Korea and Manchuria Under the New Treaty

THE treaty of Portsmouth has, among other things, recognized the new situation which the swift progress of the war had developed in Korea and Manchuria. This recognition was demanded by Japan and granted by Russia, and one is amazed as he ponders the immense changes brought about by the war and the straightforward manner in which M. Witte recognized them in behalf of Russia. A prolonged diplomatic parley would have resulted, had he insisted, as his government had often done, that Korea was a sovereign state, and whatever advantages Japan had gained therein had issued from a flagrant breach of neutrality; and that the Russian rights in Manchuria had arisen from exclusive agreements between Russia and China, and were not affected by the damages Japan had so treacherously inflicted upon Russia. Instead, M. Witte frankly but quietly surrendered to Japan the Russian lease of the province of Kwang-tung and such legal title as Russia possessed over the Manchurian railway under Japanese occupation, and furthermore agreed to Japan’s preponderating interest, in Korea, and to the principles of the “open door” and of the Chinese territorial integrity in Manchuria. In so doing, the Russian statesman went far beyond the accomplished facts, and reversed the wonted method and policy of Russia in the Far East, as well as abandoned his own cherished desire of making Dalny the great emporium of Asiatic Russia. The harsh lessons of the war had awakened him from the dream of an artificial commercial empire, and Russia as an aggressive exponent of the exclusive trade policy has thus departed from the Orient.

The treaty, however, so far as it relates to Korea and Manchuria, has not only recognized Japan’s new position therein but also cleared the ground for new developments in these regions. It is the purpose of this article to review the present status of Korea and Manchuria, and to attempt an analysis of some of the issues likely to determine the further progress of events in these important territories.

I

The great and increasing community of economic interest between Korea and Manchuria on the one hand and Japan on the other, which has been discussed elsewhere by the present writer, and further confirmed by more recent statistical data, need hardly be retold. If the facts in this inchoate stage of trade are already so potent, it may be expected that the mutual economic dependence of these regions will eventually be so intimate that the political security of their intercourse will become absolutely imperative. Thus the economic readily passes into the political. Between Korea and Japan, in particular, political relations are known to be as vital as the economic, and closely interwoven with them. Let us now briefly observe what the Japanese have thus far done in order to foster their political and economic relations with the peninsula, or, in other words, in what status the treaty has found Japan’s “preponderating interests” in Korea.

After her quick entry into Seul at the outbreak of the war, Japan found herself precisely in the position which she had long desired to establish. The plan of joint non-intervention in Korean affairs as agreed upon between Japan and Russia in 1896 and 1898, which had again and again resulted in competitive intervention, had proved disastrous to the interest of Japan and of general reform; but now Russia had abruptly withdrawn from Seul, and Japan found herself free to move alone. Thereupon she hastened to impose upon the Korean Foreign Minister a treaty of alliance, on February 23, 1904, which laid the foundation for all Japan’s subsequent conduct in the peninsula. By this treaty, Japan insured for an indefinite period of time the safety and repose of the Korean imperial house, and guaranteed the independence and the territorial integrity of the Korean empire. Korea should adopt Japan’s advice concerning reform. She should also allow Japan to take necessary measures in case Korea should be in danger of foreign aggression or an internal revolt. Neither party should conclude without the other’s consent an agreement with a third power contrary to the principles of the present treaty.

Details in connection with this fundamental agreement were to be arranged later between the two governments according to the circumstances. And the details, as they have gradually unfolded themselves, have proved to be of the most extraordinary character. One of the first demands proposed by Mr. G. Hayashi, Japanese Minister at Seul, was embodied in the so-called Nagamori scheme, whereby the right of cultivating all the waste lands in Korea exclusive of the government lands was to be granted to a Japanese subject, T. Nagamori, for a period of fifty years, subject to a renewal. This exhaustive proposition was met by the most widespread clamor of protest that had ever greeted a foreign demand in Korea. It was of no avail to explain that the ownership of the lands would remain with the Koreans, and that the cultivation would bring vast amounts of imported money, greatly increase the wealth and the export trade of the Korean people, and double the customs revenue of the government. The officials and peasants forthwith identified in their minds the use of its soil with the sovereignty of the Empire, and were, moreover, impervious to the argument that a ruthless exploitation of the soil was one thing and an economic development of its resources another. The extreme tension was removed only by the temporary suspension of discussion on the matter by the Japanese in July, 1904. Purchases of both cultivated and waste land in tracts of varying sizes have since been made by the Japanese settlers in Korea, especially in the south and along the Seul-Fusan Railway, where some of these tracts are said to be becoming important as models of an improved method of culture. Such an exhaustive enterprise, however, as was contemplated by the Nagamori plan seems now most unlikely to be demanded again.

