Richard Mulcahy, Chief-of-Staff, were the powers behind the Revolution and that a group of five or six wealthy, influential Americans of Irish birth or extraction were the men in the United States who actually directed the political and financial policy of Sinn Fein.

Realizing the news-value of the material which Scotland Yard had accumulated, Sir Basil was asked to give his permission for its publication in the United States and England. Being intensely interested in the possibilities of helping to lay the foundation for a better understanding of the Irish problem through the press, the ‘D. I.’ handed me photostat copies of a number of confidential documents, among them the secret constitution of the Irish Republican Brotherhood.

Publication of this paper in the United States and England caused a storm in Irish and British circles. Mr. De Valera denied its authenticity, but admitted that there was nothing in it to which any Irishman would take exception. When General Macready came to London he gave me a statement vouching for the truthfulness of all the documents. This I sent to Sir Basil for final verification before cabling it to the United States. The original copy was, however, misplaced or lost and, after a duplicate was sent to Scotland Yard, the following note was received: —

CONFIDENTIAL
SCOTLAND HOUSE, S. W., 1.
17 May, 1920.
DEAR MR. ACKERMAN, —
I do not understand what has become of your first letter, as it has never reached me or you should have had your MS. back long ago. I have made one or two slight alterations which I have no doubt you will accede to, otherwise I think your cable is excellent. By the way, there is a question being asked in the House of Commons to-morrow about the constitution of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, no doubt resulting from publication in America.
Sincerely yours,
B. H. THOMSON.

As the reactions from the first efforts to acquaint the American and British public with some facts, heretofore known only to the highest British and Irish officials, were so encouraging Sir Basil decided to rush his plans for a confidential exchange of views between representatives of the two peoples. His problem was to find a man who, possessing the confidence of both sides, had the tact and ability to negotiate. As a preliminary move he sent a long statement, one month later, with the accompanying letter: —

CONFIDENTIAL
SCOTLAND HOUSE, S. W., 1.
24 June, 1920.
DEAR MR. ACKERMAN, —
I suppose that the enclosed would be no good to you to use as the views of responsible people here? If not, perhaps you will return it to me.
Sincerely yours,
B. H. THOMSON.

Before I could publish the document Colonel Edward M. House, former President Wilson’s great associate, arrived in London where he received an urgent letter from Sir Horace Plunkett pleading with him to assume the difficult and dangerous rôle of mediator between England and Ireland. Sir Basil was enthusiastic when he heard the news, and at the joint request of Colonel House and Sir Basil I went to Dublin to explore the possibilities of peace. With letters to Sir Horace, to General Macready and Sir John Anderson, Assistant-Chief-Secretary for Ireland, Mr. Griffith, and the American Consul whose relationship with all factions was a source of unstinted praise from the White House and the State Department in Washington, I arrived in Ireland on the thirtieth of June and discussed with each of these men the advisability of mediation.

This was the beginning of an almost endless number of journeys between London and Dublin which led to interviews in prison with Sinn Fein leaders, to the meeting between Mr. De Valera and Sir James Craig, the present premier of Ulster, to conferences with Mr. Collins and Sir Hamar Greenwood, and to the interview between Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Martin H. Glynn, former Governor of New York, which resulted in the invitation from the Premier to Mr. De Valera to come to London and discuss the possibilities of peace. At the same time Mr. Steele was ‘carrying on’ negotiations between Sir Mamar Greenwood and other Sinn Fein leaders which resulted in the final negotiation of the truce last summer. Unknown to the outside world two American newspaper men were acting as the sole connecting links between Sinn Fein and Downing Street, with the ever-ready assistance and counsel of another American whose coöperation, for diplomatic reasons, cannot be recorded adequately and justly at this time.

There had been many peace feelers before this one initiated by Sir Horace Plunkett, but they had all fared badly because the negotiators lacked the confidence of either the Irish or British. In this instance, however, both sides acknowledged their faith in Colonel House. Macready, Anderson, and Plunkett said they would personally ‘welcome mediation by Mr. House,’ but they were skeptical about the attitude of Sinn Fein, believing that, no matter what Mr. Griffith said, the ‘ murder-gang’ and the ‘extremists’ would never agree to compromise.

