Some Results of the Eastern War

A PROMINENT diplomatist in St. Peters-burg recently remarked that “every one has agreed upon peace except the belligerents.” Add to this fact the other, that internal conditions in Russia, which need not be detailed here, are such as to make the cessation of hostilities a necessity, and the world is justified in the hope that peace will come in the near future. In fact, speculation is already rife regarding the results of the war, and some of our diplomatic friends across the Atlantic not Russian in nationality, are foreboding loss of prestige and the destruction of European commerce in the Far East as one result of a Japanese success.

That earlier bugbear, the “Yellow Peril,” is being revived and is again the subject of discussion. A gentleman, high in official life and in close touch with the French Foreign Office, has discovered another disastrous result of Russian defeat. He predicts the capture of Vladivostok by Japan, which will thus acquire “the only port and naval base on the shores of the Pacific Ocean which hitherto have been in possession of a European power.” To quote him further, “this would mean that all the commerce of the Pacific Ocean would become the monopoly of only two powers with strong naval bases on the Pacific, namely, Japan and the United States. These two non-European powers could divide up Chinese trade at their pleasure.” . . . This gentleman sees Russia and all other European powers “equally left out in the cold.” And from his own gloomy forecast, he predicts that “whatever else Japan may demand, she will not be allowed to exclude Russia and the rest of Europe from all naval and commercial influence in the Pacific.”

It is rather surprising that this presumably well informed prophet of evil to Europe overlooks or is ignorant of several most important facts. He is doubtless right in assuming that, unless peace is made almost at once, Japan will capture Vladivostok. But that is by no means the “only port and naval base” upon the Pacific hitherto held by a European power. For some sixty years Great Britain has held Hongkong, an invaluable naval base and port of distribution of commerce from all parts of the world, and doubtless she will continue to occupy it in the future. It is of tenfold the value of the Siberian port mentioned. In North China upon the Shantung coast, Germany occupies Chiao Cho with a liberal area of hinterland, and farther north, within quick reaching distance of Tientsin and Peking, Great Britain is in possession of Wei Hai Wei, a fine harbor, and easily defended. True, France is not represented in this list, but she holds seaports, and has a large colonial area upon the Pacific Ocean, beginning a little to the south of Hongkong and extending down to the terminal point of the Asiatic continent. If European powers may take and hold these several ports named, thousands of miles distant from their own proper domain, why may not Japan capture and occupy permanently Vladivostok, comparatively within a stone’s throw of her own empire, and a constant menace if occupied by an unfriendly European power ? It is not to be taken for granted that the Mikado has such an object in mind, but if he had, what objection could, with any decent show of consistency, be raised by the governments named ? With the naval bases and centres of trade mentioned held by Great Britain, Germany, and France, any monopoly of commerce, such as is seen in the forecast of the French diplomatist, is a manifest impossibility.

Another and conclusive hindrance is found in existing treaties. Substantially every commercial treaty between the several western powers and Japan, China and Corea, forbids monopoly and provides specifically for equal opportunities, privileges, and concessions in trade. Any favor or exemption granted to one is, by that very fact, granted to all. Thus, when the United States, in its recent commercial treaty with China, secured the opening of two additional ports in Manchuria (secured, by the way, in the face of the impertinent interference and secret threats of Russia) to the commerceof this nation, those ports were, of necessity, opened to every nation — Russia included — which has treaty relations with China. Even “ special spheres of influence,” so much discussed a few years ago in connection with Chinese affairs, are impossible under any fair interpretation of existing treaties, but the “Open Door,” or equal opportunities everywhere and for all, is specifically recognized and pledged. Only by violation or rearrangement of all existing treaty engagements with the nations of the Far East could any exclusive monopoly of the commerce of the Pacific, or any modification even remotely approaching it, become possible.

While, therefore, it is manifest that no such results, injurious to Europe, can follow the success of Japan in the existing struggle, it still remains true that, in consequence of that success, the future of the Far East will be,must be, widely different from the past. It is both wise and prudent to foresee, to understand, so far as may be possible, the changed lines within which shall lie the coming development, the history, of the nations upon the Asiatic shores of the Pacific.