A less drastic concession of the fishing rights along the entire coast-line of Korea was granted on request, in June, to the Japanese fishers, as well as to the Koreans, and in return the latter were rewarded with similar but unexercised rights on the northern coast of Japan. Concerning mining, also, the Japanese have made surveys, and have furnished an expert as adviser to the Seul Government. Thus far extensive mining operations have been successfully undertaken only by the Americans at Yunsan and by the British at Yinsan. New mining laws will now probably be promulgated, and, together with the development of the railways, and river navigation, capital will flow in from Europe and America, as well as Japan, to develop the great mineral wealth of the peninsula.

A far more important work than in these industries has been achieved by the Japanese in transportation, communication, currency, and other politico - economic matters which directly and profoundly concern the native and foreign interests in Korea.

The Seul-Fusan Railway, the concession for which was promised by Korea so early as 1894 in her treaty of temporary alliance concluded with Japan on July 23 of that year, but the building of which had, since August, 1901, progressed very slowly, was finally at the close of 1903 given a helping hand by the Tokio government. The latter guaranteed the payment of ten million yen of the capital of the railway company and its interest, and granted two million and two hundred thousand yen as special subvention. The company was then reorganized, and the work of construction was pushed so vigorously that the entire length of two hundred and seventy-four miles was completed in November, 1904, and opened to the public on the first day of the present year. This railway, with its well-known branch to Chemulpo and another branch to Masampo, not only possesses an immense strategic value, but also runs through by far the richer half of the Korean Empire, comprising nearly seventy per cent of both the cultivated area and the farmers’ families of the entire peninsula, as well as sixty or seventy towns in which fairs are held regularly three times each month. It is beyond a doubt that the cultivation and improvement of the rich soil, and hence the exporting capacity and importing power, of this region will receive a great impetus from this railway, and the general mode of life of the people will undergo profound changes through contact with Japanese influence, which is now flowing into South Korea with increased facility. The tourist may now reach Seul from Fusan in thirteen hours; or in fifty-six hours, and presently perhaps in less than fifty hours, from Tokio. This ease of transportation will be doubled and trebled as the Seul-Wiju Railway now under construction, and the Seul-Wonsan and other contemplated railways, connecting the four quarters of Korea by rail, are completed. Eventually, from the northern frontier, railways will be extended by the Japanese toward Niu-chwang and to Liao-yang or Mukden, and thus be connected with the Northern Chinese and the Manchurian Railways, so that a through connection by rail will soon be established from Fusan to Peking and to Europe. Of these lines, the concession for the SeulWiju Railway had often been demanded by the French, but the Korean government had accepted their proposition only to the extent of employing French engineers, the government declaring that it would construct the line by its own capital and under its own control. Before this plan had at all materialized, however, the opening of hostilities between Russia and Japan suddenly changed the situation, and the concession was at once granted to the latter early in March, 1904. The line, which is two hundred and eighty miles long, is now in active construction under the supervision of the Japanese military authorities. It may be added that, along this and the Seul-Fusan lines and around their stations, extensive tracts of land have been acquired by the Japanese “for military necessity,” some of them through purchase and others by seizure. In this procedure of the Japanese authorities the political significance of these lines appears well exemplified. The enormous economic value of the great railway system must seem in the minds of many Koreans not a little compromised by the political fears which the system has entailed upon them.

Hardly less sweeping than the other concessions that have been described is the right of the river and coast navigation reluctantly granted by the Korean government to the Japanese on August 13, 1905. The entire coast line of the peninsula, more than seventeen hundred miles long, as well as all the numerous streams which flow out from the main mountain range, has been thrown open to the Japanese shipowners. The latter may also at any landing-place rent land and build warehouses and wharves, which provision would as much facilitate colonization as navigation. The Korean coast to the west and south affords many harbors and anchorages, only a few of which have been open to foreign trade, so that within a few years the maps will show several new ports hitherto unknown to the world. As to the rivers, their navigable courses are, owing to the soft beds and extensive erosion, rather long in comparison with the short lengths of the streams. Consequently, the civilization of Korea has from ancient times grown along the great rivers, so that their navigation leads to the wealthiest and most populous parts of the peninsula. This concession, therefore, together with the railways, may be said to have opened practically the entire economic sections of the Korean empire to Japanese enterprise. The rivers and harbors will naturally be improved, and the natives and foreign traders will alike be benefited by the new activity, the latter of whom always enjoy, in this as well as all other matters of commerce and navigation, the most-favored-nation treatment in Korea.

