The Future of Naval Warfare

IN the days when the wily sophomore lured the innocent freshman to a mock examination before a simulated faculty, one question was frequently put to the trembling candidate. “ If,” said the pretended occupant of the chair of physics, "an irresistible force comes in collision with an immovable body, what will happen ? ”

Should a like practice obtain at Annapolis, the naval fledgeling may perhaps find a solution in the impending conflict between armor improvement and the development of destructive gunnery. The question restated is, “ If unlimited penetrating power meets absolutely enduring defenses, what then?” It is not necessary to reach the abstract point to find a practical issue. The moment a final superiority of the one over the other is gained, when the explosive shot or shell which no armor can defy is invented, or the armor which no missile can pierce is discovered, then naval warfare is at an end. When dynamite-laden shells become harmless as bullets of cork against a hull of adamant, or when the impact of a single shot will tear to pieces the strongest ship which can be put afloat, naval warfare is reduced to the condition of the famous duel which Van Tromp is said to have proposed to a French officer, where both combatants were to sit on a powder-cask with a lighted fuse in the bung-hole.

The tendency is now toward the development of two distinct classes of naval vessels. One class is of fully armored ships, in which the maximum of defensive capacity is sought for. The other is of partly protected cruisers, fleet enough to keep out of the range of the line-ofbattle craft. Any combat between these two will be very like the strife, so vividly described in The Talisman, between Saladin and the Knight of the Couchant Leopard, and, like that, will probably end in a peaceful picnic in the nearest neutral port which may answer to the Diamond of the Desert. The business of the one is commerce-destroying, and therefore it will not fight if it can help it. The business of the other is fighting, but it can fight only when attacked.

In the old days of sailing-ships, all naval vessels, as a rule, by reason of superiority in spread of canvas and men, were able to overtake the ships of commerce. Swift frigates and corvettes swept the seas. Fleets of the line could effectively blockade an enemy’s harbors, and only an equal or superior force could break through the cordon thus drawn. But with the present plans of coast defense this will be no longer possible, nor could such a fleet get near enough to cover the landing of an army conveyed in transports.

The armored ship on the high seas has nothing to do but to wait for the approach of another of similar capacities. Then one of two things must happen, according as the relation may Stand between offensive and defensive powers. There will be either a harmless exchange of shots, or a mutual destruction. These changes must affect very sensibly the character of both officers and men. The old naval warfare turned very largely upon the two qualities of seamanship and courage. Up to the time of the free use of steam on the ocean the general conditions of combat were about equal. Ships of like tonnage, armed with guns of the same calibre, encountered, under their respective flags, either in fleets or in single actions, and the turning-point of victory was with the officers on the quarterdeck and the men at the batteries. The nation which won was the nation best combining the nautical instinct, which is above all rules in seeing and doing the right thing at the right moment, with the bulldog tenacity which never knows when it is beaten. There was then plenty of room for both these qualities to come into play. Now the new conditions greatly reduce these two factors of victory. Discipline, constrained by the inexorable science of complicated machinery, takes the place of that old seamanlike faculty which divined the chances of wind and wave, and seized them with skillful daring. The colossal defenses of the present reduce all peril to a minimum up to a certain point, and then make destruction all but inevitable.

The motive power of the ship, once controlled by seamen at their stations, under fire, or aloft, amid showers of grape and canister, securing the parted rigging and the torn canvas, is now in the hands of stokers, below the water-line, and first aware of danger when it bursts upon them from riven boilers or the shock of the torpedo underneath the keel. They are aware of danger only in the moment of its paralyzing mastery.

So, with the officers, it is manifest that the fierce concentration of responsibility upon the successful execution of a single act must increase the tension of courage to an all but unendurable strain. It is like the temper o£ the gambler who stakes his all upon the turn of a single card, the valor which is desperate rather than deliberate. Sooner or later these conditions must greatly harm the finer moral qualities of the service. Excess of peril brutalizes ; impunity of destruction hardens. The mingling of the two must result in a character of which the ideal was found in the Old World pirate, who made his captives walk the plank, and who, in the moment of capture, fired his last pistol down the hatchway of the magazine.

