The Fallacy of a German Peace: The Necessity for a Decision

In the preceding articles I have pointed out that the advantages which Germany has already gained through the war, or has assured for herself in the future, if the present situation remains essentially unchanged, consist of seven chief elements. Before we arrive at final conclusions concerning these elements, let us establish the following facts: —

1. From August, 1914, to the end of July, 1917, — in the space of three years, — Germany, with her 68 million inhabitants, has devoted to the war about 115 billion francs, or 1691 francs per capita.

Within the same time France, although her population is only 40 millions, has had to spend, in a war which was forced on her, 100 billions of francs, or 2500 francs per capita. During these three years every Frenchman has had to contribute 800 francs a year more to the war than each German. Putting aside all questions of advantages from the war, therefore, it may truthfully be said that the war has cost Germany much less than it has France. A comparison of the war-expenses of the two groups of belligerents would only prove this fact more convincingly.

2.Unquestionably Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, as separate States, have been ruined by their warexpenses, but this ruin is all to the advantage of Germany, as it throws her vassals into a condition of absolute financial dependence. As a result, if Pan-Germany is to continue to exist, the Berlin government must be the unchallenged controller of all the financial combinations on which the peace and well-being of Pan-Germany depend. Now these combinations evidently can serve only to strengthen the German hegemony.

No parallel situation is to be found among the Entente powers. The ruin of Russia, for example, would simply make the ruin of France more inevitable, unless a decisive victory of the Allies were to rob Germany of her iniquitous spoils and at the same time guarantee to France the legitimate reparation which alone can save her from irretrievable financial disaster.

3. If Germany can still continue to float new internal loans with comparative ease, it is because her wholesale territorial and Pan-German seizures are considered by her people as new pledges of the credit of the German state as the heart of Pan-Germany.

4. France, which has spent in three years of war 2500 francs per capita of her population, has suffered only loss: 20,000 square kilometres of her territory have been invaded, and given over to undreamed-of spoliation at German hands. Germany, on the other hand, which has spent only 1691 francs per capita for the war, has occupied 500,000 square kilometres of foreign soil, burglarized her own allies, and piled up huge profits from the war.

The diversity of these profits is so great, and the mortgage that they have placed on the future is so heavy, that no figures will convey the sum-total of these advantages; but enough has been said to show that the aggregate is enormous. If one deducts the 115 billions of francs devoted by Germany to the war from the total represented by all the elements of advantage already enumerated, one begins to realize that Germany has really wrung from the war present and future profits which can be computed only in hundreds of billions of francs. This war, therefore, has brought Germany boundless material gain, such as no war in history has ever brought to one people. It is equally certain, on the other hand, that Germany can utilize her advantages only on the express condition of maintaining certain indispensable conditions of the situation on which they are based. We shall now see to what minimum these conditions may be reduced.

Our table ¹ shows that out of the seven elements of advantage won by Germany from the war, the last six — that is, those in the second group — are altogether independent of the first, except for one small detail relating to the national fortunes of the territories occupied by Germany to the southeast that is, in Albania, Montenegro, Roumania, and Serbia.

If, therefore, the formula, ‘peace without annexations and indemnities,’ were actually adopted, Germany, by withdrawing from Belgium and France to the west, Russian Poland to the east, and Montenegro, Albania, Roumania, and Serbia to the southeast, would renounce her first element of advantage, represented by the value of the invaded territories — that is, about 155 billion francs. From this, however, must be deducted the tens of billions’ worth of plunder carried out of the invaded territories during these three years, consisting either of products already used up by the Germans, or of material, metals, and securities which have already been removed to Germany. Her renunciation of this first element of advantage would therefore be rendered relatively incomplete were the formula adopted.

We should note also that there are excellent reasons why Germany’s renunciation could never apply in reality to the territories invaded by her to the southeast — Serbia, at all events.

