A Diary of the Reconstruction Period

VI. THE USURPATIONS OF CONGRESS

Wednesday, December 12, 1866.
Negro suffrage in the District is the radical hobby of the moment and is the great object of some of the leaders throughout the union. At the last session the Senate did not act upon the bill for fear of the popular verdict at the fall elections. Having dodged the issue then, they now come here under Sumner’s lead and say that the people have declared for it. There is not a senator who votes for this bill who does not know that it is an abuse and wrong. Most of the Negroes of this District are wholly unfit to be electors. With some exceptions they are ignorant, vicious and degraded, without patriotic or intelligent ideas or moral instincts. There are among them worthy, intelligent, industrious men, capable of voting understandingly and who would not discredit the trust, but they are exceptional cases. As a community they are too debased and ignorant. Yet fanatics and demagogues will crowd a bill through Congress to give them suffrage, and probably by a vote which the veto could not overcome. Nevertheless, I am confident the President will do his duty in that regard. It is pitiable to see how little sense of right, real independence, and what limited comprehension are possessed by our legislators. They are the tame victims and participators of villainous conspirators.

Monday, December 24, 1866.
Most of the members of Congress have gone home or abroad on excursions free of expense, a popular way of travelling recently introduced by free passes and passages. It is a weak and factious Congress, the most so of any I have ever known. There is less statesmanship, less principle, less honest legislation than usual. There is fanaticism, demagogism, recklessness. The radicals, who constitute more than three fourths, are managed and controlled by leaders who have no more regard for the constitution than for an old almanac, and the remaining fourth are mostly party men, not patriots. There are but few who have a right comprehension of the organic law and our governmental system. There are a few good, conscientious men, but no great and marked mind looms up in either house. It seems to be taken for granted that Congress is omnipotent and without limitation of power. A proposition, introduced by Thad Stevens, for reducing the old State of North Carolina to a territory, was quietly received as proper and matter-ofcourse legislation. By what authority or by what process this is to be brought about is not stated nor asked. To break down the states, to take all power from the executive, to cripple the judiciary and reconstruct the Supreme Court, are among the principal objects of the radical leaders at this time. Four fifths of the members are small party men, creatures of corner groceries, without any knowledge of the science of government or of our constitutions. With them all, the great, overpowering purpose and aim are office and patronage. Most of their legislation relates to office, and their highest conception of legislative duty has in view place and how to get it.
The talk and labor of reconstruction is the engine by which they hold power, yet not a man among that great number of elected radicals appears to know or be able to define what he means by reconstruction. The states were for a time, while the rebellion was going on, antagonistic. Those in rebellion were out of their proper relation to the government. But the rebellion has been suppressed. War has ceased, and those of our countrymen who were in arms are, and have been for eighteen months, pursuing their peaceful avocations. Each state has its executive, its legislative, and its judicial departments, and the whole machinery of government is in full operation; the state and municipal laws are in force; everything in each of the slates is as perfect and complete as it was ten years ago before the rebellion, saving and excepting their right to representation in Congress, which is denied them by the radicals who want to reconstruct and govern them. There is nothing to reconstruct. If Congress will forbear longer to obstruct, the country will move on quietly and prosperously.

Thursday , December 27, 1866.
A number of the members of Congress, all I believe radicals, have gone South. They have free tickets from the War Department, and travel without expense to themselves. If some saucy fellow, with one fifth of the malignity and hate of these members, should insult or show impudence to the visitors, it would be a god-send [to them] and furnish them with reasons abundant to outlaw the whole Southern people.

