Compulsory Arbitration

ONE of the most striking features of our easy-going American character is a ready submission to the domination of our servants. Whether it be Bridget in the kitchen, the railway in our streets, or Congressmen in the Capitol at Washington, we meekly bear the arrogance of the powers of our own creation. In fact, a slight acquaintance with the daily press is sufficient to show that in the matter of public administration the change of relation is an accepted fact, and we discuss at each succeeding election, not whether we shall employ Democrats or Republicans to serve us, but whether we shall submit to Democratic or to Republican rule. Now that we shall not have that question to settle for two years to come, is it not worth while to consider whether we shall continue to endure without effectual protest every inconvenience which our servants, the carrying corporations and their employees, inflict upon us ? These functionaries, who in our advanced civilization perform for the most of us on a large scale the office of coachmen and draymen, sometimes display an indifference to their duty of which even our cooks do not dream. If Bridget were to depart without a word of notice for a three days’ outing, she would expect her rights in our kitchen to cease forthwith ; but if our public coachmen, the railway companies, refusing to make terms with those in their employ, fail to perform their duties for a like period, we submit as tamely as they could wish. We grumble, to be sure, but the idea of calling these unfaithful stewards to account never enters the public mind. Indeed, in discussing the merits of disputes between its servants and those whom they hire to do their work, the public appears to forget that it has any rights of its own in the matter. Yet the right of the State to interfere is, in truth, unquestionable, resting on the fact that the carrying corporations have received peculiar privileges, by their own petition, from the public, in consideration of public duties which they engage to perform, and that a strike prevents the satisfactory performance of those duties. At the same time, however, in legislating for its own protection, the State must not abridge the rights of freemen possessed by the employees, nor those granted by law or inherent in justice to their employers. Thus it comes about that the only fair legislation to secure the public its rights will preserve those of both employer and employed, while insisting on the obligations of both.

The experience of the past, with the delay and inconvenience suffered by the public during protracted strikes, amply justifies the State in extending to disagreements between their higher and their lower servants its right to control those corporations which have the privileges of eminent domain or of exclusive occupation of territory. Only one other solution of the problem is possible : endowment of both employers and employed with the light of reason and the light of Christianity. As this will probably require several thousand years to accomplish, we are forced, in the mean time, if we hope for relief, to adopt the alternative offered in compulsory arbitration.

In considering this subject of state arbitration, there are three important divisions to be observed. In the first place, what shall be the nature of the arbitrating power, whom shall it recognize as parties to a controversy, and how shall it compel submission to itself of all disputes, with the evidence upon them ? Second, by what principles shall it be guided in making a decision ? Third, how shall that decision be enforced, — how far by legal compulsion, and how far by practical constraints alone ?

I. (1.) The corporations concerned are nearly all railways, and most of them are engaged in interstate commerce, so that arbitration of disputes which may interfere with the performance of their business comes within the scope of congressional legislation. Yet this circumstance does not impair the power of the several States from which they have received their right of way to control their relations with their employees, just as they now regulate them in respect to rates or other matters through commissions or the courts. Interstate roads might, however, have the right of appeal to the United States courts on the plea that a decision by the state authorities was unjust, though not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The first question is, then, whether this would wisely be made a subject of uniform laws for the whole nation, or whether it should be left to the individual States. One of the advantages of our federal system of government is that, in legislating along new lines, each State has the benefit of the constantly accruing experience of all the rest. Now, this subject of compulsory arbitration is a new and delicate one. A national law would apply to all parts of the country at once, and, if it proved to be unjust, the resulting evil would be widespread. At the same time, amendment would probably be more difficult than in the case of state laws, while for making amendments there would be no example of a more successful system elsewhere to serve as a guide. Again, so long a step toward centralization would arouse more determined opposition than would the passage of similar laws by particular States.