Over the means of communication, also, — namely, the post, telegraph, and telephone system of Korea, — Japan has secured as complete a control as over the railways and navigation. Hitherto there had existed two parallel systems in Korea, the one under Korean and the other under Japanese management, causing a continual friction and embarrassment to both parties and greatly retarding the communication with the outside world. The native postal system inaugurated in 1895 still depended on horses and human shoulders for conveyance, handled no parcels or money orders, and in 1901 carried only 1,380,000 messages as compared with the 8,200,000 carried in 1903 by the Japanese postal system in Korea. In telephone, also, the Korean system in operation in Seul and Chemulpo was subscribed to by less than a hundred persons, while the Japanese service in the same localities and in Fusan was supported by nearly a thousand. The telegraphic service had been so unreliable and at times so utterly out of order that the Japanese army was obliged, at the opening of the Chinese war in 1894, to construct a military line between Fusan, Seul, and Chemulpo. Until the outbreak of the Russian war, however, the Japanese had made little further progress in telegraphic construction, while the Korean system had in the meantime been considerably extended. The latter still continued to be cumbersome and sometimes unreliable. The entire system of post, telegraph, and telephone under Korean control showed in the budget for 1904 receipts of 100,080 yen and a deficit of 230,589 yen, an excess of the expenditures over the revenue being an annual feature of the system, whereas the parallel system in the peninsula under Japanese management actually brought in the same year an income of 477,136 yen, or an excess of 151,199 over the expenditures. In spite of its comparative inefficiency, however, the Korean government had more than once requested the Japanese to withdraw their postal service from Korea, and also had brought numerous obstacles against telegraphic communications. As the recent war swiftly changed the situation, however, the Japanese system in Korea made vigorous progress, to the clear advantage of all parties concerned. Mr. Ōura, Japanese Minister of Transportation, and a party of experts, made an inspecting tour of Korea and Manchuria toward the end of 1904, and a result of his observations has now appeared in the agreement signed on April 1, 1905. By this contract the entire system of communication in Korea, excepting the telephone service in the Imperial household, was, with a view to incorporating the system with the Japanese, transferred to the charge of the Japanese government. The latter should assume the financial responsibility for management and extension, and make reports and pay part of the profits to the Korean government. When the Korean finances were sufficiently strong, the entire system should be returned to the charge of the Seul government.

Japan’s control has extended also over the public finances of Korea. The wellknown evils of the free nickel coinage in Korea were at last brought to an end when the mint was closed on November 30, 1904; the monetary union of Korea with Japan was decreed on January 19, 1905; and, finally, the redemption of the old coins was begun in June. The new coins are on the gold basis, and the old coins which are now declared to be on the silver basis are, as was the case with the old Japanese coins in 1897, when Japan adopted the gold standard, exchanged for exactly one half their face values under the new system. The Japanese First Bank at Seul has been entrusted with the entire business in connection with the monetary arrangement, and is in return allowed to issue notes against its strong reserves. Those who have studied the diplomatic history of Korea before the war know that these Japanese banknotes were at once a great lubricator of foreign trade and a bone of contention between the Russian and Japanese diplomats. For the purpose of carrying out the new system, the Bank undertook to float a six per cent loan of two million yen at Tokio last July, which was more than four times over-subscribed. The Bank was further given charge over the national treasury. Deposits of the government are to receive no interest, from the Bank, which in return is under obligation to loan to the government without interest any amount not exceeding 300,000 yen beyond the entire deposits, or between 300,000 and 1,000,000 over the deposits at six per cent. If this arrangement may not be expected to produce an effect of preventing corrupt practices of the Korean tax-collectors, integrity has at least been largely assured in the handling of the issues of the taxes after they once reach the central exchequer. It should also be remembered that by far the most far-reaching importance of the new financial agreement consists in its monetary section, for the advantages of a stable currency to the entire economic life in Korea can hardly be exaggerated.