The six elements of German advantage forming the second group of our table are infinitely more important to Berlin than the first element — which is in any case partially assured by the ‘no indemnity’ formula, as we have seen. Although they are less directly apparent to the Allies, the six elements of the second group are nevertheless real, for they depend on incontrovertible military, economic, and geographic facts. Now these six elements, big with possibilities for the future, depend entirely on the covert but certain seizure which the war has enabled Germany to make of her own allies. But this seizure was possible only as a result of Serbia’s destruction. Serbia, therefore, formed the geographic bulkhead which Germany had to batter down before her influence could predominate over Bulgaria and Turkey. The destruction of Serbia was the sine qua non of the establishment of Central Pan-Germany, which assures the Kaiser of the six principal elements of advantage from the war. Moreover, it is undeniable that the essential prop of Central Pan-Germany has been furnished by the BerlinBagdad Railroad, of which the most important branch, that of BelgradeNish-Pirot, runs across Serbia. Now, that Germany is fighting for the Berlin-Bagdad line, Count Karoly, an ally of Berlin, admitted, speaking on December 12, 1916, in the Hungarian Chamber. (See Le Journal de Genève, December 30, 1916.)

To sum up, then, German victory and the fruition of her most important war-advantages depend directly on the maintenance of Central Pan-Germany, made up of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Now this maintenance is based on two prime conditions.

1. The continuance of Serbia’s state of subjection to Austro-Germany.

2. The preservation of the new economic and military lines of communication between Berlin on the one side and Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, and Constantinople on the other. These are, indeed, the bonds which have enabled Berlin to reduce to practical slavery the Poles, Czechs, Yugo-Slavs, and Roumanians, — the adversaries of PanGermany, — and then, without changing any names or long-established frontiers, to make Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria vassal-states of Berlin, and, consequently, active elements of Central Pan-Germany.

Finally, if the present order of things in Central Europe is preserved, Germany can maintain the HamburgBagdad line. This would be assured by the adoption of the formula, ‘peace without indemnities and annexations.’ This is easily proved.

As we have already seen, even if Germany were to withdraw in the East and West, the stipulation ‘no indemnities’ would permit her to give back the territories stolen from Russia, France, Belgium, and Roumania in a condition of complete economic, physical, and moral collapse: in a word, sucked dry. By reason, too, of the principle of ‘ no indemnities,’ the reconstruction of these devastated countries would be another cause of financial exhaustion for France, Russia, Belgium, and Roumania, already overburdened with the costs of the war. But, even assuming that the Germans withdraw from these occupied territories to the East and West, — although at present there is no reason for seriously considering such an eventuality, — no one in his senses could believe that they would give up Serbia unless forced to do so by the most ruthless methods; for Serbia, by reason of her geographic position, is absolutely essential to the existence of Central Pan-Germany, on which, in turn, Germany’s vast advantages depend.

Of course, it is easy to imagine that Germany would give her signature to treaties of settlement, even involving Serbia. But treaties signed by Germany have no value whatever, ‘We snap our fingers at treaties,’ said the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin to Mr. Gerard, American Ambassador at Berlin. Besides, even supposing that Berlin were party to a treaty concerning Serbia, this treaty might allow Serbia to exist in theory, but not in fact. We must look the situation in the face: Serbia is one great graveyard. Her population has been systematically butchered by the Bulgarians, with German approval. Serbia is completely ruined. The Bulgaro-Austro-Germans have taken everything.

Now the principle ‘no indemnities’ would keep Serbia in this terrible and irremediable state of misery. It is evident that under these conditions the Serbian state would be hopelessly crippled. If, therefore, Austria-Germany were to say to the Allies, ‘Very well; in conformity with the formula “no annexations, no indemnities,” we are willing to recognize Serbia’s dependence by treaty,’ who would be deceived by this sinister and portentous joke? Who could believe in the sincerity of a proposition which, on the face of it, is rendered impossible of fulfillment by the ‘ no indemnities’ clause. And what guaranty would the Allies hold that Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria would withdraw from Serbia at the same time, in view of the fact that such a withdrawal, if bona fide, would imply Berlin’s renunciation of the whole Central Pan-German scheme and its vast attendant profits?

