his time four years ago the country's financial situation was a mess. The
United States had embarked on an exercise in fiscal adventurism unlike any it
had ever tried, outside wartime or depression, and the numbers looked shocking:
from 1981 to 1984 the federal budget deficit had more than doubled, to a
startling $185 billion, and the projections showed things getting worse fast. A
new presidential term was just beginning; members of the policy-making
establishment in Washington were resolved to put the budgetary fire out for
good. (This should sound familiar right about now.) In the midst of this near
panic over the deficit Charles L. Schultze, who had been the chairman of the
(Council of Economic Advisers under President Jimmy Carter, was telling anyone
who would listen something that few people understood just then. "The tragedy,"
he said at the time, "is that there is no crisis." With any luck and some
sensible management by the administration and the Federal Reserve Board, there
would be no depression, no collapse, no caving in of the economic roof under
the weight of the spectacular near-doubling of the national debt in only four
years. The country could muddle through with these deficits for a long time, a
possibility that Schultze, a fierce anti-deficit "hawk," acknowledged but
fretted about.
Balanced budgets, it has been said, are the economic equivalent of chicken
soup: whatever ails you, reduce the deficit. In the 1930s Herbert Hoover blamed
the budget deficit for prolonging the Depression; in the 1970s people blamed it
for inflation. Earlier in this decade people said that the budget deficit would
drive up interest rates and abort the economic recovery, and that it would
overstimulate the economy and re-ignite inflation; they have accused it of
pushing up the dollar, and more recently of making the dollar weak. They have
said that it would certainly bring upon us a day of reckoning of one kind or
another-- a recession, a world financial crash, a big inflation, a crunching of
the standard of living. Everybody waited. Nothing happened. The stock market
crashed, but the economy glided on with eerie aplomb. The expansion, one of the
longest of the postwar era, continued. Inflation stayed under control.
Gradually the wisdom of Schultze's words is coming home. Many professional
economists have long agreed with Schultze about the deficit, albeit in a quiet,
don't-remind-us kind of way. The full import of what they were saying is at
last seeping into the consciousness of the public and of the Washington
political establishment. Something terrible may yet happen, but with each year
in which it does not, the case for regarding the budget deficit as an economic
crisis weakens.
Telling people that they had better balance the budget, or else, is fine--
for a time. But it is like telling your son that he'd better stop smoking, or
cigarettes will kill him: after a while, when "or else" hasn't happened, the
deterrent effect of the warning wears off, and there is little to replace it.
The credibility of the deficits-are-disastrous school is shot, which leaves
everybody wondering what it is, after all, that we are so worked up about.
The President and Congress will soon be working on a package of deficit
reductions, just as they have been doing for most of the past six years-- with
some success: what were rapidly rising $200 billion deficits four years ago are
stable or slightly declining $150 billion deficits today. In Washington the
anxiety level has decreased in the past year or two, partly because the worst
deficits are behind us but also partly because, after seven years in which the
country broke every fiscal rule in the book and nothing terrible happened, it
is harder to see why we had the rules in the first place. Conservatives and
liberals have formed an unlikely alliance whose binding principle is that
cutting the budget deficit is not, after all, the most important thing in life
(they could, however, hardly be further apart on what is the most important
thing in life). People in the middle, who have a gut feeling that what the
country has been doing is wrong, are left to gnaw on a question: Is the deficit
really so bad?
Maybe it is time to admit that running a big budget deficit is a
survivable condition. Deficits do matter, a lot. But to see why they matter,
one must use economics to look past economics, to the social compact.
A RECESSION SPREAD OVER THE REST OF TIME
In the early 1970s, for reasons that remain obscure, the rate of
productivity growth dropped off sharply in the United States and the other
major industrial countries. Suddenly a given amount of national work effort was
producing a smaller gain in living standards. A country can deal with something
like that in a number of ways. It can increase its work effort if, for
instance, millions of women go to work, as happened in the United States.
Another thing it can do is borrow.
