I

CAN a foreigner, belonging to a belligerent nation, publish his views of the policy of a neutral state, while a war is at its height, without running the risk of being told to mind his own business? Should he keep quiet and wait for the end of a war that shows no sign of ending, before he expresses his opinion as to how to end it ?

My answer is that, in time of war, a foreigner is less entitled than ever to remain silent if he thinks he can help the interests of his country and the general interest as well. If he is mistaken, public opinion will dispose of him; if he is right, he renders a service to all. The war may suspend the course of solidarity between nations, but it does not prevent the existence of that solidarity, and, in fact, emphasizes its benefits.

Moreover, when I am asked, as a Frenchman, how I regard the duty of the United States, I can only refer to what I have always said and written:1 I am more than ever convinced that a great and young country such as the United States can realize its destiny only through peace. In these days, a war of conquest would be folly and nonsense, for the United States more than for any other country. For its own good and for the good of all nations, the duty of the New World is to experiment with

a new policy, a policy of conciliation and respect for Right, in the place of the traditional antagonism and adventurousness of which we in Europe see the irreparably tragic results. The United States, which were held up to us in Europe, twenty years ago, as a danger, ought, on the contrary, to be our guides, like strong and clear-sighted children who end by guiding the footsteps of their parents when the old people’s eyes are dimmed by age. But they cannot play this fine part unless they have no doubt as to the course they should follow and unless they do not allow themselves to be led astray by wrong education, by yellow newspapers, by bad and interested advice, and by the bad example of Europe. My duty as a European and a tried friend of the United States is to say, with the utmost possible emphasis, ‘Do not let yourselves be led away on the wrong path as we were. Keep your youth and strength free from the blunders we have been committing for centuries. The price always has to be paid in the long run; the sins of the fathers are visited upon their children and their children’s children. If you are wise to-day, you will sow prosperity, glory, and happiness for your descendants. Your error will be their misfortune.’

II. AMERICA’S DUTY

The duty of the United States is written in luminous letters in their short history. American democracy has grown tenfold in population, wealth, and power in the course of a century of liberty and peace. Unlike its necessary and sacred internal struggles for independence, its three foreign wars waged in a century were not inevitable, and terrible risks have to be set off against their advantages. The most glorious and productive wars for the United States were those that were avoided—especially those that seemed most certain to occur — between Great Britain and her young and emancipated colony, from the Treaty of Ghent to our own times. The fact that this treaty of disarmament has been faithfully observed by both parties for more than a century is a victorious demonstration of a truth that is misunderstood and even ignored in Europe — that peace can be durable. This experience has made other very important innovations possible, such as the first memorable attempt at arbitration over the Alabama case, and many others. What was done at The Hague was merely an outcome of the treaty of Ghent and the Alabama arbitration; and this is why the United States in 1899, and all the American republics in 1907, took a prominent part in it.

1 It must be understood that the author was requested by the Atlantic to write this article. The volume especially referred to here is America and her Problems, published by the Macmillan Co. — THE EDITORS.

This being so, the incalculable advantages derived by the United States from the accomplishment of their duty in the past should dictate their duty in the present and future.

The United States, who were the promoters of the organization of international peace, see the very principles of their work threatened by the present war, and not only their work but the guaranty of their existence. Even assuming, contrary to all probability, that the great war of 1914-1915-1916 is some day proved to have been inevitable, that it is at least justified by results, and that it ends in the final and systematic triumph of Might over Right, then we must conclude that the experience of the United States was

nothing but a happy accident of an ephemeral nature, and even a mistake involving imprudent delay in completing their military organization. The only resource of the United States and all neutral nations will then be to repent of having believed in the possibility of peace, and to make up for lost time by abandoning productive activity and joining in the exhausting and unproductive race for armaments, all the while noting the absurd fact that this race was itself one of the principal causes of the war. In this way we reach the supreme mockery of all progress, or, shall we say, universal anarchy and the failure of our civilization.

If, on the other hand, the present war is universally condemned, as it ought to be, and placed on a level with the most monstrous crimes and inconceivable madness; if the United States refuse to contradict themselves, and give the signal for such condemnation; if they use it as proof that they alone were in the right and that their attachment to peace has benefited them, while the routine war superstition has been the ruin of Europe, — then all the nations now fighting among themselves will be compelled to turn their eyes toward the United States standing firmly on their principles.