Of the other details of reform which have not advanced so far as those already discussed, we may omit all but one. It may be said that in some respects a more urgent need of reform than in all the branches of administration that have been enumerated is found in the local government of Korea. For it is universally known that the illegal exactions of the provincial officials and land-owning nobility are largely responsible for the improvidence and penury of the Korean peasant. He finds it unwise to improve his work or to increase or save his earnings, for all his surplus capital would invite the extortions of the ill-paid official or poor landlord. All the industries of Korea, the excellent products of some of which have at one time or another in history been the pride of Korea, have for this reason deteriorated so far that one finds to-day the remains of her past glory rather in China and Japan than in Korea herself. So long as this state of things is allowed to persist, the industrial habits of the Korean people, and consequently the material basis of their national progress, may hardly be expected to improve. The reforms in currency and transportation, in navigation and trade, and even in agriculture, would even tend to enrich foreign entrepreneurs faster than the Koreans themselves. It would be rash to say that the habitual laziness which the latter have acquired during centuries of oppression is hopelessly beyond remedy. The removal of the prime cause, that is, official corruption, together with the creation of new opportunities of life, such as the already mentioned reforms would bring, might serve to make the Koreans unlearn in decades the evil traits they have acquired in centuries. The experiment would, at any rate, be worthy of high statesmanship. What, then, have the Japanese reformers done in the way of improving the local administration of Korea ? It is perhaps just to say that this work has only been begun from several directions, and that with the return of peace Japan may be expected to apply herself with zeal to this most complex and delicate of all reforms. In the North, General Hasegawa, commander of the Japanese army in Korea, has placed the provinces of Phyöng-an and Ham-gyöng under martial law, whereby the police of the army has been vigorously suppressing the illegal conduct of the Korean official and of the Japanese soldier. In many respects the people prefer the stern military administration of the Japanese to the irregular but extortionate rule of the Korean officialdom. It is said that the magistrates now shrink from holding offices in the North. The military régime must, however brief its duration, leave a distinct impression upon the people of a clean administration of local affairs. The Japanese Minister at Seul also took an unusual step when he proclaimed through the Japanese Consuls to the Koreans at the ports that the latter might henceforth appeal from the local officials to the Consuls or the Minister. The anomalous privilege has been exercised by many a Korean. More regular and permanent measures are, however, being taken. An adviser of police affairs has been employed from Japan, and the old police force of Seul has been reduced from 1723 to 1000 men on increased salaries, four illiterate chiefs and more than a hundred of the personal guard of the high officials being dismissed. The reform at the capital will presently be followed in the provinces, and it is expected that the new police force will assume the power of collecting the taxes which has hitherto been vested in the civil officials. These measures are potent, but are mere beginnings, and the future task of official reform seems colossal.

These remarkable changes in Korean administration which have been enumerated in the preceding paragraphs have not always been designed and proposed by the Japanese Minister at Seul, but largely by the various Japanese advisers whose service the Korean government has secured by special contracts. In accordance with the agreement of August 22, 1904, Mr. Megata and Mr. Stevens, the latter an American citizen long in Japanese service and formerly Councilor at the Japanese Legation at Washington, were employed, for an indefinite period, as financial and diplomatic advisers, respectively, with the following broad powers: that all the important undertakings in these respective departments should be approved by the advisers, and that the latter might make propositions to the Cabinet or confer directly with the Throne. Besides these two, there are Japanese advisers with more or less similar powers in the departments of agriculture and commerce, of the army, of education, and of police, and the European advisers, including the versatile Miss Sonntag, who had hitherto been employed by the Korean government, have been dismissed one after another since the outbreak of the war. The last to leave was Mr. McLeavy Brown, the honored director of the Korean customs, whose highly useful service ended at the close of last August. Concerning the Japanese advisers, who now virtually control the important affairs of the state, one may observe a common characteristic, which distinguishes them from their compatriots who in a similar capacity flowed into Seul ten years ago, during and after the Chinese war. These were for the most part adventurous spirits with more schemes for reform than special attainments in their respective departments, while the present incumbents are mostly recognized experts with ripe knowledge acquired during their long terms of service in Japan or abroad. They seem to have thus far worked in harmony, and will probably be organized into a definite relationship to one another and to the Japanese Minister.

Under the impulse of these and other forces, the Korean government has, besides agreeing to the changes proposed by the Japanese, undertaken to institute a few innovations of its own initiative. Wiju and Yongampo on the northern frontier have thus been opened at last to foreign trade. Some changes have been made in the military organization, which has proved of little service, but consumed annually a third of the expenditures of the impoverished State. The official system of the central government has been remodeled on a conservative basis, three hundred sinecures being abolished.

From this broad survey of the works of the Japanese government in Korea, one may say that it is an altogether extraordinary state of affairs that the treaty of Portsmouth has found in the peninsular empire. Within a brief year and a half, and under the exigencies of a war, Japan has gained a partial control of the foreign affairs and the local administration and a complete mastery over the transportation, communication, currency, navigation, and fisheries of Korea, and thus has succeeded in laying a broad foundation for the economic enterprise therein of all industrial nations of the world. Side by side with the activities of the authorities, private citizens of Japan have migrated in large numbers into Korea, where they are now reckoned by tens of thousands, and the entire peninsula is already assuming an air of great fermentation. The schools are filled with pupils, periodicals and books are eagerly bought, men of the two nationalities are jostling one another, and the local officials are subjected to the merciless scrutiny of the unwelcome foreigners. The older people are compelled by circumstances to adjust themselves to the fast growing new surroundings, while the younger generation are forced, in spite of themselves, to take more and more heed of what passes in a sphere wider than that of their self-interest. On the one hand, “the war helped rather than hindered trade,”says an American consular report, “the commercial highways being held open. Cereals yielded large crops and sold high, both Japan and Russia buying. Labor was abundantly supplied with work at good wages. Much of this had to do with the movement of troops. This brought in millions of dollars of unexpected and unusual money. It is interesting to note that the Koreans never had so much money to spend, and that they spent it freely; hence any improvement in Korea or in the East is bound to be followed by advantages to foreign trade. One disadvantage, doubtless due to the war, and partly to the increased wages, was the increased cost of living. This advanced fifty per cent, in some cases fully one hundred per cent.” On the other hand, wherever the two races meet for practical purposes, unpleasant incidents occur, and often cause bitter complaints by the Korean and unfavorable reaction upon the Japanese. Amid this stimulus and this jar, a new nation is being moulded to meet the new conditions which are fast gaining control over the entire situation.