There is nothing wrong with borrowing, as such. It is how you use the
money you borrow that counts. If you borrow and invest wisely, your investment
will generate a stream of future income; you can use that stream of income to
repay your debt, and you will probably still have a good bit of money left
over. It is something else again if you just spend the borrowed money to
maintain your standard of living. Then you are merely deferring pain; you are
better off at first, but worse off in the future, once you start having to pay
back what you owe In the 1980s the United States government deferred a lot of
pain.
A budget deficit, to begin with the obvious, is the difference between the
amount taken in in a year and the amount spent. If the government spends $1
trillion but takes in only $850 billion, as it did, approximately, in fiscal
1987, it has to borrow the difference. The place it goes to borrow (if we
ignore for the moment the possibility of receiving help from abroad) is the
national pool of savings available for investment. Later on, to pay the
interest on the additional debt it has assumed (interest claims almost twice as
much of the federal budget as it did ten years ago), the government must raise
taxes or, if it wishes to escape part of its obligation by repaying the debt in
debased currency, crank up inflation. Either step makes future Americans less
well off than they would otherwise have been, unless the government invested
what it borrowed in ways that made the country more productive. It didn't. The
deficits of the early 1980s enabled the country, without an offsetting tax
increase, to build up its defenses and to continue to pay for programs that
distribute benefits to the middle class. In short, deficits financed
consumption.
Economists initially feared that the enormous budget deficits might well
squeeze out national investment while also setting off another round of
inflation, by overstimulating the economy with spending. To hold inflation
down, Paul Volcker's Federal Reserve kept money tight. Partly for that reason,
interest rates, after adjusting for inflation, have been higher in this decade
than at any time since at least the 1920s. This has helped make the country an
attractive place for foreign investment. So, as things turned out, the
government's borrowing did not reduce investment in this country much, because
se foreign money rushed in to fill the gap. But since the investment belongs to
foreigners, who capture most or much of the returns, the future living standard
of Americans is lower than it would have been if we had saved and invested more
ourselves.
The numbers here are revealing. In the 1960s and 1970s net private
American saving averaged 8.1 percent of the gross national product. Saving by
state and local governments kicked in an additional 0.4 percent of GNP, but the
federal government, by running deficits, contributed negative saving of 1.0
percent of GNP. Add that up (8.1 plus 0.4 minus 1.0) and you get 7.5 as the
percentage of GNP available for domestic investment. In fact we invested only
7.0 percent of GNP here. The other half a percent we invested abroad: we were
net creditors.
That was pretty much the situation in this country over the whole postwar
period, until the 1980s. Then our behavior changed markedly. Take 1987, when
the budget deficit was actually somewhat below its 1980s average. State and
local surpluses had risen to 1.2 percent of GNP, but that was the only positive
development for saving. The private sector saved a lot less, and so, by running
higher deficits, did the federal sector. Private saving in 1987 was 4.1 percent
of GNP, or about half the level of the 1960s and 1970s, and the federal budget
deficit was 3.5 percent of GNP, or more than three times the previous average.
When you total this up (4. 1 plus 1.2 minus 3.5), you get only 1.8 as the
percentage of GNP available for investment here-- less than a quarter of the
amount that was available in the sixties and seventies. Still, investment in
the United States amounted to 5.1 percent of GNP, courtesy of the Japanese and
the Europeans: we borrowed a sum equal to 3..3 percent of our GNP from them.
It would have been one thing if Americans had offset, or mostly offset,
the rise in the federal budget deficit by saving more privately: we would just
have been moving our savings from one pocket to another. But private saving and
federal saving both fell. That, in a nutshell, is the story of the 1980s. Now,
at some point every person decides how much of the fruits of his labor he wants
to enjoy today and how much he wants to set aside to add to his (or his
children's) wealth tomorrow. The same goes for countries. If you ask where the
right place is to draw the line between current and future consumption, the
answer is that there is no right place. You have to choose.
This is where the world-is-ending analysis begins: we have consumed more
and saved less today, we will be less well off tomorrow than we would have
been, and therefore we will be poor tomorrow and we are ruining ourselves. The
statistics on the point, however, are unlikely to incite panic. Exact figures,
or anything like them, are impossible to obtain. But you can get a pretty good
idea of the magnitudes involved.