Friday, January 4, 1867.
At the Cabinet to-day the President read his veto message on the bill reorganizing the District of Columbia which excluded those who had given comfort to the rebels but allowing Negroes to vote. I was not aware until to-day that the bill had been sent him. When I last conversed with him, about a week since, he said he had not received it. He had, moreover, requested the Cabinet to consider the subject, for he should wish their written opinions. I was therefore surprised when without official cabinet consultation or opinion he, to-day, brought forward his proposed message. The document is one of length, — too much on the defensive of himself and the Supreme Court,—and does not, I think, take hold of some of the strongest, points for a veto.
Seward gave it his approval and made quite a random general speech without much point. Said he had always advocated Negro suffrage and voted for it in New York. Here and in the states where there was a large preponderating Negro population it was different, — if they were not in a majority they were a large minority. That eventually universal suffrage was to prevail, he had no doubt. All governments were coming to it. There are today representatives in service in Egypt, elected, etc., but he approved the message.
McCulloch approved the message because he was opposed to giving this privilege to the Negro. That was the sentiment of his state, as well as of himself, and he had always voted in conformity to it.
Stanbery occupied much the same position. Had as a member of the Ohio legislature voted against Negro suffrage. Should do the same to-day if there, and behind that on the naked question there were at least one hundred thousand majority against it in that state.
Stanton took from his portfolio a brief and carefully prepared written statement, to the effect that he had examined the bill and could perceive no constitutional objections to any of its provisions; he therefore hoped the President would give it his approval. I read from some rough notes that the bill proposed to do something more for the blacks than to raise them to an equality with the whites, — it proposed to elevate them above a certain class of whites of admitted intelligence and character who, heretofore, were entitled to and had exercised suffrage. If suffrage is claimed for the blacks on the ground that they are rightfully entitled to it as citizens of the United States, then to deprive the white citizens of that right which they now enjoy is to inflict a punishment upon them and subject them to a forfeiture, and it is proposed to do this without due form of law, — that is, without trial and conviction, they, by an ex-postfacto law, are to be condemned. The constitution would thus be violated in two of its most important provisions, deemed essential to the preservation of liberty, and the act, if sanctioned, will stand as a precedent for any similar violation hereafter, etc.
On the other points I agreed with the gentlemen that Congress ought to pass no such law until the states had at least gone as far, — that the people of the District (the white people) ought to be heard. I expected that Stanton would have met me defiantly, but he said not a word.
Browning was opposed to the bill for the reasons stated in the veto, and so was Randall.
After all had expressed themselves, Attorney-General Stanbery enquired how long the veto could be delayed. The President said until Monday. Stanbery remarked that would not be sufficient for his purpose. He had reason to believe that the Supreme Court would give its opinion on the test-oath question on Monday, which he thought would embrace the point which I had raised. He had not turned his mind to the constitutional question, but believed the objection well taken.
Stanton still said nothing; I thought, however, that he was of Stanbery’s opinion.
General Grant, who was present by invitation, was very emphatic against the bill, not because it disfranchised rebels, for he said he rather liked that, but he thought it very contemptible business for members of Congress whose states excluded the Negroes, to give them suffrage in this District.
I agreed with him, but remarked there were other and stronger reasons also, which, in a difference between the President and Congress, should not be overlooked. McCulloch said he doubted if it would be politic to bring forward the constitutional objection at this time, for the radicals would seize hold of it and insist that we were in sympathy with the rebels.
Randall was also decisive against it. The message was just right; he would add nothing nor take anything away. I stated that I had no controversy in regard to the message, but that if there was a constitutional point against a bill which was to be vetoed, that point ought, in my opinion, never to be omitted.
Not being satisfied that the President should omit the constitutional point in his veto message, I called on him this evening for further conversation. Stanbery was with him. The President produced a file of letters of Forney, Clerk of the Senate, written while he was paying court to the President, strongly urging him to take the position he has pursued, praising and complimenting him. Yet this fellow is now attacking, abusing, and misrepresenting the President summarily in his ‘two papers, both daily.’
The President my suggestions in regard to the constitutional objection; agreed with me; admitted, as I urged, the importance of it and of his concurrence with the court, but did not say, nor did I ask or expect him to say, whether he would make that point in his message. I am inclined to think he will not. The question of expediency raised by McCulloch and Randall, and the point not having been original with himself, as all are aware, have their influence. Yet he hesitates. This is his great infirmity. The President has firmness but is greatly wanting in prompt decision. He is unwilling to take a step, but when it is once taken he does not recede.

