German Methods of Conducting the War

THE present war, in which many millions of men are engaged, has opened up a great variety of new problems of organization and of military technique; and these in turn have influenced the methods of warfare. Wireless telegraphy, submarines, and airships have created new and terrifying possibilities in the conduct of war which have shocked the public sensibilities. Added to the charges arising from the use of these new weapons are the old charges of atrocity and cruelty which every war brings. Many of these charges are willful falsifications, many of them are of psychopathic origin, and many are mythical.

Admitting that, in the passion engendered by war, brutal instincts may be let loose and occasional atrocities be committed by individuals on either side, a German may be permitted to point out in reference to the army of his own country that it is inconceivable that the iron discipline of German troops, whose efficiency in every other direction is recognized, should have broken down here.

Omitting, then, a discussion of these atrocity charges, and confining itself, as far as possible, to admitted facts and uncontested reports, this article will examine the methods of warfare employed by Germany and her adversaries in the present conflict, under three main heads: —

I. Methods of Warfare in the Air.

II. Methods of Warfare on Land.

III.Methods of Warfare at Sea.

I. METHODS OF WARFARE IN THE AIR

In this connection the first things to be considered are the attacks of aircraft and the throwing of bombs from them. Many have believed this method of warfare to be a violation of international law; while others, who made no such claim, declared it to be inhuman and absolutely useless.

Let us first look at the legal aspect. Even the first conference at The Hague in the year 1899 considered this question. The second conference, in 1907, practically confirmed the findings of the first with a few exceptions. In one of the declarations made at this conference, it was laid down that, the ‘contracting powers agree to prohibit for a period extending to the close of the third peace conference, the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other new methods of similar nature.’ This declaration was signed by the representatives of twenty-seven states out of the fortyfour present.

Among the seventeen states which did not sign were France, Italy, Roumania, Russia, Servia, and Germany. Thus practically all the big military powers at the convention, with the exception of Austria-Hungary, failed to sign this agreement, and for a very good reason; for if ever war has to be made, which is regretted by none more than by Germany, there is no reason why the latest technical inventions should not be made use of. It will be observed that none of the big military powers which are in possession of airships signed this declaration.

It is easily understood why England signed this declaration, and was the only power to ratify it: her interests lay in such a declaration, for her insular safety is threatened by attacks from the air. Furthermore, every attempt in England to develop an effective type of airship has been a failure. The airships which England built had all sorts of other good points, but either they were not able to fly or they collapsed after the first few attempts. Only of late has England had any conspicuous successes in aviation. England’s interest therefore is quite different from that of the nations which have had airships for a long time, especially France and Germany.

According to recognized international practice, Germany is not bound to abide by this declaration, since, like the seventeen other states, she did not sign it. The bombardment from airships and flying machines therefore is not forbidden by any international agreements, and Germany is altogether within her rights in making use of this new weapon in which she is so far superior to the Allies. International agreements of this kind are not and cannot be ideal. They are compromises in which each side makes concessions.

It cannot even be shown that the throwing of bombs from airships is an especially inhuman method of warfare. There is no difference between such bomb-throwing and a bombardment from land. It is impossible to arrange any bombardment so that non-combatants will not be struck, or so that some of the shots will not strike other places than those aimed at and often destroy private property. Private property damaged in war on land is no different from private property destroyed and captured on the high seas, as, for instance, by the superior British fleet. One is just as justifiable as the other. It is well known that Germany tried repeatedly in the Hague Peace Conference to put an end to the confiscation of private property on the high seas, for the simple reason that Germany’s interest lay in such an international pact, owing to the fact that its navy is very much smaller than the British. Germany would have been willing to offset such a concession with an agreement not to throw bombs from the air, but England’s interests were opposed. This fact is not stated here in the sense of rebuking England; but it is only just that if Germany does not object to Great Britain using her means of warfare as best she can, Germany on the other hand should not be criticized for making the best use of her weapons.

Now, however, the objection is raised, and this at first glance seems to be a point well taken, that the throwing of bombs from airships is really a waste of effort, as it accomplishes nothing. The American is apt to ask what is the use of throwing bombs into a city that is not even being besieged at the time. This seems senseless to him, and especially inhuman when a German airman throws bombs into Paris, or when a Zeppelin sends projectiles of a similar kind into Antwerp before the city is even invested. A calm and judicial consideration, however, will show that this view is not justified. The airman over Paris did not aim at the unfortunate woman and the unhappy children who became the innocent victims of war in the immediate vicinity of the Eiffel Tower; the bombs were meant for the wireless station on the Eiffel Tower. It is hardly necessary to explain how enormously important the destruction of this station would have been.