During the war of a few years ago, into which the peace-loving Chinese were invited and almost driven by the Japanese, it was repeatedly asserted, with truth, by the leaders of political thought and policy among the latter, that the struggle was entered into, not so much, or mainly, to settle any question of predominance in Corea, or any other personal questions between the belligerents, but to demonstrate to the nations of Europe that the time had come when Japan must be classed, and reckoned with, as among the first-class powers of the modern world. In a similar way, there is, upon the part of Japan at least, a far broader motive and purpose in the existing war than the mere determination of the questions, important as they are, whether Manchuria shall or shall not remain the property of its rightful owner, China, and whether the Czar or the Mikado shall have predominant political influence in Seoul. While those combined to form the nominal, and immediate, cause of the war, they were after all only incidents of it, or incarnations, so to speak, of far greater, broader, more vital questions,— questions involving other European powers than Russia, other Asiatic nations than Japan, — which must be fought to a full and final issue. The time had come in the marvelous development of modern life in Japan when those larger questions, whether affecting her or her neighbors, must be met and answered once for all. The future of the Far East depended upon them. Hence the war long expected in Japanese circles. And hence, as an issue of Japanese success, a widely changed future for the Far East.

The earliest knowledge which the empires of Eastern Asia had of the peoples of Western Europe was brought them by sample. It came in the guise of heavily armed ships overcrowded with buccaneers, freebooters, sea robbers, men astonishingly like Drake and Hawkins, with whom the average reader is familiar. It need hardly be said that the introduction thus effected was not satisfactory. Indeed, it was misleading to the Asiatics, extremely painful, and horribly expensive. Much later came a different type of European into the Far East, in the shape of missionaries of the Catholic church. These were eventually expelled from the several empires of China, Japan, and Corea, not because of the strange religion which they taught, nor for their good works, many of which still remain, but because of repeated and persistent efforts to interfere with the politics or civil government of the state. The inception of modern acquaintance and relations between Western Europe and the Far East was even more unfortunate. So far as China is concerned, it was accomplished in connection with an attempt, persisted in for a score of years, and ultimately successful, to fasten upon an immense race the most horrible and deadly curse known among men. The common laws of humanity, the wise statutes and moral sense of a heathen nation, were ruthlessly thrust aside and sacrificed, in order to satisfy the money lust of a so-called Christian powder. It is true that no such conscienceless outrage was perpetrated upon Japan. And it is equally true that the subsequent history of Japan has been far different, far brighter than that of opium-cursed China.

These important facts of the earlier relations between the Far East and the Western world are stated with the utmost possible brevity. It is necessary that they be kept in mind by any person who seeks either to understand the more recent past of the two great empires still remaining there, or to forecast their future.

To these most uninviting features of the beginnings of acquaintance and intercourse between Europe and the nations of remote Asia must be added two factors, continuous in their operation, and most strongly hostile to any good relationship and understanding. They were inevitable, yet most unfortunate; necessary, and yet they have been the most positive of all hindrances to the proper growth and development of the Far East. To substantiate these assertions it is only necessary to point to the more recent history of Japan. She rid herself of these most offensive conditions of international intercourse some years ago, and the change for the better in every direction was immediate and amazing. They consist in a limitation, at two points, of the inherent sovereign rights of the rulers of those nations. In every treaty made the principle of exterritoriality was asserted, which is to say that all foreigners resident within the empires of China, Japan, or Corea, were not subject to the laws of those empires, but remained under the jurisdiction of their native lands. Actions, whether civil or criminal, against them could only be tried and determined before and by an official of their own nationality. One need only imagine such an exemption from the laws of the land in favor of foreigners, insisted upon and enforced in this country, to realize how bitterly it would be resented. Yet it was necessary. No self-respecting government, no civilized authority, could consent to the submission of its people to the barbarous laws, the unjust and cruel judicial procedure, recognized and practiced in those lands when treaty relations were established.

The second point of limitation affected the finances of each of the three governments named, and took the shape of dictation, in detail, of the rate of duty leviable upon all imports of foreign merchandise and all exports of native products. A schedule of tariff rates was attached to and made a part of each commercial treaty. It was uniform for all nations, and, under the agreements and stipulations affixed, no modifications of rates or terms could be made until the assent of all powers interested had been secured. This unusual procedure and interference with sovereign rights was based upon the argument that neither friendly intercourse nor trade with Western nations was desired by the governments of the Far East, that the treaties themselves were compacts made under duress, or at the point of the bayonet, as was the fact, and that nominal privileges of trade having thus been forced upon them, they would, unless prevented by this limitation, tax out of existence a commerce which was unsought and unwelcome. Doubtless this argument was wholly sound, but that in no way served to lessen the resentment caused by the infringement upon the rightful authority of the sovereign. An undesired guest would hardly expect to transform dislike into cordiality by the unique process of shackling the hands and feet of his host. And while upon this topic, it may be as well frankly to admit that it was not always either easy or pleasant to reason with the high officials of China or Japan against the imposition of a higher than five per cent rate of import duty upon American fabrics while it was within the knowledge of both parties to the discussion that the United States was collecting a duty of fifty per cent upon all imports of Chinese or Japanese manufactures of silk, and sixty per cent upon their porcelain wares.