Saturday, January 5, 1867.
Gave the President the passage quoted from Jefferson. It is in the first volume of Jefferson’s work, — his autobiography, page 49. It is quoted by De Tocqueville. I again advised that the constitutional objection should be presented in his message.
McCulloch tells me that General Grant urged upon them to adopt the amendment. Said the North was in favor; that they had decided for it in the late election; that if not adopted the government would impose harder terms.
What nonsense! What business has Congress to impose terms upon states? General Grant, not very enlightened, has been led astray, I trust unwittingly on his part, by Stanton and Washburne.²

Monday, January 7, 1867.
The veto went in to-day. But a party vote over-rode it, as was expected. The message was courteous in terms and the argument and reason very well, though not as strong and exhaustive as could have been wished; sufficiently so, however, to have satisfied ail who are not partisans or fanatics. No calm, considerate and true statesman, or legislator, can believe it correct to impose this bill upon the District against the unanimous voice of the people.
The ignorant, vicious, stupid Negroes who have flocked hither cannot vote intelligently; are unfit to be jurymen. The states and constitutions from which these came would oppose it within their own jurisdictions.
In the House of Representatives, fanaticism, prompted by partisanship, ran wild. The reckless leaders were jubilant, — the timid followers were abject and obedient. Ashley introduced a resolution to impeach the President, or to authorize enquiry, and by an almost straight party vote it was adopted, and referred to the judiciary committee under the previous question. It will never result, even under party drill, in an impeachment and conviction, but it is disreputable and demoralizing that a packed party majority should so belittle the government and free institutions as to entertain such a resolution from such a source. But Ashley has not done it without consulting others.

Tuesday , January 8, 1807.
The President brought forward the question of issuing a proclamation for more extended amnesty — referred to Mr. Lincoln’s successive proclamat ions, beginning with that of September, 1862, and showing consistency and uniformity of proceedings and views.
Stanton stated that he had this morning received a copy of the act which had just passed the legislature of North Carolina, granting amnesty and oblivion; said that all our officers and soldiers were liable to be harassed and arrested through the Southern states for trespass and injury; thought it would be well there should be reciprocal amnesty. The suggestions struck all favorably and will, I think, receive consideration and action.
Another matter the President remarked he wished to bring forward was that, in view of what was taking place around us, especially on the subject of dismantling states, throwing them into a territorial condition and annulling their present organization and government, he considered it important he should know the opinions and views of each member of the Cabinet. If we are united, that fact would carry weight with it, here and before the country; if we are not united, there is weakness.
I had observed through the whole sitting that the President was absorbed and prepared for an energetic movement, and from what he had said to me on Saturday, I anticipated what his purpose was. But he had been slow and procrastinating, and until he broached the subject I had not, after previous experience, much faith that we should reach it to-day. When he commenced, however, his countenance indicated firm and fixed resolution. He was pale and calm, but no one could mistake that he was determined in his purpose.
I doubt if any one but myself was aware of what was passing in his mind. Perhaps McCulloch may have thought of it, for I told him on Saturday evening of my interview. He said he had repeatedly spoken to the President, and had similar intimations, but he too had little confidence.
Seward was evidently taken by surprise. Said he had avoided expressing himself on these questions; did not think it judicious to anticipate them; that storms were never so furious as they threatened; but as the subject had been brought up, he would say that never, under any circumstances, could he be brought to admit that a sovereign state had been destroyed, or could be reduced to a territorial condition.
McCulloch was equally decided, that the states could not be converted into territories.
Browning, who sat next to him, began to express his views, a discourtesy which he not unfrequenlly commits, but I think will not again, for Stanton interrupted him and requested him to wait his turn.
Stanton said he had communicated his views to no man. Here, in the Cabinet, he had assented to and cordially approved of every step which had been taken, to re-organize the governments of the states which had rebelled, and saw no cause to change or depart from it. Stevens’s proposition he had not seen, and did not care to, for it was one of those schemes which would end in noise and smoke. He had conversed with but one member, Mr. Sumner, and that was one year ago, when Sumner said he disapproved of the policy of the administration and intended to upset it. He had never since conversed with Sumner nor any one else. He did not concur in Mr. Sumner’s views, nor did he think a state would or could be remanded to a territorial condition.
I stated my concurrence in the opinions which had been expressed by the Secretary of War, and that I held Congress had no power to take from a state its reserved rights and sovereignty, or to impose terms on one state which were not imposed on all states.
The President interrupted. He said the power to prescribe terms was one thing; the expediency was another. I said I was opposed to the whole subject or theory of prescribing or imposing terms to the constitution on sovereign states on the score of expediency as well as of want of power. If there was no power, it certainly could not be expedient. I confessed I had not been as reserved as the Secretary of State and Secretary of War in expressing my opinions. When friends had approached me and conversed on these or indisputable fundamental questions, I had not refrained from stating my views, especially to those who had consulted me. It seemed to me proper that we should do so. I had conversed with Mr. Sumner in the early part of last session, about the period that the Secretary of War had his interview, — that then Sumner had taken exception to the omission of Negro suffrage, and for that reason, and that only, he had opposed the President’s policy of reconstruction.
Stanbery said he was clear and unqualifiedly against the whole talk and theory of territorializing the states. Congress could not dismantle them. It had not the power, and on that point he would say that it was never expedient to do or attempt to do that which we had not the power to do.
Browning declared that no state could be cut down or extinguished. Congress could make and admit states, but could not destroy or extinguish them after t hey were made.
The resolution to impeach the President, Seward and others treat lightly. My impressions are that it will not result in a conviction, although infamous charges, infamous testimony, and infamous proceedings will be produced as easily, honestly, and legally as Butler could get spoons in New Orleans. But the preliminary steps having been taken, backed by a strong party vote, the radicals are committed.
Ashley, who introduced the resolution, is a calculating fanatic, weak, designing, fond of notoriety, and not of very high-toned moral caliber. I do not. think, however, that he is, as some suppose, a tool of others entirely,— certainly not an unwilling tool. He seeks the notoriety and notice, and hounds like Boutwell and Williams of Pittsburg edge him on. Colfax, though feeble-minded, is Speaker, seeks to be foremost, and has been an adviser with Ashley and pioneered the way for him to introduce the resolution. Stevens, much shrewder and abler than either, keeps in the background, though the chief conspirator.