One would naturally ask, to what general course of events would these new conditions tend. An analysis and interpretation of the forces which the war has set loose and which are bringing their inevitable consequences would be highly instructive. Let us, however, content ourselves here by pointing to the Korean clauses in the three important documents concluded within the last two years, in which the rapid development of the Korean problem is easily traceable, — namely, the Korean-Japanese treaty of alliance of February 23, 1904, the RussoJapanese treaty of peace signed on September 5, 1905, and the Anglo-Japanese agreement of alliance concluded on August 12, and published with Lord Lansdowne’s dispatch to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg on September 26, 1905. It will be remembered that the first instrument at once placed Korea under Japan’s military protection and administrative guidance, and bound Japan to uphold Korea’s independence and territorial integrity, including the safety of her Imperial house. One will readily observe that two distinct points are here involved. These two points the further progress of events, some of which have already been described, seems to have put so far apart, that in the treaty of Portsmouth Japan’s preponderance over Korea was recognized by Russia, while little was said of the independence of the peninsular empire. It was even said that M. Witte insisted during the discussion of the clause that Baron Komura should declare in his proposed terms that Japan intended to make of Korea a province of the Japanese Empire. This the Baron is reported to have emphatically declined, presumably because he would not consider the protection by Japan and the territorial integrity of Korea incompatible with each other. The difference between the theoretical and practical situation is, however, reflected unmistakably in the AngloJapanese agreement, the third article of which reads: “Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes Japan’s right to take such measures for the guidance, control, and protection of Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, providing the measures so taken are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.” In other words, Japan is left free to control Korea and then prevail upon the latter to open her door equally wide to all nations, including Japan herself. After specially dwelling on the substance of this article, Lord Lansdowne says in his dispatch: “The treaty at this point differs conspicuously from that of 1902. It has, however, become evident that Korea, owing to its close proximity to the Japanese Empire, and to its inability to stand alone, must fall under the control and tutelage of Japan. His Majesty’s Government observes with satisfaction that this point has been readily conceded by Russia in the treaty of peace, and there is every reason to believe that similar views are held by the other Powers with regard to the relations which should subsist bet ween Japan and Korea.” Thus are Korea’s alleged incapacity of self-government and Japan’s need of control over the peninsular affairs openly recognized by a third Power, and it is taken for granted that no other Power will deny these points. Such a declaration could not be made, it is admitted, in 1902, when the first treaty of alliance was concluded, nor perhaps even at the time when the Korean-Japanese protocol was signed in February, 1904. Yet the doctrine of Korea’s independence is still not theoretically contradictory with this situation now recognized by the Russian and British governments, nor has it become less effective than in the last year, for, while the control by Japan has since been tightened, Korea remains a separate empire with all the sovereign rights of an independent State. Japan, speaking technically, exercises a supervisory control and discharges administrative functions entrusted to her care. The future trend of affairs — whether the Korean independence will vanish into a mere fiction as the Japanese control advances, or whether under the latter the peninsular people will be trained to an effective self-government— must largely be determined by the mutual interaction of the complex factors, both Korean and Japanese, public and private, conscious and unconscious, which are steadily working out the destiny of the peninsula, but which can hardly be adequately discussed here.

II

The new situation in Manchuria is less advanced in evolution, but is, in its legal aspects, more complex, than that in Korea. This difference is well illustrated in the treaty of Portsmouth, which contains less exhaustive but more numerous clauses about the Three Provinces than about the peninsular empire. Any one who is familiar with the diplomatic history before the war and the recent changes brought about in Manchuria is aware that there are in that vast territory three spheres, one including another, each of the smaller of which is under special conditions in addition to those governing the one next larger than itself, — namely, the entire Manchuria, the territory under military occupation of the Japanese, and that part of the Liao-tung peninsula which was leased to Russia in 1898 for twenty-five years, subject to renewal, and which the Russians have named the province of Kwang-tung. Of these three spheres, the new treaty has provided, regarding the whole of Manchuria, that the Russian and Japanese forces should simultaneously and completely evacuate it, that China’s full sovereignty should be reinstated therein, and that both the contracting parties should agree to the principle of equal economic opportunities therein for all nations. The importance of this triumphant concession made by M. Witte in behalf of Russia needs no emphasis. Concerning the lease of Kwang-tung, including Port Arthur and Dalny and the adjacent islands, it was stipulated in the treaty that it should be transferred to Japan.