To suppose such a thing possible implies a complete ignorance of the Germanic spirit as it has manifested itself since the beginning of history. Besides, declarations made by the Germans themselves show that they will never recede from their position as regards Serbia. As early as December, 1916, the Frankfurter Zeitung prepared its readers in advance for the ‘pacifist’ tactics about to be employed — tactics which are now being tried out with the help of the Russian anarchists, the Kienthal Socialists, and the Pope.

‘Certainly,’ said the Frankfort paper, ‘if we are to make a lasting profit from the military situation, both in its favorable and in its less advantageous aspects, it is essential that special questions should be severally considered in their relation to the whole. To-day our point of view should be as follows; in the East, the formulation of definite demands, and in the West, negotiations on a flexible basis. This is not a programme but a general line of action. “Negotiation” is by no means a synonym for “ renunciation.” ’

This last sentence should be read and pondered over by all the Allies. Here we find an absolutely clear statement as regards the fate of Serbia, whose restoration, by means indicated later, is the one thing which can save the world from the consequences of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme,

On August 8, 1917, at a banquet given at London for M. Pachitch, the Serbian Premier, Mr. Lloyd George acknowledged in decisive terms Great Britain’s obligations to Serbia — obligations which are practically those of the whole Entente.

‘What I have already said in the name of the British Government regarding Belgium, I here repeat in the name of the same Government regarding Serbia. The first condition of peace must be its complete and unrestricted restoration. I have not come here to make a speech. I have simply come to say that, no matter how long the war should last, Britain has pledged her honor that Serbia shall emerge from the conflict independent and completely restored. Moreover, it is not only a matter of honor. The security of civilization is directly involved here. In the West, Belgium has blocked Germany’s way, and Serbia in the East has been the check of the Central Powers. She must continue to mount guard over the gateway to the East.

To this the Berlin Kreuzzeitung made reply.

‘ Mr. Lloyd George has said that the integral restoration of Serbia was an essential condition of peace and that British honor was pledged to this restoration. The war-aims of England and those of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria are in absolute opposition on this point.’

The Hamburger Fremdenblatt, speaking for Germany as well, added, —

‘ Germany and Austria-Hungary have crushed Serbia. They alone will decide what disposition is to be made of King Peter’s former realm.’

There can be no illusion here. The formula ‘ peace without annexations and indemnities’ cannot apply to Serbia, which is the keystone of Pan-Germany.

We now see that, even if the withdrawal of Germany from the territories of Belgium, France, and Russia now held by her were to take place, Central Pan-Germany would remain essentially intact; and her commercial competition alone would suffice to bring about the economic ruin of France, England, and Russia. The last-named countries would be staggering under their colossal war-debts, with no offsetting compensation, whereas Germany, thanks to six great elements of advantage, would find her war-losses more than counterbalanced by her profits. What chance would the Allied powers, exhausted by a deadly peace, have against the thirty million soldiers of Pan-Germany when Berlin, refreshed by a short respite, should choose to renew her hold over those western territories which she had temporarily relinquished?

Is it not plain what depths of deception lie beneath that formula, ‘peace without annexations and indemnities,’ which the Russian Socialists, ignorant of the vast advantages accruing to Germany from the war, have adopted at the suggestion of Berlin’s Leninist agents? Let us look at the facts, not at the words. If the formula ‘peace without annexations and indemnities’ is acceptable to the Germans, it is simply because this formula, in the opinion of Berlin, will assure the maintenance of Central Pan-Germany, which, in turn, pledges to Germany the domination of Europe and the fulfillment of all other elements of the Pan-German scheme.

Now, if Central Pan-Germany were to survive, thus assuring to Germany all its vast attendant advantages, and leaving the Allies to face their incalculable war-losses, could such a peace properly be called a ‘white peace’? Could a peace which gave Germany the domination of Europe be called a ‘ drawn game, ’ a ‘ peace without annexations or indemnities’? What sort of ‘limping peace’ (paix boiteuse) would permit Prussian militarism to hold sway over the 150 million people of Pan-Germany instead of the 68 millions of 1914, and put 30 million soldiers at Berlin’s disposal ? What one of the exhausted states of Europe could lift a hand under such conditions? This would be no paix boiteuse ; it would be the peace of slavery.

