The Isthmus Canal and Our Government

IT is a noticeable circumstance that though the Panama and Nicaragua routes have shared the suffrages of most engineers, certain authorities have opposed both. Could we judge from the language used in some quarters, no one, probably, would have thought of undertaking either. Such criticisms come to mind at a time when the embarrassment of the Panama Company involves in so much doubt the question how the enterprise is to be finished, while, on the other hand, the difficulties of the Nicaragua route, be they what they may, have thus far prevented any attempt to overcome them. We are almost ready to ask, Have not the critics of these routes been partly right ?

One of the authorities referred to is Walton W. Evans. A lecture delivered by this able engineer before the American Society of Civil Engineers in 1880, and several communications to the American Geographical Society, are evidence of his acquaintance with the subject and his competence to discuss it. In one respect Evans agreed with De Lesseps: both insisted that the canal to join the Atlantic and Pacific should be a sealevel canal. De Lesseps favored the Panama route, forty-three miles long; Evans, the San Blas, ten miles shorter. Upon the latter a slight impediment exists in the shape of a mountain, through which it would be necessary to bore a ship tunnel seven miles long; and this consideration has led most engineers to favor Panama as against San Blas, although at the latter point the coasts of the eastern and western seas approach nearest to each other. Evans, although in favor of a sea-level canal, was convinced that such a work was not practicable at Panama. Meeting De Lesseps on one occasion in Paris, he assured him that he would never succeed in excavating such a channel at that point. That there was force in the prediction is apparent from the fact that in the fall of 1887 De Lesseps gave up the sea-level plan, and adopted locks.

While Evans was opposed to Panama, he was no less hostile to Nicaragua. In a communication to the American Geographical Society, made in December, 1879, he said : —

“A canal built on the Nicaragua route will be, when finished, a total failure, and all the money invested in it utterly sunk; for the day is not far distant when the trade of the world will demand that a canal be built between the two oceans on the shortest route and on the most direct line, regardless of the difficulties that may be encountered.”

Alongside Mr. Evans we may cite another American authority, Frederick M. Kelley, of New York. Mr. Kelley’s laborious interest in the solution of the question and his munificent contributions to that end — he spent out of his private fortune $120,000 for surveys on the Isthmus — are well known. We omit Mr. Kelley’s testimony against Nicaragua, since it is similar to that of Mr. Evans. With respect to Panama he wrote : —

“ As we are building the canal for all time and to satisfy the ever-expanding wants of commerce, it is the height of folly to locate it where dangerous floods and almost bottomless swamps will destroy it and render useless the undertaking.” ¹

The noticeable thing about this judgment is that Mr. Kelley subsequently used the undisputed right of a Yankee, and changed his mind. After De Lesseps had got his enterprise under way, the New York banker published a letter. in which he indorsed the enterprise he had previously condemned. De Lesseps had adopted the principle which both Evans and Kelley held to be essential, the sea-level plan; he had chosen for his undertaking a spot where, even if locks were provisionally put in, they might be subsequently taken out, and the work cut to the sea level. This, on the other hand, cannot be done at Nicaragua. Such considerations determined Mr. Kelley to take the position he did in his letter of May 21, 1883. He predicted, at its close, that the barrier of the Cordilleras would be flung down at Panama, and the oceans thus united. Whether Mr. Kelley’s prediction of 1879, that “ dangerous floods and almost bottomless swamps ” would ruin the work, or that of 1883 be the more credible, each, according to his preference, may decide. As for Mr. Evans, it appears from certain utterances, made not long before his death in 1886, that he never became favorably disposed to the Panama enterprise. So vehemently impartial was he in his hostility both to Nicaragua and to Panama that he averred in 1879 that any attempt to construct a canal upon either route would be “the extreme of folly.” With all respect to this noted engineer, whose chef d’œuvre is the remarkable railroad in Peru, which threads the Andes 15,648 feet above the sea, we are disposed to maintain, and public sentiment will bear us out in this matter, that in the course of not many years either the Panama “ folly ” or the Nicaragua “folly” will be carried through. Either through the cut of Culebra or the lake of Nicaragua the wings of commerce and its machinepropelled ships are to pass by night and day.² What the relation of the canal to the United States is to be we shall soon be called upon to decide.