From the time the big deficits started, in 1982, through 1987, the
government borrowed about $1.1 trillion-- a lot of money. If the deficits had
been proportional to the average of those of 1960-1981, a little more than 1.5
percent of GNP, the government's borrowing from 1982 to 1987 would have been
about $350 billion or about $750 billion less than it was. Most of that $750
billion, instead of being sopped up by government consumption, would have been
added to Americans' stock of invested wealth, and would be augmenting future
income. We lost some of the returns on the $750 billion in the form of interest
payments to foreigners who invested here (the interest rate during the 1980s
was roughly 10 percent), and some of them in the form of investment that the
United States simply did without. The returns here, too, economists say, would
have been something like 10 percent a year. So we are talking about a reduction
in future American income on the order of $75 billion a year, forever.
A good way to think about what all these numbers mean is this: to have
consumed an extra $750 billion in wealth, which might have yielded annual
returns of $75 billion or so a year forever, is roughly comparable to throwing
a party today in exchange for accepting a serious recession spread out over the
rest of time. In an interview late last year Schultze said, "It's like adding
one more recession to forever." If we were to go on the same way for another
$750 billion, we would add another recession to forever. And so on. We could
probably do that several times before we noticed much of a difference in any
particular year.
If the figures are not so scary as the rhetoric, maybe that should not be
surprising. Changes in economic policy that are enormous in relation to the
federal budget-- tripling the budget deficit, say-- are small in relation to a
$5 trillion economy. Schultze said, "There are two broad ways the government
can affect the economy. On the demand side, it can screw up economic stability,
so we have recessions, a war, or inflation, leading to a future recession. You
make a mistake and you really can see it. You can get big numbers. However, on
the supply side"--that is, in matters like saving and investment, which affect
the economy's capacity to produce goods and services over the long run-- "the
short-to medium-term identifiable good or harm the government can do with any
one thing it does is always small. You can never get those numbers to come out
big in any one year." And so it is with the budget deficit: "If I do the
arithmetic, it's never going to be a number that's going to shock you"--at
least, not unless cumulated over many years. Schultze was not, however, saying
that the deficit is unimportant. "Tenths of a percent add up," he warned.
In the early 1980s the deficits were growing so quickly that they
threatened to swamp the government with upward-spiraling interest payments.
That threat is past. The current deficits are large, but they are on an
arithmetically stable track. The upshot is that we could probably go on running
large government budget deficits for a very long time, but at a price: higher
risks of two kinds. First, a big deficit, like anything else that makes
investors nervous, probably subtracts from the margin of economic stability. In
the immediate wake of the election Wall Street was particularly worried that
foreigners could lose confidence in our economy and cut off our line of credit,
exposing the United States to possible big interest-rate shocks and to a
collapse of the dollar. Still, a higher-risk policy does not necessarily mean
that we are on a course to disaster. We can fairly say that it would be a good
idea to avoid running a budget deficit, other things being equal, in order to
reduce the likelihood of crisis. What we cannot say-- but what many people,
particularly on Wall Street, say nonetheless-- is that there is a more than
slight chance that U.S. budget deficits will lead to frightening short-term
consequences.
The more fundamental risk is the one inherent in borrowing to consume.
Regardless of the deficit, new technology and rising productivity will almost
certainly make our children somewhat richer than we are-- the question is how
much richer. If the country's wealth grows a lot, the effects of today's
deficits will hardly be noticeable, but if growth is slow, future generations
may curse us for taking from them what they will have turned out to need. That
is the risk we take. Herbert Stein, another past chairman of the council of
Economic Advisers and today one of Washington's most experienced and wisest
economic thinkers, said not long ago, "My preference would be not to have an
increase in American consumption, or not so much of an increase in American
consumption. I'd rather see more investment, because I feel some obligation to
my grandchildren. But it seems to me that that's about all there is to it. It's
that kind of choice It is not a matter of ruin or collapse. It's the same kind
of choice that an individual makes when he decides how much to save."