When one realizes that modern warfare is conducted, not only by the physical strength and endurance of the troops, but above all by the inventions of mechanical genius and the proper use of modern appliances, one easily sees the enormous importance of the Eiffel Tower wireless station. It distributes the orders of the French War Office to the armies in the field. From it news is sent out over the entire world. Instructions to the French fleet are ‘wirelessed.’ The communication between the Allies — between the British and French governments, between the allied fleets and the armies in the field —is conducted from this station. The destruction of this means of communication under the circumstances would be more important than that of an entire army corps. If the airman missed his target and unfortunately struck non-combatants, such is the inevitable risk of war. He can be reproached for what he did no more than Germany has reproached the British for the brave but unsuccessful attempts of the English flyers to destroy German Zeppelin sheds and Zeppelins at Düsseldorf and other unfortified towns.

Attacks by airships are even more useful than those by aeroplanes, according to the general opinion of military experts. There is no doubt whatever of the fact that the prompt aid rendered by the Zeppelins above Liège contributed greatly toward hastening the fall of that fortress. If one wishes to judge rightly the value of Zeppelin attacks upon Antwerp even before its investment, one must have in mind the immense complicated organization of such a modern fortress. Defense of a modern fortress no longer consists merely in leading the troops to the walls where guns are placed and then firing at the attacking enemy. Even more important than the bravery and deeds of the troops is the technical organization. One look at the map of the fortifications of Antwerp shows clearly how such an organization works.

The far-extended double line of forts demands a careful organization of the railroad system, with every detail so thoroughly regulated that troops can at a moment’s notice be taken from places where they are not needed and be thrown into other positions where the enemy’s attack is the stronger. There must be complicated machinery for properly placing heavy artillery material, for moving ammunition, for transporting the wounded, for operating canals and sluices in order to flood certain districts. In short, it is necessary to operate a large technical apparatus which must work with the precision of a clock; and the threads connecting the various parts of such an apparatus run together at a few points. These points may be likened to the brain, with which the outer members of the body are connected by nerves. If this brain is injured, the entire body is made useless, and the greatest bravery cannot offset destruction of the inner mechanism. To this must be added the importance of arsenals, of magazines for ammunition, of oil-tanks, of grain-elevators, the importance of the headquarters of the chief commander, the general staff, and so forth.

The destruction of the central points must hasten the surrender of such a fortress by weeks. Their destruction through bombs thrown from airships may therefore be a much more humane method of warfare than the destruction of the entire fortress by a bombardment from all sides could possibly be. At all events, this more modern warfare — which paralyzes the body of a fortress through the destruction of the central nervous system, and thus forces the fortress to surrender — may spare many thousands of lives and property of incalculable value.

II. METHODS OF WARFARE ON LAND

1. The fundamental rules for the conduct of war on land are laid down in the ‘Convention Concerning Laws and Customs of War on Land’ which forms part of the conferences at The Hague of t he years 1899 and 1907. The source of this convention is, as is well known, an American authority, namely, the ‘Instructions for government of armies of the United States in the field, drawn up by Dr. Francis Lieber and revised by a Board of Officers of the United States army at the instigation of President Lincoln, and issued from the office of the Adjutant General to the army in General Order No. 100 of 1863.’

These instructions have been justly called ‘a deed of great moment in the history of international law and of civilization.’ They have formed a basis for similar work on the part of France, England, and Germany, and have been incorporated, in spirit at least, into the Hague Conventions. These conventions must be considered valid, because the Convention of 1907 was, so far as the warfare on land is concerned, only a revision of the Convention of 1899, which is binding by reason of ratifications deposited by all the nations now at war. At any rate, the Peace Foundation is right in stating that instructions in the form of general orders are issued to the different armies having all the force of the sanctions of martial law behind them. The German code of 1870-71 was entirely based on the American document, the terms of which were in part almost verbally followed. The new instructions are practically the same in a modernized form.

2. The Conventions of 1899 and 1907 are amplified by a number of special declarations, of which one concerns the use of shells containing asphyxiat-

ing or deleterious gases,¹ and another refers to expanding bullets.’ Charges have been made that the French have used such shells, and both sides have charged the use of expanding bullets by the enemy. We shall not enter here into the question whether this violation of the laws of nations has been practiced.