Upon the importance of such a work we have no occasion to dwell. Mr. Evans — and it is a pleasure to quote him in this case, because we are able to agree with him better than in his twin fulminations against Panama and Nicaragua— averred in 1879 that this canal matter was “ the most important matter in the line of progress now before the world.” If we take into account both the commercial aspect of the case and that which concerns the international status of such a work, but little exaggeration is implied in these words. It is probable that the Suez Canal and the Interoceanie Canal of America are to introduce significant modifications into international law. To the political aspects of the question as much importance attaches as to those more obvious and material. The elements of this political significance we propose to take up. Such a question concerns our country as much as any other. In the opinion of not a few it concerns us more.

Should we apply to history for a precedent possessed of like conditions, one is immediately found. There is perhaps but one, — the recent settlement of the international status of the Suez Canal. This problem is in fact settled in the Old World. Its settlement in the New has not been as yet attained. After negotiations which lasted several years, a basis of agreement was reached by the French and English governments. Twenty-eight years after the beginning of the work, and eighteen after it was opened, the relation it was to sustain to international law was fixed. A convention was signed by France and England October 24, 1887. By this the neutrality of the work is established. It is to be open indiscriminately to the merchantmen and war-ships of all states; all to stand upon the same level. To the Italian government, whose influence had been exerted in favor of this solution, the thanks of the French were officially conveyed. The German government acquiesced in this solution. Finally, after certain modifications, none essential, the convention was signed, October 29,1888, by the representatives of the Powers. In this instrument, pains are taken to establish directly and indirectly the principle of equal, impartial right; the most insignificant state cannot complain that her ships and citizens are not treated as well as others. It might have been impossible to reach such a result in the seventeenth or eighteenth century ; but over its predecessors the nineteenth has indisputable advantages.

The first question we shall probably ask is, whether we can do better than this. Could any solution of our own interoceanic question be devised that would better answer the needs, perhaps apprehensions, of weaker and smaller states and the susceptibilities of the larger ?

But precedents are not to count for everything. Sometimes they are on the wrong side. A useful recourse, at times, in examining disputed points, is to suppose a case. While this method is no more conclusive than precedents, it may throw light on the matter investigated, and assist us to reach a conclusion. Suppose that nature, anticipating the needs of man, had cut the isthmus of Central America, and that the passage was so wide that it would be impossible for any state, by seizing either shore, to fortify and command the strait. Such a channel would be open to all. Would it be possible for any state, even the most insignificant, to allege that nature had done her wrong ? If, however, man, left to his own resources, cuts the passage, if he determines that it shall be used by all upon the same terms, would not his determination be just ? By such a course, would the chances of international rivalries, disputes liable to degenerate into every sort of complication, be lessened or increased ? One of the tendencies of civilization is to restrict, not to pamper, the causes of animosity between states. One of the ways of promoting this object, as far as interoceanic communication goes, is to reject the policy of special privileges and special rights. This view has prevailed in the Old World. Must it not prevail in the New ?

The policy of the United States at present is in favor of this solution ; and to the credit of our government it may be said that this has been its regular and normal policy for fifty years, ever since its attention was first called to the subject. Into treaty stipulations of another character it has never consented to enter. That tendencies of a nature hostile to this traditional policy have existed is not to be denied, but the regular practice of the United States has been that described.

Let us consider the manner in which this policy has been pursued and promulgated, glancing also at such attempts as have been made to depart from it. Our government recognizes to-day what may be called the liberal principles of interoceanic intercourse. Europe recognizes them, too. The more these principles are considered, the more disposed shall we be to approve them and look forward to their recognition by the entire world. The sentiment of posterity — is not the assertion conservative and safe ? — will reprobate any attempt to interfere with them, or substitute for them policies, even tendencies, of any other kind.

Should the project of a canal at Nicaragua—in its interest several elaborate surveys have been made since 1870 — ever reach fulfillment, the sketch which we propose will apply to this undertaking as well as to that at Panama. In the course of our examination, we shall have occasion more than once to refer to Nicaragua. The treaty of 1848 with New Granada had reference to the building of a transit-way at Panama. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty had special reference to the scheme of the lake.

A coincidence, which calls to mind divergences rather than concords, connects itself with the Nicaragua Canal. The preferences of Napoleon III. and those of the United States concurred! During his imprisonment in the castle of Ham, Louis Napoleon prepared a careful, more than a plausible paper upon the Nicaragua route. It is found in his published works. An envoy from Central America proposed to him that, should Louis Philippe’s government consent to his release, he should put himself at the head of the undertaking. The prince, however, was never to be indebted to Louis Philippe in such a way. If the friends of the Nicaragua project prove as successful in breaking the Cordilleras as the prince did in his jailbreaking projects of 1846, the future of the enterprise is secure.