Thursday, January 10, 1867.
The New York Times correspondent states, tolerably correctly, the position of General Grant on the suffrage bill of the District of Columbia. He condemned the members of Congress for imposing Negro suffrage on this District until their states had adopted the principle. The worst thing in the bill, he said, was that which violated the constitution. Punishing rebels by ex-post-facto law was right; condemning them without trial he did not object to. Yet General Grant will very likely be the next President of the United States. I do not think he intends to disregard the constitution, but he has no reverence for it, — he has no political principles, no intelligent ideas of constitutional government, and it is a day when the organic law seems to be treated as of less binding authority than a mere resolution of Congress.
Dined this evening with the President, the Cabinet and their families, General Grant and the Tennessee delegation and their wives being present. Mrs. Taylor, wife of the member of the Eastern District of Tennessee, says she buried her dresses to keep them from the rebels, and the one she wore this evening she owned before the war and had buried it for over four years. Occasionally she unearthed her clothing, evenings, to air and preserve it. Colonel Hawkins said all his wife’s dresses, save what she wore at the time, had been stolen from her, and what the rebels could not carry away they had torn up and destroyed. Mrs. Taylor said she carried arms and was at all times ‘ready with her shooter.' The people of Tennessee, particularly those of East Tennessee, were great sufferers during the Civil War.

Tuesday, January 15, 1867.
The tone and language of the press and of considerate men are against the impeachment project; but the radical leaders have a purpose to accomplish and intend to press the subject. Not to do so, after what they have said and done, would check the conspiracy and be a defeat that would in all probability injure them as a party. Whether it will not injure them more to proceed and fail, they do not pause to consider. They are vindictive and restless, regardless of right, and constitutional restraint and obligations. Thus far they have been successful in exercising arbitrary and unauthorized power, and they will not hesitate in the future, as in the past, to usurp authority, to try without cause and to condemn without proof. Nor will they scruple to manufacture evidence if wanted.
There is nothing judicial or fair in this proceeding. It is sheer partisanism with most of them; a deliberate conspiracy with the few. The subject was taken up in caucus. A farce was then gone through with. A committee is sitting in secret, — a foul conspiracy, — trying to hunt up charges and evidence against as pure, as honest, as patriotic a chief magistrate as we have ever had. It is for his
integrity they conspire against him. I see by the papers this evening that the radical legislatures of one or two states are taking the matter in hand, and urging impeachment without any facts, or fault, or specified crime, as a mere party measure, but it is all in character, — a conspiracy against the constitution, and the President for adhering to it.