Here, however, there is room for a complete misunderstanding. The peace observed by the United States with Great Britain, for instance, or with France or Russia, has never been ‘peace at any price.’ It has always been based on a spirit of conciliation and justice, on mutual respect for right and on the guaranties provided by treaty. The violation of treaties is incompatible with peace, and is, in fact, the negation of peace and a crime against peace. By observing the Ghent treaty of peace with England, the United States have merely shown respect for right. As long as their example is followed, all goes well; the world makes progress, and peace becomes established and takes root as a part of the national habits; but if, on the other hand, a state, inspired by the desire to dominate, systematically violates treaties and opposes contempt for right to the new tradition of respect for right, then there is danger, not only to the policy of the United States, but to their whole political system, their liberty, and their existence. And if, furthermore, the violated treaties were signed by the United States, and if they admit such violation, they simultaneously renounce their rights, their duty, and the part they should play. They resign themselves to be mere lookers-on at a struggle which will decide their own fate; they withdraw from the ranks of the defenders of human liberties; they lose caste and disqualify themselves. Such weakness is astonishing. It is not American. It is worse than being afraid of blows; it is being afraid of responsibilities.

All neutrals have of course been influenced by the brute force of the German system of terrorization. Germany’s neighbors could hardly look on without trembling at the spectacle of the weakest state invaded by the strongest, one that had guaranteed its neutrality! It is quite easy to understand why Holland, Switzerland, and Denmark should hesitate to expose themselves to the terrible fate of Belgium. It was a question of life or death for them. The risks run by American democracy were quite different and much smaller, if there were such risks, and that is why its duty was so evident. For this reason the admirers of the United States were deeply disappointed when that country remained unmoved by the declaration of war, the violation of Luxembourg and Belgium, and all the execrable crimes that will for ever hold up the tragic month of August, 1914, to the horror of the world. It is true that the Pope, who is still more inaccessible and invulnerable than the Government of the United States, has observed the same reserve, but at the cost of a great weakening of his churches and of religion itself. Who can maintain that this war should lay Europe waste with impunity, in the name of the German God allied with the God of Mahomet, without a word from the representative of Christ? Saint Peter has denied his Master a fourth time!

The abstention of the United States government is, to my mind, more serious than that of the Pope, because the United States are a young people — the great resource on which we counted for a better future. If France had held aloof under similar circumstances, it would have been said that the French were an old nation in a state of decadence. But that was not the case. France has often laid herself open to unfavorable opinions from foreigners who see her under false conditions, but she did not hesitate to do her duty, and, after one year, she is still more determined than on the first day.

In August, 1914, the United States ought to have uttered a whole-hearted protest against any violation of right. A definite, humane protest from them would have had incalculable consequences. It would have opened the eyes of the German people by warning them that they were on the wrong road. It would have emboldened other neutrals and brought them together, and, in this way, the people of the United States would have been raised to the rank of directors of the modern conscience and also to that of judge for the future. And what a judge! No mere Pontius Pilate, indifferent to the death of the Just Man, but the arbitrator to whom all would have had recourse after the war.

A year has gone by. Is the duty of the United States any less urgent than it was? No; even admitting a complete victory for the German armies, the duty of America will be all the more thankless and the more pressing. The longer the government of the United States delays its protest, the more certain will be the necessity of making that protest.

III. AMERICA’S INTEREST

It will be objected that the duty of the United States is not necessarily in accord with their interest, or rather, in virtue of the recognized formula, that reasons of state are the only ones a government should recognize; that a state has no duties, and that, as the saying is, duty, like religion, is good for people only. Such sophisms may be argued in private conversation, but not in the atmosphere of a democracy. Neither in the United States nor elsewhere are there two kinds of morality. The interest and the duty of the state, like that of the individual, are inseparable. The United States need to be assured of future stability; consequently they need to be assured that treaties will be respected. It is therefore to their interest to protect Right.

Now, what are the interests which are represented as enforcing abstention on the United States? Let us weigh the more important of them.