In reviewing our governmental policy we go back fifty years. In 1835, twenty-four years before ground was broken where Port Said now stands, the United States Senate passed a resolution with reference to an American canal. It was “ resolved that the President of the United States be respectfully requested to consider the expediency of opening negotiations with the governments of other nations, and particularly with the governments of Central America and New Granada,” as to the carrying out of such a project. And it was further resolved that this course was recommended for the purpose, among others, “of securing forever the free and equal right of navigating such canal to all such nations, on the payment of such reasonable tolls as may be established to compensate the capitalists who may engage in such undertaking.” This resolution was unanimously voted.

Four years later, the House of Representatives adopted one of similar purport. As in the former case, it passed without a dissenting voice. The President was again requested to consider the expediency of negotiating with other states, in order to ascertain the practicability of the proposed work, and also for the purpose “ of securing forever the free and equal right of navigating such canal to all nations.”

The first step taken in pursuance of these resolutions was the negotiation of the treaty of 1848 with New Granada, now the United States of Colombia. In compensation for an agreement on the part of New Granada that United States citizens should possess the same privileges as Granadian citizens in the use of any transit-way, the United States guarantied the neutrality of the Isthmus and the sovereignty of New Granada over it. In execution of this latter provision, the intervention of United States troops has more than once been asked for. In 1856, 1862, 1864, 1865, and 1885 applications of this character were made. In 1885, both Colon and Panama were for a time in the power of insurgents, and great destruction of property ensued. The United States forces occupied both towns, and also the line of the railroad. They protected from further depredations both public and private property, including that of the Panama Canal Company. De Lesseps expressed himself in the highest terms as to the conduct of our forces on this occasion.

But it is to be noted that, owing to further developments and later surveys, our government finally favored, not the Panama, but the Nicaragua route. This being outside the territory of New Granada, the United States were in no way bound as to it by the treaty. Indeed, the executive branch of our government subsequently negotiated a treaty of different tenor with Nicaragua; and this, had it not been for the objection of the Senate, would have been formally concluded. To establish the principles of the resolutions of Congress, there was wanting a treaty of general purport, —a convention which should apply to every part of the Isthmus, not to a particular part or parts alone. Such a treaty was negotiated shortly after.

A curious circumstance as to the New Granada treaty here requires to be noted. In the diplomatic correspondence between Great Britain and the United States, from 1881 to 1883, it was alleged by the latter that the negotiation of treaties of like tenor between Colombia and European Powers would be regarded as an act of unfriendly character.³ It was maintained that the guaranty of neutrality given to New Granada by the United States was necessarily exclusive in character.⁴ The entire correspondence was conducted, on the part of the United States, by Messrs. Blaine and Frelinghuysen. At the time the treaty was concluded, the position of our government and the signification which it attached to the treaty were precisely the reverse. In his message to the Senate, which accompanied the draft of the convention, and in which its adoption is recommended. President Polk gives four reasons on which his recommendation rests. The fourth — and it happens to be the only one presented at length — is thus introduced : —

“ In entering into the mutual guaranties proposed by the thirty-fifth article of the treaty, neither the government of New Granada nor that of the United States has any narrow or exclusive views. The ultimate object, as presented by the Senate of the United States in their resolution, to which I have already referred [the resolution of 1835], is to secure to all nations the free and equal right of passage over the Isthmus. If the United States, as the chief of the American nations, should first become a party to this guaranty, it cannot be doubted — indeed, it is confidently expected by the government of New Granada — that similar guaranties will be given to that republic by Great Britain and France. Should the proposition thus tendered be rejected, we may deprive the United States of the just influence which its acceptance might secure to them, and confer the glory and benefit of being first among the nations in concluding such an arrangement upon the government either of Great Britain or France.”

Nothing could be more explicit. It is here stated that neither the government of the United States nor that of New Granada has any “exclusive views.” The statements that follow show with equal clearness that it was the understanding of the United States that other governments were to join, if they chose to, in giving guaranties equivalent to those of the United States.