3.The greatest discussion has been roused by the methods of war used by Germany in Belgium for the suppression of sniping, and in the treatment of an enemy’s territory occupied during war, such as the treatment of noncombatants who have been found with weapons in their hands, the taking of hostages in towns and villages, the destruction of houses in various places, the levy of war contributions, and so forth.

What is sniping? Sniping is the participation in the hostilities of non-combatants of a territory invaded or occupied by the enemy. Non-combatants are all people not belonging to the army. As Belgium has a standing army, volunteering forces are admitted only under the conditions of Article I.² The fundamental principle is that the volunteers must be recognizable as soldiers and must carry on the war openly.

In Belgium the German troops have been attacked by non-combatants, not belonging to any military organization. The question of recognizing the ‘Garde Civique’ as lawful has never been raised. But ihe Belgian population took part in the fight without having any distinctive or recognizable emblem, without openly carrying arms, or otherwise conforming with the foregoing article. The attacks upon the Germans were made from ambush, from houses, and so forth, in places where the population, at the time of the occupation by German troops, had appeared to be peaceable. They had hidden their weapons to produce them later. Snipers’ warfare has been carried on in Belgium with all the horrors of a guerrilla campaign, and has even been glorified by French and English papers as something heroic.³ Whether this franc-tireur war was waged by the people at. the behest of their government or not, may be left undecided.

The suppression of sniping has been recognized by all nations as a dire necessity. All military instructions in regard to it have been with the object of assuring the greatest efficiency in suppression. The most vigorous methods are undoubtedly the most humane ones in this respect, for they act as a preventive. During the Boer War, for instance, Lord Roberts issued the following army order: —

‘Wherever any attempt has been made to destroy the railroad line, all the farms and residences within a circumference of ten miles must be destroyed, cattle and all provisions taken away, and the residents driven away without food or shelter.’

The reason for such Draconian measures against sniping is the immense danger it means to the army. Of what particular importance it is to Germany in this struggle that the occupied territory of Belgium should be kept quiet is evident. Communication with the German front from Verdun to Rheims, Roye, Arras, Lille, and Ostend depends absolutely upon the Belgian railway system and roads. Destruction of this line of communication would endanger the provisioning of the army, the bringing up of ammunition and supplies, the transportation home of the wounded and of prisoners of war, and in case of defeat — which every commander-in-chief must include in the possibilities— would lead to the complete destruction of the German army.

Under these circumstances, even the most criticized act, the so-called destruction of Louvain, will gain quite a different aspect from that which it had in the discussion in the press. What are the facts? The occupation of Louvain had taken place in an entirely peaceful manner. In order to be as impartial as possible, I take as basis, not the official German report, most unfavorable to Belgium, but the report of a neutral, the Dutch correspondent of the Niew Rotterdamsche Courant,’⁴ He states: ‘The city was occupied in the regular way by comparatively few soldiers. Suddenly a shot was fired out of the house opposite to the headquarters of the staff. Immediately afterwards a number of shots were fired from houses nearby, and in a moment this shooting spread from house to house, from street to street, with such a speed that the German soldiers fell in great numbers; many were wounded. The horses of the train were killed or bolted. A general confusion was the result.’ During this fighting fires broke out which spread with terrific speed over the city.

It is evident that in such a fight no distinction between public and private buildings could be made, as artillery had to be used in the most endangered places, especially against buildings from which shots were fired. All the same, the German troops did all they could to save works of art. Lieutenant Thelemann, in private life a high official of the Prussian Ministry of Public Works, attempted, together with a number of soldiers, to save works of art endangered by flames. While he was engaged in doing this, he was shot at from ambush by non-combatant residents of Louvain, and was severely wounded. In the face of such facts, no claim can be made that architectural monuments of art and of historical value were wantonly destroyed or attacked. Whenever any such buildings were struck, it was in self-defense, or was an absolute military necessity. Herein a number of the foremost American correspondents are unanimous. Their reports are confirmed by the ViceRegent of the University of Louvain, Dr. Coenrad.

The treatment of Louvain was an act of self-defense, and cannot be stigmatized as a barbarous method of war. Besides, the damage done must be calmly judged, without undue exaggeration. The well-known director of the German Bank in Berlin, Dr. Helfferich, who was in Louvain shortly after the above occurrences, writes: ‘ It is quite absurd to speak of a total destruction of the town. Only the eastern quarter, whence, after the apparently peaceful surrender of the town, our troops were in a treacherous manner persistently and systematically fired at, and also the streets leading from the railway station and from the direction of Tirlemont into the interior of the town, have had to be shelled and burned down. All the houses and walls in those streets are thickly strewn with bullet marks, which bear evidence that every single quarter in those streets had to be taken by storm.