Regarding the second sphere, it was agreed that the railway south of Kwancheng-tsu should pass into the hands of the Japanese, the Russians holding the line from that point to Harbin, together with the trans-Manchurian railway which connects the Siberian and the Ussuri railways, and that both Powers might station reasonable numbers of railway guards along the lines under their respective control. This arrangement will leave 478½ miles of rail in the Japanese hands, and 146½ miles to Harbin and about 936 miles between Mandchouria and Grotekovo in the Russian. Also, the rights of the Japanese to construct certain branch lines and utilize the Yentai and other coal mines, which had been operated by the Russians, were recognized. It will be remembered that the railways in Manchuria were originally constructed, in pursuance of the Russo-Chinese agreements of September 8, 1896, and March 27, 1898, by a semi-official Russian organization called the Eastern Chinese Railway Company, and that they were really managed by Russia, but were nominally under a joint control with China, which country might purchase the lines after thirty-six years, or else take them over without payment after eighty years. From this it seems to follow that Japan must specially treat with China as to whether the old terms should rule the disposition of the railway surrendered by Russia, or whether China should purchase it sooner than at the end of the stipulated period. Japan, however, will, in accordance with the treaty of Portsmouth, guard the line with the necessary forces, so long as it is under her control, as Russia will likewise in regard to the railways under her management. Japan will also, as has been pointed out, construct with her own resources a railway from the Korean frontier toward Niuchwang and possibly from the same starting point toward some strategic and commercial centres on the main line south of Kwan-cheng-tsu, together with a branch from the latter to Kirin, the Chinese concession to Russia for this last line having been transferred by the new treaty to Japan.

The arrangement between Russia and Japan regarding the railway guards was natural from the perpetual danger to life and property from the so-called mounted bandits who infest nearly all the inhabited parts of Manchuria. There is in every large section of China an unsettled population ready to create great disorder whenever troubles arise. Provincial troops are largely recruited from these men, and after disbandment their lawless habits become intensified. They are a peculiar product of Chinese society and politics, and have been an important historic factor throughout the ages. They have, however, nowhere been so turbulent in recent years as in the two southern provinces of Manchuria, where they have successfully utilized the native instinct of the Chinese to aggregate, and formed powerful bands of marauders. The leaders of these bands may at a moment’s call gather the hundreds, and often thousands, of their followers, who appear at other times as farmers, woodcutters, petty pawnbrokers, and the like, but may in an instant turn robbers and incendiaries, and become a law unto themselves. Their predatory expeditions are so frequent that farmhouses are often found armed for defense, and many a wealthy youth even joins the band in order to make his house immune from outrages. During the war both the Russian and Japanese armies employed bandits as laborers, as spies, and even as volunteers. It is improbable that the marauders would return to a quiet life immediately after the ravages of the war, and the railways and other properties would be open to their depredations but for the guards provided for in the new treaty. It must not be expected, however, that the Chinese government will view the guards with complacency, for not only will their existence be a continuous reminder of its incapacity to maintain order, but also the memory is still fresh of the political dangers which the so-called railway and frontier guards of Russia have recently caused in Manchuria. Only under the wisest rule would the bandits disappear, and only then may the foreign guards be withdrawn. In the meantime, the numbers of the guards to be stationed are strictly defined within safe bounds, and China is no longer likely to agree to their increase.