There are advantages in assigning to the diplomatic corps and state office men of high capacity, who have taken a conspicuous part in the government of the state. But they may be without diplomatic experience. They may not possess that familiarity with diplomacy which in Europe is thought essential, and makes of the diplomatic service a profession in itself. One cannot but ask whether, if a thorough knowledge had been had of the phases of the interoceanic question and the negotiations in which the United States had engaged, the error indicated could have taken place.

A fact which refers to the understanding of the treaty, to which the Colombian government has consistently adhered, will show the connection between the treaty and the Panama Canal. In the canal charter occurs a stipulation to this effect : that the ships of no state, if at war with the United States of Colombia, shall be allowed to use the canal, unless such state shall have entered into a convention with Colombia, and guarantied the neutrality of the Isthmus and the sovereignty of Colombia over it, — exactly the guaranties given by the United States. The object of these and other stipulations is to induce all maritime states to grant to Colombia the same proper guaranties accorded by the United States. If the canal were open to-day, the navies of no belligerents, except those of Colombia and the United States, would be permitted to use it. Article VI. of the charter says: " Le passage du canal est rigoureusement interdit aux bâtiments de guerre des nations en guerre avec une ou plusieurs autres et qui, par traités publics passés avec le gouvernement colombien, n’auraient pas acquis le droit de transiter par le canal en tout temps.” The United States is the only nation which has acquired this right; it was secured by the treaty of 1848. We occupy, therefore, an exceptional position. By no other state is it shared except by the grantor of the charter. If the United States chose to pursue a policy hostile to the treaty, hostile to the interpretation put upon it at the time, we might perhaps hope, even endeavor, to retain this exceptional status. But according to the plain construction of the treaty, that put upon it in the President’s message, we have no right to object to the conclusion of other conventions of this kind.

From this consideration of the signification of the New Granada treaty and the relation it sustains to the Panama Canal, let us recur to the state of the interoceanic question.

When the resolutions of 1835 and 1839 were passed, and even later, no such traffic existed as called for the construction of a canal. But these negative conditions were not to last. The discovery made at Sutter’s mill in February, 1848, effected a change. An emigration set in to the Pacific slope. Still it did not seem practicable to construct a canal at once. The more feasible enterprise of cutting the Isthmus of Suez, where delving in sand and scooping constituted the greater part of the work, had not been as yet attempted. Rock work and leveling hills were another matter. To pulverize the vertebræ, so to speak, of the American continent Remanded more time, more genius, and more money. Therefore, as a temporary makeshift, and because a quasisolution was imperatively demanded, the Panama railroad was built. But the time was approaching when the larger solution must, it was manifest, take the place of this provisional and imperfect one. Our government was accordingly prepared to do what Congress had recommended, — negotiate a treaty defining the bases upon which any interoceanic canal should rest. The negotiations were conducted by the administration of General Taylor; the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was the result. This result was reached, it may be said, by the Anglo-Saxon civilization of that day, the governments of the United States and Great Britain being the participants. The principles thus formulated were essentially those which Congress had recommended.

The preamble to the convention declares that the United States and Great Britain. “ being desirous of consolidating the relations of amity which so happily subsist between them by setting forth and fixing in a convention their views and intentions with reference to any means of communication by ship canal which may be constructed between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by way of the river San Juan de Nicaragua,” confer the requisite powers upon their plenipotentiaries.

This is the only purpose stated in the preamble. —to set forth the position of these states with reference to interoceanic communication. But alongside this design a secondary and, as we may call it, instrumental one was kept in view by the United States. In January, 1848, prior to the evacuation of the City of Mexico by our forces. Great Britain occupied Greytown, at the mouth of the San Juan River. She claimed to exercise sovereignty by virtue of a protectorate in the name of the king of the Mosquito Indians. Here Great Britain was holding the very spot at which the proposed Nicaragua Canal was to terminate. To secure the neutrality of the passage, it was considered, and justly so, necessary to dispossess her. Both parties agreed, in one of the stipulations of the convention, that neither should occupy, fortify, or colonize any part of Central America. Owing, however, to a disagreement as to the construction of the treaty, the dispossession of Great Britain was not at once effected. It was not brought about till after protracted negotiations, which occurred during the administration of President Buchanan. In 1860, Great Britain abandoned the Mosquito protectorate ; she also ceded the islands known as the Bay Islands to Honduras. Mr. Buchanan, in his ensuing message, stated that the negotiations with Great Britain had resulted in “ a final settlement entirely satisfactory ” to the United States.

Next we come to the stipulations of the convention which relate directly and exclusively to interoceanic intercourse.