It is not alleged that any such point has yet been reached. The argument here is that it must be reached eventually, on the present lines along which naval warfare is moving. To effect this experimentally, maritime offense and defense will require the test of war. Before his first duel, Charles O’Malley bragged that he could hit the stem of a wineglass at fifteen paces. “ Yes,” said Count Considine, “ but the wineglass has no pistol in its hand.”

The test of war, so long as it remains inconclusive, must mean experiments of destruction terrible to conceive of, and ever leading on to vaster possibilities of ruin and expense. The finality in view means a condition under which naval warfare stops, because either the chance of victory or the possibility of resistance has been eliminated from the problem.

The purpose of this paper is to submit that this end is presently attainable by the combined action of the chief maritime powers making the ocean the free common for all nations, and declaring against its use for belligerent purposes. Land-fighting will go on while the warlike passion remains in the heart of man, but it seems feasible that a perpetual “ truce of God ” should set apart the ocean. A great pervading system of international law now rules ocean traffic. Under mutual treaties drawn up by a maritime congress, each power might agree to maintain its quota of a general navy for the needs of marine police service. This would cover the chief utility of a navy in time of peace : the charting of coasts, the planting of lighthouse and danger signals, the scientific study and experiment which navigation profits by, the work of rescue, the prevention and punishment of crime on the high seas, and the destruction of derelicts. Such a united navy would enforce all decrees of admiralty courts, and would compel the resort to arbitration in all the vexed and vexing questions between sea-bounded peoples. If the chief naval powers once entered into this plan, all the lesser ones would be constrained to join the league. The obstacles which stand in the way of a universal land federation do not exist for a nautical confederacy; for the sea is a kingdom, an empire, or a republic (as one may choose to style it) of and by itself. It has to a great extent a common language, and in a still greater degree a community of thought and feeling, an unwritten law of usage, and a nautical homogeneity rising above the bonds of race and speech. The forecastle of almost every ocean-going ship is cosmopolitan.

Then, again, owing to the larger use of steam, navigation tends more and more to settled routes. The fisheries are confined to narrower limits. The coasting trade of nations, between their own terminal points, follows, of course, the one familiar track. The old mercantile adventuring, in which ships were to be found anywhere and everywhere, is a thing of the past, and much of the sea is as solitary as the pathless forest. Hence the duty of an international navy could be concentrated with great advantage at certain stations and along ocean lanes. One can readily grasp the value of a sea-patrol along the three-mile-wide track of transatlantic commerce. With ships of the highest excellence, stored with provisions and supplies of every sort, carrying salvage crews, and cruising with almost the precision of the life-savers of the coast-guard as they walk their beat on shore, the chances of every shipwrecked or distressed vessel would be vastly bettered. The derelict, now one of the leading perils of the sea, would disappear from the list of marine dangers, and the dread of icebergs and field-ice would be greatly lessened, if cruisers were constantly watching for and reporting the drifting danger. One frequent maritime incident is for a vessel in distress to be spoken by another under conditions which even the unselfish and almost boundless generosity of the seafaring class cannot overcome. A master’s first duty is to his ship’s company, the crew and passengers under his care. The sea Samaritan, with his men on short allowance and a crippled craft, may, however unwillingly, have to pass by on the other side. How greatly would be he relieved were his the moral certainty of being able, within twenty-four hours, to report the case to a naval commander whose special office would be to hasten to the rescue !

One source of jealousy between naval nations is the establishment by rival powers of coaling-stations. If these have to be strongly fortified, their expense is great, and each power is anxious to maintain as many as possible. This would at once be changed under the new plan. The common interest would then be to select with a single eye to convenience the best spots, and to place there the largest facilities required by steam navigation.