At least, until Congress take action in the matter, each State ought to enact a law applicable to corporations within its own limits. Such a law might establish a permanent board, or it might designate some judge of one of the higher courts, whose duty it should be, whenever a case entitled to arbitration was presented to him, to appoint a temporary body of arbitrators, and to preside over their hearings and deliberations. The object of the proposed arbitration, it must be remembered, is not to settle strikes, but to prevent them ; and to this end there must be some authority to whom appeals may at any time be made with assurance of a speedy hearing. Still, it seems as if a body of men appointed for each controversy under general rules, so framed as to insure impartiality, might be better than one chosen for permanent service by popular vote, or appointed by an elective officer. Complaints would come up at irregular intervals, and, after a few decisions had established precedents, would probably be infrequent; but they would come from various localities, and might happen to come from widely distant points at the same time. Thus, promptness of action, which is of the highest importance, and an appreciation of the special conditions of each controversy, would be best secured by local boards of temporary appointment. This would be the case, at least, if arbitration were made a national matter. A permanent board might then find itself much of the time with nothing to do, and at other times crowded with business, and hurried from one end of the country to the other to settle some comparatively trivial question. Again, a mistaken decision, even though palpably unjust, if made by a temporary board, would be limited in its effect, and need not destroy confidence in the principle of arbitration for other questions in the future ; but a slight apparent bias on the part of a permanent body might create such distrust and unwillingness to appear before it as to make the whole system a failure. With so much, too, depending on the character of a permanent board, it would be hard to keep it out of politics. Finally, whatever the nature of these boards of arbitration, provision ought to be made for their adequate compensation.

(2.) There would seem to be no need for asking who shall be the recognized parties to a dispute ; but this question has, in fact, been the occasion of intense bitterness in many strikes, and in some cases the cause of the strikes themselves. The trouble arises from the membership of the men in associations whose orders they are popularly, and sometimes justly, supposed to obey like slaves, and also from their employment of agents not of their own number to represent them. It has been thus far a favorite and a very plausible excuse of employers for refusing arbitration that their men have asked it not simply as employees, but by the vote of some labor organization, and that their claims are presented by an outsider, not by one of themselves. They ignore the fact that none but their employees are members of the assembly that passed the vote in question, and they refuse to see the difference between a dictator and a representative. Sometimes, again, they say that they are ready to listen to the demands of their men as individuals, but not in a body. So long, however, as a request comes from the employees themselves there is no good reason why they should not present it through an agent, or why that agent should necessarily be one of their own number ; provided only he be in fact their agent and express their real wishes. There is, on the other hand, a most important reason why their claims should be made thus collectively, and through some representative not employed by those to whom he makes his appeal, and hence not subject to discharge for his temerity. Discreditable as it is to certain employers, and incredible though it seems to be to many among the public, workingmen often hesitate to present their own claims or those of their fellows from fear of discharge on some fictitious pretense; and not always discharge alone, but the black-list as well. For this reason, they should be allowed, when they desire it, to state their case by an advocate ; and it makes no possible difference as regards the justice of their claims whether he be one of their number, or a lawyer, or even a walking delegate.

Nevertheless, to protect boards of arbitration from continual appeals by irresponsible claimants, and also to give the public reasonable assurance that the men are not mere dupes of officious leaders, there ought to be some definite enactment fixing the conditions under which hearings shall be given. There is a common idea among the more favored classes that laboring men never think of wanting any other terms than those offered them, until they are aroused to discontent by agitators who seek notoriety and support in idleness, regardless of the consequences to their victims. “No doubt the men are in the wrong, and would never have struck at all except for those walking delegates and Knights of Labor,” is the offhand way in which many a really benevolent gentleman passes judgment upon all strikes alike, after five minutes’ perusal of his morning paper. But just because, once in a while, this judgment happens to be true, it is very important to remove all possible excuse for it in future.

To attain this end, the law should admit the right of railway employees to organize, and should provide that the officers of their organizations be entitled to recognition by the boards of arbitration : on condition, however, first, that these organizations shall be open to none but railway employees, and shall actually contain a majority of the men concerned in each petition presented; and, second, that their officers shall be appointed by themselves, and shall owe allegiance to no outside organization. This, it will be observed, does not preclude the choice of men not actually engaged in railway work as officers, or the employment of counsel to present their petitions. Each class of employees, too, could be permitted to have its separate organization or to unite with others, as it might choose.