In Article I. it is stipulated, with regard to the proposed work, that neither contracting power “ will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship canal ; ” and “that neither will ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same or in the vicinity thereof.” It is agreed that neither will endeavor to acquire “ for the citizens or subjects of the one any rights or advantages in regard to commerce or navigation through the said canal which shall not be offered on the same terms to the citizens or subjects of the other.”

It is stipulated, Article V., that the contracting parties “ will guaranty the neutrality of the canal, so that it may be forever open and free.”

It is agreed, Article VI., " to invite every state with which both or either have friendly intercourse to enter into stipulations with them similar to those which they have entered into with each other, to the end that all other states may share in the honor and advantage of having contributed to a work of such general interest and importance.” The same article describes “the great design ” of the convention to be “ that of constructing and maintaining the said canal as a ship communication between the two oceans, for the benefit of mankind, on equal terms to all and protecting the same.”

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty was concluded with special reference to the Nicaragua route, believed at the time to be the most feasible. It is provided, however, Article VIII., that the stipulations of the convention are to be applied to any other routes in like manner. The language of the treaty is : —

“ The governments of the United States and Great Britain having not only desired, in entering into this convention, to accomplish a particular object, but also to establish a general principle, they hereby agree to extend their protection by treaty stipulations to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway, across the isthmus which connects North and South America, and especially to the interoceanic communications, should the same prove to be practicable, whether by canal or railway, which are now proposed to be established, by the way of Tehuantepec or Panama.”

President Taylor, in his message to the Senate, which accompanied the draft of the treaty, said : “ The object of this treaty is to establish a commercial alliance with all great maritime states for the protection of a contemplated ship canal through the territory of Nicaragua, to connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and, at the same time, to insure the same protection to the contemplated railways or canals by the Tehuantepec and Panama routes, as well as to every other interoceanic communication.”

This message remained in the secret archives of the Senate over thirty years. Finally its publication was authorized in 1886.

In the provisions of this treaty, the establishment of the principle of equal rights, the absence of any disposition to claim special advantages, are apparent.

Here we may notice a temporal distinction between the New Granada and Clayton-Bulwer treaties. The latter was concluded in perpetuity, the former for twenty years. It was stipulated that at the expiration of twenty years the treaty should continue in force, if neither party objected. All that is required to terminate it is twelve months’ notice. Nothing is easier than to get rid of it, if either party so determine.

Not a little significance attaches to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, looked at in connection with the Suez Canal. The date of the treaty, 1850, preceded by four years the diplomatic origin of the Suez Canal, and by nine years its initiation by the dredge process. De Lesseps established both the Suez and Panama enterprises upon the principles of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. It cannot be said that these principles owe to him their origin ; still less that in any diplomatic instrument by him prepared they first found expression. This honor belongs to Great Britain and the United States. Yet by a strange contradiction, the Anglo-Saxon states, after they bad originated and established these doctrines, were not disposed in an equally consistent, manner to stand by them. When their application was undertaken by financiers and engineers not AngloSaxon, Great Britain and the United States were less ready to adhere to their position. If in any quarter De Lesseps met with hostility in the case of Suez, it was from Great Britain that it proceeded. A like opposition to Panama has been manifested by a large element in the United States.

An enthusiastic or Chauvinistic American might aver that the Suez and Panama enterprises, established upon the principles which form their basis, grew out of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty itself. Had De Lesseps wished to secure special privileges for French shipping, or any kind of French political or military control, he would have known — he could not have helped it — that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty stood in the way. Had he attempted to carry out such schemes, he would have met with the opposition of Great Britain and the United States. These powers would have been pledged to oppose any such policy. They would have been fully justified, even in the employment of force.⁵

Before referring briefly to that counter-current which for a time set in and favored a modification of the ClaytonBulwer treaty, an expression of opinion on the part of our government subsequent to its ratification may be cited. President Fillmore, in his message to Congress in 1851, said : —

“In investigating this important subject, this government has had in view one, and only one object. That object has been, and is, the construction or attainment of a passage from ocean to ocean, the shortest and the best for travelers and merchandise, and equally open to all the world.”

