Japan and the European War
THAT ‘peace is the work of righteousness’ is a trite saying. Yet this truism has seldom been observed in international dealings. Japan’s participation in the European war and her campaign against the German possession of Kiao-chau is simply another illustration of justice asserting itself against the wrong enthroned upon the dais of selfishness at the expense of righteousness. It is proof that no two nations can remain friendly without mutual respect and consideration.
In these days when European nations are battling against one another, all in the name of God and of the Prince of Peace, it seems useless to say that Japan is essentially a peace-loving people. Yet it is a remarkable fact that while Europe was engaged in continuous internecine warfare, Japan enjoyed two hundred and fifty years of Arcadian peace under the Tokugawa Shogunate. To this record not a parallel is to be found in the history of the world.
Rejuvenated by the impact of foreign cannon-balls, Japan had to fight two mighty wars, — as all young nations must fight to protect themselves against the encroachments of older, stronger neighbors. Japan’s wars with China and with Russia were wars of self-defense. On that subject the verdict of history has already been given.
Japan’s generals and admirals are not to be classed in the herd of vulgar warriors. Togo and Cyama, Yamagata and Nogi, are of the school of Timoleon, of William of Nassau, and of George Washington. They have drawn the sword only to give peace to their country, and restore her to her place in the great, assembly of the nations.
Japan does not glory in conquest. Even in conquered lands she has not built emblems of triumph. Upon the pinnacle of a shell-rent hill at Port Arthur to-day stands, not a monument of Japanese victory, but a monument which the Mikado’s soldiers dedicated, while the flames of war were still smouldering, to the spirits of the Tsar’s gallant fighters who defended their fortresses with unwavering courage against the onslaughts of the Japanese.
The world has not yet forgotten that in the Boxer disturbance the Japanese soldiers were the most orderly and humane of all foreign troops brought to China on the occasion. Your charming writer, Eliza Scidmore, in her As The Hague Ordains, told you how humanely Japan conducted the war against Russia.
Toward individual Germans no Japanese entertains animosity. So far from it, every Japanese loves and respects Germans. Japan is grateful for the contribution which the Germans have made to her progress and civilization. Many a Japanese scholar has made pilgrimage to German seats of learning, and many a German scientist and expert were tutors in our schools and factories. And yet Japan is confronting Germany in the arena of battle.
Japan’s coffers are not overflowing with gold. The two wars made her comparatively poor; she must needs devote all her time and energy to the recuperation of her financial strength. She knows that another war at this time must arrest the progress of her commerce and industry and add more weight to the burden which has already been taxing the strength of the nation. Why, then, did Japan send an ultimatum to Germany?
Because Japan’s experiences with Germany during the past two decades have convinced her that Germany is a disturbing factor in the Far East and a menace to both China and herself.
Because Japan regards treaty obligations as sacred and inviolable, even when the fulfillment of such obligations must entail enormous cost.
Because Japan believes that the maintenance of China’s territorial integrity is essential to her security and independence.
Japan’s Experience with the German Government
You all know how the Kaiser treated the Mikado at the end of the ChinoJapanese war, which cost Japan a hundred thousand lives and a billion yen; few of you are aware that Germany’s interference with the Chino-Japanese peace terms was only the first of many unpleasant experiences which Japan has had with Germany.
The Germans to-day are anxious to tell the public what enormous sums the Berlin government has expended for the upbuilding of Kiao-chau; but compared with the sacrifice Japan offered upon the altar of Port Arthur, German expenditure on Kiao-chau sinks into insignificance. Germany ousted Japan from Port Arthur because she wanted to give it to Russia so that she might take Kiao-chau without Russia’s objection. It was a game of give-andtake between the Tsar and the Kaiser. When the peace treaty was signed between Japan and China all Japan was celebrating; the next day the nation was in mourning because of the German advice compelling Japan to quit Port Arthur. Never was Japan’s pride so greatly outraged as on that occasion. An officer destroyed himself in protest against the government’s acquiescence in the German advice; several cut their fingers, and with their own blood wrote memorials urging the government not to be bullied by the Powers.
The German seizure of Kiao-chau, followed by the Russian occupation of Port Arthur, the British occupation of Wei-hai-wei, and the French occupation of Kwan-chow Bay, was responsible for the Boxer disturbance of 1910. When the Boxers besieged the legations in Peking, Japan immediately proposed to the Powers that she be permitted to rush her troops to rescue the beleaguered foreigners. The Kaiser put his foot upon the Japanese overture and insisted that, unless he was satisfied that Japan’s action would by no means interfere with the interests of other nations, he could not consent to the proposal.
The historic picture of the Yellow Peril painted by the Kaiser was disagreeable enough to the Japanese, but when the Japanese found the Kaiser secretly encouraging the Tsar to muster his troops in Manchuria in the wake of the Boxer incident, they saw in him an imminent danger to their country. About this time the London Times published an article reporting the existence of a secret treaty by which the Kaiser was to render the Tsar clandestine assistance in the event of a RussoJapanese war.