The organizations of railway men being thus legally recognized and open to all in a given company’s employ, not only should the arbitration board give a hearing to cases presented by their officers, but it should also properly decline to hear complaints from individuals or small bodies of disgruntled men who were unable to secure for their petition the support of their fellow-workmen. Such would still have the same right as the rest to appeal to their employers, but a state board of arbitration ought never to be regarded as a primary court open to every complainant. The law should not say in so many words that every complaint must be presented by the approval of this or that order of laborers, but that every general petition must be approved by a majority of those whom it concerns, and every personal grievance, in so far as personal grievances are admitted at all, by a majority of the complainant’s fellows, or by their duly appointed representatives. On questions of wages all interested could easily express opinion, but cases of alleged unjust discharge could be more intelligently passed upon by a small body like an executive board. Finally, the law ought to provide that no matter be taken before the state board of arbitration until it has first been presented to the proper officers of the corporation. Employers must in no case be denied the opportunity of dealing directly and justly with their men ; and, on the other hand, the men must not be allowed to get the idea that they are responsible first to boards of arbitration, and only secondly to their employers.

(3.) Arbitration boards should have the right to demand from both sides such information as they may think needful; and failure on either side to respond satisfactorily to any question should warrant the presumption that the answer, had it been given, would have told against the party refusing it. Beyond this there would be no need in the law of provisions compelling testimony or punishing contempt. Moreover, if a body of employees were to strike without making any appeal for arbitration, they would thereby subject themselves to the same consequences as if they had refused to accept a decision rendered on evidence. Again, the corresponding rule must be that, if the men alone appear before the board, the decision shall be by default against their employers. Finally, the arbitrators should be allowed to decide for themselves what sort of information they need, and should not be obliged to listen to irrelevant arguments on either side.

II. Though the nature of the evidence to be admitted will vary with each case, and though those to whom judgment is committed must be guided largely by their own sense of justice, it is still worth while to consider what general principles ought to be observed, and what, if any, might wisely be incorporated in law.

In the first place, with opportunity for arbitration provided, the so-called sympathetic strike could not be tolerated. In fact, it could occur only in case a body of men were to stop work out of sympathy with strikers in some other State, or were to refuse to handle “ non-union ” goods of some sort, or cars received from outside roads on which strikes were in progress. The State, however, cannot recognize a right on the part of its servants to obstruct any business which is carried on in conformity with its laws or with those of sister States ; neither can it, after doing all in its power to provide means of justice for its own employees, allow them to put it to inconvenience by taking part in the quarrels of those beyond its jurisdiction. Yet the men might properly l-efuse to be removed to a distance to take the place of strikers on some other part of a system under the same general control as their own line. Again, the whole body of a company’s employees within the same jurisdiction should have the right to support the petition of any of their number; for if this were not allowed it would be possible to cut down wages, first for one small set of men, and then for another, until all had been reduced, without giving a fair chance for a united protest.

The most frequent subjects of dispute which may properly come up for arbitration are wages, hours of service, and, in certain cases, the grounds for promotion and discharge. Regarding wages there are at least three different theories: (1) that the ability of a company to pay should be taken into account, a theory advocated by employees when a company is prospering, and by employers when the contrary is the case; (2) that the value of a service to the company should be considered, presented by corporations that wish to keep the wages of as many as possible of their men below the standard rate; (3) that wages should be proportioned to the labor and skill required to perform a given service.

As to the first theory, of payment according to ability to pay, the employees have, perhaps, equal rights with the stockholders to benefit by unusual profits. It is the public, however, that has the true claim on them. If, then, the people choose to say that this special profit, instead of being used to reduce rates or improve accommodations, shall be given to the employees as nominal wages over and above the value of their service, the company can have no good ground for complaint; but the employees have no right to expect such benefactions. On the other hand, the limit to which wages may be reduced on the plea of a road’s poverty must not be too low to maintain uninterrupted service. Again, in considering the wealth or poverty of a carrying corporation, and its consequent ability to pay good wages, it will generally make a great difference whether calculation be made on the basis of the actual value of its property or on that of the face value of its securities. It is fair to say that, while the public is at liberty to pay, by means of extortionate rates, as high dividends as it may please on watered stock, it ought not to allow the payment of interest on fictitious values to serve as an excuse for pinching the employees.

The second theory is that payment should depend on the value of the service rendered. It seems plausible enough to say that the engineer of a local train ought not to be paid as much as he who runs the through express, because the service of the former is of less value to the company. But if this principle be pressed to its conclusion, its unfairness becomes apparent ; for if it be just, then, similarly, the engineer of a through freight, that pays little more than operating expenses, should have less pay than the engineer of a local, that contributes to fixed charges and dividends as well. An engineer would deserve less for bringing a nearly empty train safely through snow and storm than for carrying the same train full of passengers on a fair day. It may be that the engineer of the local deserves less than the driver of the through express; not, however, because his service is less valuable, but because it involves less of responsibility or of skill.