In 1858, Mr. Cass, our Secretary of State, expressed himself as follows: “What the United States want in Central America, next to the happiness of its people, is the security and neutrality of the interoceanic routes which lead through it.” ⁶

But an attempt to reverse these precedents, at least a disposition to be dissatisfied with them, manifested itself during the period which followed the breaking of ground at Panama. It may be conceded that the Panama undertaking was begun under circumstances calculated to excite among Americans, if not hostility, at least a sense of regret, and perhaps a keen one. Out of such regrets unfriendly, even hostile, feelings might arise. It had been believed that the capital, skill, and genius which such a work required would almost of necessity come from the United States ; but this did not prove to be the case. When it appeared that we were not prepared to undertake the task, and that another state was, a cheerful acquiescence in such foreign management of the enterprise was not to be expected. We must distinguish, however, between a sentiment of chagrin and a disposition to favor the establishment of such a work upon principles other than those which our government had sanctioned and observed. If, supposing it were to be built by Americans, the proper basis was neutrality and equal rights, was it just, when we were not ready to enter upon a task of such unprecedented complications and doubtful issues, to criticise another state which was ready, and which undertook it upon the very principles first advocated by the United States, and consecrated and ratified by us in a public instrument ?

It is not proposed, in a sketch of historical sequence, to cite the utterances and positions of our government during the inaugural phases of the canal. There is no occasion to suppose that these views are indorsed by the people of the United States to-day. Our government has reaverred the original and sound American doctrine, and with this there is every reason to believe that public sentiment is in accord.

Certain references, however, may be made to the positions temporarily assumed, and to arguments brought forward in support of them.

Not a little has been said, and in high places as well as elsewhere, respecting the construction of an interoceanic canal under “ American control.” ⁷ To this expression two significations attach. It may apply simply to fixing the tolls. Americans might prefer to have the work executed and the tolls fixed by an American company. But we are to remember that the right to establish tolls belongs as clearly to the corporation, whatever it be, which executes such a work as it does to the Suez corporation or any other so placed. Such right is subject to the stipulations of the charter upon which the franchises of the corporation rest. If at any time the tolls levied at Panama prove unreasonable, if it should appear that the French are deriving a disproportionate income from an enterprise of whose financial prospects it is scarcely necessary to speak, we might be obliged to open a second route. There would seem to be little reason, however, for apprehensions upon such a score.

But the term “American control” may have another meaning. In a political or military sense, it might signify such control as would ruin the neutrality of the canal altogether. To some it has seemed unreasonable that the United States should permit armed vessels to traverse the canal, if their errand should be to attack our Pacific slope. But those who reason thus should remember that other states have Pacific coasts as well ; notably Mexico, also the Dominion of Canada. So have Central America and the United States of Colombia, not to speak of other South American states. All may be supposed to have interests upon their Pacific shores, and to wish to have these interests protected. A curious feature of this reasoning is that all these states, with the exception of the United States, are comparatively weak ; some might even be called puny. It is not in their interest; it is in that of the single, powerful, well-organized, even contingently aggressive state, that it is proposed to institute an exceptional control and exceptional rights. Why not put all upon a level ? If, nevertheless, special privileges be granted, why not vouchsafe them to the weak instead of to the mighty ? The establishment of safeguards for weaker states is one of the prominent characteristics of the civilization of the day. All that is ignored in advocating what is known as “ American control.” ⁸

There is another argument, or rather allegation, brought forward in favor of “American control.” It is said that the Panama Canal is to constitute part of the coast-line of the United States, and that we ought to exercise control over what is virtually to become a part of our territory. But we should not lose sight of the fact, in this any more than in the previous case, that upon the American continent are states besides our own. They also have coast - lines. It is as reasonable to maintain that the Panama Canal is to constitute part of the coast-line of Mexico as of that of the United States. As much may be said of Canada or of Central America. Although really an interior water-way, yet in a very specific sense it will constitute also a part of the coast-line of Colombia. Let us take this theory of coast-lines and apply it to the Straits of Gibraltar. According to this doctrine, France might allege (and it would be hard to dispute the assertion) that the Straits of Gibraltar constitute part of her coast-line. Without traversing them no ship can pass from one of her northern or western ports to Marseilles, or Nice, or Toulon. Germany, prior to the eccentric and double-edged policy of Bismarck, — which has no doubt aggrandized Germany upon the north, but has clipped and contracted her upon the south, and has cut her off, perhaps forever, from the Mediterranean,— Germany could have said the same thing. Trieste used to be a German port. Even Russia, with a naval port upon the Black Sea and one upon the Baltic, might aver that part of her coast-line was possessed by foreigners. She might put in a claim for the possession of part of the rock of Gibraltar, as well as states more contiguous to this multiple coast - line of which we speak. If half-civilized states should be counted, we may bear in mind that the Straits of Gibraltar form part of the coast-line of Morocco, also. Nor can it be denied that England, who holds Gibraltar, and acquired it by an act of war and aggrandizement two hundred years ago, might assert that the straits form part of the coast-line of Great Britain; at least of the British Empire. They lie upon the track between Britain and her Indian and Australian possessions. But is it not a pity that an act of spoliation which occurred during the early part of the last century should be quoted in support of an egoistic and narrow policy which it is proposed to pursue today ? Gibraltar — is such a supposition so improbable, after all ? — is yet to revert to its legitimate and rightful owners, the people of Spain.