In these two interferences with the inherent right of sovereigns to manage their own business affairs, and to govern all persons, independent of nationality, who may choose to reside or sojourn within their territories, is to be found the actual cause of the indifference and open hostility, so long manifested, to railway and telegraph construction, mining developments, and the hundred and one forms of modern progress. The Chinese government, especially, would not consent to the introduction of thousands of skilled laborers, all foreigners, which such enterprises must render necessary, who would be independent of the jurisdiction of the emperor whose protection they enjoyed, and who could only be punished for wrong-doing by an outside authority. Superstitious objections, such as disturbance of the graves of ancestors, the opposition of the dragon-guardian of the empire, and others of the same sort, were almost wholly fictional, empty substitutes for the real reason, which the high ideal of courtesy possessed by the Chinese would not permit them to state frankly.

Still another must be added to these points of friction, centres of disturbance, as they may be called, in the past relations between Europe and the Far East. It includes the entire policy and lines of action of the former toward the latter, and has found expression in an open attitude of proprietorship, disregard of the manifest rights of the Oriental, and almost innumerable deeds of aggression and spoliation. It is not extreme to say that, in all the years since the establishment of treaty relations with China, the European will, rather than the changeless laws of just and fair dealing between man and man, or, what is the same thing, between nation and nation, has formed the ultimate basis of decision in nearly every matter at issue between the Western nations and that great empire. Patience, forbearance, and that timidity which is the natural attendant of newly established relations, have been mistranslated into indifference, stolidity, and cowardice. Submission to open outrage has not in the least served to shame the perpetrators, but has rather encouraged them to even more conscienceless exhibitions of greed and lust. The fierce and suspicious rivalry between the great powers of Europe for political and commercial control in the Far East has alone saved China from utter spoliation.

Yet such national policy and action are never either right, wise, or safe. Any government is treading upon dangerous ground when its treatment of another is such as to give the high officials of that other cause to say what the Chinese Cabinet has often said: “It makes no difference where the right lies in any question, China is always forced to yield.” And those who have had occasion to study the peoples of Eastern Asia have long been convinced that even Oriental patience has its limits, that with them aversion to war does not spell cowardice, and that the time would come when the European policy of injustice and greed herein outlined must either cease or find a defender upon the field of battle. True, such a policy of aggression, robbery, and national murder has long been pursued in Southern Asia with nominal success, as the maps wall show. But it is far from certain that that success is more than superficial and temporary. Be that as it may, it is a well recognized fact that the colder zones of the earth produce a different type of manhood from that found in the tropics, and Asia is no exception to this rule, as the events of the past year have abundantly demonstrated to any who may have entertained a different belief. It has proved to be somewhat dangerous to measure the spirit and temper of the Japanese and Chinese by that found among the more effeminate races of India, Burmah, and Siam.

That struggle between the remaining nations of the Far East and Europe, long delayed yet always certain, has come at last. In it Russia stands for the typical aggressor and marauder of Europe, while Japan is the self-constituted champion and defender of the inalienable and selfevident rights of the governments upon the Asiatic coasts of the Pacific. To state the case in other words, Japan is defending the independence and territorial integrity of her neighbor as necessary to the ultimate protection of her own. The real question at issue is as broad as can be stated. It involves the life of those nations of the Far East, and all of the minor issues, some of which are suggested herein, which combine to form genuine, untrammeled national existence. And they are being fought to a finish, to a changeless decision. Should Russia win, Eastern Asia will, in no long stretch of time, lose all form and semblance of independent, self-governing life, will be dealt with as Africa and Southern Asia have been. The cormorant powers of Europe will scream and wrangle, perhaps fight, over the plunder, and China, Japan, and Corea, dismembered, will sink into nameless colonies.

But Russia cannot win so long as Japan continues to exist. In that cluster of islands is to be seen, what has never before been recorded in history, nearly fifty millions of people, so perfectly united as to be fused by the fires of patriotism into a single individual, determined to die or to live as a free nation, and fighting as only such a mass of humanity, so inspired, can fight for such an end. They cannot be beaten, and no lover of humanity and freedom ought to desire it. Fortunately the end seems near, and all indications point to Japanese success. Even those who were confident, either desirous or otherwise, of the humiliation and probable extermination of Japan, concede the question, and busy themselves with conjectures of the probable terms of peace which Russia may be able to secure.

To forecast the future of the Far East, thus freed from European interference and domination, would require another chapter. Some of the more immediate issues of the struggle ought to be summarized here.