Saturday, January 19, 1867.
The occurrences of the week have not improved the prospect of affairs. There is a wild delirium among the radical members of Congress, which is no more to he commended and approved than the secession mania of 1860. In fact, it exhibits less wisdom and judgment, or regard for the constitution, whilst it has all the recklessness of the secession faction. By the exclusion of ten states, a partisan majority in Congress, under the machinery of secret caucuses controlled by an irresponsible directory, has possession of the government and is hurrying it to destruction, breaking down state barriers and other departments besides the legislature. Whether some of the better disposed, but less conspicuous men among the radicals will make a stand is uncertain. As yet they have exhibited no independence, or political or moral firmness.
In the meantime the President, conscious of his right intentions and from habit, holds still and firm. Seward, relying on expedients, is dancing round Stevens, Sumner, Boutwell, Banks and others. Runs to the capitol and seats himself by Stevens in the House and by Sumner in the Senate. This makes comment in the galleries, and paragraphs in the newspapers, and, Seward thinks, will, through their leaders, conciliate the senators and representatives towards himself, if not towards the President.
Sumner is easily and always flattered by attentions and notice, though he will not relinquish what he esteems his great mission of taking care of the Negroes and subordinating and putting down the Southern whites. Seward is willing the Negroes should have all Sumner would give them, for he sets no high estimate on suffrage and citizenship.
Stevens has none of the sincere, fanatical fervor of Sumner, nor much regard for the popular element, or for public opinion, but having got power he would exercise it arbitrarily and despotically towards all who differ with him. He has no profound respect for Seward, but feels complimented that the Secretary of State should come into the House of Representat ives and sit down by and court the ‘great commoner.’ It is an observance that gratifies his self-esteem, a homage that soothes his arrogance.
Stanton continues to occupy an intermediate position on some important questions, differing with the President but almost obsequiously deferring to him. McCulloch says he is treacherous, and a spy. He does not, however, I think, make regular report to any one. The radicals receive his subtle advice and promptings and give him their support. The President understands him, but still consults him as fully as any member of the Cabinet. Seward and Stanton continue to cooperate together. Seward, I think, has doubts of Stanton’s ‘divinity,’ yet, in view of his radical associates, considers him more than ever a power, and impresses the President with that fact.
Gradually the radical leaders are pressing on impeachment. Under the lead of the New York Herald and Forney’s Chronicle, the radical presses are getting into the movement. Yet the exclusionists or centralists have doubts if they can succeed, though earnestly striving to that end. Violent partisanship but no statesmanship, no enlarged or comprehensive views, are developed in either house.
The states which were in rebellion are each organized and in full operation as before the rebellion, but Congress did not do this, nor have any part in it. The people themselves in the respective states did it, and the lesser lights in Congress are told that they must assist in undoing the work which has been well and rightly done by the people interested, and compel the states to go through the process of disorganizing in order to organize.
The President, remains passive and firm, but with no declared policy if the radicals pursue their design to impeach and suspend him during trial. He said to me one day what he would do in a certain contingency, but it was rather thinking aloud what he might do than declaring a policy.
What General Grant and certain others might do were Congress to proceed to extremities, neither the President nor any of his true friends are aware. I doubt if Grant himself knows. The radicals who distrust him are nevertheless courting him assiduously.

Saturday, January 26, 1867.
Congress does not make much progress in the schemes of reconstruction and impeachment. The radical portion of the Republicans are as keen as ever, and will continue to be so, especially on impeachment, but the considerate hesitate. It is a party scheme for party purposes, not for any criminal or wrong act of the President.
On reconstruction, as it is called, there are differences and doubts and darkness. None of the radicals have any clear conception or perception of what they want except power and place. No well-defined policy has been indicated by any of them. Stevens wants a stronger government than the old union.
Violence of language has broken out two or three times during the week. The Speaker, whilst ready to check the Democrats, permits the radicals to go to extreme length. The President is denounced and vilified in the worst and most vulgar terms without any restraint or intimation of impropriety from the presiding officer, yet Mr. Colfax wishes to be popular. His personal aspirations warp his judgment, which is infirm, and, like most persons in striving to reach a position for which he is unfitted, he fails. Those who may be pleased for the moment with his partisan leanings, will not confide in him beyond the moment.