Is it by advancing claims like these that light is to be shed upon the interoceanic problems of the day ? Such argumentation refutes itself. It enables us, in fact, in a more satisfactory manner than prior to its investigation, to apprehend the principles of the case. Of necessity, such a line of reasoning involves us in contradictory claims and pretensions. If carried out in a consistent and legitimate way, the result would be that the completion of the Interoeeanic Canal of America would be attended by jarrings and contentions. There would be endeavors on the part of state against state to get the mastery. Is it to the interest of American or general civilization that the finishing of such a work should be productive of struggles for precedence, or discord of any kind ? Its opening ought rather to bring about more amicable relations ; a larger and riper disposition on the part of all to recognize the rights of each.

That in the course of 1888 three treaties were signed, — all with special reference to the completion of the Panama Canal, — whose purpose is to establish, in the case of all disputes, decision by arbitration instead of by war, is not perhaps generally known. These conventions were concluded by the republic of Ecuador with the French, Spanish, and Belgian governments. It is true that their ratification is scarcely to be taken for granted. But the fact of their signature by the plenipotentiaries of the states concerned is of admirable augury. There is reason to believe that the Panama Canal is to favor and further the harmonious relationships of states, not to be a cause of jargon and disputes. By such a consideration we should be led to regard as impracticable, as impossible, the revival of pretensions as to its control. As far as the use of the canal goes, it ought to be, and must be, the pathway of the world. That was a remarkable prediction made by General Sheridan at the centennial of the United States Constitution, that one hundred years hence arbitration would take the place of war. Who will undertake to say that this prophecy of a famous soldier may not be fulfilled ? If it be realized, the Suez and Panama canals are to contribute to its realization. The treaties of 1888 testify to their influence. The words of General Sheridan and every similar statement or prediction should serve as a sort of warning that the principles of justice and wisdom planted at Suez and Panama ought never to be disturbed.

However fact or circumstance led to that deviation from the traditional policy of the United States which occurred, it is a matter of congratulation that such mistaken views have been abandoned. Have they not been abandoned for all time ? In President Cleveland’s message, transmitted to Congress December 8, 1885, the following occurs with reference to the question: —

“ Whatever highway may be constructed across the barrier dividing the two greatest maritime areas of the world must be for the world’s benefit, a trust for mankind, to be removed from the chance of domination by any single power, nor become a point of invitation for hostilities or a prize for warlike ambition.”

Referring to the proposed Nicaragua treaty, already rejected by the Senate, the message continues : —

“ An engagement combining the construction, ownership, and operation of such a work by the government with an offensive and defensive alliance for its protection with the foreign state whose responsibilities and rights we would share is, in my judgment, inconsistent with such dedication to universal and neutral use.”

The Executive next refers to existing treaty stipulations: —

“ The lapse of years has abundantly confirmed the wisdom and foresight of those earlier administrations, which, long before the conditions of maritime intercourse were changed and enlarged by the progress of the age, proclaimed the vital need of interoeeanic transit across the American isthmus, and consecrated it in advance to the common use of mankind by their positive declarations and through the formal obligation of treaties. Toward such realization the efforts of my administration will be applied, ever bearing in mind the principles on which it must rest, and which were declared in no uncertain tones by Mr. Cass, who, while Secretary of State in 1858, announced that ‘ what the United States want in Central America, next to the happiness of its people, is the security and neutrality of the interoceanic routes which lead through it.’ ”

The President closes by reiterating the positions taken.

“ These suggestions,” he says. " may serve to emphasize what I have already said on the score of the necessity of the neutralization of any interoceanic transit, and this can only be accomplished by making the uses of the route open to all nations, and subject to the ambitions and warlike necessities of none.”

