A Century of American Diplomacy

THIS is an eminently readable sketch of our diplomatic history, written by a gentleman who was himself for a time at the head of our Department of State. It is the outcome of a course of lectures given to a college class. A considerable part of the text consists of apt quotations from men who, early or later, played leading parts in conducting our foreign relations, or in moulding public opinion on questions of foreign policy. The whole gives an impression of careful use of first-hand sources, and a laudable desire to present the leading facts of the story in a clear and effective manner. Some of his quotations are perhaps a trifle below the dignity of his subject, and others have little beyond personal bitterness to commend them. Again, the wisdom of reviving, in a work of this kind, the details of the petty and sometimes squalid wrangling between the early agents of the country may well be doubted. If it was wise to do it at all, Mr. Foster has done it in a very striking and impartial way.

Historians of diplomacy may take widely differing views of their precise function. If a man undertakes it, as for example Mr. Trescott did, with the feeling that he frankly holds a brief for his own country’s case, the product may be excellent in its way ; it may be the truth, but is very sure not to be the whole truth. On the other hand, the writer may set himself the task of describing impartially the various questions and troubles that have arisen between his own and other governments. The man who would perform this task must have the rare gift of a really judicial mind ; for the bias of patriotism will be continually at work. Diplomatic history, in this highest sense, is the most difficult kind of history to write. It is as if a Republican or a Democrat were called upon to write a true history of American parties. What would seem true history to the one would not seem so to the other.

As to this supreme quality of judicial fairness I think Mr. Foster’s book leaves a somewhat mixed impression. He seems to have been conscious of strong feelings, and to have wished to be fair to other countries in spite of them. The result is at times a little puzzling to the reader.

Great Britain is of course the country with which we have had, and are likely always to have, the most numerous and important diplomatic dealings. It happens that this quality of Mr. Foster’s mind is most conspicuously shown in his treatment of our relations with England. His history of these relations strikes me as, on the whole, extremely good ; occasionally (for example, p. 249) he chides us for undue hardness toward England ; but there are omissions of facts important for the English case, and there are occasional outbursts that seem hardly in keeping with the context. For example, he devotes a long paragraph to the burning of the public buildings at Washington in 1814 ; but he makes no mention of the previous burnings by American troops in Canada for which the destruction of the Capitol was declared to be reprisal. He remarks, in a casual way (p. 62), that “ it is well known that the British were in the habit both of making false translations or decipherings and of forging documents ; ” but he gives no example, and cites no authority for these extraordinary charges. He goes out of his way to remark that England’s course in relation to the South American republics was “ wholly influenced by a desire to enlarge its trade, and by its jealousy of France,” — an imputation of motives uncalled for and unseemly. He is a little overfond of phrases such as the “ arrogant and selfish conduct ” of the British. These are blemishes which detract from the value of his book. The historian must condemn bad conduct; but it is no part of his business to call bad names or to impute mean motives.

Mr. Foster associates himself unreservedly with the most advanced version of the Monroe Doctrine. He leaves no doubt as to his own thorough “ Americanism.” Every expansion of the Monroe Doctrine meets his approval. He is strong in condemnation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, as a sad lapse from that doctrine : he calls it “ the most serious mistake in our diplomatic history.” He quotes, with seeming approval, Secretary Frelinghuysen’s contention that it “ is voidable at the option of the United States because of its violation by Great Britain.” He gives no hint of Great Britain’s defense against the charge of violating that treaty, nor any mention of the fact that she eventually agreed to act on our interpretation of it, and made arrangements which our government declared to be “ entirely satisfactory.” If the space he devotes to quotations denouncing the treaty had been given to a simple narration of the facts connected with it, he would have done his readers a more useful service.

With his account of the “ most recent assertion of the Monroe Doctrine ” — that made by President Cleveland in the Venezuela boundary question — more serious fault must be found. He makes the assertion that the British government “had from time to time enlarged its claims, and was steadily encroaching upon territory claimed by Venezuela, and over which that government had exercised jurisdiction.” These statements I believe to be demonstrably untrue. The charge, made by Venezuelans, of enlarging claims is based upon a mere juggling with the facts. The British claim, from beginning to end, was that possession of the lower course of the Essequibo River carried with it a right to the interior basin drained by that river ; and that, by early occupation of the coast up to the mouth of the Orinoco, their predecessors, the Dutch, had won a title to the coast region. No enlargement of that claim was made at any stage. The only thing that can be said with truth is that certain offers of compromise, which were rejected by Venezuela, were withdrawn, and that the later offers were less favorable to her. The fact that the arbitrators unanimously awarded to the British colony several thousand square miles more than the British proposed as a settlement, as late as 1886, ought to have opened Mr. Foster’s eyes as to the real merits of this famous controversy. Further, his account of the arbitration treaty needs revision. He states that, as a result of our intervention, it was “ finally agreed that the whole territory in dispute should be submitted to arbitration.” Now, Venezuela had persistently claimed up to the river Essequibo, including territory that had been actually occupied by settlers, under Dutch and later English rule, for over two hundred years. No government could consent to arbitrate such a claim as that. Lord Salisbury refused to do it, as his predecessors had done. Contrary to Mr. Foster’s assertion, the whole territory in dispute was not submitted to arbitration ; it was agreed in the treaty that title to territory actually occupied by either party for fifty years or upwards should not be drawn in question. The final award, which assigned to British Guiana the whole coast up to the mouth of the Orinoco, carried the boundary a hundred and thirty miles farther to the west than Lord Aberdeen offered to set it in 1844; and in the interior it gave the colony not only the whole of the territory which England refused to arbitrate, but also nearly the whole of what Lord Rosebery’s offer of 1886 would have submitted to arbitration. In view of the whole story, Mr. Foster’s suggestion of British arrogance and grasping selfishness in connection with this matter would seem to be singularly misplaced. If defense of the latest form of Monroe’s legacy requires this sort of argument, more’s the pity.

In spite of some defects, the book is certain to be very useful. It is a decided advance, in my humble opinion, on earlier efforts in the same line. The publishers deserve a word of recognition for the excellence of their share in the work. Type, proofreading, and general appearance are all that could be desired.

S. M. Macvane.