Every one is not a loser by war, we are told, and that is true. It has no doubt cost the United States temporarily a few markets and the active circulation they need. Some of their principal exports, such as cotton and copper, are seized as contraband. But à quelque chose malheur est bon. There is some good even in the war. It might have been thought, for instance, that the war would ruin the San Francisco Exhibition. As a matter of fact, it was a good thing for the exhibition, because Americans had to travel in their own country instead of in Europe. Instead of selling, Europe is buying, and has changed from a competitor into a customer. Americans are supplying Europe with provisions, grain, vehicles, machinery of all kinds, ammunition, and woven stuffs. European capital, flowing into the United States with orders from Europe, is favoring America’s great enterprises. The war has given the United States the equivalent of an immense loan without interest and an unhoped-for addition of capital. It has stimulated the development of the United States. A great many Americans who have enriched themselves may well approve of the war and hope it will last indefinitely. Why should any protest be expected from them?

Why? Because the fact of accustoming one’s self to evil does not do away with the evil. The United States are not alone in profiting by the war. It might even be said of a belligerent country! In France, outside the army zone, the country is very prosperous.

I can hardly believe my eyes, but my information shows it to be a fact. Railroad traffic has never been more active than it was this summer. On some of the main lines, the receipts, in spite of the free travel for soldiers and often for their families, exceed those of previous years! Life has resumed its course, to such an extent that I see country districts growing wealthier and profiting by the abundant crops, military allowances, and so on. Four cows, for instance, fetch the price of five; and potatoes, which are very plentiful, are almost as dear as early vegetables. I know people who are saving money and even making their fortunes. I see our roads well kept up as far as the front. Our parks and gardens have as many flowers as usual, even where shells are falling. In the cities, women, who are everywhere so brave and admirable, are as smartly dressed and cheerful as in the past. It is hard to believe that there is a war. Is this any reason why our children, or those who are left to us, and those of the Americans, should not have to pay when the terrible material and moral settlement comes after the war? How can any one be so blind as to rest satisfied with profits made in 1915 to the detriment of the activity and safety of several generations to come? I make due allowance for the comparative prosperity which will result from the scarcity of labor, the rise in wages, and the necessity of rebuilding ruined property. I admit that, after the war, we may expect a period of renovation, like the Renaissance coming after the Hundred Years’ War. But how can the reconstruction of buildings and the securing of government contracts be compared with the normal development of progress and the benefits of the various forms of initiative, inventions, and discoveries which we expect from peace?

This war being the detestable fruit of aberration, it is only too natural that it should, in turn, lead to aberration.

Again, it is claimed that it is to the interest of the United States to deal lightly with Germans and the German cause, however bad it may be. They are compelled to do so by circumstances which I take into due account.

Jingo shouting is not argument. I leave this kind of thing to the preachers of hate and to those newspapers which, before being Germanophobe, were Anglophobe and Russophobe, and which will always be xenophobe, or rather demophobe. Long before the war I expressed my horror of German militarism. The criminal nature of Germany’s aggression has exceeded all anticipation and all limits. It was combined with premeditation, espionage, and a methodical deviltry of which no victory can wipe away the indelible stain. This much being said, Germany, though guilty, is a victim of the domination to which she has submitted. The people of the United States have less to do with the German government than with the German people, and cannot be expected to judge the German government’s crimes and the fruitful coöperation of the German people in American prosperity with the same severity. This is an undoubted fact.

The Frenchman is not known in the United States. I am one of those who have tried hard to get justice done to him; but, until the last few years, his name was little more than an echo of a glorious past, associated with La Fayette, La Salle, and other pioneers; and it is an echo very nearly killed by the combined misrepresentations and lies of hostile newspapers and of certain French papers and books which seemed to justify the worst kind of attacks.

The Englishman was for a long time a rival, after having been a master, and the Irish in America did their best to discredit him. The Russian was known only by the revolutionary ideas of young intellectuals who had escaped the penal settlements in Siberia and found centres of liberation propaganda in the universities of the New World. All that Americans knew of Russia was the defects of its government. Its genius, its reproductive power, and its prodigious future were a sealed book to them.