The most momentous question to all minds about the future of Manchuria will be whether China will henceforth prove sufficiently strong to govern the territory and prevent all possibilities of another disastrous war. As Sir Robert Hart has said in his memorial recommending an increase of the land-tax, the ultimate cause of the Russo-Japanese war was China’s inability to safeguard portions of her own empire. It is well known that the policy of the late Li Hung-chang to allow the absorption of Manchuria by Russia was hardly opposed by any Manchu prince in Peking, and that the outburst of indignation against Russia which took place finally after April, 1904, came more from the patriots in the eighteen provinces than from the authorities at the capital. Those who have followed the recent events in China, however, must also have noted that an important change has latterly come over her official mind. The latent and often suppressed desire for reform has, since the failure of the Boxer uprising, and especially since the outbreak of the late war, gradually become such a potent power among the more enlightened Chinese that the policy of the Peking government already reflects signs of its irresistible influence. What is more to the point is that the patriots regard reform as a necessary means for the strength of China. The motive force is beyond a doubt the growing jealousy of China as a sovereign nation. A full discussion of this significant movement, with its far-reaching consequences, would extend into a prolonged article. Let it suffice here to suggest that the growing national sentiment must in no small measure have been inspired by the incidents of the war, but that the same jealousy, once aroused, is directed against all foreign Powers, not excepting the United States and Japan. Concerning the United States, we need not be reminded of the boycott movement and the Canton-Hankau railway affair. As regards Japan, it would be erroneous to suppose that. China would meekly submit Manchuria to the guidance of the Power which is of a similar race and culture with herself, and which has, at an enormous sacrifice, saved the territory for her from Russian occupation. Influential persons, in and out of office, have manifested deep concern lest Japan merely displace Russia as usurper of the Three Provinces. As soon as the Japanese army occupied Ying-kau (Niu-chwang) and established its civil administration, the Peking government demanded an immediate restoration of the city to the Chinese authorities. It will be remembered that China desired to be represented at the recent peace conference, and when her wishes were not complied with, hastily notified the Powers that she would not consider herself bound by the terms regarding Manchuria which Russia and Japan might conclude between themselves. China even contemplated sending special envoys to the neutral Powers in order to ascertain their views on Manchuria, and seek their moral support for China against any unfavorable agreement between the belligerents, but the plan was defeated by an opposition. It is evident that there are in China two classes of patriots, one of which is animated by national jealousy with little regard to the complex requirements of the modern state, and the other possessing a clearer understanding of the real position China holds among the Powers. It seems probable that the practical wisdom and enlightened patriotism of the latter class, though it is the smaller, will prevail over the former, the extreme wing of which must be strongly anti-foreign. To this abler class seem to belong Yuan Shi-kai, Viceroy of the metropolitan province of Chili, which is the most closely related to Manchuria, and the new Viceroy of Manchuria, Chao Erh-sun himself. These and other statesmen have frequently met together and deliberated plans for the reconstruction of Manchuria. From the understood views of these persons, it may perhaps be inferred that their plans include, among other things, the assimilation of the official system of Manchuria with that of China Proper, a conservative invitation and adoption of Japan’s advice and assistance for reconstruction, and a gradual upbuilding of an efficient army and police force.

Under these circumstances, it seems reasonable to suppose that, so far as China is concerned, she is at least fully alive to her sovereign rights in the birthplace of her reigning dynasty, and, what is more, is determined to do her utmost to insure its safety. She will tolerate the preponderating influence of no Power over the territory. Within Manchuria, moreover, there is little probability of a renewed aggression by Russia so long as she is bound by the terms of the treaty, for her railway guards will at no time be powerful enough to occupy the vast territory. Nor is Japan, a Power which has persistently declared her adherence to the principle of China’s sovereign rights in Manchuria, likely suddenly to become so short-sighted as to infringe them, to the detriment of the moral prestige she has acquired there at an immense sacrifice. In the last analysis, the only possible source of danger is in the diplomacy at Peking. For, if Russia has now lost her last hopes of an exclusive trade policy in Manchuria, has she also outlived her old diplomatic methods? In such a country of contradictory forces as China, a tremendous issue might hinge on this question. A Li Hung-chang at Peking might, under the venal influence of a covert diplomacy, be yielding the vital interest of Manchuria or Mongolia, and be steadily undermining the work of reconstruction zealously carried on by a Chao Erh-sun at Mukden. The world has yet to be convinced that its hopes of the change of Russia’s methods are not unjustified. If she should persist in her old art, it may be safely predicted that Japan would by all means prevail upon China to strengthen Manchuria against a renewed danger by a virtual coalition with herself. The consequent régime in that territory may be either a joint administration by China and Japan, as in the case of Egypt and England in Soudan, or a supervisory rule by Japan, as that of England over Egypt, or, perhaps more likely, an entrusted administration (Übertragene Verwaltung), as that of England in Cyprus, or that of Austro-Hungary in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Hoping that such a result is a remote possibility, it must still be admitted that Japan has acquired so great a moral influence over China, and Manchuria in particular, that no degree of chauvinism on the part of the reactionary Chinese will be able to obstruct certain reasonable suggestions which Japan may be expected to make. These suggestions will be political as regards Kwang-tung, the lease of which has been surrendered by Russia, and mainly economic for the whole of Manchuria. Of the former, Japan will request China to recognize her assumption of the lease either under the old terms concluded between Russia and China, or under entirely new terms to be settled between China and Japan. As for Port Arthur, it is idle to speculate at this stage whether it will be refortified by the Japanese during the term of the lease, or whether it will be completely dismantled.

For the rest of the leased territory, the Japanese authorities will be able to maintain therein a wise administration, matured by their experience of governing the natives of this part in 1895 and 1904-05. Japan’s probable economic policy for the whole of Manchuria calls for a few words of explanation.