‘On the other hand, the whole of the southern half of the town and also part of the west have remained almost completely intact. Numerous houses there bear inscriptions, such as ‘Good people in this house, please spare,’ and the like. The Town Hall, the pearl of Louvain, is preserved in its entirety. It was saved by our troops. Officers who took part in the street fighting at Louvain relate that our soldiers applied the steam hose, in order to extinguish the fire in the buildings close to the Town Hall and thus to save this architectural jewel from destruction. They never stopped in this work of preservation, although they were, in the very act of rescue, incessantly fired at by the citizens of Louvain. Unfortunately it was not found possible to preserve the valuable library of the University. A tower of the Cathedral has tumbled down while the nave is unimpaired.’

In the meantime the report of the German Art Commission ⁵ appointed to investigate these charges has been received in the United States. The report confirms the statements of Dr. Helfferich.

It has seemed necessary to treat the destruction of Louvain somewhat in detail, as it is characteristic of the exaggeration of all such reports.

The destruction of cities and other places is only the climax of measures necessary for the suppression of sniping; as a rule, fortunately, less vigorous measures are sufficient for this purpose. Among these are the searching of towns or villages for weapons hidden by non-combatants. Only people who, upon order of the occupying troops, do not deliver whatever arms they have in their possession, or are later found with them, or have made use of them, are doomed to death. Sometimes hostages are taken to insure the quiet behavior of the population of occupied places. Only if this measure proves insufficient and the attacks upon the occupying troops are renewed by non-combatants, is no other course left to the occupying army than to destroy such places.

There is one method of war which particularly has been much misunderstood: the levying of contributions. It will, however, be conceded that the levying of contributions as a preventive measure against sniping is, compared with the other methods, the mildest. Instead of taking life, it takes only property; for this reason it may, however, be perhaps most effective. Articles 48, 49, and 50 of the Hague Conferences⁶ cannot be applied, so far as sniping is concerned. The instructions to the various armies do not contain these rules, so far as the writer has had the opportunity to study them. They hold, on the contrary, the whole population responsible for acts of sniping and allow the infliction of pecuniary exactions from the point of view of prevention and military necessity. But it may be pointed out that war contributions have been levied in Belgium, not only for the purpose of discouraging sniping but also, as the writer has been informed, for use in the administration of occupied territory.

According to the Articles quoted, the levying of war contributions ’for military necessities’ and ‘the administration of such territory’ are common and are expressly permitted. Belgium is at the present time practically administered by Germany, and the situation has brought forward military necessities to be met by contributions. If the estimate as to their amount is somewhat summary and roughly based on the existing Belgian methods of taxation, who will reproach an administration organized with the utmost speed and kept up in good working shape within a few miles of the firing lines?

4. Public opinion in the United States has, furthermore, been greatly concerned with the bombardment of cities and villages in the north of France, during which were struck buildings of historical and artistic value, devoted to religion and art. Not all cases can be mentioned here. Therefore, the writer proposes to discuss only the bombardment of Rheims, as the most conspicuous example. It must first be established that according to Article 25 of the Hague Convention of 1899, ‘the attack or bombardment of towns, villages, hospitals or buildings which are not defended is forbidden.’ If, therefore, the French placed weight upon the preservation of such cities as Rheims, Lille, Arras, and so forth, they should not have been occupied by military forces. The French, however, made Rheims a main pivot of their artillery position, and, according to the testimony of English and American correspondents, massed enormous quantities of artillery in direct proximity to the cathedral. The French occupied Rheims for military purposes, that is, to secure for themselves the strategic advantages offered by such places for the movement of troops, — the easier method of quartering them, greater protection, quicker disposition, and so forth. This, of course, obliges the opponent to take such places by force, and possibly even destroy them by bombardment. Germany has done so even with towns of her own; with Soldau, for instance, an unfortified place in East Prussia, when it was occupied by the Russians. Soldau has been completely destroyed.

During such bombardment it is not always possible to spare historical buildings, devoted to religion, art, science, and charity. The particular rule of the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, Article 27,⁷ decrees that such protection should go ‘as far as possible,’ and makes this subject to the provision that ‘they are not used for military purposes.’ This view fits the actual conditions. During a bombardment it is not possible to prevent accidental shots from striking such buildings. Let us recall that the English, during the bombardment and storming of Delhi in 1857, did not respect monuments of art, nor could they have done so. During the siege of Rome by the Garibaldians, Nino Bixio even considered the cannonading of the entire Vatican.