When Japan was engaged in a lifeand-death struggle in Manchuria, German attitude toward Russia was virtual violation of neutrality. The German government, for example, permitted a German steamship company to sell a number of steamships to the Russian navy and so help Rozhestvenski’s Baltic squadron to secure coal en route to the Japan Sea. What was more surprising, a German prince who was by Japan’s special courtesy allowed to accompany the army to the front, was found secretly reporting to his government the activities of the Mikado’s forces without permission of the censoring officers.
From such experiences the Japanese believe that the presence on Chinese soil of a German naval and military base is a constant menace to their country. Would that China could be far-sighted enough to see that her position can be strengthened only by cooperating with Japan.
England Asked Japan to Act
The assertion that Japan thrust herself upon the war without England’s invitation is as sinister as it is unwarranted. Japan did not join hands with England without England’s request. When it became evident that England must come to the rescue of France and Belgium, the press of Japan, without exception, hoped that Japan would not be called upon to aid her western ally. But the western ally did call upon Japan.
On August 3, that is, the day before England declared war on Germany, the British Ambassador to Japan hurried back to Tokio from his summer villa and immediately requested an interview with Baron Kato, Foreign Minister. At this conference the British Ambassador informed Baron Kato that his government was compelled to open hostilities against Germany, and that it desired to ascertain whether Japan would aid England in the event of British interests in the Far East being jeopardized by German activities.
Baron Kato answered that the question put to him was such a serious one that he could not answer it on his own account.
On the evening of the same day Count Okuma convened a meeting of all the Cabinet members. Bearing the resolution of this meeting, Baron Kato, on August 4, called upon the British Ambassador and told the latter that Japan would not shirk the responsibilities which the alliance with England put upon her shoulders.
At this time Japan did not expect to be called upon to aid England for at least a few months. But on August 7 the British Ambassador suddenly asked for an interview with Baron Kato and told the Foreign Minister that the situation had developed in such a manner as to oblige England to ask for Japan’s assistance without delay. On the evening of that day Premier Okuma requested the ‘elder statesmen’ and his colleagues to assemble at his mansion. The conference lasted until two o’clock the next morning. Before it adjourned the policy of Japan was definitely formulated.
What caused Downing Street to invite Japan’s coöperation so soon is not clearly known to the outside world. But the Japanese press is in all probability right when it says that Japan and England were obliged to act promptly in order to frustrate the German scheme to transfer Kiao-chau to the Chinese government before Germany was compelled to surrender it at the point of the sword. Had Germany succeeded in carrying out this scheme she would still have enjoyed, in virtue of Article 5 of the Kiao-chau Convention of 1898, the privilege of securing in some future time ‘a more suitable territory’ in China. This was exactly the condition which t he allies did not want to see established in China. If, on the other hand, Germany were forced to abandon Kiao-chau by the arbitrament of the sword, China would no longer be under obligation to ‘cede to Germany a more suitable place.’
This was, I think, what persuaded Japan and England to act promptly in the Far East. In the meantime a German cruiser, ignoring the rights of a neutral state, captured a Russian steamer within Japanese jurisdiction; a British gunboat, chased by another German cruiser, fled into a port only a hundred miles west of Tokio; a number of British merchant vessels were either captured or chased by German warships; while a few Japanese ships were also intercepted by German cruisers. These activities of the German squadron were interpreted by Japan and England as a disturbance to ‘general peace’ in the Far East and the ‘special interests’ of the two countries in that region.
Japan’s Wish for China’s Territorial Integrity
In proposing to restore Kiao-chau to China, Japan is not actuated by altruistic motives, but by motives of self-interest. Not that she wants to ingratiate herself with China; it is simply that she thinks that her interests and safety can be most effectively protected by preserving the territorial integrity of China.
Japan’s strength lies in her isolated position, widely separated from the aggressive countries of the West. As England is trying to avoid the brunt of German aggressiveness by upholding the independence and integrity of the Netherlands, so Japan is anxious to maintain the territorial integrity of China, making it a sort of buffer state. This cherished aim of Japan has been partly frustrated because of German and Russian aggressions in China. To protect her existence and safety against the designs of such ambitious powers, Japan was compelled to occupy Korea and Port Arthur, thus making her territory contiguous to that of Russia. To-day Japan feels more forcibly than ever the disadvantage of having such an aggressive nation as Russia as her neighbor, and she does not want to see another ambitious power establish itself upon Chinese soil.
This is the reason that Japan does not wish to occupy Kiao-chau or any other section of China. The logic is clear: should Japan occupy Kiao-chau permanently, other Powers would surely follow Japan’s suit and slice up for themselves large portions of Chinese territory. Should this come to pass, the powerful nations of the West would become Japan’s immediate neighbors, thus inevitably weakening her naturally strong position. This means a larger army and a more powerful navy, with a proportionately heavier burden of taxation.