In the economics profession the conventional view right now is similar to
Schultze's: that the country's most urgent economic need is to get the deficit
down, and maybe even run federal surpluses, in order to get saving up. "The one
thing we know we can do to gin up productivity growth--- not by very much,
but, by God, we know w e can do it--- is to save and invest more," Schultze
said. "Precisely because government can't do much, we ought to damn well do
what we know how to do." A growing number of people, however, are challenging
the Schultze view.
THE CASE FOR THE DEFICIT
Hardly anyone actually likes deficit spending in prosperous times. But, as
Herbert Stein has said, nobody likes open-heart surgery either. The question
is, What's the alternative? On the Republican right many people have come to
see deficits as less risky than any of the other available choices. On the
Democratic left opinion has taken a similar drift in the past year or two.
Conservatives would rather have deficits than bigger government; liberals would
rather have deficits than smaller government. In the middle are those, like
Schultze, who say that the first priority should be reducing the deficit and
never mind about the size of government-- but that middle has been shrinking as
the deficits themselves have stabilized and set up regular housekeeping.
It used to be Republicans who shrieked about deficits and Democrats who
said they were not such a big deal. Republicans have accused Democrats of
turning around in their tracks on the issue and caring about budget deficits
only after a Republican President starts running them. There is something to
that, although Reagan's deficits were unlike anything the country had ever seen
before outside depression or war. If anything, the reversal of conservative
Republicans was more striking. In 1981 Jack Kemp, who was then a congressman,
announced, "The Republican Party no longer worships at the altar of a balanced
budget." Conservatives were once people who instinctively felt that the budget
should be balanced, even if that meant raising taxes. Now they are people who
tend to believe that taxes should be held down, even if that means living with
deficits.
A good way to get inside their point of view is to visit Stuart M.
Butler's office on Capitol Hill. Butler, a quick and forthright thinker, is in
charge of domestic-policy studies at the conservative Heritage Foundation.
Prominently displayed on his office wall is a framed picture of the economist
Milton Friedman, beneath which is this quotation, from a talk Friedman gave in
1983: "You cannot reduce the deficit by raising taxes. Increasing taxes only
results in more spending, leaving the deficit at the highest level conceivably
accepted by the public." Over the past decade or so that idea has become gospel
to many conservatives, Butler among them.
"Like all public policy," Butler said in a recent interview, "it's a choice
between alternatives. It's not that I love deficits. But I like to know what
are the alternatives we're talking about. And the alternatives that have been
proffered by Schultze and others I do not find attractive. I find them arguably
leading to even less desirable economic consequences in the future. They open
up, I feel, a political dynamic that might even be self-defeating"-- that is,
tax increases would be used to increase spending and not to reduce the budget
deficit.
Butler and other conservatives argue that deficits are the symptom, not
the disease. The disease is runaway federal spending. "There had been a rapid
increase, prior to Reagan, of both spending and taxing. What Reagan has
essentially done has been to top out or slow down the rising taxes. You had two
runaway elements of public finance, spending and taxes. We've got control of
one of them, taxes, and the deficit is the symptom of the fact that we haven't
got control of the other. So the solution is to get rid of that other runaway
item, which is the spending side. "
Suppose you offer Butler a deal: Reduce the budget deficit-- say, by $100
billion-- with a package that includes a substantial tax increase. He won't
take it, even if you stipulate that all of the tax increase goes toward
lowering the deficit and none goes toward increasing spending. "I think the
negative impact on future generations of raising taxes would be higher than the
impact of borrowing," he said. In other words, it may well be better for the
economy, given the current burden of taxation, to continue borrowing than to
raise taxes. The idea is that we are merely talking about subtle differences of
economic effect when we choose between taxing and borrowing to finance the
government, and it is not clear which is actually worse for the economy.
Finally-- and this is the argument that really infuriates liberals--
conservatives believe they get something in return for the budget deficit: "I
see the deficit as a wedge to put the pressure on public spending," Butler
says. "If you're looking at the deficit and the size of the government sector,
the second measure"--the size of government--"is far more important in its
overall economic impact, and I think everyone who is in the conservative camp
who is less bothered about deficits would pretty much agree with that line of
argument." So if in return for higher deficits we get a smaller government, it
is a good trade.