The vast mineral and agricultural resources of Manchuria are well known to-day. During his recent campaign, Prince Kuni even discovered near Liaoyang some rice growing wild among tall millet, which fact suggests the possibility of an extended culture in Manchuria of the upland (okabo) variety of rice. In spite of these facts, however, thoughtful observers from Japan have concluded that the primary work in this class of industry in these regions may well be left to the Chinese immigrants; or, in other words, that it would be unwise to undertake the Japanese colonization of Manchuria on any large scale. The climate is too vigorous and changeable, the natural scenery is too monotonous, the farming implements are far too large and heavy, and the Japanese settlers are too unsteady and sensitive, for the latter to be successful farmers in this new land. The Chinese, on the other hand, who now constitute nine-tenths of the more than ten million inhabitants of Manchuria, are, in their habits and mental aptitude, an ideal agent for its development. It is not the Japanese farmhands who may succeed here, but the Japanese capitalists and organizers. Under these peculiar conditions, Japan’s economic policy in Manchuria should rather be commercial and manufacturing than colonial.

From this point of view, the policy appears comparatively simple. Japan will insist, in all her undertakings, here as well as in Korea, that, however narrow the entrance may be, the door for trade and other economic enterprise shall be open equally to herself and all other nations. This policy on the part of Japan, which is so imperative for her true welfare, and has been so repeatedly declared before the world, and so successfully enforced by war against the arch-enemy of the policy, has now been freshly announced in the preamble of the new treaty of alliance with Great Britain concluded on August 12. At present there are four “ports" in Manchuria open to foreign commerce: namely, Mukden, the scene of the great battle; Antung and Tatung-kan near the mouth of the Yalu; and Ying-kau, better known as Niu-chwang, at the mouth of the Liao. The opening of Mukden, which took place in January, 1904, may be considered in conjunction with the temporary opening to the Japanese made during the war at Liaoyang, An-shan, Hai-cheng, Niu-chwang (not Ying-kau), Ta-shi-chiao, Kai-ping, Hwang-feng-cheng, and Sai-ma-tsi, some of which may remain open to foreign trade after the war. All of these towns are in the interior, and have varying importance as producing or distributing centres. Of the other three open ports, all on the coast, Antung and Tatung-kau, which were opened at the same time as Mukden, are important primarily as stations of the great timber traffic on the Korean border and eastern Manchuria. Their hinterland is otherwise limited in resources, the harbors need improvements, and the waters are frozen for more than three months each winter. At present, and for several years to come, Niu-chwang (Ying-kau) must be considered by far the most important trading port of Manchuria. Although its waters also are frozen during the winter months and its harbor needs dredging, the navigation of the Liao River by thousands of junks leads to the productive soil of western Manchuria and southern Mongolia. The present writer has discussed elsewhere the nature and the recent progress of the trade of this port, and the controlling position Japan occupies therein. Since the evacuation of the Russians in July, 1904, the Japanese have made some improvements here, and the trade which had been suspended by the war has resumed its activity When the railway connections with the Korean lines are completed, the trade at this port will receive a new impetus, and, with the peaceful development of the interior, may within a few years reach very high figures. Between Niu-chwang on the one hand and Antung on the other, however, there is the great port of Dalny, upon which the Russians had once built their hopes of a great commercial empire in the East, and which, with its gigantic though unfinished improvements, has passed into the Japanese hands for the remainder of the term of the lease of Kwang-tung. Dalny was once declared a free port by the Russian Emperor, but, owing to the barren nature of its hinterland, the trade of this port has never been a great success, in spite of its railway connections and practically ice-free waters. There has been some discussion among the Japanese as to the future possibilities of this port, some condemning it, from its geographical position, as an artificial mart never to be successful, and others holding that its importance will eventually excel that of Niu-chwang. These people say that the sterility of the hinterland of Dalny, which itself may be improved by a careful irri gation and afforestation, is more than made good by its unexcelled means of transportation inland. For, in addition to its unfrozen waters and great improvements, Dalny is in connection with the valleys of the Sungari and the Amur rivers, which are after all the most productive parts of Manchuria, and from which the freight is cheaper by rail to Dalny than by water and rail to Niuchwang. If this argument is sound, the prosperity of Dalny must largely depend on the development of mining, agriculture, and manufacture in the northern districts through the major part of which the Russian railways pass, and this important economic necessity may have more influence than any other factor toward a harmonious coöperation between Chinese, Russians, and Japanese in Manchuria.

We cannot conclude this article without again referring to the new AngloJapanese agreement of August 12, 1905, which for the period of ten years has bound the parties to uphold the principles of the integrity of China and of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in that empire and Korea. The treaty is designed not only to maintain the territorial rights and special interests of the two Powers in East Asia and India, but also to “consolidate and maintain general peace” in these regions, and to “preserve the common interests of all the Powers in China.” The impressive manner in which these humane and progressive principles have been again proclaimed in the East may be said to be largely owing to their successful enforcement by means of a war. Its horrors and sacrifices, it is cheerful to see, have not been without abiding results. These even the defeated nation has frankly recognized through the treaty of Portsmouth, while the powerful coalition of the victor of the war with the greatest seapower of the world would seem to have insured them beyond all perils.