Again, the prompt oversight of marine wrong-doing would certainly he favored if all the present susceptibilities of national flags could lie taken out of the account. The pirate and the slaver are now liable to be brought to by any war vessel, but these are almost extinct as marine wrong-doers. Mutiny, barratry, abuse and ill treatment of seamen by officers, are matters in which it would greatly help justice if all questions of national jealousy could be removed, and any armed ship could have the rights of interposition that vessels of the navy under the same flag as the wrong-doer now have.

The case of civil war is one which at present sets the naval establishments of all the great powers on the qui vive. Each of them hastens its squadron to the ports of the disturbed country, “to look after the interests of its own commerce,” but rarely, except in consequence of flagrant inhumanity, interferes to protect any but its own citizens. If this were made a general duty, in the same way in which, in case of a street row, the nearest policeman is expected to step in, and the maritime power on the spot should be considered bound to see to the safety of all neutral lives and property, a vast deal of diplomatic complication might be avoided. So, too, the sending of arms, munitions, and insurgents from one nation to another ought not to be left to the navies of the respective countries to put a stop to ; it should be made the duty of the naval watchman, whatever his colors, to “ comprehend all vagrom ” craft, and compel them to show their business. With the completed system of signaling which would follow the establishment of a naval confederacy, the bad business of abetting conspiracy and revolutions in a neighbor’s country could be swiftly disposed of.

The construction of commerce-destroyers has been referred to already, and notice has been taken of the probability that they will not seek a combat with one another. It only remains to note that, in the event of a naval war between two maritime powers, the result will be that each will sweep away the merchant marine of the other, for the benefit of the neutral nations, who will at once pick up the carrying-trade of the seas. The sentiment of enlightened nations is against privateering, but “ commerce - destroying ” must take the same shape. The temptation of large prize money will keep the fleet cruisers from seeking battle with their like while wealthy and unarmed traders are to be picked up. When they fight, it will be, it is to be feared, after the fashion of Prince Hal and Poins toward Falstaff, Bardolph, and Peto.

The whole spirit of modern war is moving away from the old standpoint. Formerly, the purpose was to do all possible injury to an enemy. Now the theory is that only inevitable evils shall be inflcted, that non - combatants shall be spared and wanton mischief forborne. Doing harm for harm’s sake, when there is no military exigency served, is considered base and cruel. The victors on the field are expected to care for the wounded of the vanquished as well as for their own. Hospitals in a besieged city are protected by the Geneva cross flying over them. With the celerity and magnitude of modern military operations, it is possible for a great campaign to begin and end in a single season, and a decisive battle to leave behind it no wider scar than its own field. While the principle is that war, like its own cannonballs, is regardless of whatever is in its path, it must not turn aside for needless harm-doing.

But naval war is both dilatory and destructive. Its indirect mischief far exceeds its direct, and therefore is more slowly felt. It is quite possible for one of two belligerents to have absolute control of the seas, while the other is supreme upon the land. If the strength of the latter is conclusive against attack on shore, the navy of the former is deprived of its only legitimate service, that of covering a landing of troops. This was shown in the Crimean campaign, where, if Russia had been able to win the battle of the Alma, the siege of Sevastopol would never have taken place. Subsequent attempts showed that the attack on the sea-front was a vain waste of men and missiles. It is more than likely that the development of coast defense will continue to render impracticable the approach of a fleet within the longest gunshot range of shore artillery ; and the land force has the added protection of torpedoes, both fixed and dirigible, of monitors and floating batteries. The land defense has the further advantage that it is conducted on interior lines, and can have unlimited facilities of reinforcement and base of supplies. The offensive power of a navy is therefore restricted to blockading, the siege of ports of entry, and possible coast-raiding. Unless the power possessing the naval superiority is able to obtain and hold a permanent footing on the enemy’s territory, it cannot compel a peace. War, under these conditions, becomes a trial of mere endurance, of distress and inconvenience. But, in the event of war between two fairly matched naval powers, fighting on the ocean may continue for years without a decisive action. Meanwhile, commerce-destroying goes on, causing mutual loss and distress without any adequate compensation. Its weight falls on peaceable non-combatants. For one valuable prize taken and sent in, hundreds of ships will of necessity be burnt or sunk, and their crews and passengers left to shift for themselves in neutral ports. The point here insisted on is, that while military success generally obtains for the victors substantial results, a naval war is likely to be inconclusive, and may terminate with no other satisfaction to the belligerents than that of the infliction of a great deal of purposeless damage.