Economics can't be used to prove Butler wrong, but there are certainly
ample grounds for skepticism. Few economists would dispute that, everything
else being equal, raising taxes is not generally good for the economy. The
evidence is scant, however, for the proposition that raising taxes is worse
than borrowing. We just don't know-- and in such circumstances the usual
presumption is that one ought to pay one's bills.
As for where a tax increase would go, some of it probably would be used to
increase spending--but hardly all of it (the tax increases of 1982 and 1983,
the latter a large one to keep the Social Security program solvent, played a
major role in stabilizing the monster deficits of the early 198Os). Most people
part ways with the conservatives in being willing to accept somewhat higher
spending in exchange for lower deficits. Also, it is not at all clear that
running deficits has held down government spending much. After all, the Reagan
years set two postwar records simultaneously: for highest peacetime deficits
(an average of 4.7 percent of GNP from 1982 through 1988, higher than in any
preceding postwar year), and for highest spending (an average of 23.4 percent
of GNP over the same period-- again, higher than in any preceding postwar
year). A lot of economists, many of them conservative, have long believed that
raising taxes, not cutting them, is the best way to constrain spending in the
long run, because it forces politicians to impose pain if they want to give out
goodies.
Alas, the economic evidence is not strong enough to settle the argument.
We do not know how big the government would have been without the large Reagan
deficits, and we do not know how a tax increase or a like amount of borrowing
would cascade through the economy to affect generations still unborn. And all
of that is finally beside the point. If what you most want is smaller
government or lower taxes, then budget deficits are a secondary concern.
Something analogous may be said for the emerging thinking on the left, which
turns the conservative argument on its head and says: A more aggressive
government presence in the economy is vital to economic success, and if
strengthening that presence means running a budget deficit, then so be it.
Some economists on the left, including Robert L. Heilbroner, of the New
School for Social Research, in New York, hold that large Budget deficits are
actually a good thing, as long as they stay under control. "When the economy
needs stimulus, a deficit can be very useful," Heilbroner said recently. "Right
now, I'm not terribly impressed by the overall rate of growth of the economy."
These days, however, that position is rare. What is not so rare among liberals
is the idea that there are three things we need to do for the national economy:
avoid a recession; make additional investments in education, research,
infrastructure (roads, bridges, and other public goods that have been allowed
to deteriorate), and so on; and reduce the budget deficit. The budget deficit
is third on their list.
Jeff Faux, the president of the Economic Policy Institute, a new liberal
Washington think tank, has become a leading proponent of this emerging liberal
view. "I think deficits do matter," he said not long ago. "But I think that
other things matter as well. The problem with the debate is that it has become
dangerously oversimplified, as if all our problems could be resolved by simply
erasing the fiscal deficit. I think that's wrong economically, and I think it
risks what could be a very, very disastrous outcome-- that is, a recession.
It's not possible to have a recession next time. That is, if we have a
downturn, it's going to turn into something worse"-- because of the large
amounts of debt hanging over the world financial system. "We're talking about a
long economic bath for America, the likes of which we haven't seen since the
1930s."
Not everyone on the left goes along with Faux there, but liberals have
traditionally worried more about unemployment than about inflation, and so they
are generally averse to doing anything that they think might bring on a
recession-- which, as Faux points out, would just increase the deficit anyway,
as tax receipts fell off and welfare spending rose. Faux and many liberals
think that rapid deficit reductions could easily trigger a downturn. "Given the
dangers of recession and what it can do," Faux said, "if you're going to take a
risk, take it on the side of keeping the economy going."