If the Allies are to understand the crucial situation which lies before them, they must realize that, as Lloyd George said, ‘The security of civilization is directly involved in the independence of Serbia.’ But the independence of Serbia can never be assured so long as Germany practically exercises a hegemony over the 50 million people of Austria-Hungary, for the AustroGerman unit of 118 million inhabitants, all subject to Berlin, is geographically the mistress of the Balkans. The pledge of Serbia’s independence, therefore, does not lie in Serbia, but north of the Danube. This pledge involves the liberation of the peoples under Hapsburg domination, — the Poles, Czechoslovaks, Yugo-Slavs, and Roumanians, which alone can permit the creation of a barrier sufficiently strong to block the Hamburg-Persian Gulf line, and, at the same time, annul the vast advantages that the definite establishment of the formidable economic and military Pan-German scheme would assure to the Kaiser and his people.

Now it is much easier to devise the destruction of Pan-Germany than is generally supposed. This fact will become plain as soon as the Allies as a whole realize that the freedom of the nationalities subject to the Hapsburgs should not only be an object of the Entente victory, but also a means to that victory. This, however, is a point which needs greater elaboration than I can give in this paper, whose com plexity has already carried it to a great length.

In a word, the solution of the Central European problem means everything for the Allies. So long as it remains unsolved, victory will be out of reach. On the other hand, when this one point has been settled, all the other special war-aims of each of the Allies can be fulfilled with ease.

Assuming now that the problem of Central Europe has been solved, could it be said that the resulting peace would be ‘without annexations and indemnities’? Plainly not: for this peace, if it is to break up forever the autocracies of the Central Empires, must for reasons of nationality change the existing frontiers, which have made Austro-German imperialism possible. It might also involve certain legitimate reparations. Could it be said that peace on the terms of the Allies would be a ‘white peace,’ a ‘drawn game’? Again we must say no; for such a peace would bring incalculable benefits to the world: the end of Prussian militarism, together with the possibility of organizing the society of nations under other and better conditions. Neither could it be called a ‘paix boiteuse,’ for the destruction of Prussian militarism would insure to the world a long term of rest after the present awful struggle.

The formulæ ‘peace without indemnities or annexations,’ ‘white peace,’ ‘drawn game’ and ‘paix boiteuse’ have therefore no more connection with reality in the event of an Allied victory than in that of a German victory. The truth in a nut-shell is that, by virtue of the prime importance of the Central European problem, either the Allies will win victory through the destruction of Pan-Germany, or else the Germans, thanks to Central Pan-Germany and its economic and military advantages, will reduce all Europe to slavery. These are the two phases of the dilemma.

In any case, the fact that expressions without any practical application, and hence absurd, are constantly made use of in many Allied organs of public opinion in the discussion of peace, proves beyond doubt that certain Allied circles, poisoned by the influence of Lenine or Kienthal, have lost their sense of realities. With such insidious enemies as the Germans, this involves a real danger for that moral resistance of the Allies which is so invaluable. The Americans, through their practical common sense, can be of the greatest service in helping the European Allies to set it at naught.

President Wilson, by his message to Russia and his Flag Day address, has already done much for the common cause by clearly setting forth the concrete difficulties to be overcome by the Allies if they are to live at liberty. Mr. Gompers has done the same by his firm stand regarding the Stockholm conference. By energetically opposing the pernicious Socialist theoreticians, he has supported those real Socialists in France, England, and Russia who understand the vital importance of killing Prussian militarism.

May all true Americans continue to speak as these two men have done! The common sense of their opinions, spread broadcast among the European Allies will help us to neutralize the deadly action of those among us who have become intoxicated by theories. The cause of the Allies is an ideal, but the triumph of this ideal can never be insured by words; it can be compassed only by the accurate knowledge of military and economic realities.