II

Ireland at this time presented many strange sidelights to a foreigner. In one of the fine, old Georgian mansions in Dublin, after dinner one evening, I met a dignified but irate old lady, descendant of a proud and ancient Irish family, who was vigorously opposed to American mediation, because, as she explained in detail, all good Irish servants were going to the United States where Americans were corrupting them with high wages.

‘Why!’ she protested, ‘Do you know that I give employment to twentyeight servants and they leave me as fast as they can get money to cross the Atlantic! Only last week one of my maids, who had been with me three years, whom I paid £20 a year, board and lodging, whom the other servants called “Pony” because she did so much work, actually left me because some fool countryman of yours offered her £100 and free passage to New York?’

‘Mediation?’ she asked breathlessly. ‘No! Not by an American!’

Possessing the traditional poise of the British people, General Macready weighed carefully what he thought might be the attitude of Sinn Fein before he voiced his own approval. Desiring peace, he believed that the Irish leaders should not be told that he, representing the ‘enemy’ (which he said with a smile), approved mediation; so he asked me to tell my ‘Sinn Fein friends ’ that General Lucas, whom they had just kidnapped, was not really important to the British military organization and that ‘ for every general they capture, six more are waiting to come over.’

When his message was delivered to Griffith and Fitzgerald, they remarked that ‘one British general’ was enough and that even a joke could be‘carried too far,’

Mr. Griffith, who was then the official spokesman of Sinn Fein in Ireland, declared he would personally accept mediation if Mr. House acted officially for the Wilson Administration. Other conditions were that Ireland be recognized as the ‘Switzerland of the Seas.’ He did not approve Plunkett’s ‘Dominion plan.’

Before I returned to London, Fitzgerald, the curly-haired diplomat of Sinn Fein, said he had seen Mr. Collins. I told him the British considered Collins the leader of the murder-gang and that they believed if Griffith talked peace the extremists would soon put him out of the way. Fitzgerald retorted that Collins was the cleanest, most capable and devoted member of the Cabinet, and that he had personally heard Collins denounce one of his associates at a Cabinet meeting for suggesting that all British officers and soldiers be massacred, as being ‘unworthy of Sinn Fein.’ I asked him how he explained the murders of British officers, and he answered that no ‘enemy’ was killed in Ireland excepting those doing ‘dirty work,’ — spying!

Summing up the attitude of Sinn Fein, which he desired me to present to Colonel House and the British Government, Fitzgerald said that everything I had been told by individual Sinn Feiners was not official and that I would have to await a report from him later of the attitude of Dàil Eireann. The Dàil alone had power to discuss peace.

Throughout my stay in Ireland I was followed by detectives from Dublin Castle and Sinn Fein G.H.Q. Although I had pledged my word of honor to both parties that I would not exchange information on any subject, excepting mediation, I was subjected to the searching test of ‘agents’ so numerous that the jaunting-car drivers did a flourishing business carrying them hither and thither in following me from the private hiding-place of a Sinn Feiner to the protected walls of a British stronghold. On the cross-channel steamer plying between Kingstown and Holyhead I recognized a Scotland Yard detective whom I had met in London. I asked how many detectives there were on the ship.

‘Well,’he replied, casually, ‘several, I presume.’

Then he related an experience he had had the night before. Following a passenger who aroused his suspicion, he discovered that he changed his complete make-up on the ship, put on a false moustache, parted his hair in the middle, changed his suit and hat and landed in Ireland a totally different citizen from that he had been when he left England. Assisted by several ‘Tommies’ on guard at Kingstown, he detained the stranger for examination, showing him his Scotland Yard credentials. The visitor took from his purse a similar card, remarking with a laugh: ‘ By jove, you and I are in the same business!’

After my report to Colonel House and Sir Basil Thomson of the impressions gained from a hurried visit to Ireland, it was decided that steps should be taken to persuade both the British Cabinet and the Dàil to invite Colonel House. Within a few days Fitzgerald came to London. Sir Basil conferred with Mr. Lloyd George and, in the meantime, others ‘sounded’ Lord Reading, Viscount Grey, Lord Northcliffe, Sir Edward Carson, and Mr. Bonar Law, whom Mr. Asquith cleverly described as ‘the other half of the Lloyd George shears.’

Accompanied by another member of the Dàil, Fitzgerald presented the following propositions: —

1. That any ‘settlement’ would have to include Ulster;

2. That only the Dàil had authority to speak for Sinn Fein and the British military leaders prohibited the Dàil from meeting;

3. That if mediation were undertaken by Colonel House he would have to represent officially the United States Government.