In short, the only true rule is the third : that any service which the employer thinks worth doing at all shall be paid for according to the skill and labor required for performing it, with due allowance for peculiar irksomeness, danger, or responsibility, regardless of its precise value to the company. This rule should be followed as closely as possible, for it is that by which wages in general must always be governed, according to the law of supply and demand. It is desirable that the public, through its arbitration boards, interfere as little as possible with the operation of this law, only insuring itself against the inconvenience sure to result if the state of the labor market be put to the test of a strike.

In the question how many hours railway men shall work the public has a vital concern. The lives of travelers are imperiled if those in any way connected with the running of trains or the repairing of tracks are kept under a severe strain. In this matter, therefore, public safety may often require more restrictions than the men themselves would have a right to ask. For the same reason, the subject might wisely be treated by general laws, though such laws could not attempt to fix the precise limit of working time for all classes of employees. Not only must the railway business go on at all hours of the day, but the severity of the strain and the responsibility upon those employed vary widely according to the posts they fill. It is, perhaps, not too much for a station master to be on hand at the occasional arrival of trains during eighteen hours of the twenty-four, though it would be a dangerous policy to expect a switchman to be alive to his duty during such a period. Again, a local engineer may be kept on duty ten hours a day, but few managers would be reckless enough to require a man to run a fast express for an equal length of time. A maximum time limit might, however, be set for many classes of employees, such as ten hours of actual service, all to be included within twelve consecutive hours, and to be continued for not more than six successive days. That would, no doubt, be more than could justly or safely be required of many men; but there is no other business in which precise rules on this subject would be so difficult to frame. Accordingly, the enactment of such a general time limit into law ought not to preclude the right of any class of men to a hearing on the matter before the arbitration board.

The hardest question which may require arbitration is that of promotion and discharge. In such a matter every employer wishes to be free to act on his own judgment. The discipline essential to efficient service is endangered if employees are not held strictly accountable to their employers, and nowhere is thorough discipline more indispensable than on railways. Even in the government civil service, though the power of appointment is restricted, it has not been thought wise to interfere with the power of dismissal. Much less has the State advanced so far in socialism as to limit the right of any ordinary employer to discharge his men, with or without reason, at pleasure ; and only because the arbitrary exercise of a similar right by corporations sometimes results in their inability to perform their public duties can the State wisely or justly interfere with them. The State, moreover, concedes the right of laboring men to organize, and any railway company that attempts to prevent the exercise of this admitted right ought to be held responsible for the consequences. In fact, it is so clearly for the interest of employers to retain good men in their service that questions of discharge would not be a proper subject of arbitration at all, were not some corporations still avowedly hostile to the organization of their employees. Perhaps, too, it is fair to make some concession to the suspicions of the men, unreasonable though they often are. It is the nature of all mankind, save ourselves, to be unreasonable ; our part is to be magnanimous. Every precaution, however, should be taken to prevent indiscriminate appeals to arbitration. This is due, first of all, to the employers, to whom outside supervision must, at best, be annoying ; but it is even more important to the men, for nothing could more discredit their cause than the frequent presentation of complaints that could not bear investigation. No boards of arbitration ought ever to overrule the action of railway managers merely on the ground that they themselves might have done differently in the circumstances, and purely personal complaints ought not to be entertained. In all cases of discharge presented, the men must convince the board that the reasons alleged were a mere pretext for action prompted in reality by hostility to organized labor. It would then be wise policy for the employers to treat their men fairly, in order to avoid possible overruling from without, and for the men to accept in good faith the decisions of their employers, unless very sure of a genuine grievance. Moreover, by being careful to place in prominent positions in their orders only such of their number as are of unquestioned character and efficiency, they can do much to relieve boards of arbitration in the difficult task of deciding what is the real cause of a man’s discharge.

It is a signal advantage of arbitration in advance of open warfare that those to whom decision is committed will be free from the prejudices which the incidents attending a strike often excite. At present we are too ready to judge a body of strikers by their worst specimen, and to think the merits of a controversy changed by a single injudicious act of the weaker party. With arbitration to prevent instead of to settle strikes, there will be no riots or acts of violence on the part of hot-headed sympathizers with the men ; no employment of Pinkerton “detectives ” by the management, to obscure the real issue and render impartial judgment impossible. The boards will not yield to the temptation to punish the corporations for their arrogant demand to be allowed to regulate their own affairs, like private individuals ; nor, on the other hand, will they refuse justice to the employees because some of their claims may be extravagant or their economic theories absurd.