No sane Japanese can fail to see that the game is not worth the candle. It is only by maintaining the territorial integrity of China that Japan can enjoy peace and devote her energies to the promotion of the arts of peace.
Japan and the United States
As the historian Bancroft says, the ‘vine of liberty’ under American auspices took deep root and filled the land and reached unto both oceans. Westward the ‘fame of this only daughter of freedom’ crossed the Pacific and inspired the islanders of Japan.
To-day Japan is the one standardbearer of modernism in the whole Orient. ‘ The wisdom which had passed from India to Greece; the jurisprudence of Rome; the mediæval municipalities; the Teutonic method of representation; the political experience of England; the benignant wisdom of the expositors of the law of nature and of nations in France and Holland, all shed on her their selectest influence.’
But the nation whose political and social ideals exercised the most potent influence upon Japan is the United States. For the Declaration of Independence which went forth from the historic hall of Philadelphia found her disciple in the ‘child of the world’s old age.’
Geographically Japan intervenes between the great autocracy of Russia and the grand republicanism of America. With the moral support, if not the material assistance, of the United States, Japan hopes to stem the tide of Russian autocracy with its militarism, its religious intolerance, its discriminating policy against foreign interests in commerce and trade.
Japan cherishes no animosity toward the Russian, but she realizes that her greatest danger lies across the Japan Sea. It is the irony of fate that, in taking up arms against Germany, Japan should appear to be aiding Russia. The Japanese would feel sorry if the Empire of the Kaiser were to be overrun by the Tsar’s Cossacks, because Japan stands for liberalism and is opposed to autocracy and militarism.
This very fact that the Japanese stand for liberalism persuaded them to combat the militarism of Germany in the Far East. No one wishes more sincerely than the Japanese that the war should terminate promptly and result in the establishment of a better understanding between Japan and Germany, based upon mutual respect and consideration, each recognizing fully the rights of the other; for no two nations can be friendly when neither scruples to disregard the rights of the other. The dove of peace builds her nest in the haunts of righteousness, and she builds it nowhere else.
That Japan’s policy in China is in harmony with that of the United States needs no explanation. But for those uninitiated in the history of Far Eastern diplomacy a few words may not be amiss.
Following upon the heels of the war against Russia, Japan concluded with England a treaty whose foremost aim was the ‘preservation of the common interests of all the Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.’
Again, in June, 1907, Japan took the initiative in exchanging with France a memorandum whose object was the preservation of the territorial integrity of China.
For the third time Japan, in July, 1907, succeeded in concluding with Russia a convention recognizing ‘the independence and the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the principle of equal opportunity in whatever concerns the commerce and industry of all nations in that empire,’ and engaging ‘to sustain and defend the maintenance of the status quo and respect for this principle by all the pacific means within their reach.’
It is plain to you that the principles embodied in all these documents are in perfect consonance with the traditional policy of t he United States in the Far East, as it was enunciated by the late illustrious Secretary of State, Mr. John Hay, and as it has been consistently followed by his successors.
The Commerce of the Pacific
Japan’s foremost object in joining hands with England in the present world-crisis is to keep the Pacific lanes of trade free from molestation, as well as to remove the German base of operation in China, and thus insure enduring peace in the Far East.
With the European nations in the grip of war, the importation of European merchandise to China has virtually stopped. In this Japan sees a golden opportunity both for America and for herself.
China imports 473,000,000 taels’ worth of goods every year. Of this total at least 171,300,000 taels is divided up by Europe. Can American manufacturers fail to see what a splendid opportunity is offered them? Japan, importing cotton and other raw materials from America, turns them into finished merchandise to be shipped to China. Japan’s merchant vessels, plying the seas sentineled by her cruisers, are at the service of American manufacturers to transport their merchandise to the vast markets of China.
To-day the United States exports to China only 36,000,000 taels’ worth of goods. Compare this with 269,200,000 taels of Great Britain (including India and Hongkong) and you can realize what a vast field lies before you for your commerce. Japan’s exports to China amount to 90,000,000 taels per annum, much of which is made up of merchandise whose raw materials come from the United States.
Turn to Japan, and you find another wide field awaiting your commercial activities. Europe’s exports to Japan amount to 203,000,000 yen per annum. To this total England contributes 116,146,000 yen. Add to this 135,000,000 yen from British India and 881,550 yen from Hongkong, and you see what an enormous trade Great Britain is doing in Japan. German exports to Japan total 61,000,000 yen per annum, and those of France and Belgium amount to 5,400,000 yen and 9,087,000 yen respectively.
Now that the war has stopped all imports from Europe, America is in a position to monopolize the Japanese market. Can the merchants and manufacturers of America afford to let this opportunity slip?
The destiny of the Pacific is in the hands of the three nations—America, Great Britain, and Japan. Guided by England and the United States, Japan hopes to maintain the peace of the Pacific, and especially of the Far East. And the peace of the Pacific cannot be maintained without preserving the territorial integrity of China.