These unofficial, preliminary terms were communicated by Scotland Yard to the Prime Minister. It was explained that Mr. House was in no way acting for the American Government and had no intention of doing so; that his interest was only that of an American who desired a just settlement of the Irish problem.

Fitzgerald returned to Dublin. Through the influence of Scotland Yard and General Macready there were no raids by the Black-and-Tans, — until further notice! This was for the purpose of giving the Sinn Fein Parliament an opportunity of meeting without British interference.

In the very midst of these negotiations a number of British officers were murdered in Dublin. Sir Horace Plunkett was frightened and distressed. He despaired of mediation and declared that the British Cabinet would do nothing because Mr. Lloyd George was ‘cowed by Sir Edward Carson.’

A few days later, however, a messenger brought the following letter: —

CONFIDENTIAL
SCOTLAND HOUSE, S. W., 1.
DEAR MR. ACKERMAN, —
I tried to get you on the ’phone. If an invitation is received by the personage we talked of, I have ascertained that an acceptance by him would be welcomed by responsible people here. I think that it is intended by Mr. Kerr to get into touch with him to-night and let him know the position that would be taken up on this side, as a guide to any negotiations he might carry out.
Should you not hear anything from your friends over there within the next day or two, no doubt you will think of some way in which you can pick up the strings.
Sincerely yours,
B. H. THOMSON.

That night Mr. Philip Kerr, chief confidential secretary to the Prime Minister, called upon Colonel House and outlined Mr. Lloyd George’s position. During the following days mediation was secretly debated by Sinn Fein and the conclusion was reached, to which the Sinn Fein adhered to the end, that there could be no negotiations except between accredited representatives of the ‘ Irish Nation’ and official representatives of the British Government. No outside mediation would be accepted by the Dôil. In the meantime word leaked out that Mr. Lloyd George was contemplating mediation. Tory leaders launched a vitriolic offensive against the Government. They charged Mr. Lloyd George with the desire to shake hands with gunmen and forgive murderers! Being a political tight-rope walker, the Prime Minister balanced himself by voicing in Parliament his determination to deal only with the ‘men who could deliver the goods.’

He believed, as did Scotland Yard and the military authorities, that it was useless to talk peace until Mr. Collins and his associates were ready to discuss terms. Sinn Fein leaders on the other hand said that Mr. Lloyd George had tried to trick them into mediation; that he was insincere, unscrupulous, and dishonest. They cited a story of an event which occurred in Paris during the Peace Conference to the effect that, one day during a conversation between Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and a third member of the Council, the British Prime Minister was called out of the room. When he left, Clemenceau turned and said: ‘There goes the biggest liar I know.’

III

Within the knowledge of Scotland Yard this was the first serious attempt which had been made to bridge the gulf between Ireland and England. Although the efforts to invite Mr. House to mediate had failed, much good had been accomplished. It was learned that the real leadership of the Sinn Fein movement rested in the hands of the so-called extremists: Mr. Collins, Richard Mulcahy, and their immediate associates. Despite the official position of Mr. De Valera, he did not have the influence in Ireland which he had had before he began his campaign in the United States. In Mr. Lloyd George’s opinion, Mr. Collins was the only man who could ‘deliver the goods,’and until his position was clear there could be no progress toward peace.

Fighting, raids, assassinations, holdups, bomb-throwing and intensified activities of the Black-and-Tans followed the collapse of mediation. Visiting Ireland again to report the developments for the newspapers I represented, I heard nothing but unqualified statements of determination to fight it out. Both sides were confident and uncompromising. The spirit of young Ireland was typified by the remark of an old woman newsdealer who sold me the morning papers with their sensational headings.

Glancing at these, while she made change, I read of the accidental death of an Irish boy who was blown to pieces by the premature explosion of a bomb which he was making. Remarking to her how sad it was to read of deaths such as these, she quickly retorted: ‘What a wonderful thing to die for Ireland!'