The Germans, on the other hand, had come over in great numbers. They were glad to exchange their former hard status for that of American citizens. They were retiring, at first, and always industrious; and the only objection I have heard against them was that there were not more of them. It was the same in Russia, England, Italy, and France. In the United States there was regret that the level of immigration from Europe was falling, and that the Germans were neglecting North America, giving preference to their colonies and other countries. What was the cause of this regret? It was because the German was a better worker than some others. Can the war alter that? It depresses me to see responsible men naïvely committing themselves to the assertion that we must do away, not only with German military imperialism, but with German economic imperialism. What a delusion! We might as well say at once that we must make it our business to dispose of a nation with more enterprise and more children than others have. To try to prevent the Germans, or the French, or any others, after the war, from working harder than the rest, is not only childish but a wretched miscalculation. The others ought to work their hardest and best, so as to raise the general level and not try to lower it. Let us abase German pride, but let us imitate, and even improve upon, Germany’s good points. In any case, do not let us waste our time in denying their existence and in stimulating them under pretext that we want to destroy them. Shells are powerless against the inherent qualities of France and of Germany too, as well as those of any living people, and they cannot destroy a nation.

This being so, it is obviously a great mistake to ask the United States to reject co-workers against whom the only complaint was that there were not enough of them. The contradiction would be altogether too flagrant.

It must be admitted that the majority of the Germans who have left Germany did so with no thought of returning. The object, in many cases, was to avoid military service. The United States cannot regard these men as enemies. After one or two generations they become completely Americanized.

As for those who have brought German pride, domination, and militarizing principles with them, and as for the latest arrivals, it is clear that during the present crisis they are a hindrance to the policy of the United States, but it cannot be maintained that they will not become American. We have proof to the contrary in France, where we see the sons of Germans serving freely in our army,—just as the Germans have, unfortunately, assimilated some of the very best of the French, who were driven from our country by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and by persecutions of all kinds.

Those immigrants — in the United States — who have remained German are, in any case, only a minority, and most of them are not of the fighting kind; and this minority will not resist any really national outburst of American sentiment. The danger in the United States does not lie in German resistance but in American indifference.

Here is another argument that may be urged against me: Supposing that there were no war profits and that the Germans formed only an infinitesimal part of the hundred millions of American citizens, would it not still be to the interest of the United States to look on, seeing that they have no army? Must not their policy be governed by their military impotence?

This raises the problem of ‘the vital question of national defense’ and of ‘unpreparedness,’ which has been under consideration more or less in all neutral states since the outbreak of the war, and even in belligerent countries. There is not one belligerent who cannot say now, ‘Why did we not have more ammunition, arms, submarines, and so forth? ’

In the United States, the out-andout pacifists, through their very eloquent spokesman Mr. William J. Bryan, uphold the theory of not protesting and letting things follow their course. If they had their way, Germany would be free to invade and master every other country. I have already said very clearly what I think about this false conception of peace, which would lead to the enslavement of the world and the triumph of violence over right.

In opposition to the peace-at-anyprice apostles we have President Roosevelt and others, who are in favor, not merely of making a protest, but of armed intervention.

It would be more than bad grace on my part to criticize President Roosevelt’s views, although the esteem I have always felt for his person and character enables me to judge his generous conduct without difficulty; and how could I be otherwise than grateful to him for wanting to act in favor, not only of right, but of my country? I nevertheless hold to the conviction that the only suitable course for the United States Government is to lodge a protest, and that armed intervention would be a rash and useless complication, inasmuch as a large corps of American volunteers could not be formed spontaneously.

However much one may regret that the United States have no army, the fact remains. A young country, in full process of growth, cannot populate itself and develop its territories and its unlimited resources and, at the same time, militarize itself. The two processes are in contradiction. Furthermore, the war shows that, if the United States had been prematurely militarized, they would have been weakened. Germany’s force lies largely in its economic organization, or, in other words, in the perfect utilization of all its national resources. Germany would have been vanquished long ago if the whole country had been only an immense barracks. The United States, in spite of their immense progress, are still far from being as thickly populated as Germany. They have not yet enough workers for their agriculture, commerce, industries, and laboratories. The great strength for resistance of the United States is based on their economic development. Do not stop America’s growth in order to plunge into adventures!

In France, what was lacking at the outbreak of the war was neither men nor transports nor brave and capable generals, but economic organization. If we had devoted to that organization the thousands of millions we have spent in building forts, useless super-dreadnoughts, and the barracks required by our three-year military service system; if we had realized that a soldier can be sufficiently trained in a few months or weeks instead of three years, always provided that the whole nation had been supplied with the necessary officers, arms, ammunition, provisions, and communications; if we had, in short, adopted a military organization forming the complement to a good economic and democratic organization, the Germans would not be occupying part of our territory.