The entire policy and lines of action of the powers of Europe toward these Asiatic nations must be, will be, immediately and radically changed. Dictation can no longer play a leading role in diplomacy there. It will not soon be forgotten that the final answer of Japan to the insulting ultimatum of Russia that “Japan will not be permitted to hold permanently any portion of territory upon the continent of Asia,” given at the close of the war between the latter power and China, — that the final answer to this message was only made when the battleships of Russia were driven from the sea, when Dalny and Niu Chuang were occupied by Japanese troops, when Port Arthur surrendered, and Mukden was abandoned. That arrogant assumption of superiority and domination which has so conspicuously characterized all European intercourse with the Far East in the past, if a shred of it remains, must be most carefully suppressed and hidden away. Further exhibitions of it may be dangerous. Even that constant stream of advice, unsought, unwelcome, and hence unwise, which has babbled through all the diplomacy of past years, must be dammed at the fountain head. Possibly the political wiseacres of Europe will eventually discover that the quiet Orientals have for centuries looked upon unasked counsel as invariably selfish,and hence have accepted it as a warning rather than a guide. If, so much as ten years ago in the swift history of modern times, the main purpose of Japan in seeking battle with China was to demonstrate to Europe that she must be classed and reckoned with as among the first-class modern powers, has she not fairly won complete and hearty recognition of that fact ? At any rate, it may be unsafe longer to ignore it. And what Japan will demand for herself, in all essential particulars, she will demand for her neighbors.

The era of aggression, unjust exactions of so-called indemnities, and arbitrary seizures of territory, will be ended forever. This hardly need be said, but it is of such immense importance that it must be given place here. Russia must get out of Manchuria, and stay out. Further than this, the Czar must awake from, and abandon, his dream of empire upon the Pacific coast of Asia, at least so far as absorption of territory to the south of his present possessions there is a part of it. In like manner, France must cast aside that secret scheme of hers, — secret in her imagination, but patent to all the rest of the world, — the scheme of acquirement of the entire southern tier of Chinese provinces, by which she has hoped to rival Great Britain in her Indian empire, to put a French block between India and China, and thus end the British plans of open trade routes for opium and other English commodities, routes available to English commerce only. Germany will recognize the limit to any further expansion of her colony at Chiao Cho in north China. Great Britain will doubtless return Wei Hai Wei, seized by her when Russia took possession of Port Arthur, to its rightful owner. And it is not beyond the bounds of belief that Hongkong, for years the greatest smuggling depot in the world, may eventually be given back to China, from whom it was wrested at the conclusion of the first Opium War.

It must constantly be kept in mind that this is not merely a war between Japan and Russia. It is rather a conclusive struggle between the powers of the Far East and the ambition, lust, and greed of the great powers of Europe, to determine, once for all, the right to existence and the status of the first-named. If Japan wins, she will, it is more than likely, borrow a leaf from the history of the United States, and, as has been more than once suggested already, declare an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. She has made it clear beyond all possible misunderstanding that, in her judgment, the three remaining powers of the Far East must stand or fall together, that they are jointly and equally interested to prevent the increase or further establishment of European authority in that part of Asia, and that any attacks upon the territorial integrity of either of her neighbors are to be regarded as attacks upon her. What is this line of public policy but an unwritten, yet genuine, Monroe Doctrine ? There will be no occasion to fear or mention a “Yellow Peril,” if the governments of Europe recognize these issues determined by the war, accept them in good faith, and govern themselves accordingly. If they fail or refuse to do so, we may hear that phrase again. The “decadent,” the “effete” East is, strangely enough, growing younger, more virile, better able to demand and secure fair treatment from even the greatest powers of the world, every year.

So with regard to the two points of interference with sovereign rights mentioned in this article as necessary, and still existent in China and Corea, they cannot, perhaps, wisely be abandoned at present. It is, however, a debatable question whether a new, and wholly different, commercial treaty might not be concluded, which would sufficiently guard our commerce in those countries, and yet not involve an offensive interference with the inherent right of their rulers to manage their own financial affairs. It need hardly be said that success in that direction would free our trade there from a heavy burden, and open the way to its increase as nothing else can.

Condensed into a single phrase, “ Japan for the Japanese,” “ China for the Chinese,” “Corea for the Coreans,” embodies the issues which are being settled in the present war. Why should not each of the great powers of Europe accept this principle for the nations of the Far East which each demands, and exacts, so scrupulously for itself. Once heartily recognized and carried into consistent operation by a diplomacy of good sense and common morality, misunderstanding, contempt, and hatred, now almost universal in the continental portions of that vast area, will gradually disappear, China will repeat the marvelous development of Japan, and the world will be better, richer, and far safer, for the change.