Reckless and courageous, the Blackand-Tans, who had the most difficult task of all police forces in Ireland, set about their work of suppressing the Irish Republican army, undaunted by criticism and unafraid of attack. They raided Sinn Fein clubs, schools, homes, and public places. Tramways were stopped and passengers searched for weapons. Whole sections of the city were surrounded. House to house searches were made for Collins and other leaders. Rewards were offered for the capture of these men, dead or alive. The ‘war’ was on! Even such a peaceful citizen as Sir Robert Woods, M.P. for Trinity College and a famous surgeon, loyal to Ireland and to the Empire, was held up and searched. As the youthful Black-and-Tan flourished a revolver in his face, while he felt his clothing for weapons, Sir Robert admonished him by saying: ‘You should be more careful with that revolver: it might go off.'

‘That’s all right, old chap,’replied the officer, ‘I can soon reload it!'

Returning to London I received a telegram from Mr. Fitzgerald, on August 18, asking me to come to Dublin at once. Four days later I left, after having had several talks about Mr. Collins with Sir Basil Thomson and Colonel J. F. C. Carter in Scotland House. The British military authorities had been endeavoring for months to apprehend him, but they always arrived at his newest hiding-place after he had departed. Sir Basil was extremely anxious to know what kind of a man he was; why he would not agree to independence within the British Commonwealth of Nations and wherein lay his strength with the Irish army and people.

I told Sir Basil that, the next time I went to Ireland, I hoped to interview Mr. Collins; but I wished beforehand to have the assurance of the British authorities that I would not be ‘shadowed’ or interfered with in any way. Accordingly code telegrams were sent to General Macready. Arriving in Dublin I went immediately to Mr. Fitzgerald’s hiding-place, put my cards on the table, saying that I had the word of Scotland Yard that I would not be followed in case I could see Mr. Collins. Without being requested I gave him my word that I would not reveal to anyone the place, time or manner of a meeting with the head of the Sinn Fein army. This pledge was unnecessary because I was never asked by Sir Basil or General Macready at any time to reveal any confidential information which might lead to the identification or arrest of any Sinn Fein leaders.

In the afternoon of August 23, Mr. Fitzgerald called at the Shelbourne Hotel and together we went for a walk. At tea-time he suggested that we go to the home of a friend of his and we entered one of the beautiful old mansions on one of the ancient squares of the Irish capital. The maid escorted us to a small drawing-room on the second floor, in the rear, overlooking a small garden. Fitzgerald excused himself only to return within a few moments with a broad-shouldered, blackhaired, smiling young Irishman, whom he introduced as ‘Mr. Collins.’

Collins at this time was thirty-one years old. He was the directing genius of a volunteer army, estimated at 100,000 men. He was credited with ‘supreme’ authority in Sinn Fein councils. He was considered by the military authorities as the leader of the ‘gunmen.’ He was said to have been the one who defeated mediation. As Minister of Finance of Dàil Eireann he controlled all Sinn Fein funds.

‘ I see,’ said Collins, who is to-day at the head of the Irish Free State, ‘that you are publishing my private correspondence before it reaches me!’

Placing upon the table several clippings of my articles in American newspapers, especially those relating to confidential reports from Mr. De Valera, which Scotland Yard had seized from a Sinn Fein courier and given to me for publication, Mr. Collins added: ‘You see, I know you better than you know me.’

For two hours Collins and Fitzgerald discussed every angle of mediation and peace ‘within the Empire.’ Mr. Collins said he had no confidence whatever in Mr. Lloyd George, and added that the basic fact which any British Government would have to consider before there could be peace was the unlimited and unrestricted right of Irishmen to rule Ireland. In the interview which he personally reread and corrected the following day, — the first public statement he had ever made, — Collins declared: —

1. There will be no compromise and no negotiations with any British Government until Ireland is recognized as an independent Republic.

2. The same effort which would get us dominion home rule would get us a republic.

3. We ask only that the American people recognize, through their Government, the Government of the Irish people which is already in existence.

Developing these propositions in greater detail Mr. Collins insisted that the Irish people would never stop fighting until they controlled the finances, the courts, the police, and the army of their own country. These three fundamental considerations, he added, would never be modified.

IV

The day following publication of the interview in the United States, Ireland, and England, Sir Basil submitted it to a third-degree examination. He asked whether I thought Mr. Collins really desired and expected a republic or whether the republic was merely a slogan and that he would compromise if the British Government accepted his fundamental propositions. I told Sir Basil what General Macready had said when he read the interview — that ‘an Irishman always asked £100 for a horse if he expected to get £25.’