Americans have no need to declare war to be ready to repulse any one who may attack them, and no one will ever dream of attacking them if they confine themselves, as I have always said, to strengthening their economic organization by a fundamental organization of their national defense. Switzerland, which is a thousand times more exposed to attack than the United States, and is, in fact, in the midst of belligerent states, has succeeded in developing and making herself respected. Belgium might perhaps have resisted more effectually had she possessed a more national and more democratic military system.

The question for the United States is to find the system of defense that interferes least with their economic activity. A great navy, far from protecting them, would ruin and expose them. It is proved that super-dreadnoughts are useless and can do nothing but hide themselves in port to avoid cheap defensive craft like submarines, mines, torpedoes, and aeroplanes. If Germany, instead of great battle fleets, had had nothing but fast cruisers like the Emden, the Goeben, and the Breslau, and submarines, she would have neutralized or destroyed all her enemies’ fleets.

IV. CONCLUSION

The United States cannot exist under a system which permits of the violation of treaties. Moreover, it will be a long time before they can get together an army and a fleet which would enable them to declare war.

Does this imply that they are to look on silently and helplessly at any crimes that may be committed? No; the war has simply emphasized their need of a good system of defense; they will be listened to if they cannot be attacked. But they are no more under an obligation to keep silent than to declare war.

A formal and definite protest was, and remains, their resource and their duty.

What would be the use, it will be asked, of a protest without any means of following it up? Would it not involve humiliation or war sooner or later? No. Abstention will lead the United States to war more surely than a protest. It is clear that the United States are now more or less compelled to act because they held back too much at the beginning of the war. Their attitude of reserve led the Germans to think they could do anything they pleased. It encouraged their attack, not only on France and Belgium, but on the whole world. The German government has constantly asserted that if it had been warned in good time of what England would do, it would not have declared war. If it had received a protest from America, it would have had more respect for Right, and would not have regarded Right as defenseless and non-existent.

Even now the United States government is by no means reduced to impotent protests. Assuming that it is compelled by the insolent clumsiness of the German government to break off diplomatic intercourse with Berlin, can it be supposed that such a rupture would have no moral effect ? Does not the American government possess hundreds of means of preventing the German government from taking advantage of the situation to damage American interests? The most foolish and ineffective of them, and the one that would best suit German calculations, would be a declaration of war, which would plunge the United States into utter confusion and give unexpected strength to the arguments of the peace-at-any-price party. The United States, after having been the last to declare war, might be the first to ask for peace. Their already difficult position in the world would then be aggravated by their isolation.

This isolation is not a mere expression. It is the great danger for neutrals in the future. It was argued a year ago that abstention on the part of the United States was a very clever policy and would ensure the selection of the United States as arbitrators. I have always thought the opposite: a country that plays no part in the present drama will have no share in the dénouement. If the United States make the mistake of remaining outside, no one will listen to them when the time comes for them to intervene. This is inevitable. Beware! On the day when the nations realize that they have been deceived and led out to slaughter one another, there will be more solidarity between those who have fought than between them and the neutrals who merely looked on. There are already signs of this. French wounded are admitting that they were well cared for in Germany, and it is the same with German wounded in France. A wounded Frenchman refused to be separated from a German who had saved his life. At Tours station recently, one of my friends witnessed the arrival of a batch of German prisoners. The spectators, who were so hostile at the beginning of the war, now say very little on such occasions. A big, stout man nevertheless uttered an insult. A French soldier who was one of the guard, interfered and closed the man’s mouth with these words: ‘ Let them alone. Have you been in the trenches? They have.’

Sooner or later — and the sooner the wiser — the United States, without declaring or waging a useless war on Germany, must depart from their reserve and take up their part as the guardians of right. Their subsequent influence will depend upon the clearness and definiteness with which they speak. They will not have become belligerents, but they will have taken sides. If it is urged that the German jingoes in the United States will respond by attempting to cause general disorganization, my reply is that such an attempt would not only fail, but would demonstrate that it was to the interest of the United States to prevent the war and to prevent the triumph of German pride.

It seems to me that the United States, without taking up arms, can still conciliate their interest with their duty, the Monroe Doctrine with their need for stability. They can give distracted Europe the example of their union in respecting Right, and help her to establish a new order on the basis of a permanent peace.