Thus the policy first adopted by the Whig administration of General Taylor, and observed by five Republican administrations down to 1880, was reaffirmed by the Democratic administration of President Cleveland. Are we not to regard it as the well-settled policy of the state ?

If we consider the history of the question from the Senate resolution of 1835, introduced by Mr. Clayton, down to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, through the brief period in which our government swerved from its traditional policy to the reassertion of that policy by the administration of President Cleveland, we ought firmly to resolve that this policy shall never be abandoned again. Its temporary relinquishment is scarcely to be regarded as more than a thoughtless ebullition of feeling, natural enough, perhaps, but not natural and rational at the same time. No adequate or genuine basis did it ever possess.

Were there occasion to doubt as to the course the Republican party is to pursue, as it resumes an ascendency which for a quarter of a century it exercised, an event which occurred eight days prior to the 6th of November, the day of General Harrison’s election, ought to command our attention. On the 29th of October, 1888, the European Powers signed at Constantinople the convention which has been already referred to. It fixes the international status of the Suez Canal. The basis of settlement is the equality of states and the neutrality of the work. There is one circumstance especially to be noted : Great Britain sends through the canal, and has sent through it ever since it was opened, three quarters of the shipping it floats. She sends through not merely three times as much as any other state, but three times as much as all others together. To such proportions has her maritime supremacy climbed. But Great Britain has not acquired by the treaty of 1888 any special privilege or right. She does not possess any preponderant political or military control. She stands upon the same level as others. Are the Anglo-Saxons of the western hemisphere to be less liberal or enlightened than those of the eastern ? Is it to be said that the monarchies of Europe have settled the status of their interoceanic water-way upon principles of equality and justice, and that the republics of America are to have a basis of another sort ? In that case, we shall have to admit that the shores of the Atlantic, somehow or other, are twisted. Liberalism has planted itself in Europe, illiberalism in the heart of our republics.

We cannot too carefully consider, too rigorously ponder, one circumstance. No doctrine of control, British, or French, or German, nothing of the kind has obtained a foothold, however minute, however wretched, in the treaty of Constantinople. There is a joint and equal control, a broad and liberal one ; nothing more.

Another consideration should not be lost sight of. Whether the return to power of the Republican party is to prove an advantage to the United States and civilization remains to be seen. Precisely here is one of the tests. What upon this point is to be the policy of the incoming administration? This question is not one of narrow limits. It involves and is to control the interests of the world. It touches the basis of civilization. If the Republican party, repudiating the errors which marred the last years of its ascendency, putting under-foot the counsel of unworthy leaders, should get its inspiration once more from the principles with which it started, this question would be as plain, as little subject, to quarrel or flaw, as any of those which its powerful hand determined between 1855 and 1865. The principle to which the Republican party owed its success and fame was equal rights, impartial justice. The principle applies to states as well as to men. It applies to the problem now before us, settled at Suez, unsettled at Panama, as well as it did in the days of Kansas and the March to the Sea. Senator Hoar, of Massachusetts, who represents upon this question the sounder, higher elements of the Republican party, said in 1887 of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty : “ It was an American policy and an American triumph, declaring forever the indissoluble marriage of commerce and peace.” He averred at the same time that the treaty of 1850 was one of the great steps in the world’s progress.⁹ Mr. Seward, in his touching and eloquent tribute to Mr. Clayton, spoken in the Senate, December 3, 1856, expressed himself in similar terms. He declared that “ the first universal fact in the history of the human race — a fact indicating an ultimate union of the nations — was the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.” What was the foundation of that treaty ? The equality of states, as the equality of man was the signal and the inspiration of 1861. According to the ClaytonBulwer treaty, the law of greed, that law which has exemplified for so many centuries the relations of state to state, was to be, as far as this question went, finally buried. Equal rights were to be the portion of all. If the Clayton-Bulwer treaty may be spoken of in the words of Mr. Seward and Senator Hoar, what are we to say of the treaty of Constantinople ? Is it not a reflection of the former ? We have here the treaty of 1850 transmitted to the Orient, signed and ratified by the representatives of imperialism there. It is in fact a Yankee notion planted in the shadow of St. Sophia’s mosque.

Is it possible, when we see the principles we were the first to advocate receiving world-wide recognition and acceptance, that here in the United States a shadow of doubt can remain ? Let us reverence and observe the nobler precedents of our history.

Stuart F. Weld.