As Mr. Lloyd George was in Lucerne for a holiday, Sir Basil asked for a confidential written report and a copy of the interview for Sir Hamar Greenwood who was going to Switzerland for a conference with the Prime Minister. In the private report, it was emphasized that Mr. Collins had not closed the door to peace, nor even slammed it, but had submitted three extremely vital issues for the First Lord of the Treasury to decide: namely — Was England prepared to concede to Ireland her right to her own courts, her police, and her business administration.

The Director of Intelligence, knowing only too well Mr. Lloyd George’s readiness to fight, did not wish him to get the impression that Mr. Collins was a man who would not deliver the goods if he had the opportunity. Sir Basil favored peace with Ireland as soon as it could be realized honorably by his own Government. He had contended from the beginning and had persuaded the Prime Minister to so state in Parliament, that Mr. Collins was the chief Sinn Feiner who could speak with authority. Now he had spoken! It was up to Mr. Lloyd George to act!

No one ever knows in advance what Mr. Lloyd George will do. In the opinion of Sir Basil Thomson he could interpret Mr. Collins either as challenging him to a fight or inviting him to a public debate on the issues of Irish independence.

When two nations are at war, or when the leaders of two belligerent peoples are unable to meet personally, they frequently accept the press of their countries or of the United States as a forum before which they can present their views. Throughout the World War the American newspapers were the principal tribunes for discussion. The leaders of every nation availed themselves of the opportunity of presenting their views to the American people and indirectly to their own and their enemy publics. This is the great service which the modern newspaper renders to the public. This forum is world-wide in its scope. It is open to all. It is more influential than parliaments and its verdict is as decisive as any recorded vote of elected representatives of the people. Mr. Collins did not speak to me but through me to the citizens of his own country, England, and the United States because the interview was distributed throughout the English-speaking world.

Confronted with opposition from the Conservatives, who were ‘insulted’ by Mr. Collins’s protestations that he would not compromise, Mr. Lloyd George decided temporarily to ‘interpret’ Mr. Collins’s views as a ‘slap in the face of British intelligence.’ The Premier intended to test the Sinn Fein organization first by a much more severe ‘third degree.’ The Lord Mayor of Cork had gone on a hungerstrike in Brixton prison. His starvation campaign might be worth a game of political chess. Feelers were put out to see whether Sinn Fein would ‘listen to reason’ if Mr. MacSwiney were released. One of the Lord Mayor’s nearest relatives herself wrote a confidential note to Mr. Mulcahy asking him to call off the hungerstrike. This note was duly photographed by Scotland Yard before it reached Mr. Mulcahy without any Irish man or woman suspecting it. Scotland Yard agents had the habit of obtaining such confidential letters quite frequently. But Mulcahy and Collins, who alone had the power to issue orders to Irish volunteers, could not be reached by the pleas of relatives and they were immune from social and political pressure because of their methods of living. They could not appear in public and in consequence they lived‘underground’; traveled underground in the sense that no one ever knew how they moved from place to place and only a very few trusted associates knew where they could be located.

While Mr. Lloyd George and others moved their pawns in the game of chess for Mr. MacSwiney’s life, Collins and Mulcahy refused to play, and the Lord Mayor passed away like many other volunteers who willingly gave their lives for the republic of their dreams.

This incident cut all the peace cables between Ireland and England. The British Labor party attempted mediation, but neither the Irish leaders nor the British Government, wished for political reasons to give aid and comfort to any move by Organized Labor which might result, in strengthening the Labor party politically.

V

From late September to the week before Christmas, when Archbishop Clune of Australia made his plea for a Truce of God, the rupture was complete. Both sides flooded the press with attacks; attempts were made to bomb the House of Commons; military activity in Ireland was multiplied anti magnified. British officials declared that the ranks of Sinn Fein were tottering because of alleged differences between the Moderates and the Extremists. The campaign in the United States for the recognition of the Irish Republic worried Downing Street and disturbed the sleep of more than one American government official who knew not to what bottomless pit the agitation might lead. Thanks to the watchfulness of the American Consul in Dublin, whose reliability and judgment had been tested on many occasions, in Spain, in Italy, and in Ireland, at critical and historic moments, the United States Government possessed such detailed confidential information that the official relations between Washington and London were never disturbed by the incidents of the British-Irish controversy.