It is important to state again that the bombardment of the Cathedral of Rheims was a military necessity. The official report of the Headquarters of the German army is as follows: —

(OFFICIAL)

ARMY HEADQUARTERS, September 22, 1914.

After the French, through the building of heavy fortifications, had made Rheims the main stronghold of their defense, they themselves forced us to attack the city with all available means. The German Army Commander-inChief gave orders to spare the Cathedral, so long as the enemy refrained from using it to his advantage. On September 20th, the white flag was raised on the Cathedral and respected by us. In spite of this we were able to locate a military observer on the tower of the edifice, which explained the effectiveness of the enemy’s artillery against our attacking infantry. It was necessary to dislodge him. This was accomplished with shrapnel fire by our field artillery. Our heavy artillery was even then not allowed, and firing was stopped as soon as the observer was dislodged. We are able to state that the tower and the exterior are standing intact. The roof burst into flames. The attacking forces therefore have gone only as far as they were absolutely compelled to go. The responsibility rests with the enemy, who attempted to misuse a monument of architectural art under the protection of the white flag.

For a German the fact that an official communication is issued by the army headquarters is proof sufficient of its absolute truth to facts; and the truthfulness of this German official announcement is beginning to be recognized in the United States as well.

It may be noted, by the way, that the French, by establishing an observation station in the tower, compelled the Germans to fire upon and damage the ‘ Muenster ’ in Strassburg, the most famous monument of German Gothic architectural art and a document of old German history,

III. METHODS OF WARFARE AT SEA

The methods of war on land have been discussed chiefly in connection with German warfare, but now the methods of war at sea bring us in more intimate touch with English warfare. Here also only the most important facts can be taken into consideration, the field of controversy being too large to be dealt with in one article. Minor questions, therefore, like the sinking of the German auxiliary cruiser Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse within the three-mile zone on the coast of Spanish possessions; the chasing of German ships within the three-mile zone right into the mouth of New York Harbor itself; the taking of German and Austrian reservists, on the way to their colors, off neutral ships, — a method by which New York Harbor has for a long time been blockaded by British cruisers like a harbor of a belligerent nation; the searching and destroying of German mails on neutral steamers,⁸ and a series of other alleged infractions of international law, may be altogether omitted from this discussion.

The main feature of English methods of warfare at sea is the seizure of foodstuffs, destined for and shipped to Germany, as contraband of war. The intention is to bring Germany to her knees by starving her out. I do not wish to raise the question whether this method of warfare is a very humane one. It cannot be compared with the starving out of a fortress, inasmuch as non-combatants are permitted to leave a fortress before its investment,

whereas the non-combatant population of fifty-seven million people can hardly leave Germany. Besides, as a practical measure, this method is of no avail in this war. Germany is self-supporting, as has been shown in detail by Dr. Dernburg, the former German Colonial Secretary, in the Review of Reviews.⁹ Furthermore, it is doubtful, even if Germany were not, whether England would be able to carry out such a plan. Germany has occupied Belgian and French territory. There seem to be plans under consideration by the German government to feed the Belgian population by importing foodstuff. Certainly Germany will not oppose this measure, so long as she herself has sufficient food to live on. But if the aforesaid method of England should cause a real shortage of food in Germany, no one could expect Germany to treat the residents of the occupied territory differently from her own people at home. So England would be starving out not only the Germans, but the Belgians and many of the French.

In this article the question of starving out a country will be discussed only from the general aspect of the justification of such a method of war. The legal basis for the theory is the question of contraband of war. It is determined by the ‘Declaration of London of 1909 concerning the Laws of Naval War.’ To be sure, the Declaration of London has not been ratified up to the present time, and is, therefore, not formally binding. But as all the contracting nations have assented to and signed the convention, England herself having invited the conference and the discussions having been carried on in London, the Declaration forms the moral and written code of the nations. Furthermore, Great Britain has recognized the principle of the Declaration in former wars. Having accepted the law as binding when it was to her own advantage, she should accept it now, even though it favors others.