It remains to consider the obstacles, and then the advantages, of the plan proposed.

It may be said that a great maritime power like England would never come into a plan which would leave it without the power of protecting its colonies and dependencies. But the scheme here proposed would make all the league responsible for that protection. Nothing in its terms would hinder the free transportation of troops and supplies between any parts of the same empire, to India. Australia, South Africa, and Canada. There are just three eases in which England could he embroiled with a power likely to enter the league. One of these is with the United States of America in regard to Canada; the second is with France or Germany in South Africa; the third is with Russia in India. The probability of the first is almost infinitesimal, since the American people do not want British North America unless the Canadas desire annexation ; and if they do desire it, with anything like unanimity, it is obvious that the whole might of the British Empire cannot prevent it. It could as easily build a pontoon bridge from Valentia to Cape Race. The chances of serious collision in Africa are not great, since the chief problem is to settle and to civilize the dark continent in the face of climatic drawbacks and a savage population. With Russia the fight must be a land fight along the northern frontier of India, and its fortunes must turn very largely on the hold of British rule upon the vast and complex native races. Given a firm grasp upon these, and the naval strength of England is unimportant. If that grasp fails, a fleet in the Hoogly or in the harbor of Bombay can have very little influence on operations along the Hindoo Kush or at the gates of Herat. It is hard to see how England would fail to gain all the ends she has been straining every nerve to compass, — and more, — if such a confederacy were to assure the perpetual freedom of the seas, and she could take the lead in establishing it without loss of prestige.

This plan would greatly simplify the relations of the most civilized states to the semi-barbarous ones. In case of piracies, ill use of shipwrecked seamen, and the like, the knowledge that redress would be demanded by the allied navies would bring speedy and complete submission. There would be, too, the advantage that such proceedings would be more measured, dignified, and humane than when, as now, they are left to the discretion of the aggrieved nation. In fact, it would be very like the substitution of grave judicial action for the hasty and extreme dealing of individual righting of personal wrongs. For the protection of the weaker communities, instead of the present uncertain and slow pressure of the public opinion of nations loath to meddle in what does not directly concern them, there would be established, upon fixed precedents and general agreement, principles of action somewhat in conformity with the tenets of Christian enlightenment. Probably it would, in time, render contraband the supply of arms and deleterious liquors to the natives of savage lands.

Another difficulty in the outset would be the apportionment of naval duty between the contracting powers. At present, the state of matters is very much as if each ward of a city were required to maintain an independent force of police, whose duty should be to look after the entire city territory, and therefore there would be employed as many times the requisite number as there were wards. It surely would not ho unreasonable to adopt the present municipal system, by which each squad has its especial beat, while in any emergency the bulk of the force can be detailed for duty where it is most wanted. There would be a choice of duties. Cruising off the Crozets or the Falklands in the month of August would hardly be as easy and pleasant as to pass the same month in sight of Honolulu or in the waters of Japan. There would have to be a rotation of duties, but these could be apportioned as now the changes of shore and dockyard service are in individual navies. It would no doubt be possible to give a preference to the nations best fitted for service in the warmer regions, and vice versa ; but since the practical result would be a blending of the allies into one vast international navy, these questions would, in time, dispose of themselves. The ranking admiral would be an officer who had been everywhere and done everything in his profession, and be fitly the ultimate judge in all emergencies.