Next on the priority list comes investment. Faux said, "We've got this
sort of Catch-22. It's almost become a cliché that we've got to invest
more, and we have to do that in order to make our economy competitive. But we
can't do that because we've got this budget deficit, which in part is a result
of our not being competitive. So we keep putting off what I think are these
essential investments. At some point we have to realize that the neglect of
certain public investments has gone on for so long that it's absolutely
essential that we make those investments. When your tires run out, you need new
tires." In effect, we can say that today's budget deficit makes our children
worse off than they might have been-- but how much worse for them still if we
let the nation's stock of human and public physical capital fall into
disrepair, or if the government fails to help us compete successfully with the
Japanese. Suppose, then, that you offer Faux a deal: $100 billion, say, in new
government spending on education, fighting poverty, building infrastructure and
the rest, all of which must be financed by borrowing and thus adding to the
deficit. He would take it.
Like the conservative argument, the liberal argument is credible but far
from incontestable, and there are lots of grounds on which to question Faux's
viewpoint. First, the big concern for most economists over the past year has
been not that a recession would start any minute but just the contrary-- that
inflation might be about to take off. If that is the case, then reducing the
budget deficit would be just what the doctor ordered. Anyway, liberals, like
conservatives, tend to overstate the government's effect on the economy: the
deficit fell by $70 billion from 1986 to l987, and nothing much happened at
all. There is good reason to suppose that no deficit reduction that Congress
might muster the will to pass would trigger a recession, especially since the
Fed could offset some of the deficit reductions with lower interest rates.
Second, and more fundamentally, the Achilles' heel of the liberal argument
is inflation. In the past, efforts to keep the economy going at whatever cost
have usually led to inflation, which then led to a recession when the Fed
clamped down. To a large degree, that is what happened under Presidents
Johnson, Nixon, and Carter. So, arguably, the liberals' plan does not prevent a
recession, and might in fact bring one about. Liberals argue that a rapid
inflation is now unlikely; many analysts on Wall Street say just the opposite;
the truth is that nobody knows. Finally, practically no one disputes that
borrowing is fine if it is used to make: good investments. But the key word
there is good. A lot of people-- especially conservatives-- look dubiously on
the idea that the government will make good investments, given the pressures of
politics, and they are very skeptical indeed that the government's investments
will generally be better than the ones the private sector would have made had
it held on to the money that the government, with its budget deficits,
borrowed.
Neither faction can prove its own economic assumptions or disprove those
of the other side. Economics has produced no generally accepted answer to the
question, What is the best mixture of taxation and borrowing by which to
finance a given level of government spending? In the absence of an answer,
people are using economic rhetoric to conduct a debate that economics cannot
settle-- a political and ideological debate over what it is that government
should and should not be doing, and what risks are worth taking to achieve that
goal. It was always so. The anti-deficit people who kept crying wolf, and who
are still crying wolf, have done themselves and the polity no favor. They have
tried to turn the fiscal-policy debate into a one-sided argument, to the effect
that anybody who cared about the country's economic health had only one
rational choice: cut the budget deficit. In the end they have undermined their
own position by claiming too much, and have left the country confused and
adrift on the question of why we make such a fuss about deficit spending.
We do make a fuss, and we have for decades-- centuries, really. The
balanced-budget dogma goes back to nearly the beginning of the republic. Only
relatively recently, since Franklin Roosevelt's administration, have people
taken to seeing the desirability or undesirability of deficits as mainly an
economic question. For a long time Americans had what is probably a better kind
of debate over deficit spending: a political and moral debate. For it is on
political and moral grounds that we balance budgets.
THE SIGN OF A COVENANT
The imperative to balance the budget is, at bottom, a rule, like any other.
People can and do argue all day about what rule is best on economic grounds--
balance the budget, balance it over the course of a business cycle, hold the
ratio of the national debt to GNP constant. But whatever we decide, what we are
finally talking about is a rule of social behavior, like the rules about
property--a rule defining the nature of what it is people are doing together
and how they agree to treat each other, today and over time. The enforcement of
a rule does not tell you that everybody is playing the right game, so to speak,
but it does tell you that everybody is playing the same game. In that sense, a
balanced budget represents to most people a social sign that, as the political
scientist Aaron Wildavsky once put it, things are all right. For Americans, a
balanced budget is like the rainbow of Genesis-- the sign of a covenant. "The
bow shall be seen in the clouds and I will remember my covenant."