So far as the legal foundation is concerned, Article 24, in connection with Article 33, of the aforesaid Declaration is decisive.¹⁰ According to Article 24 conditional contraband includes foodstuffs. But according to Article 33, conditional contraband is liable to seizure only if it is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces, or for a government department of the enemy’s state. Foodstuffs, therefore, cannot be confiscated as contraband so long as they are intended for the sustenance of non-combatants and consigned to private parties. The taking away of all foodstuffs sent to a nation at war is certainly not permissible. The intention of starving out a nation — leaving the human side out of the question — can, in compliance with international law, be carried out only by an effective blockade. But the German ports are for very good reasons (submarines) not effectively blockaded.

This method, employed at present in regard to foodstuffs, is also opposed to former British practice. The same question was raised between the United States and Great Britain, during the recent Boer War, in connection with the seizure of the vessels Beatrix, Maria, and Mashona, which were taken by British cruisers to Delagoa Bay. In the course of the correspondence, Lord Salisbury thus defined the position of the British government on the question of contraband: — ‘Foodstuffs with a hostile destination can be considered contraband of war only if they are supplies for the enemy’s forces. It is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used. It must be shown that this was in fact their destination at the time of seizure:¹¹ This statement by Lord Salisbury is in harmony with what is laid down in Holland’s Manual of Naval Prize Law, issued by the British administration in 1888.

In the war between Russia and Japan, the Russian government issued to its naval officers instructions in which foodstuffs were designated as contraband of war. The British government protested against this prohibition, which included rice and provisions as unconditional contraband, this being regarded as ‘ inconsistent with the law and policy of nations.’ The British government, it was declared, did not contest that, ‘in particular circumstances, provisions may acquire a contraband character, as, for instance, if they should be consigned direct to the army or fleet, of a belligerent, or to a port where such fleet may be lying’; but it could not admit that ‘if such provisions were consigned to the port of a belligerent (even though it should be a port of naval equipment) they should therefore be necessarily regarded as contraband of war.’ The true test appeared to be ‘ whether there are circumstances relating to any particular cargo to show that it is destined for military or naval use.’¹²

The same position was taken by the United States during the RussianJapanese War, and the result of the British and American protests was that rice and provisions were regarded as contraband ‘if destined for a belligerent government, its administration, army, navy, fortresses, naval ports, or purveyors,’ but not if ‘addressed to private individuals.' As to proof of destination, the doctrine of continuous voyage is not applicable to conditional contraband. Such cargoes should therefore not be in jeopardy when sent to a neutral port.

The interpretation of the British government went even further. On the 29th of March, 1909, considerable discussion took place in the House of Commons with reference to the word ‘ enemy ’ in Article 34 of the Declaration of London, 1909, Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War, according to which goods are considered as conditional contraband for the use of the armed forces or for a government of the enemy state if they are consigned to a contractor who supplies articles of this kind to the ‘enemy.' On this occasion the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mackinnon Wood, stated that the word ‘contractor’ in this article ‘cannot possibly apply to a mere merchant who supplies goods to the general public,’and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, on April 5, 1909, in answer to a question on the divergence between the terms of Article 34 and the General Report, replied as follows: ‘For the reasons already given, I cannot admit that there is any ambiguity as to the meaning of Article 34.¹³ It is made clear, both by Article 33, on which Article 34 is dependent, and by the general official report of the Conference, that the word “enemy” in Article 34 can only mean the enemy government. It is evident, however, that if the point had been raised at the time it would have been made perfectly clear in the drafting, and we therefore propose to make a declaration, at the time of the ratification, that the word “ enemy ” in Article 34 means the government of the enemy.’

Notwithstanding those statements, there is no doubt that in the present war the practice of Great Britain is entirely different. Foodstuffs are constantly being seized, on neutral ships, although the neutral flag should be a perfect protection against seizure; and the rules of Articles 33 and 34, qualifying goods as conditional contraband only if their destination is the enemy’s government or armed forces, are, by the English starving-out system, as utterly disregarded as the formal declarations of the representatives of the British government and of Sir Edward Grey himself. It is evident how much this method of war interferes with the trade of the small countries, like Norway, Sweden, Holland, Denmark, so dear to the big heart of Great Britain, and with the production and export even of the United States. The author still earnestly hopes that the government of the United States will perceive the great importance of construing its neutrality in the present war as it did during the Russian-Japanese War, not so much in the interest of Germany, which, as has been said, is self-supporting, but because of the danger involved in establishing a different precedent; because thus only can the sanctity and validity of former international practice, and of signed, although not yet ratified, treaties be safeguarded; and because of the immense, just, and material rights of American citizens, which a contrary course so gravely menaces.