It may be also objected that, without the stimulus of possible war, no officers worth their salt would seek the navy. One can imagine this motive in the case of the army. A soldier who never fights or expects to fight is only a finished and pedantic militia-man. But the seaman, once afloat, is face to face with foes ever at hand. No science can quite rob him of the need of skill, courage, and constancy. In the naval duties here suggested there would be opportunity for all the high qualities which make the complete naval officer one of the most accomplished and estimable of public servants. The peace records of navy life are filled with stories of heroism and noblest devotion to duty. Will there not also be a gain in the training of the navy men of all nations by this elimination of the war element ? Now, there is a constant sacrifice of something to the needs of combat. Speed, safety, comfort, health, were in turn disregarded. In the monitor type everything was subordinated to the theory of a submerged and armored batterybearing craft. The turret steamer attempted to obtain sea-going powers, but the fate of the Captain showed the danger of the low freeboard. The heavier the armor, the more need of a low centre of gravity and a deep draught. The ship of the free-ocean navy, needing only a moderate armament, could be planned so as to secure the perfection of speed and seaworthiness. She could combine the largest capacity for stores and fuel with the best accommodation for officers and crew. She would, no doubt, discard the tugboat pattern now in vogue, and return to the old use of sails and spars; and last, but not least, the brutal and suicidal ram would disappear.

A federated naval service would offer, it seems to me, a higher professional advantage. Being international, it would be taken out of politics, and into the category of civil service. By economizing the number of ships necessary to sea supervision under the plan of coöperative responsibility, and by saving the enormous expenses of armor and ordnance now weighing so heavily upon naval estimates, it would be quite possible to offer higher pay and to provide retiring-pensions on a liberal scale.

The question arises of the event of land hostilities between two members of the maritime league. How would it be possible for the nations, say France and Germany, or Russia and England, to be friends at sea and foes on shore ? This might be met by requiring that for the time being the naval vessels of the belligerents should be assigned to duty at stations divided by meridian or equatorial lines. The Pacific could be made the ground of one fleet, the Atlantic of the other; neutral powers could be expected to see that the compact was duly kept. In the old days, when “ gentlemen adventurers ” sailed under the black flag, the law among them was that there should be no fighting on shipboard, but that in the event of a quarrel the parties to it should be set on shore at the first convenient landing, there to settle the matter with pistol and cutlass. In the same way, the nations must fight their battles on dry land ; and if this rule could be enforced, as it was to a considerable extent, among the lawless and desperate buccaneers of the Spanish main, why could it not be made effectual as to all who sail the seas ?

As the idea and the possibility of naval war gradually withdrew to the background, the navy of the nations would consolidate more and more into an ocean nationality. The habit of acting in absolute concert, with the obedience which is the essence of sea service, would make the naval marine one, whatever might be the independence of the merchant marine of each people. One cannot read the striking story of the efforts for the relief of Sir John Franklin’s party without seeing how nobly and heartily the forces under various flags could work together.

Does all this seem Utopian ? The four or five greatest naval powers of the world, if once agreed, could quickly compel all the lesser maritime nations to fall into line. The contingent which each power should furnish would be based upon its sea-going traffic, or any power might be permitted to commute by a subsidy. The power failing to do its share might be held to forfeit the benefits of the league, be barred from the ports and refused the protection of the admiralty courts of the other powers. A congress of the maritime nations, as has been said above, could draw up a plan which should be mutually ratified by treaty. The gain would be that, once established, the peace of the ocean could not again be broken. Nor would there be danger that this sea confederacy would ever imperil the security of the land. For all essential needs of navigation, the sea-traversers are absolutely dependent upon the simply which the land affords. In fact, one would hardly notice this objection save for the ingenuity of the inland Congressman and the rural editor to whom it might occur.

To sum tip in a word or two, the conclusion reached is that no one power can possibly obtain the absolute dominion of the high seas to the exclusion of the rest. No advantages which the naval preponderance of one power can gain for it can be held secure from the hazards of battle. Every benefit for which it is worth while to fight, every privilege which it is desirable to defend, can be had by the simple step of prohibiting naval warfare. This, as has been shown, does not abolish navies or strip them of their continuing usefulness and honorable renown.

As commerce protectors, as guardians of the seas, as worthy antagonists of the ever restless forces of wind and wave, an efficient navy, working for the interests of all who go down to the sea in ships, and do business in great waters, will always have enough to do and abundant credit for its gallant deservings.

Walter Mitchell.