When reports began to appear about alleged differences between De Valera, Collins, and Griffith, the two latter gentlemen wrote to me at length in London, saying, ‘ Every member of the Irish Cabinet is in full accord with President De Valera’s policy,’to quote from Mr. Griffith’s letter, while Mr. Collins, in a long letter, denounced the writers of reports of differences between Sinn Fein leaders as ‘ British propagandists.’ The essential part of his letter follows: —

DÀIL EIREANN
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
MANSION HOUSE
DUBLIN
The statements are the statements of a man who sees t hings, not as they are, but as he would like them to be. They are the continuation of a campaign which dates from the Sinn Fein success at the Election of 1918. For months after that success the agents of English publicity wrote and rewrote that Sinn Fein was losing its hold on the Irish people. When the local elections of this year gave them a rude shock they consoled themselves by saying, ‘Sinn Fein will rapidly decline now when the people see that its representatives won’t be able to work the local administration.’ The propagandists were again given the lie, and now they have fallen back on the alleged differences between the leaders.
Everyone here at home knows well there is no difference, and knows equally well it is this fact that has been the great, strength of our position. Anything which I said about ‘no negotiations,’ has been said more forcibly and much more ably both by President De Valera and by the Acting-President, Mr. Griffith. This talk of differences is an old policy with England. It is only to be expected at this time, when the situation becomes more and more difficult for her, and shames her more and more before decent people, so that she will leave nothing undone to break up the splendid solidarity of the Irish nation. Too often in the past she has deceived us in this fashion. Now she is desperate that she can no longer do it.
Frantic efforts are being made to show that certain individuals called ‘ Moderates’ are making themselves distasteful to certain other individuals called ‘Extremists’ and that these Extremists are in turn standing in the way of a settlement. English propaganda will get its countless scores of journalists to write this up, in Ireland, in England, in Europe, in America, so that opinion may be prepared for the murder of Macready’s ‘half-hundred.’ Whoever else is deceived, the Irish people and the supporters of the Irish cause will not, be deceived. There are no ‘Moderates’ and no ‘Extremists.’ We all stand together on our common Election Manifesto of December, 1918.
MICHAEL COLLINS. 30.9. 1920.

Every member of the Irish Cabinet is in full accord with President De Valera’s policy. When he speaks to America he speaks for us all. In seeking explicit recognition of the Irish Republic he is acting by and with the unanimous advice of his Cabinet, and if Americans of Irish blood and Americans with Irish sympathies loyally support our President, that recognition can undoubtedly be gained.

ARTHUR GRIFFITH.

Nevertheless there were differences, then as there are to-day, between Mr. De Valera and Griffith and Collins; but the common hatred of a common enemy solidified the ranks of Sinn Fein until Father O’Flannegan, who became Acting-President after the imprisonment of Mr. Griffith, sent his startling message to Downing Street. Mr. Griffith did not know that anyone knew that he, at that very time, had grave differences with his associates, and that he went to the office of a mutual friend late one night and asked protection from his ‘own people.’ But these differences were natural in view of the vigorous methods of suppression inaugurated by the Black-and-Tans, and in face of the split between the Irish advocates in the United States.

Throughout these developments Sir Basil Thomson was the calmest man in England. While the peace movement which he initiated early in 1921 had had a stormy voyage upon the seas of public opinion, his experience during the war had taught him that patience and persistence led to ultimate success, He knew, too, from reliable confidential sources in Ireland, Australia, and Rome that the Christmas season would witness new developments which might lead the ship of peace into less turbulent waters. Although disappointed he was not discouraged. Like General Macready he had been in too many campaigns to give up.

There were others, however, who were on the verge of melancholy; among them, a kindly, white-haired American woman who had shared with her husband the days and nights of terror and uncertainty of two years of Dublin life. On the verge of a nervous breakdown, she called to him early one morning for his razor.

‘What in the world do you want with it?’ he asked.

‘I’m going to kill myself. Where is it?’

‘Why, my dear, my razor won’t help you. It’s a safety.’

A few days later she met General Macready at dinner in the Royal Hospital on the outskirt s of Dublin, where he lived with his family, and related the incident to the old officer.

‘Well, Mrs.——,’ drawled the General, solemn and thoughtful, ‘I shave with an old-fashioned razor. Every morning when I lather my face I take this old weapon in my hand and I say to myself: “Now, Nevil Macready, will you cut your throat or shave yourself?”— and I always shave!’

(Mr. Ackerman’s second paper will deal with the Irish education of Mr. Lloyd George, and the American education of Mr. Michael Collins.)