III. All has gone on smoothly thus far, on paper at least; an impartial arbitration board has been appointed, and an impartial decision, based on just principles, has been rendered. But what if either party refuse to accept the decision ? Shall the law attempt positive compulsion ? That is not necessary, and with the employees would be impossible. The law may, however, fix serious consequences for refusal to comply ; legal consequences for the company, and practical consequences for its employees. For the corporation is the creature of the State and the holder of special public favors ; the men have received no favors from the public, and can be held to no legal duties. Yet they have moral obligations, and it is right that the State, after undertaking to secure them from injustice, insist, in return, on recognition of these obligations, and use such constraint as is not tyrannical to enforce it.

A corporation, then, though it should still have a nominal right to reject the terms of the arbitration board, ought to be held to full accountability for the consequences. It should be required to maintain uninterrupted operation of its lines, while its employees would be at liberty to leave at once in a body. If, under these circumstances, it fail in the least to do its work, its lines should be taken in charge immediately by a receiver, who would offer the men the terms just fixed by the arbitrators, and so continue the operation of the road. This saves the public from inconvenience without involving the forfeiture of a company’s charter before the stockholders can be heard ; but on such conditions no corporation would be likely to reject the official settlement, unless it had so good a case as to feel sure of ability to fill all vacancies instantly, or unless the terms proposed were really believed to be ruinous. In the former instance, it would be justified by success ; in the latter, it could prove its sincerity by offering to surrender its property to the State at a fair valuation, — that is, the present cost of building and equipping a similar line added to the original land damages of the line surrendered. It is not, however, at all likely that such a course would ever be taken. Most public carrying companies are either so profitable or so highly capitalized above the actual value of their plant that sale of the property at its true value would not look attractive.

In the next place, what shall be done if the employees refuse the terms offered, or if they strike without first applying for arbitration at all ? The more the State insists on the performance of their duties by corporations, the more clear becomes its own duty to secure these companies effectively against loss through the refusal of their employees to accept terms which the State itself, by its agents, has declared reasonable. But the State cannot compel freemen to work against their will; and to require men, on entering any service, to bind themselves to accept whatever conditions may be fixed by the decision of a body yet to be constituted would be contrary to the very idea of free labor. It is, however, perfectly just to require due notice of an employee before leaving his employer’s service, as also of the employer before discharging his men without a special cause, or reducing their wages. The time required should be the same for both parties, and the penalty for an employer for disregarding the rule should be wages for the full period. From the employees it would be impossible to compel service, and often impracticable to collect a fine, especially when a large number struck at once; while the idea of making refusal to work a penal offense is as repugnant as it would prove impossible of execution. There is still, however, a means of constraining the employees, suggested by that device, most villainous under abuse, the black-list. Men in the employ of public carriers should be licensed, and should lose their licenses as the penalty for leaving their posts without either due notice or the public consent. Licenses should cost nothing in the first instance, but the price should be very heavy for their renewal if once forfeited. This price would be in effect the fine imposed as a penalty for quitting work without warning, and the experience of men unjustly black-listed in the past gives reason for believing that the fear of losing their right to public employment, with the difficulty of regaining it, would save a corporation from danger of a sudden strike on a decision of the arbitration board unsatisfactory to its employees.