The covenant reaches through two dimensions: up and down the political
spectrum in the present, and across the generations through time. In the
present the shared goal of balancing the budget--- the government taxes no more
than it spends, and it spends no more than it taxes-- represents a compact
between conservatives and liberals. A balanced budget is a sign for liberals
that conservatives are paying their share of taxes, and a sign for
conservatives that liberals are restraining their spending. Given that there is
general disagreement about what it is that government should he doing, a
balanced budget is a sign that we have all reached a compromise: I may not
support all the programs you like, and you may not support all the ones I like,
but we have agreed to restraint, and within that restraint, we are supporting
each other.
Republicans were appalled when Democrats, saying that we should balance
the economy rather than the budget, waved aside the zero-deficit rule earlier
in this century. Democrats, in turn, were horrified when the Reagan-era
policies raised the rule-breaking to a new order of magnitude. To the extent
that conservatives decided that they would rather have lower taxes and spending
than balanced budgets, they were saying that they would he better served by
abandoning the game than by compromising with the liberals, and they walked off
the playing field. Now many liberals, too, seem to be wandering off the field,
unwilling to make big domestic-spending cuts to get the deficit down.
The result is just what we might expect: deep and rending social division
over government's role, with an annual war between the Butlers and Fauxes of
the world tending to replace annual compromise. This has serious consequences,
not least of them friction, demoralization, and often paralysis within the
institutions of government. Large budget deficits have become an acute public
embarrassment, a sign of the country's inability to cope and of people's
unwillingness to make some sort of deal. Inability to solve the problem has
become the problem. Beyond that, the budgetary trench warfare that has
preoccupied Washington in the 1980s has frozen the liberals' social agenda and
is in the process of tearing up the conservatives' defense program. Paralysis
will not, in the long haul, do anybody much good.
Perhaps the second dimension of the covenant is more profound still.
Because economics cannot tell us what is the right amount for each generation
to save, we rely on a fiscal rule: As the previous generation did unto us, so
we will do unto the next generation, barring a war or other demand of
extraordinary urgency. If every year the budget is more or less balanced, each
year's group of voters has to pay its own way, and the burden of financing
government remains neutrally distributed among generations. A good case can be
made that neutrality is not the best policy-- but there is nothing like a
consensus on what is a better policy. And to break the long-standing covenant
with future generations is a social decision of the gravest import; no wonder
it makes Americans uneasy. Whenever one set of voters breaks the rule by
running larger-than-normal deficits, it grabs a windfall from the future. The
future may never notice the difference-- we don't know. But even so, is this
the right thing to do? Economics cannot tell us that.
"It's a matter of preference," Herbert Stein told me. "Most people save
for their children even though their children are expected to he richer than
they are. But I have no problem with someone who says, 'I don't care about
that-- let my children work their own way,' if that's a deliberate choice. I
don't think that was a deliberate choice by the American people. I don't think
they realized what was going on."
Now, zero deficit is not the only possible rule. Any rule will do, as long
as everyone agrees to it and it is applied more or less uniformly over time.
Zero deficit has the advantage of being easy to explain and of being the rule,
or at least the goal, that people have lived by in this country for two
centuries; it is the rule whose rightness people feel. But we can switch if we
like. Maybe we have switched. "The rule that the budget should be balanced
obviously is not operative," Stein said. "And so I think the direction in which
we have to go now is the direction of rational choice."
We have learned in this decade that we throw away the balanced-budget rule
at great peril to our machinery of governance and our national conscience, but
we have also learned that the economy is unlikely to stop us. After seven years
of big deficits, a day of reckoning has come, all right, but it is not the kind
of day of reckoning that we have been led to expect. It is not a financial or
economic disaster: it is our confrontation with the fact that, like atheists
who must learn to set standards in a universe without divine judgment, we are
on our own with these deficits. We must choose to balance the budget, or not,
without the certainty of economic determinacy and without the prod of calamity.
Copyright © 1989 by Jonathan Rauch. All rights reserved.