Monday, January 28, 1867.
The President sent in his veto on the Colorado bill to-day, giving cogent and sufficient reasons why that territory should not with the present population be admitted as a state. A veto on the admission of Nebraska will go in tomorrow. Both these vetoes have been looked for.

Saturday, February 9, 1867.
The House has been excited for a day or two. A proposition Submitted by Stevens from the reconstruction committee proposing to establish military governments over the Southern states meets with opposition from many Republicans who are not yet radicals. There has been but little legislation this session in the [proper] sense of the word. A radical party caucus decides in relation to the course to be pursued on all important questions. Two-thirds of the Republicans and all of the radical partisans attend. A majority of them follow Stevens & Co. Those who hesitate, or are opposed, have neither the courage nor the ability to resist. A measure, however offensive or even unconstitutional, having the caucus sanction, is brought into the House, the previous question is moved and carried, and, without debate, adopted. But on the matter of these vice-royalties, a stand was made against Stevens and the previous question was not sustained. Governor Banks appears to have been the leading man in opposition, but he had no plan or policy to propose. To-day, I am told, he introduced some rude scheme for a commission to take charge of each of the ten states which are under the radical ban of execution. These commissions are to disorganize the states and then reorganize them.
There is neither wisdom nor sense in the House, but wild, vicious partisanship continues, and is uncanny.

Monday, February 11, 1867.
Elliott of Massachusetts, chairman of a committee sent out by Congress to New Orleans, made a report for upsetting the state government of Louisiana and converting the state into a province or territory, over which there is to be a governor and council of nine, to be appointed by the President and Senate. These radicals have no proper conception of constitutional government or of our republican federal system. On this absurd scheme of Elliott and Shellabarger, both centralists, the House has ordered, without debate, the previous question, — prostrating a state, tearing down our governmental fabric, treating states as mere corporations.