It is not proposed to interfere with any man’s right to work or not to work for a given employer or at a given compensation, since the license is not to be forfeited as a penalty for refusing terms which an arbitration board thinks fair, but only for leaving work without due warning, on dissatisfaction with those terms. The men are sustained by the whole force of the law in their right to strike instantly in case the corporation refuses the terms fixed, while their own right to refuse them is unquestioned so long as they give notice in advance. At the same time, uninterrupted service is secured by the appointment of a receiver if the managers fail to operate their road, while the system of licenses protects the company from tyranny on the part of the men. The State would not say to the corporation : " You must pay this rate of wages, and you must reëmploy these men.” But it would say : “ We think that these wages are no more than you ought to pay, and that your motive in discharging these men was purely tyrannical. If, then, your men all leave you in consequence of treatment in our judgment unfair, we shall hold you responsible for any resulting inconvenience. If you fail in the least to perform your duties as common carriers, we shall take control of your property and operate it until you are ready to offer the employees what seem to us reasonable terms.” Neither would the State, on deciding against the men, say to them: “ You must work on the terms your employers offer you.” It would say : “We believe your employers’ terms are reasonable. You may reject them if you choose, but you must give fair notice before leaving, so that your places may be filled. And if you leave without notice, and thereby embarrass your employers and put us, the public, to inconvenience, we certainly shall not consider you the sort of men to be employed in the public service again.” Under such conditions, it is improbable that railway employees would ever strike at the cost of their licenses, unless they saw prospect of bettering themselves in some other calling. On the contrary, the provision for arbitration and the due recognition of their organizations would inspire in them a confidence in the public good will and a sense of responsibility which would raise the tone of the service, and make possible a better understanding between them and their employers.

Apart from the natural hesitation before any innovation felt by those fortunate members of society who have never personally suffered by a strike, there are two general reasons why those more immediately concerned oppose the idea of state arbitration. In the first place, many corporations will fight, on what they call principle, any such admission of the right of the State to interfere in their affairs; and, in the second place, some of the laboring classes, holding that the only remedy for the tyranny of corporate power is in state ownership, object to any half-way measure. There are some on both sides who believe that there is an irrepressible conflict between labor and capital, and, being of opinion that both might and right are on their side, desire to hasten, rather than to postpone, the crisis. Again, there are some of both parties who, while favorable to the idea of arbitration, have no confidence that just decisions would be rendered by any tribunal likely to be established for that purpose.

The combined effect of these objections is to prove the moderation of the plan. It goes too far for extremists on one side, and not far enough for those on the other. It is idle, however, at this late day, for public carriers to deny the right of the State to control them. They should rather accommodate themselves to the fact of the right, and then so conduct their affairs that there shall be no occasion for its exercise. The experience of the majority of railways in the country shows that, if their employees are treated with fair consideration, arbitration boards will have little to do. On the other hand, there is no good reason why advocates of state ownership should not support a moderate move in that direction. Such a step tends to familiarize the people with the idea of government control; and if at the same time the necessity of carrying it further be obviated or postponed, none but such as put the justification of their pet theory above the welfare of the country should regret the result.

There is, moreover, no ground for lack of confidence in such arbitration boards as might without difficulty be constituted. Their appointment by the judiciary would obviate the danger of partisanship, and a body fairly composed would always have the support of public opinion. On the other hand, the managers of carrying companies are, by virtue of their peculiar position, under constant temptation to seek the favor of their employers, the stockholders, by returning. good dividends at the cost of hard terms to the employees. Losses incurred by cutting rates may be made good by cutting wages. As the stockholders are not, and cannot be, acquainted with these matters so as to decide them for themselves, the managers ought to be glad to leave to a public tribunal the decision of the difficult question of their relative duties to those above and to those below them. The public, while perhaps in some instances inclined to favor the weaker party, has a certain interest of its own in keeping operating expenses down, that rates also may be low. This interest would be strong enough to prevent popular support of extortionate demands, while it would not be sufficient to induce approval of niggardliness in dealing with the employees ; for there would be a feeling that a corporation willing to pinch its men would not be likely generously to bestow the proceeds of its meanness on the community at large. Thus, public sentiment, when the evidence is fairly before it, is likely to uphold whichever side is right.

It is a trite saying, but worth ever bearing in mind, that this difficulty, like most labor troubles, arises from a keen sense of rights combined with utter disregard of obligations. In the present instance, however, while the obligations of the men, until the public take some action in their behalf, are to their employers alone, the obligations of the corporations are twofold, — to their men and to the community. Fortunately, too, the latter duty, being legal as well as moral, gives the State the opportunity, while maintaining its own rights, to compel both parties to a dispute to recognize their moral obligations to each other. In view of the experience of the past, the duty of proposing something better rests on those who object to state arbitration. It is a curious spectacle, the general complaint and vituperation on the part of the public while a strike is in progress, and the lapse into the old indifference that follows almost immediately when it is over. Yet it rests with the people alone to decide whether they will suffer in the future as in the past, or will exercise their right of control over their quarrelsome servants.

Charles Worcester Clark.