Friday, February 15, 1867.
A call was made on the 8th of January on the President for any facts which had come to his knowledge in regard to failure to enforce the Civil Rights Bill.³
When the resolution reached the President he brought it before the Cabinet. for answer, and it was referred to the Attorney General on the suggestion of Stanton, that he should forward copies to the heads of departments for answer. On receiving the resolution I answered immediately without an hour’s delay, and so, I think, did the other members, except Stanton. The subject had passed from my mind and I supposed had been reported until today, when Stanton brought in his answer to the President. It was a strange and equivocal document, accompanied by a report which he had from General Grant, and also one from General Howard.⁴ Grant’s report was brief but was accompanied by a singular paper transmitted to him by Howard, being an omnium gatherum of newspaper gossip, rumors of Negro murders, neighborhood strifes and troubles amounting to 440 in number, — vague, indefinite, party scandal which General Howard and his agents had picked up in newspapers and in all other ways during four weeks, under and with the assistance of the War Department which had aided in the search.
There was but onesentiment, I think, among all present, and that was of astonishment and disgust at this presentation of the labors of the War Department. The Attorney General asked what all this had to do with the enquiry made of the President. The resolution called for what information had come to the knowledge of the President respecting the execution of the law under the Civil Rights Bill, and here was a mass of uncertain material, mostly relating to Negro quarrels, wholly unreliable and of which the President had no knowledge, collected and sent in through General Grant as a response to the resolution.
Two or three expressed surprise at these documents. Stanton, who is not easily dashed when he feels he has power and will be sustained, betrayed guilt, which, however, he would not acknowledge, but claimed that the information was pertinent and was furnished by General Grant. If, however, the President did not choose to use it he would decline doing so. Subsequently he thought the Attorney General should perhaps decide.
Seward undertook to modify and suggest changes. I claimed that the whole was wrong, and that no such reply could be made acceptable under any form of words.
Randall thought the letter of Stanton and the whole budget had better be received, and that the President should send in that he knew nothing about it when this Senate’s resolution was passed, but that having [subsequently] received this information he would have it looked into and thoroughly investigated.
Stanton, who showed more in countenance and manner than I ever saw him, caught at Randall’s proposition. Said he would alter his report to that effect and went to work with his pencil. Seward indorsed Randall. Said he thought all might be got along with, if that course was pursued.
I dissented entirely, deprecated communicating this compilation of scandal and inflammable material, gathered by partisans since the action of Congress and represented to be a matter of which the President had knowledge when the resolution was passed. It would be said at once by mischievous persons that he was [in possession of] facts of which Grant complained, but of which the President took no notice, that Congress had called out the information and [that] Grant communicated it, and that there is mal-administration; that this was the purpose of the call, the design probably of the members who got it up.
Stanton looked at me earnestly. Said he was as desirous to act in unison with the President as any one—no matter who; that this information seemed to him proper, and so, he said, it seemed to General Grant who sent it to him; but if others wished to suppress it, they could make the attempt, but there was little doubt that members of Congress had seen this — likely had copies. Finally, and with great reluctance on his part, it was arranged that he should, as the rest of us had done, give all the information called for which had come to his knowledge in answer to the resolution; and that the reports of Grant and Howard should, with the rumors, scandal and gossip, be referred to the Attorney General for investigation and prosecution, if proper.
It was evident throughout this whole discussion of an hour and a half that all were alike impressed in regard to this matter. McCulloch and Stanbery each remarked to me before we left, that here was design and intrigue in concert with the radical conspirators at the capitol. Stanton betrayed his knowledge and participation in it, for though he endeavored to bear himself [well] through it, he could not conceal his part in the intrigue. He had delayed his answer until Howard and his subordinates scattered over the South could hunt up all the rumors of Negro quarrels and party scandal and malignity, and from them [this alleged evidence had been passed] through General Grant, on to the President. It would help generate differences between the President and the General, and if sent out to the country under the call for information by Congress, would be used by the demagogues to injure the President and, perhaps, Grant also.
Seward obviously saw the intent and scope of the thing and soon took up a book and withdrew from the discussion. His friend, Stanton, was in a position where he could do little to relieve him. Randall played the part of trimmer to extricate Stanton, who availed himself of the plank thrown out.

Saturday, February 16, 1867.
Had a brief interview with Browning (who was at my house, at a reception, last evening) concerning the proceedings yesterday. He expressed his amazement at the course of Stanton. Said he listened and observed without remark till the close, and was compelled to believe that there was design and villainy, if not absolute treachery, at the bottom. It was with reluctance he came to this conclusion, but it was impossible to do otherwise.
I have been so disturbed by it and by the condition of affairs that I made it a point to call on the President and communicate my feelings. I told him that it was with reluctance I was compelled to express an unfavorable opinion of a colleague, and that I would not do so except from a sense of duty. I adverted to the occurrences of yesterday and told him I had carefully and painfully pondered them, and my first, impression was fully confirmed by reflection, that the details of Stanton’s report, the introduction of Grant and Howard, with their catalogue of alleged murders and crimes unpunished, which had been industriously gathered up, was part of a conspiracy which was on foot to destroy him and overthrow his administration; that it was intended the statement of reported murders should go abroad under his name, [as if it had been] drawn out by Congress, and spread before the country on the passage of the bill establishing military governments over the Southern states as a justification for legislative usurpation. That report was to be the justification for the act. [I told him] that there had been evident preconcert in the matter and that radical congressmen were acting in concert with the Secretary of War. I alluded to the manipulation of officers by the War Department, and mentioned how improper men had been placed at important points, and how I had been impressed with the views of the Secretary, which we all knew to be radical and hostile to the President’s policy. [Finally I said] that I could perceive Grant had been strongly but unmistakably prejudiced, — perhaps seduced, worked over and enlisted, — and that gradually the administration was coming under the War Department.
The President listened and assented to my observations, spoke of the painful exhibition which Stanton made of himself, said he should, but for the rain, have sent for Grant to know how far he really was involved in the matter, etc. [He added] that as regards the military governments, they were not yet determined upon, perhaps would not be. He still hesitates, fails to act, retains bad advisers and traitors.

(To be continued.)